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Overview
Turkey first applied for associate membership in
the European Union (EU)—then the European
Economic Community (EEC)—in 1959. The appli-
cation resulted in an association agreement in
1963, whereby Turkey and the EU would, in princi-
ple, gradually create a customs union by 1995 at the
latest. The customs union was seen as a step toward
full EU membership at an unspecified future date.
The EU unilaterally granted Turkey preferential
tariffs and financial assistance, but the process of
staged, mutual reductions in tariffs and nontariff
barriers was delayed because of the economic and
political conditions in Turkey. After pursuing
inward-oriented development strategies through-
out the 1960s and 1970s, Turkey switched over to a
more outward-oriented policy stance in 1980. The
opening up of the economy was pursued in part
with the aim of integrating the country into the EU.
Turkey applied for full membership in the EU in
1987. The response in 1990 was that accession
negotiations could not be undertaken at the time
because the EU was engaged in major internal
changes, and that matters were further complicated
by developments in Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union. However, the EU was prepared to extend
and deepen economic relations without explicitly
rejecting the possibility of full membership at a
future date. Thus the plans for a customs union
were revived.
On March 6, 1995, it was agreed at an Associa-
tion Council meeting in Brussels that a customs
union would be created between Turkey and the EU
as of January 1, 1996, to be fully phased in by 2001.1
As a result, Turkey currently imposes no quotas or
tariffs on imports of industrial goods from the EU.
The associated liberalization for Turkey has been
estimated as implying a 7 percent average reduction
in tariffs (Harrison, Rutherford, and Tarr 1997).
The major exception to free trade is agriculture—
neither party liberalized completely. The average
tariff rate on imports of agricultural commodities
from the EU is 21.4 percent. Agricultural trade is
also subject to tariff quotas and price regulation,
which have produced a high degree of protection in
both the EU and Turkey. Thus, in terms of further
liberalization of merchandise trade, accession will
primarily have an effect on agriculture.
A major development under the customs union
was that Turkey implemented the European
Union’s Common Customs Tariff on imports of
industrial goods from third countries. It has also
adopted most of the preferential trade agreements
concluded by the EU, as well as other measures
covered by the EU’s commercial policy (such as
antidumping). Turkey has adopted EU competition
policies, established a Competition Board, adopted
EU rules on protection of intellectual and indus-
trial property rights, set up a Patent Office, and ini-
tiated a process of harmonizing technical standards
for industrial products and strengthening internal
conformity assessment and market surveillance
structures.
On December 10–11, 1999, the European Coun-
cil meeting held in Helsinki produced a break-
through in Turkey-EU relations. At Helsinki,
Turkey was officially recognized as a candidate state
for accession, on an equal footing with other candi-
date states. The result was the creation of a so-called
Accession Partnership with the EU, which means
that the EU is working together with Turkey to
enable it to adopt the acquis communautaire, the
legal framework of the EU. But, in contrast to other
candidate countries, Turkey did not receive a
timetable for accession. After the approval of the
Accession Partnership by the Council and the adop-
tion of the Framework Regulation on February 26,
2001, the Turkish government announced on
March 19, 2001, its own National Program for the
adoption of the acquis communautaire. Progress
toward accession continues along the path set by
the National Program.
In late 2004 another milestone was reached with
the recommendation of the European Commission
that the European Council endorse the launching
of formal accession negotiations with Turkey
and establish a timetable for accession (European
Commission 2004b). In December 2002, the
Copenhagen European Council had concluded that
“if the European Council in December 2004, on the
basis of a report and a recommendation from
the Commission, decides that Turkey fulfills the
Copenhagen political criteria, the European Union
will open accession negotiations with Turkey with-
out delay.” At a December 2004 Council meeting, it
was decided to launch negotiations.
Although the process has now been launched,
great uncertainties continue to prevail about
whether Turkey will be able to achieve its goal of
accession to the EU.2 Some of these uncertainties
are economic, and they are the subject of this book.
Other uncertainties are more political in nature.
Some of these are in the hands of the Turkish
government—for example, realization of the EU
political and human rights criteria formalized by
the European Council in Copenhagen in 1993, and
acceptance of restrictions on immigration post-
accession.3 Others are not. Arguably, the greatest
uncertainty is whether EU governments and soci-
eties are willing to accept a large secular but
nonetheless Muslim state as part of the EU. Time
will reveal the ultimate outcome. What matters in
the short to medium term is the impact that con-
tinued progress toward achieving the conditions
for membership will have on Turkey. The EU is the
focal point for reforms in a large number of policy
areas, and the preaccession process, which has
been ongoing for several years, is a unique experi-
ment in using international harmonization as a
tool in implementing a comprehensive reform
strategy.
Much has been achieved by Turkey in recent
years, including progress in implementing the
customs union—which covers many policy areas,
not just trade but also nontariff barriers and com-
petition policies—despite severe macroeconomic
shocks and instability. The 1999 European Coun-
cil decision affirming that Turkey is a candidate
for membership was followed by far-reaching
constitutional and legislative reforms, ranging
from improved civil liberties and human rights to
enhanced civilian control of the military. A
Department for EU Affairs was set up in 2000 to
coordinate all of Turkey’s policies related to the
preaccession process. A series of constitutional
and legislative changes were adopted during
2001–04, some of them major, as well as numer-
ous regulations, decrees, and circulars detailing
how these reforms should be implemented. A
Reform Monitoring Group, under the chairman-
ship of the deputy prime minister responsible
for human rights, was established to supervise
the reforms across the board and to solve practi-
cal problems, including bureaucratic inertia and
bottlenecks at both the central government and
state government levels (European Commission
2004c).
However, clearly much remains to be done on
both the macro- and the microeconomic fronts.
Accession entails going beyond the customs union
for manufactures and integrating the markets for
agriculture, services, and factors (labor, investment,
and capital flows). Until now, liberalization of trade
has been restricted to industrial goods. Because agri-
culture accounts for about 14 percent of Turkey’s
gross domestic product (GDP) and services 60 per-
cent, the liberalization of trade to date has thus had
limited implications for three-quarters of eco-
nomic activity. Although this statement is an exag-
geration because autonomous reforms have been
implemented in these sectors of the economy, join-
ing the EU will require Turkey to adopt and imple-
ment the whole body of EU legislation—the acquis
communautaire—in all areas.
The purpose of this volume is to highlight cer-
tain aspects of Turkish accession, with an emphasis
on the implications of integrating fully into the sin-
gle market, adopting the acquis, and meeting the
Maastricht Treaty criteria for fiscal and monetary
policy.4 The contributors to this volume focus pri-
marily on the impact of accession on Turkey—only
two chapters consider the possible impacts on the
EU. One reason for this emphasis is that in size
Turkey is small relative to the EU as a whole.
Turkey’s GDP in 2004 was €240 billion compared
with the combined GDP of the EU25 of €10.2 tril-
lion.5 Thus Turkey would account for only 2.3 per-
cent of the EU’s total output. Most of the adjust-
ment burden and potential benefits therefore
pertain to Turkey. One major exception, however, is
related to Turkey’s large population: the free move-
ment of workers could have a substantial impact on
the EU in both economic and political terms, and
the large population of Turkey may also have impli-
cations for decision making in a larger EU. The out-
come of accession talks on the movement of people
is very important not only for the EU but also for
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Turkey, because the net benefits of accession will
depend on the conditions under which Turkey may
accede to the EU.
Although the primary interest in this volume is
to assess what accession may mean for Turkey and
to gauge how far along Turkey is toward meeting
the acquis, the Turkish case is also relevant for
other countries that may seek to use a strategy of
“deep integration” with a large, developed country
or common market as a focal point and mecha-
nism for undertaking both trade-related and regu-
latory reforms. Increasingly, developing countries
are negotiating deeper forms of regional integra-
tion agreements with high-income trading part-
ners. Even though most of these agreements do not
come close to the depth of cooperation entailed by
accession to the EU—and in some sectors such as
agriculture the accession process is unique in that
it implies integration into a common policy
involving direct subsidies and managed trade—
close study of the implications of seeking to emu-
late the acquis should be of interest to other coun-
tries contemplating the design of integration
efforts.
The volume is divided into four parts:
• the macroeconomic dimensions of EU accession
for Turkey
• sectoral analyses of the effects of integration
into the EU (adoption of the acquis) for the agri-
culture, manufacturing, services, and network
sectors
• the economic challenges of accession for
Turkey’s labor market, investment framework,
and environmental policy
• an assessment of the net impact for the Turkish
economy as a whole of the various changes
implied by adoption of the acquis in the areas
covered by the other parts of the volume, com-
plemented by analyses of the likely implications
for the EU in three central areas: European deci-
sion making and voting after Turkish accession;
international transactions, both trade with and
inward migration from Turkey; and the EU
budget.
This introduction begins by summarizing the
themes and key findings emerging from the chap-
ters that follow. It then briefly discusses the likely
impacts of Turkey’s accession on the EU, and it
concludes with a discussion of lessons for other
developing countries that can be drawn from
Turkey’s efforts to date to bring its policies into
alignment with the acquis.
Macroeconomic Developments 
and Prospects
From 1990 to 2000, economic crises began to affect
the Turkish economy with growing frequency. Peri-
ods of rapid economic expansion alternated with
periods of equally rapid decline. Inflation during
1990–2000 fluctuated between 55 and 106 percent,
for an average rate of 75 percent. Currently, Turkey
is in the midst of a determined campaign to turn
around decades of weak performance stemming
from pervasive structural rigidities and weak pub-
lic finances. The past few years have witnessed
three major attempts at addressing underlying
weaknesses. The first, during 2000, was under the
three-year stand-by agreement with the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF), initiated in Decem-
ber 1999 after a significant drop in output mostly
caused by external factors, including the 1999
earthquake. Despite some notable achievements, a
worsening current account and a weak banking
system led to a liquidity crisis in late 2000. This
crisis turned into a full-blown banking crisis
in February 2001, in which the government
responded by abandoning the crawling peg regime
and floating the currency. In May 2001, the IMF
increased its assistance under a new stand-by
arrangement. Just as the revised program was
beginning to show results, the terrorist attacks of
September 11 in the United States triggered the
reemergence of serious financing problems. In Feb-
ruary 2002, the IMF approved a new three-year
stand-by credit agreement for Turkey to support
the government’s economic program. With the
implementation of the stabilization program,
Turkey envisaged a gradual but steady improve-
ment in its economic conditions. In August 2004,
Turkey approached the IMF for what it hoped
would be a final three-year stand-by agreement
that will serve as an exit program from instability
and excessive debt.
The economic stabilization programs proved
successful at combating inflation, which fell from
54.7 percent during 2000–01 to 10.6 percent in 2004
because of efforts to maintain fiscal and monetary
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discipline. According to the Turkish State Planning
Organization (SPO), the fiscal deficit during 2001
amounted to 16.4 percent of the gross national
product (GNP)—and 20.9 percent of GNP, accord-
ing to the IMF definition. During 2004, the fiscal
deficit was brought back down to 6.2 percent and
the government ran a primary surplus of 6.9 per-
cent of GNP. After contracting by 9.5 percent in
2001, real GNP expanded by 7.9 percent in 2002,
5.9 percent in 2003, and 9.9 percent in 2004. The
growth was driven by strong productivity gains
and by robust private consumption, investment,
and exports, and it has not been hindered by cuts
in government consumption and investment. The
unemployment rate fell from 11.5 percent in the
first quarter of 2002 to 10.3 percent in 2004, and
the average interest rate on government debt
declined from 63.8 percent in 2001 to 25.7 percent
during 2004. Ratios of debt to GNP are still high,
but they have been falling. The net public debt-to-
GNP ratio has decreased from 90.5 percent in 2001
to 63.5 percent in 2004. This decline reflects signif-
icant income growth during 2002–04, attainment
of sizable primary surpluses over the last three
years, and appreciation of the real exchange rate
(RER).
Although these are positive developments, it is
too early to determine to what extent the rebound
reflects a transition to sustainable growth. Substan-
tial risks remain. First, during 2002–04 the RER
appreciated to what is arguably an unsustainable
level. Although the appreciation of the RER helped
to reduce the inflation rate and the debt-to-GDP
ratio, it led to a widening current account deficit.
The annual deficit in 2004 reached US$15.4 bil-
lion,6 and the current account-deficit-to-GDP ratio
increased to 5.1 percent. Because foreign direct
investment (FDI) inflows remain weak, the deficit
is funded by additional foreign debt, raising con-
cerns about the sustainability of the current
account. Second, the public sector debt remains far
too high for comfort. Assuming trend economic
growth of 5 percent and a primary fiscal surplus of
6.5 percent of GDP, the debt ratio will fall over time
as long as real interest rates remain below 15 per-
cent. Currently, the real rates on domestic debt are
about 11 percent. But shocks to credibility could
easily push them higher and lead to concerns about
the sustainability of fiscal policy.7 A primary fiscal
surplus of 6.5 percent remains the minimum
required for safety. Third, the labor force participa-
tion rate declined from about 57 percent at the
beginning of the 1990s to 48.7 percent in 2004,
mainly because of the discouragement of job seek-
ers. The policy of keeping the primary fiscal surplus
at 6.5 percent of GDP over the coming years will
constrain the use of fiscal policy to drive down the
unemployment rate in the economy. But unless
employment growth picks up, continually high
unemployment and low participation rates could
undermine the social and political support for
reforms.
As discussed in greater depth by Sübidey Togan
and Hasan Ersel in chapter 1, the macroeconomic
challenges for Turkey remain substantial. Besides
solving the problems summarized in this introduc-
tion, during the preaccession period Turkey needs
to reduce its annual inflation rate to about 3 per-
cent, keep the debt-to-GDP ratio below 60 percent,
and achieve stable growth in real income over time.
Unless Turkey’s growth performance does improve,
its real per capita GDP will never converge with the
EU average and the accession of Turkey might cre-
ate unmanageable stresses. In addition, the authors
note that to avoid the risk of speculative attacks on
its currency over the coming years, Turkey should
continue to follow policies aimed at establishing a
sound fiscal framework, a robust banking sector,
and sustained price stability. Turkey also must take
measures to increase the national savings rate from
its rather low level of 22 percent in 2004 (China’s
savings rate is 44 percent) and reverse the apprecia-
tion of the real exchange rate. To attain sustainabil-
ity of the current account, the real exchange rate
has to depreciate gradually over time to its long-
run equilibrium level. After accession, Turkey will
be expected to join the Exchange Rate Mechanism
(ERM II) for at least two years and to meet the
Maastricht conditions for monetary and fiscal con-
vergence before a bid for membership in the Euro-
pean Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is
considered. Once admitted to the EMU, Turkey
would replace its domestic currency with the euro
at an irrevocably fixed exchange rate, confer the
bulk of its reserves to the European Central Bank,
and be bound by the Stability and Growth Pact.
Togan and Ersel argue that for Turkey the problem
is not how to stay out of the EMU but, to the con-
trary, how to reap the net benefits expected of
monetary integration by fulfilling the Maastricht
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criteria as soon as possible. Finally, the authors
note that the benefits of integration can only be
derived at some cost, and the costs of fulfilling the
Maastricht criteria, including the conditions for
sustainability of the current account when esti-
mated by expected output losses, could turn out to
be quite substantial.
Sectoral Reform Challenges
Achieving and sustaining macroeconomic stability
will depend importantly on structural reforms,
especially removal and reduction of subsidies and
price controls, and the imposition of hard budget
constraints on enterprises owned by the public
sector. Agriculture has been a heavily distorted
sector of the economy, accounting for a significant
share of the public sector deficit. The banking
sector was at the heart of the 2001 crisis—better
regulation and noninterference in lending deci-
sions are needed to reduce the probability of
another crisis requiring bailouts or recapitaliza-
tion of the system. Privatization of state-owned
firms is the most direct means of imposing hard
budget constraints. These and many other issues
are addressed in the sectoral chapters that explore
the effects of integration into the EU on agricul-
ture and on the manufacturing, services, and net-
work industries.
Agricultural Markets and Incomes
In chapter 2, Sübidey Togan, Ahmet Bayener, and
John Nash study the impact of EU accession on
Turkey’s agricultural markets and incomes. In
Turkey, agriculture accounts for a large share
of total output (14 percent) and employment
(33 percent). The corresponding figures for the
EU15 are 1.7 percent and 4.3 percent. In absolute
numbers, Turkey employs about the same number
of people in agriculture as the EU15, or more than
7 million. Trade in agricultural products between
the EU and Turkey is a relatively small part of
their total trade, because it is not part of the cus-
toms union and so is subject to duties, quotas, and
price regulations. Turkey applies high specific
duties to the commodities supported by the EU’s
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP): cereals and
processed cereals, sugar and sugar products, dairy
products, and meat. Olive oil is also highly pro-
tected. Turkish exports of vegetables and fruits
receive export subsidies. The EU, by contrast, has
granted imports from Turkey preferential treat-
ment. Import barriers exist mostly in the form of
tariff-quota schemes, in which imports within the
quota benefit from preferential treatment. Togan
and his colleagues estimate that about 70 percent
of imports from Turkey enter the EU duty-free
and are not subject to any other import barriers.
As a result, most of the adjustment after integra-
tion of Turkish agriculture into the CAP will fall
on Turkey.
Agricultural support has been important in
Turkey, imposing a large burden on taxpayers. In
2003 the total support of agriculture, including the
higher prices paid by consumers, was equivalent to
4.4 percent of GDP (OECD 2004a). This figure is
much higher than the comparable one for agricul-
ture in the EU—1.3 percent of GDP. These num-
bers suggest that Turkey’s accession to the EU is
likely to have important social, distributional,
and political effects, unless these transfers are
maintained under a common agricultural policy,
which is unlikely. Indeed, adoption of CAP-type
policies—something Turkey is already in the
process of doing—will reduce the overall level of
support, even if Turkey becomes eligible for the
current CAP levels of financial support.
Since 1993, the CAP has been gradually shifting
away from price support to income support, with
the result that prices in the EU are now closer (but
still above) world market–clearing prices and farm-
ers are compensated by direct income payments.
The structure of the CAP is such that it favors the
main agricultural products (and farmers) of the
original six EU members: Belgium, Germany,
France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.
Those products are grains, sugar beets, dairy prod-
ucts, and beef. Fruits, vegetables, poultry, and
pork—important products of the newer, southern
members—receive less or no support. In prepar-
ing for the accession of the Central and Eastern
European (CEE) countries, the EU decided that
farmers from the CEE countries would not be
excluded from direct income support payments,
but that such payments would be lower: equivalent
to 25, 30, and 35 percent of the system prevailing in
2004–06. After 2006, direct payments will be
increased gradually in order to achieve parity with
the original EU15 in 2013.
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Turkish agriculture will confront major reforms
in the preaccession period. In Turkey, the most
important part of agricultural policy has been price
support. State economic enterprises and agricultural
sales cooperatives have been commissioned to buy
cereals, tobacco, tea, and sugar beet from farmers at
prices determined by the government. These prices,
which are higher than world market prices, have
been protected by import tariffs. The second most
important component of Turkey’s agricultural pol-
icy is the various subsidies, grants, and exemptions
lowering the cost of inputs, including capital, fertil-
izer, seed, pesticides, and water. The output of
tobacco, hazelnut, tea, and sugar beet production has
been controlled in various ways. Services to farmers,
such as research, training, and extension and inspec-
tion services, have been provided free or at low cost.
Turkey is implementing significant reforms to
move it toward more decoupled and targeted forms
of support. Under the government’s reform pro-
gram, output price supports, import tariffs and
input subsidies and grants are gradually being
replaced by direct payments to farmers based on
their holdings of land and animals. Income support
has been capped. Privatization of state enterprises
in the agricultural sector is also part of the pro-
gram. The end goal is that Turkey will have an agri-
cultural policy similar to what is now being pur-
sued by the EU in its reforms of the CAP: high
intervention prices and protection from the world
market will have been replaced by direct income
support, lower protection, and prices approaching
those on the world market. In chapter 4, Joseph
Francois uses a global general equilibrium model to
assess the quantitative effects of completion of the
customs union by extending its coverage to agri-
culture. He concludes that despite the importance
of the agricultural sector for Turkey, the overall
aggregate welfare gain associated with completion
of the customs union is limited, although resources
will be pulled into agriculture. Commodity-specific
impacts are small, with the largest adjustment
effects in the more protected sectors, such as grains
and meat, and expansion in the sectors that are
highly subsidized in the EU, such as sugar.
The Turkish reforms have emerged from the
prospect of accession, as well as the need to reduce
public expenditure. In the short run they will lead
to considerable gains in efficiency. According to
Togan and his colleagues, adoption of the CAP will
generate substantial changes in the agricultural
incomes of producers, the welfare levels of con-
sumers, and the budget revenues of the govern-
ment. The authors estimate that, in the medium to
long term, EU-like policies will lead to a 1.9 per-
cent increase in real household incomes in Turkey.
Lower-income households (rural households) will
experience an even larger increase in real income.
But adoption of the CAP will require substantial
adjustments on the part of Turkish farmers. The
effect on farmers’ incomes will be driven mainly by
the amount of CAP-like compensation payments
they obtain. Their income will decrease consider-
ably under Agenda 2000 policies without direct
payments, but will increase under Agenda 2000
policies with direct payments. The budgetary costs
to Turkey of adopting EU-like agricultural policies
will depend on whether Turkey receives compen-
sation from the EU budget for introducing these
policies. Without compensation, the cost will
amount to €3 billion under Agenda 2000 policies
with direct payments similar to those applied in
the EU and to €1.2 billion if the payments equal
only 35 percent of what is granted in the EU mem-
ber countries.
Manufacturing
In chapter 3, Sübidey Togan, Hüsamettin Nebiog˘lu,
and Saadettin Dog˘an study the effects of EU inte-
gration on the Turkish manufacturing sector.
After reviewing developments in the trade in
manufactures and in particular the effects of the
customs union with the EU, they analyze tariffs
and nontariff barriers in trade with the EU and
third countries. Because tariffs are now largely a
nonissue, they focus more on nontariff barriers,
especially technical barriers to trade (product
standards). They conclude that challenges lie
ahead for both Turkish firms and the govern-
ment. Both must apply a large number of EU
norms. For example, Turkey has adopted all of
the 23 new approach directives that require affix-
ing the CE conformity marking, but only 18 of
these directives entered into force up to the present
time. As a result of these directives, the number of
mandatory EU standards decreased from 1,150 in
1999 to less than 500 in 2004 (European Commis-
sion 2004c). The Turkish Standards Institute
(TSE) is presently concentrating its activities on
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the transposition of the European and interna-
tional standards and on achieving full membership
in the European Committee for Standardization
(CEN) and the European Committee for Elec-
trotechnical Standardization (CENELEC).8
Many of the requirements of the acquis in this
area revolve around accreditation and conformity
assessment, in which a large number of government
bodies establish criteria as part of regulatory over-
sight activities and the Turkish Accreditation
Agency (TÜRKAK) accredits the inspection service
providers. Here a major challenge is for TÜRKAK
itself to become accredited and recognized in the
EU. Currently, its certifications are not recognized,
requiring double accreditation for providers or
redundant inspection on entry of goods into the
EU. Progress is also needed on the introduction of
mutual recognition clauses in national legislation
and the acceptance and adoption of simplified pro-
cedures for the import of products bearing the
CE (Conformité Européene) marking. In 2003 toys,
medical devices, and other products bearing the CE
marking were entitled to enter the Turkish market
freely with no further check on the technical
dossiers (European Commission 2004c). Such
measures will facilitate trade and reduce costs for
traders. Indeed, it has been reported that during the
period after the decision was made to accept the CE
label, customs authorities sent numerous consign-
ments to the TSE for inspection, arguing that they
were not able to assess the risks related to the mini-
mum safety requirements. Numerous studies of the
impacts of a customs union have argued that the
abolition of such real trade costs is likely to generate
significant gains for Turkey. Full implementation of
the EU acquis on technical barriers to trade, with
the accompanying institutional strengthening, will
constitute the major change from the status quo in
the nonagricultural merchandise trade with the EU.
Market Access and Regulatory Issues
In chapter 4, Joseph Francois complements the
analysis of the impacts of extending the customs
union to include agriculture by a discussion of the
implications of EU accession for regulatory reform
in Turkey, focusing in particular on the transporta-
tion sector. For this sector, the acquis revolves
around the EU’s common transport policy, which
seeks to develop integrated transport systems based
on advanced technologies that contribute to envi-
ronmental and safety objectives; to improve the
functioning of the single market in order to promote
efficiency and choice; and to improve transport links
between the European Union and third countries.
The common transport policy places a major
emphasis on the strict application of competition
rules and state aid disciplines. Challenges range from
physical integration to harmonization of infrastruc-
ture, vehicle, environmental, and other standards;
development of logistics networks; and improve-
ment of border crossings and trade facilitation poli-
cies (such as modernization of customs facilities).
The EU is concentrating on greater liberalization
of rail transport, landing rights/access to airports
(allocation of slots), gradual abolition of the queu-
ing system for certain inland waterway markets, and
improved application of the rules on work practices
in the road haulage sector (European Commission
2004c). An overall goal is a more level playing field
through the application of competition principles,
including the use of state aid and cross-subsidies.9
Railways are a major fiscal burden for the
Turkish state. Turkish State Railways (TCDD),
manages Turkey’s seven largest ports and its rail-
ways, locomotive and carriage manufacturers, and
repair workshops. During the 1980s and 1990s, rail
operation cost the Turkish government more than
$10.5 billion in constant 2002 U.S. dollars. As noted
by the World Bank’s Trade and Transport Facilita-
tion Web page on Turkey,10 TCDD needs to be
restructured, the railway network scaled down,
service improved, and prices increased. The acquis
in this sector requires that TCDD separate out and
report on the results of each of its activities (to
identify cross-subsidies), and that it end cross-
subsidies from ports to rail and from freight to
passenger traffic by shifting to a system of direct
subsidies for passenger services (motivated by
social objectives such as universal service). The
much more stringent fiscal discipline associated
with implementing the acquis will have a beneficial
effect on resource allocation and the use of trans-
port services. Existing cross-subsidization of the
railways by the ports suggests that port authorities
should be subjected to greater scrutiny by regula-
tors and the competition authorities, because in
other countries (the threat of) competition by
other (new) terminal operators has been shown to
be an effective source of market discipline.
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Francois explores both the quantitative and
qualitative implications of Turkish accession to
the EU for the transport sector. He adopts an
innovative methodology using data provided by the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) to determine how far
Turkey is from “best practice” as defined by the EU
standards for this sector—not just in the regulatory
domain but also in terms of “performance.” In part,
this involves applying numerical estimates of the
economy-wide and sector-specific impacts of acces-
sion (given the preexistence of the customs union
for goods) on the transport sector. This process is
complemented by an assessment of the prevailing
regulatory regime, using factor analysis (principal
components) to identify commonalities across
countries and regulations. Francois concludes that
there is little support for the claim that accession is
exerting significant pressure on Turkey to restruc-
ture in view of either general market access condi-
tions or regulatory convergence requirements.
Notwithstanding this conclusion, as noted above,
Turkey confronts numerous policy changes in
adopting the acquis in the transport area.
Telecommunications Sector
Chapter 5 by Erkan Akdemir, Erdem Bas¸çı, and
Gareth Locksley examines the Turkish telecommu-
nications services from the perspective of EU acces-
sion. Turkey is the last OECD country to liberalize
its fixed-telephone services. Likewise, its privatiza-
tion of the public monopoly in fixed lines has been
delayed significantly. Yet Turkey, in the medium
term, will need to adopt the new set of directives
approved and published by the European Parliament
and the European Council in 2002. In chapter 5 the
authors consider the framework directive, access
directive, authorization directive, and universal
service directive.
In June 2001, Turkey and the other EU candidate
countries signed the eEurope+ Action Plan, by
which Turkey committed itself to achieving certain
measurable goals in the electronic communications
sector. Akdemir and his colleagues provide a
detailed comparison of the current Turkish and
European statistics and practices in the telecommu-
nications industry. They discuss licensing, price reg-
ulation, access regulation, and universal service
dimensions. For each dimension, they also describe
the main Turkish legislation and its implementation
and compare them to those in the EU member and
candidate countries. They argue that the main prob-
lems facing Turkey are related to the implementa-
tion of the new legislation, especially in areas such as
access to the network.
Their conclusion was confirmed by the Euro-
pean Commission’s 2004 assessment, which found
that only limited progress has been achieved in
acquis alignment to date, despite the fact that the
remaining monopoly rights of the state-owned
incumbent operator, Türk Telekom, were legally
abolished at the end of 2003, including those related
to national and international voice telephony and
the establishment and operation of telecommuni-
cations infrastructure. Thus the market has been
open to new entrants since January 2004. However,
the authors argue that the (regulatory) measures
needed to facilitate market entry are not yet fully in
place, including on matters such as numbering,
interconnection, conditions of access to the net-
work, and facility sharing, implying that there are
still de facto barriers to new entry.
Banking
In chapter 6, Ceyla Pazarbas¸ıog˘lu describes the
impact of EU accession on the Turkish banking sec-
tor. One of the primary causes of the 2001 currency
crisis was the unhealthy structure of the sector,
stemming from several factors.11
• First, there were problems with state banks.
Governments have used these banks for noncom-
mercial objectives such as agricultural support;
income redistribution; and industrial, urban, and
physical infrastructure development. As a result,
the banks faced unrecovered costs from mandates
carried out on behalf of the government called
“duty losses.”The state banks covered their financ-
ing needs by borrowing at very high interest rates
and at short maturities from the capital markets.
• Second, the banking sector faced problems cre-
ated by high public sector deficits. As private
banks found the financing of public deficits
increasingly profitable, government domestic
securities as a share of total assets of domestic
banks increased considerably, making the banks
vulnerable to changes in interest rates. Further-
more, during the 1990s banks began to borrow
funds from abroad and use the funds to buy
government bonds.12 Thus banks also became
vulnerable to exchange rate risk.
• Third, in 1994 as part of an effort to prevent an
economic collapse following a fear of a bank run,
the government introduced full (100 percent)
state guarantees for deposits. Before 2001, fear of
a renewed banking crisis prevented the authori-
ties from replacing this supposedly temporary
measure with a more reasonable deposit insur-
ance scheme.
• Fourth, Turkey lacked competent supervisory
authorities, a good regulatory framework, and an
effective legal and institutional infrastructure.
Since 1999, Turkey has taken measures to reform
the regulatory and institutional framework of its
banking sector and restructure the state and private
banks. The acquis in this area requires, among other
things, an independent central bank that, as a pri-
mary task, maintains price stability. It also prohibits
direct central bank (or public sector bank) financ-
ing of the government deficit. Accession entails
acceptance of the objectives of the EMU, although
compliance with the convergence criteria is not
necessarily a precondition. However, because those
criteria are indicative of a macroeconomic policy
geared to achieving stability, all member states
must in due course comply with them on a perma-
nent basis.
In 1999 the Turkish Parliament passed a new
banking law, which mandated the creation of an
independent Banking Regulation and Supervision
Agency (BRSA). The BRSA took over the bank reg-
ulatory and supervisory responsibilities previously
fulfilled by the Treasury and the Central Bank. For
state banks, the Treasury provided floating rate
notes to those banks securitizing their “duty losses,”
and it strengthened their capital base. A law was
also introduced prohibiting state banks from run-
ning more duty losses—that is, any support pro-
vided to the state banks will henceforth have to be
budgeted. The state banks were also required to
comply fully with all banking regulations. Private
banks that had incurred significant losses in the
aftermath of the currency crises were either taken
over by the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF)
or asked to strengthen their net worth and balance
sheet structure. The capital base of banks under
SDIF management was enhanced by the injection
of government funds, and measures were taken to
facilitate bank mergers and prepare the state banks
for privatization.
In addition, the regulation of existing banks was
greatly strengthened. Currently, banks are required
to maintain an 8 percent capital adequacy standard
ratio, on both a consolidated and unconsolidated
basis. The maximum open foreign exchange posi-
tion was reduced from 30 percent to 20 percent.
Steps have also been taken to correct flaws such as
weak loan loss provisioning and the lenient large
exposure and related lending limits. Tighter limits
were imposed on both on- and off-balance sheet
commitments to related parties, and especially to
companies belonging to the same group as a bank.
Bank shareholders and managers are now personally
liable for the mismanagement and abuse of bank
resources. The BRSA requires that banks introduce
internationally recognized accounting and auditing
standards. All in all, as of 2004 Turkish prudential
requirements were in general in conformance
with those in the EU for capital adequacy standards,
loan classification and provisioning requirements,
limits on large exposures, limits on lending to
related parties, and requirements for liquidity and
market risk management.
The objective of the legislative and regulatory
reform has been to bring the regulatory and super-
visory regime for the Turkish financial sector up to
the level of international practice in line with EU
standards. This objective has been achieved to a
large extent. Pazarbas¸ıog˘lu argues that Turkey has
fulfilled most of the conditions necessary for
attaining compliance in the banking sector with
the EU integration process. She stresses that the
Turkish banking sector will be exposed to certain
costs during and after accession in the form of
competitive pressures from EU banks that have a
strong capital base and risk management skills.
However, the Turkish banking system has become
more resilient and sounder since the extensive
restructuring program and implementation of
international standards. This restructuring process
came at a large implied fiscal cost estimated to
have reached close to one-third of GDP in the
initial stages.
A major remaining issue that needs to be solved is
the privatization of state banks. In 2003 Turkey
decided to privatize the two largest state banks within
three years, to withdraw the banking license of
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another state bank, and to resume the privatization
process of another large state bank as soon as market
conditions allowed.13 The data on the Turkish bank-
ing sector reveal that in 2004 private domestic
banks held about 57.6 percent of the total assets of
the banking sector, with the five largest banks
accounting for 60 percent of total assets. The share
of state banks was 34.6 percent, while that of banks
managed by the SDIF was 0.6 percent. Foreign
banks’ share of total banking assets amounted to
3.5 percent. Thus foreign banks, in terms of their
shares of total credits and deposits, remain insignif-
icant in Turkey.
With Turkish accession to the EU, competition in
the financial sector will increase as Turkey recognizes
the competence of the supervisory authorities of the
EU member states and incorporates the principle of
home country control in its legislation. According
to Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Huizinga (1998),
foreign bank assets as a share of total bank assets over
1988–95 averaged 77 percent in Greece, 31 percent in
Spain, 61 percent in Hungary, and 51 percent in the
Czech Republic. Thus, with the liberalization of
financial markets, the penetration rates of foreign
banks in Turkey will increase substantially, causing
adjustment costs in the sector. Increased competi-
tion will improve the quality and availability of
financial services in the domestic market, enable
the application of modern banking skills and tech-
nology, enhance the country’s access to interna-
tional capital, lower prices for consumers, and lead
to a larger variety of financial instruments. Some of
the Turkish banks will benefit from larger markets
by concentrating on activities in which they have a
comparative advantage. Other Turkish banks may
be forced to merge with foreign banks or leave the
market altogether.
Energy
Chapters 7 and 8 examine Turkey’s energy sector.
The objectives of the EU’s energy policy include
improving competitiveness, securing energy sup-
plies, and protecting the environment. The energy
acquis consists of rules and policies, notably on
competition and state aid (including in the coal
sector), the internal energy market (for example,
opening up of the electricity and gas markets, pro-
motion of renewable energy sources, crisis manage-
ment, and oil stock security obligations), energy
efficiency, and nuclear energy (European Commis-
sion 2004c).
In chapter 7, Izak Atiyas and Mark Dutz describe
competition and regulatory reform in the Turkish
electricity industry. After reviewing the physical
peculiarities of the electricity industry and dis-
cussing how those characteristics have shaped the
evolution of its industrial organization, Atiyas and
Dutz present an overview of regulatory reform in
the EU, the key directives, and the recent proposals
for amendment advanced by the European Com-
mission. They also identify five main challenges
associated with adoption of EU norms in this area:
market opening, unbundling, third-party access,
public service obligations, and regulation.
Historically, the Turkish electricity sector has
been dominated by state-owned enterprises that
provide distribution, generation, trading, and
transmission services. However, privatization has
been widespread for some time. Privately owned
firms have entered the industry through build-
operate-transfer (BOT) or auto-generator schemes.
They account for about 21 percent of electricity gen-
eration. In addition, firms have been bidding com-
petitively on build-operate-own (BOO) contracts
for electricity generation. Transfer of operating
rights contracts (TOORs) have been awarded for
eight thermal plants and 14 distribution regions.
Privatization of generation assets is envisaged to
start in 2006 and to be completed in 2011. All assets
in the distribution sector will be divested by mid-
2006 (European Commission 2004c).
Many of the benefits of privatization come with
the transfer of risk. When private companies
bear risk, privatization can be expected to lead to
efficiency gains. Under the current regulations in
Turkey, the private owners in the electricity sector
bear construction and operating cost risks. The pri-
vate operator signs a long-term power purchase
agreement with the state-owned generation enter-
prise in which the latter commits itself to buy the
output of the plant for a period of, say, 20 years at a
fixed price in foreign currency. In BOT projects, the
price has ranged on average from between $.08 and
$.09 per kilowatt-hour for the first five to 10 years
of operation. The BOO projects tend to have lower
prices. The BOO contract, guaranteed by the Trea-
sury, assures the investor that the project will be
profitable irrespective of the future demand for
power. As a result, the government retains the
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commercial risks. Significant problems have arisen
with these arrangements. The high-cost electricity
purchase agreements have exposed the state
providers to significant losses and contingent liabil-
ities. The financial position of these firms is poor
partly because of high-cost BOT contracts that
involve purchase costs to the Turkish Electricity
and Transmission Company (TEAS¸) in excess of the
subsequent sales prices to the Turkish Electricity
Distribution Company (TEDAS¸) set by the govern-
ment. The associated subsidies and cross-subsidies
will have to be removed as a result of accession.
A new electricity law passed in 2001 provides for
the establishment of an independent Energy Mar-
ket Regulatory Authority (EMRA) to take over reg-
ulatory functions from the Ministry of Natural
Resources. Standard regulatory functions include
tariff setting, market monitoring, and settlement of
disputes concerning access. With this law, the gov-
ernment is introducing a market model along EU
lines that will transfer most of the task of supplying
and distributing electricity and the associated
market risks to the private sector, eliminate the
need for additional state-guaranteed power pur-
chase agreements, and minimize costs through
competitive pressures on producers and distribu-
tors, again along the EU model (see chapter 7). The
government, then, will largely withdraw from the
electricity generation and distribution businesses.
Electricity generation companies will sign contracts
for power directly with distribution companies
without government guarantees. The government’s
future role will be largely confined to determining
sector policy, owning the transmission system, and
ensuring that the rules are respected and that prices
are determined competitively. The implication is
that, once the law is fully implemented, the regula-
tory and supervisory regime for the electricity
sector will have been brought up to the level of
international practice in line with EU standards.
Although the various BOT and BOO contracts
signed in the past imply that the establishment of a
competitive environment may take quite a long
time, once the system begins to operate Turkey can
expect to derive efficiency gains in the sector result-
ing in price reductions and improvements in the
quality of the service.
In chapter 8, Maria Rita Mazzanti and Alberto
Biancardi analyze the institutional endowment and
regulatory reform in Turkey’s natural gas sector.
They focus on Turkey’s natural gas market and the
measures adopted to liberalize the sector and to
comply with EU requirements for accession. As in
the electricity industry, the main challenge con-
fronting Turkey is to increase competition in the
market while dealing with the legacy of past deci-
sions, in this case the long-term take-or-pay con-
tracts signed by Turkey’s Petroleum Pipeline Corpo-
ration (BOTAS¸). This government-owned company
dominates the natural gas sector in Turkey, control-
ling the pipeline infrastructure for oil and gas trans-
mission, liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals, and
gas distribution. BOTAS¸ has monopoly rights on
gas imports and exports and on wholesale trading,
transmission, and storage activities.
The 2001 natural gas market law (No. 4646) calls
for liberalization of the gas market and the creation
of a financially sound, stable, and transparent mar-
ket (Article 1), including the removal of the import
monopoly. As noted in World Bank (2004:1),
progress in the three years following adoption of
the law was slow: “Industry structure remains
monolithic, with no separation of functions other
than some distribution. Cost transparency, largely
due to the existing industry structure, remains defi-
cient. Competition has not developed in the whole-
sale sector. International investors remain con-
cerned by the delays.” The 2001 law requires
BOTAS¸ to conduct tenders to transfer to other
market players its existing contractual obligations
on natural gas purchases and sales until its imports
fall to 20 percent of annual consumption (the so-
called gas release program). Little progress has been
made to date on implementing this requirement,
and Mazzanti and Biancardi argue that enforcement
of measures to limit the market power of the
incumbent will be an important determinant of
gains to Turkey from reform as well as a require-
ment for satisfying the acquis in this area. Competi-
tion in the natural gas industry is impeded by long-
term investments and contracts in the upstream
activities (gas contracts and infrastructures). Gas
tends to be purchased on the basis of long-term
contracts with take-or-pay clauses that require the
gas purchaser to pay 70–90 percent of the con-
tracted capacity whether it receives the natural gas
or not; the reason is that extractors must invest
huge amounts mining and transporting the gas and
thus confront very high up-front fixed (sunk) costs
and almost zero marginal costs.
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Breaking up the upstream and downstream
(wholesale) monopoly of BOTAS¸ is a precondition
for the emergence of competition in the sector.
Mazzanti and Biancardi note that the targets set by
the law for BOTAS¸ shares (no more than 20 percent
of imports and the wholesale market) are very
ambitious, and much more so than the targets set
by EU member states. They also argue that the gas
release provisions of the law—which have also been
used by EU states in introducing competition—
could have a beneficial impact, as long as they are
designed appropriately.14
The Complementary Implications
and Challenges of Reform
Although much has been achieved in sector-
specific regulation and reform, much remains to be
done in some areas, especially energy and trans-
port. Other economic reform challenges are associ-
ated as well with accession and realizing gains from
the process. Chapters 9–11 consider three impor-
tant “horizontal” areas: the labor market, (foreign)
investment policy, and EU regulations pertaining to
the environment. The first two complement the
financial (banking) sector as critical determinants
of the effects of accession. Labor market regulations
will affect the incentives to invest, the costs to work-
ers of layoffs, as well as the overall cost structure of
doing business in Turkey. FDI is an important
source of knowledge, employment, and competitive
pressure on incumbent firms. Finally, environmen-
tal regulation has the potential to enhance social
welfare by ensuring that firms and consumers con-
front the appropriate (social) prices of their eco-
nomic activities, but it also raises the danger of
excessively costly regulation that may not be appro-
priate to Turkey’s circumstances and preferences.
In chapter 9, Erol Taymaz and S¸ule Özler look at
the labor market. They argue that one of the most
important issues for Turkey in adopting and imple-
menting the EU acquis is related to the labor mar-
ket regulations and employment policies that pre-
vail in the EU. The acquis in this area includes EU
legislation covering health and safety at work, labor
law and working conditions (working hours, part-
time work, collective redundancies, worker protec-
tion in case of bankruptcy and closure of plants,
child labor—minimum working age), gender
equality (equal pay and opportunities), and social
inclusion of handicapped people in the workforce.
In all of these areas, EU social legislation lays down
minimum requirements that must be met by mem-
ber states.
Adoption of the EU acquis will bring radical
changes in the functioning of the labor market in
Turkey, with vital consequences for firms, workers,
and the long-term performance of the economy.
The main impact will fall on the informal sector.
Taymaz and Özler note that the Turkish labor mar-
ket is currently quite flexible, because the formal
and informal sectors have very different wage-
setting mechanisms. The informal sector is largely
free from labor regulation and avoids most of the
taxes and related charges. Job insecurity is perva-
sive, and workers receive very few benefits from
their employers. By contrast, in the formal sector
labor regulations are observed, and taxes and
related charges such as social security contributions
and payments to various funds are paid. Because
the informal sector accounts for some 40 percent of
manufacturing jobs, applying EU regulations to
this part of the labor market will have major effects.
Taymaz and Özler estimate that when all infor-
mal sector firms in the manufacturing sector begin
to pay taxes and social security contributions at the
same rates applied in the formal sector, the firms
affected will lose half of their market shares as their
costs rise. As a result, employment in the manufac-
turing sector will decline by 9 percent, or some
300,000 jobs. As noted by Togan in chapter 12, the
effect of this policy change on employment will be
even more drastic when one considers its effects on
employment in agricultural and services sectors as
well. The policy implication is that if a massive
increase in unemployment is to be avoided, com-
prehensive labor market reform will be required
that includes both substantial decreases in tax rates
on wage income, tax-related charges, and payments
to various funds, and reductions in layoff costs.
Such measures will also increase the flexibility of
the formal market. Such flexibility will benefit the
economy overall, because it will remove a disincen-
tive for firms to grow and become part of the for-
mal sector—a step that requires access to the capital
markets and banking system, which, in turn,
implies becoming subject to taxation. An impor-
tant corollary not discussed by any of the contribu-
tions in this volume is that other policies in the area
of taxation and support for the private sector are
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rendered neutral with respect to the size of firms—
in Turkey, as in many other countries, tax and
related policies tend to discriminate de facto if not
de jure against small firms (Hoekman and Javorcik
2004).
Chapter 10 by Mark Dutz, Melek Us, and Kamil
Yılmaz turns to Turkey’s FDI challenges. The
authors conclude that Turkey would benefit signifi-
cantly from EU accession, largely because the acces-
sion process would help Turkey to overcome its
rule-of-law and competition-related constraints to
FDI inflows. More rapid and consistent implemen-
tation of the rules and regulations that ensure a
level playing field for all companies would be
assisted by the EU accession process; this process, in
turn, would enable Turkey to take full advantage of
investment-related benefits.
During the 1980s, Turkey made frequent use of
investment and export incentives and also relied
heavily on state-owned enterprises. The Turkish
public enterprise sector has been and still is very
large. The state-owned enterprises have shown, in
general, poor economic performance because of the
soft-budget constraints they have faced. They are
not confronted with the threat of bankruptcy and
have benefited from government subsidies in the
form of direct transfers, equity injections, and debt
consolidation. In recent years, Turkey has elimi-
nated most investment and export incentives, but
similar progress could not be achieved for the pub-
lic enterprises. Although privatization has become
a prominent part of the Turkish reforms, it gained
momentum only after the 2001 crisis and the asso-
ciated reforms, because it was recognized that state-
owned firms and the related structure of subsidies
and soft-budget constraints were a part of the
problem underlying the large nonperforming assets
of the banks. Turkey recognizes that it will have
to stop subsidizing the public enterprises at the
prevailing rates, align its state aid policies with
those of the EU, apply the same competition poli-
cies to all firms whether private or public, and pri-
vatize the public enterprises. Greater FDI can play
an important role in this transition, as it has in the
CEE countries.
In chapter 11, the final major cross-cutting or
horizontal issue chapter, Anil Markandya looks at
the costs, especially in the public sector, Turkey is
likely to incur in meeting the environmental acquis.
In this area, as in the labor market, the EU acquis
will probably have major repercussions for Turkey.
Joining the EU will require implementing the entire
body of EU legislation and standards on environ-
mental protection. This step, in turn, implies sub-
stantial investments by the public and private
sectors, as well as changes in regulations and
supporting institutions. EU policy in this area is
based on integration of environmental policy with
the sectoral policies of the EU, prevention meas-
ures, implementation of the “polluter pays” princi-
ple, and measures to address environmental exter-
nalities at their source. The acquis comprises some
200 legal instruments covering a wide range of
areas, including water and air pollution, manage-
ment of waste and chemical products, biotechnol-
ogy, radiation protection, and nature conservation.
Markandya breaks down the potential costs of
adopting the acquis based on three scenarios: a
“base case” in which no special reforms are made
and the public sector remains much as it is today; a
“medium reform” case in which the private sector’s
share is increased modestly and reforms in pricing
proceed to reduce the demand for some of the envi-
ronmental cleanup services; and a “high reform”
case in which the private sector’s role is somewhat
greater and environmental reforms are imple-
mented with more rigor.
Consider just one representative area subject to
environmental regulation in the EU: wastewater
collection and treatment. According to the EU
urban wastewater directive (91/271/EEC), all urban
areas with a total wastewater discharge of 2,000
population equivalent must be connected to the
sewer system, and discharges must receive at
least secondary treatment except for towns with
populations of less than 10,000 and in cases in
which such treatment would produce no environ-
mental benefit or would involve excessive cost.
Because the majority of the Turkish population
lives in municipalities that are not connected to
sewer treatment, and because only a very small
number of municipalities have wastewater treat-
ment facilities, the implementation costs associated
with meeting this EU regulation will be very large
indeed. How large will depend in part on negotia-
tions with the EU to determine its interpretation of
what is allowed in view of the flexibility provisions
embodied in the regulation. But rough estimates of
the investment costs of compliance run up to more
than $10 billion. Adding the additional operating,
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maintenance, and replacement costs would further
increase this amount.
Wastewater collection and treatment is just one
of the relevant directives; others include EU regula-
tions on drinking water, industrial pollution, dan-
gerous chemicals, fuel standards, air quality, and
waste management. Markandya estimates that the
total investment will run between €28 billion and
€49 billion. Although this estimate is very high, he
also notes that the costs will be spread over many
years—he assumes 17 years. Annual investments
would amount to about €2 billion to €3 billion in
the high reform (i.e., low-cost) case and €3 billion
to €5 billion in the medium reform (i.e., high-cost)
case. In the initial years, this investment would
amount to 1–1.5 percent of GDP in the low-cost
case and 1.5–2.5 percent in the high-cost case. To
this one would have to add the extra annual operat-
ing costs that will be incurred, which would be in
the range of €5 billion to €8 billion. Because
Turkey’s capital investment spending on environ-
mental areas is about 0.5 percent of GDP, accession
will imply an increase of anywhere from a factor of
two to four or more. However, many of these invest-
ments would probably be made in any event by
Turkey, although perhaps not as fast insofar as the
EU directives do not correspond to Turkey’s priori-
ties at its current stage of development. Important
here is the extent to which there is “wiggle room” in
the various directives, as well as flexibility on the
part of the European Commission in assessing
whether achievement of the acquis in all of the vari-
ous areas is a necessary condition for accession.
Also important will be the extent to which fund-
ing for some of these investments will be provided
by EU member states—although it must be recog-
nized that the money is fungible and that the Turk-
ish government must determine for itself where
grants and loans should be allocated for the highest
social rate of return. Indeed, determining this allo-
cation and deciding what trade-offs to make will
perhaps be one of the greatest challenges con-
fronting successive Turkish governments as the
accession process proceeds. In making this determi-
nation, the government must compare cost esti-
mates with benefit estimates that evaluate the gains
from the implementation of the directives. Under-
taking such a cost-benefit analysis is critical. One
strong conclusion that emanates from Markandya’s
chapter, as well as others in this volume, is that such
an analysis is needed to determine where the case
for investment is strongest and where it would be
better to delay making investments (and negotiate
extensions or agree on different sequencing with
the European Commission).
Toward an Assessment: Net Effects
on Turkey
What will be the net impact on Turkey of all the vari-
ous policy reforms involved in EU accession? In
chapter 12, Sübidey Togan attempts to go beyond the
merchandise trade liberalization analysis undertaken
by Francois in chapter 4 and quantify the impacts on
those areas identified by the chapter authors as
requiring the implementation of concrete policy
changes. Specifically, Togan considers the welfare
effects of integration with the EU associated with
policy changes in the agriculture, banking, telecom-
munications, transportation, electricity, and natural
gas sectors.He concludes that a conservative estimate
of the resulting net increase in the real income of
Turkish households is some 3.6 percent of GDP.15
Integration with the EU will remove numerous dis-
tortions in the price system and improve the business
climate for private sector development, which, in
turn, will increase the allocative efficiency of the
Turkish economy. Because these achievements will
make Turkey a better place to invest, investment,
including foreign direct investment, can be expected
to increase, bringing with it associated employment
opportunities. The allocative efficiency gains from
integration will be boosted by induced capital forma-
tion. But these welfare gains will have a price: the
adjustment costs associated with attaining macro-
economic stability, adopting EU labor market rules
and regulations, and complying with EU environ-
mental directives.
No assessment of costs and benefits should
ignore the opportunity costs associated with the
accession strategy. Indeed, one can and should ask
what the counterfactual is to accession. Any process
of regional integration by definition excludes other
options—going it alone or relying more intensively
on multilateral approaches as the focal points and
anchors for reform. Clearly, the political decision
has already been made to pursue the accession
path, but that decision does not take away the
importance of determining whether alternative
strategies might not be superior in economic terms.
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It is very difficult, however, to address this question.
Virtually everything that is being done and will be
done by Turkey could be done unilaterally. Many of
the benefits from the reforms undertaken to date
were gained autonomously—for example, the steps
to exert greater macroeconomic discipline, the
measures to strengthen the banking system, and the
introduction of greater fiscal discipline for agricul-
ture and state-owned firms. How much the tem-
plates provided by the EU model have helped is not
possible to determine. Clearly, however, the prospect
of accession played a role in the pursuit of some of
these reforms. The key dimensions of accession
as an anchor and focal point for reforms are as
follows:
• the availability of the EU “model” to follow and
implement
• the prospect of eventual free access to the EU for
Turkish workers
• the assistance granted to Turkey by the EU.
Does the EU model (the acquis) make sense for
Turkey? When it comes to disciplines associated
with the single market, we would argue the answer
is yes. The agenda here revolves around introducing
market disciplines, controlling state aids, and
encouraging competition in markets for goods and
services. Integrating transport and energy markets
also makes good economic sense, as do measures
aimed at increasing the contestability of these mar-
kets and removing competition-distorting cross-
subsidies. This is not to say that the EU model in
these areas is perfect—EU trade policy, for exam-
ple, and the CAP most obviously are not very good
examples of efficiency-maximizing policies. But the
point is that they are better than the status quo ante
prevailing in Turkey, and their adoption therefore
improves the expected policy stance in these areas.
Other dimensions of the acquis leave room for
doubt. Although much of what is being pursued
through the EU directives in the social and envi-
ronmental areas is justifiable and will bring bene-
fits, the costs of implementing regulation in these
areas can be high. It is not clear that benefits will
always outweigh costs, suggesting that these are
areas in which greater care and attention are
required to sequence implementation appropriately.
As emphasized before, however, the accession
process will take a long time, allowing for a more
gradual convergence in areas where this is likely to
be appropriate in view of Turkey’s initial conditions.
In part, the cost-benefit ratio will depend on the
extent to which additional grants are made available
to Turkey that otherwise would not be forthcom-
ing. Accession implies access to the CAP and Struc-
tural Funds, and, as a poor country, Turkey will be a
net recipient of such transfers. It is not possible at
this point to determine how large this net flow will
be. The structure of the present system of EU rev-
enue and expenditure is such that rich member
states transfer resources to poorer members.
Because Turkey is poor relative to the EU25 (even
though the difference will be smaller than it was
before the accession of the 10 new members), acces-
sion will clearly have budgetary effects for the EU if
the current criteria are maintained for transfers
among EU members. Allocations are determined in
part by voting power (in turn, a function of popula-
tion and size of the economy) as well as relative
poverty, and so there is a possibility that the rules of
the game will be changed before Turkey accedes in
order to manage the fiscal and redistributive reper-
cussions of its accession. In addition, it is projected
that by 2020 Turkey’s population will be larger than
that of any other EU25 member. This projection
may raise concerns about the decision-making pro-
cedures of the EU, as well as worries about possible
immigration effects.
Effects of Turkey’s Accession 
on the EU 
The effects of Turkey’s accession on the EU will
depend importantly on what accession will entail
for EU transfers to Turkey, EU governance (deci-
sion making), and trade and factor flows, espe-
cially migration.16 Because the trade in goods,
services, and capital has already been either cov-
ered by the customs union or addressed unilater-
ally by both parties in terms of bilateral flows, the
effects on the EU in these dimensions are likely to
be limited in the sense that they will have already
occurred at the time of any accession decision. In
any event, the aggregate impacts on intra-EU trade
will be small. Production and trade in agricultural
goods will be affected by accession, but the major
effects will be in Turkey, not in the EU, because
import barriers are relatively low for Turkish agri-
cultural exports.
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Decision Making
In chapter 13, Richard Baldwin and Mika Widgrén
evaluate the impact of Turkey’s membership on EU
voting. They analyze the EU’s decision-making effi-
ciency (its capacity to act, as measured by the prob-
ability of proposals passing a vote) and the distribu-
tion of power in the EU’s leading decision-making
body, the Council of Ministers. They also compare
two alternative Council voting rules: those accepted
in the Treaty of Nice and implemented by the
accession treaty of the 10 new entrants in 2004 and
the rules laid down in the draft Constitutional
Treaty (CT). The latter are conditional on the ongo-
ing ratification process.
Baldwin and Widgrén conclude that, in terms of
capacity to act, the enlargement will likely have rel-
atively little impact, as long as the CT voting rules
come into effect. In particular, Turkey’s member-
ship will have only a negligible effect on the EU’s
capacity to act—in large part because moving from
27 members (the EU25 plus Bulgaria and Romania)
to 29 (Turkey and Croatia) does not change much.
The answer, however, is quite different if the CT is
rejected and the Nice Treaty rules remain in place.
Under the Nice Treaty voting rules, the enlargement
would substantially lower the EU’s ability to act.
These findings confirm earlier conclusions by the
authors that an enlarged EU cannot function well
under the Nice Treaty rules. They also suggest that if
the CT is rejected, the Nice Treaty voting rules must
be reformed before further enlargement takes place.
As for the distribution of power, they find that
Turkish accession will have a big impact. Under both
the Nice Treaty and CT rules, Turkey would be the
second most powerful member of an EU29. Under
the CT rules, Turkey would be substantially more
powerful than countries such as Britain and Italy;
under the Nice Treaty rules the power differences
among the countries with a population of more
than 50 million would be small. This situation sug-
gests that the acceptability of the Constitutional
Treaty and the probability of Turkey’s membership
may well be negatively affected.
Migration and the EU Budget
Turkey is likely to have a population larger than
Germany’s 82 million by 2020, if not earlier. Turkey
is poor by European standards—PPP (purchasing
power parity)-adjusted per capita income is roughly
$7,000—and income disparities within the country
are great. The population in the southeast has less
than half the average national income, and the large
rural population is generally much poorer than the
urban population. As discussed by Harry Flam in
chapter 14, these facts have implications for both
the EU budget and for emigration from Turkey.
If the existing rules for contributions to and
receipts from the EU budget remain unchanged—
including the Common Agricultural Policy—Flam
estimates that Turkey would receive a net transfer
of €12 billion from the EU, corresponding to about
14 percent of the present EU budget. The overall
net contribution to the 10 new entrants in 2004 and
Turkey is projected to correspond to about 60 per-
cent of the present budget. Flam concludes from
this that it is unlikely that current rules will remain
unchanged in the face of such large increases in net
transfers from richer to poorer countries.
As noted earlier, the major trade impacts of
Turkish accession on the EU are likely to be in the
movement of labor. The decision to emigrate
depends on a variety of factors, but real wage differ-
entials are clearly important, as are social networks,
culture, language, and geographic distance.17 It will
take decades for Turkey to attain an income level
comparable with that of the EU15, implying that
income differentials will be a strong incentive for
migration from Turkey to the EU. The prospect of
large-scale immigration from Turkey (as well as
from new members and other candidate countries)
is a source of considerable concern among the
EU15. This was a major factor in the French deci-
sion to subject approval of Turkish accession to a
referendum. Fears that immigrants will depress
wages, boost unemployment, and cause social fric-
tion and political upheavals prevail in many EU
member states. Clearly, free migration will not be
allowed immediately upon full membership. For
the 2004 new EU members, the length of the transi-
tion period was seven years, as it was for Greece,
Portugal, and Spain. For Turkey, the period may be
longer, and it may be subject to longer-term con-
trols. However, because accession is unlikely to
occur before 2012, this is an issue that would only
come into play in 2020. By that time, Turkey should
have converged more toward the average income
levels of the EU25, reducing migratory pressures.
As noted by Flam, the strength of the incentive to
move and the total number of people who might
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move are also a function of how rapidly wages rise in
Turkey. As workers leave and the supply of workers
declines in Turkey, wages will go up. Conversely,
immigration will have a depressing effect on wages
in the EU—albeit much smaller because the EU
labor market is much bigger. The net impact on the
Turkish economy will be determined by the extent
to which capital owners are affected in Turkey, the
impact of the loss of (qualified) workers on Turkish
GDP, the extent to which earnings in the EU are
remitted, and the magnitude and impact of reverse
movements as people of Turkish origin relocate
upon retirement and repatriate capital. Much also
will depend on the skill levels of the people who
move. Unskilled migrants are more likely to be com-
plementary to more skilled nationals in the host
economy because they will allow the latter to increase
their productivity and thus their real wages.
Whatever the specific impacts, overall welfare will
increase as a result of migration, but there will be a
redistribution of income. Turkish GDP will decline,
and the EU’s GDP will rise.EU firms (capital owners)
and more highly skilled workers are likely to benefit
from the increased supply of less-skilled workers.
Turkish migrants will gain from the move, and less-
skilled EU workers will lose. The overall welfare
increase will stem from a more efficient allocation of
labor; Turkish laborers become more efficient when
they move to European countries, and the optimal
allocation is achieved when the marginal productiv-
ity of labor is equalized across EU members.
Flam concludes that the Turkish immigrant pop-
ulation in Germany may rise by some 60 percent by
2030. About 3 million people of Turkish origin are
presently in the EU, the overwhelming majority in
Germany, which implies a total movement of some
1.8 million Turks.18 Although this is a highly specu-
lative exercise—as stressed by Flam, much depends
on the parameters assumed in the model—these
numbers are manageable in view of the current
overall EU25 population of 450 million. However,
Flam’s projections assume no restrictions are placed
on migration—a strong assumption.
What such immigration will imply for wages and
employment in the receiving countries is even more
speculative. While those who have investigated the
impacts of immigration suggest that it is likely to be
limited, it should be noted that in contrast to the
debates between the proponents and opponents of
trade integration (where there is significant disagree-
ment about the impact of greater trade on labor mar-
ket outcomes), there is agreement that immigration
will have much greater impacts than expanded trade
between poor and rich countries. One reason is that
migrants will seek employment in all sectors, not just
tradables.19
Implications for Other Developing
Countries
The requirements for accession to the EU provide a
ready-made template, if a constantly evolving and
expanding one, for countries seeking to implement
far-reaching structural reform programs. What is
the relevance of the Turkish experience? What les-
sons can be drawn for other countries with a start-
ing point similar to that of Turkey that will not be
able to accede because they are not part of Europe?
A first lesson is that the prospect of accession is
not a panacea. What matters are the autonomous
decisions on economic policy made by govern-
ments. Although Turkey’s accession to the EU was
already under discussion in the 1960s, very little
progress was made in converging toward EU norms
until the early 1990s. A related lesson is that much of
what is associated with accession can be pursued by
countries that will not be able, or may not desire, to
accede. The EU acquis is a public good in the sense
that any country can avail itself of that body of leg-
islation and regulation. What matters is implemen-
tation, which, in turn, requires commitment and the
relevant institutions to apply the standards. The reg-
ular monitoring and interaction between the Euro-
pean Commission and the partner government,
facilitated by the provision of technical and finan-
cial assistance, can help to maintain progress. How-
ever, accession does not have to be part of the equa-
tion for countries to obtain such assistance—a very
similar structure is available in the form of the
association and economic partnership agreements
that many countries have signed with the EU.
Such agreements can have major potential
downsides if they involve asymmetric liberaliza-
tion of trade in favor of the EU, while keeping bar-
riers to imports from the rest of the world at high
levels. For this reason, the standard policy advice to
governments implementing such discriminatory
trade agreements is to pursue a parallel strategy of
lowering most-favored-nation protection rates as
well (Schiff and Winters 2003). Turkey, because it
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formed a customs union with the EU, has adopted
the common external tariff, which tends to imply a
low average level of protection, at least for manu-
factures.20 Assuming the problem of trade diver-
sion is addressed through the adoption of low, and
ideally uniform, levels of external protection, the
EU model of regulatory principles has much to
offer countries that are similar to Turkey—that is,
emerging markets that have extensive state involve-
ment in the economy, limited competition in serv-
ice markets, and weak banking systems. A process
of “conversion à la carte” is, by definition, not feasi-
ble when it comes to accession, but it is possible in
the context of partnership agreements. Indeed, this
option was made explicit by the EU in its 2004
European Neighborhood Policy, which offers part-
ner countries that do not have the prospect of
accession the opportunity to adopt parts of the
acquis and through this harmonization share the
benefits associated with the relevant elements of
the EU’s Internal Market. The challenge for part-
ner countries is to determine where such approxi-
mation-cum-harmonization will be beneficial and
where not. The Turkish case and its experience
offer valuable guidance on what part of the “EU
package” would be beneficial to adopt and emulate
(with assistance from the EU in the context of such
agreements) and which parts are best left on the
shelf for the future.
The Turkish experience—as well as those of the
CEE countries that acceded to the EU—reveals
clearly that trade policy is important, in that the lib-
eralization of trade with the EU led to significant
improvements in productivity and trade perform-
ance, but that in itself is not sufficient. In an envi-
ronment characterized by limited, if any, competi-
tion in the key network services industries—energy,
telecom, transport—a weak financial sector, and
limited fiscal discipline (and thus extensive cross-
subsidization and transfers), trade liberalization
needs to be complemented by measures to harden
budget constraints and to enact pro-competitive
regulation. The limited stock of inward FDI—a
phenomenon that also characterizes neighboring
countries in the Middle East and is in striking
contrast to the situation in CEE countries—is
indicative: foreign investors either perceive the
attractiveness of locating in Turkey to be limited or
perceive the barriers to FDI to be prohibitive. In
practice, the answer is likely to be a mix of these two
factors. A long history of macroeconomic instability
and high-cost services will lower the interest of an
investor, especially in light of the fact that the Cen-
tral and Eastern European countries offer an alter-
native location. Administrative barriers to FDI
(including red tape) have also been high in the past.
Finally, slow progress on privatization helps to
explain low FDI.
A similar situation prevails in neighboring
countries, although with one major difference:
most Arab countries have experienced macroeco-
nomic stability. Administrative barriers to FDI,
monopoly provision of services, state-owned enter-
prises, and slow privatization all reflect political
decisions. It is an open question to what extent
trade agreements that do not involve the prospect
of accession could assist countries that want to pur-
sue an investment and services liberalization
agenda, although the Turkish experience suggests
that even in a context of possible accession,
progress on this overall agenda can be slow. How-
ever, the deepening of accession efforts in the future
will, by necessity, imply that much of the “behind
the border” reform agenda must be implemented
for accession to become feasible. This may or may
not be true for association agreements that include
services and investment policies. Much tends to be
made of the fact that bilateral and regional trade
agreements are increasingly covering these areas,
but there is little experience with actual implemen-
tation. In principle, again, reforms in this area can
and should be implemented unilaterally. Trade
agreements may help by allowing gradual commit-
ments to be made in a more credible manner, but
much depends on the substance of the reforms. A
key requirement (precondition) for the network
services industries and the financial sector is appro-
priate regulation to ensure efficiency, to guard
against systemic risks, and to achieve social or
equity objectives (e.g., universal service obliga-
tions). These are complex areas. Much can be
learned from the experience of other countries—
such as in the natural gas sector (see chapter 8
by Mazzanti and Biancardi)—but what matters
first and foremost is clear objectives. Also impor-
tant is the establishment of an effective, general
competition authority and mechanisms to assess
the impacts and effects of reforms.21 Indeed, an
important policy decision is to what extent a coun-
try should rely on general competition law to
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discipline the behavior of enterprises, including
dominant firms in the network services industries,
as opposed to sector-specific regulatory bodies.
Conclusion
To join the EU, Turkey will have to attain macro-
economic stability, adopt the EU’s Common Agri-
cultural Policy, and liberalize its services and
network services industries. Integration will be
beneficial for Turkey, because it will remove many
distortions in the price system, boosting the alloca-
tive efficiency in the economy and, in turn, making
the country a more attractive place to invest. With
accession, Turkey will also be eligible for EU Struc-
tural Funds, with the resulting increase in infra-
structural investments further contributing to
prospects for economic growth. In addition, Turkey
will reap benefits from monetary integration, as
well as from migration of Turkish labor to the EU.
However, the welfare gains derived by Turkey from
integration will have a price: the adjustment costs
associated with attaining macroeconomic stability,
adopting the CAP, liberalizing services and the net-
work industries, and complying with EU environ-
mental directives.
According to the European Commission (2004a),
71 percent of the Turkish population supports EU
membership. This high percentage of support can
be explained in part by the economic benefits that
Turkey expects to derive from membership. Equally
important is the recognition in Turkey that the sys-
tem of governance of a rule-based society, as in the
EU with its many institutions, may provide better
prospects for meeting the demands of various
groups in society.22 Support for EU membership
also stems from the process of Westernization and
from geostrategic considerations.23
Turkish accession will also affect the welfare of
current members of the EU. Welfare will increase
because of the further specialization, reflected in
trade, capital, and labor flows, as well as the likely
growth effects of integration. The empirical
research on the economic effects of immigration
indicates fairly small and on the whole positive
effects.24 There will also be political gains for the
EU. Turkey is a large and fast-expanding market. It
is, in fact, the largest market in its neighborhood
and has a GDP that amounts to 55 percent of that
of Russia. Located at the crossroads of Europe,
Eurasia, and the Middle East, Turkey has the poten-
tial to act as a major link between these markets.
With harmonization of commercial legislation, EU
companies will be able to use Turkey as a joint
investment and export base for the Middle East and
Eurasia. Istanbul is already emerging as a base for
transnational corporations operating in the Cauca-
sus and Central Asia. Finally, Turkish membership
could help to secure stability and security in the
Balkans and Caucasus, thereby increasing EU
energy security.
Although the potential net gains for Turkey and
the EU members are significant, Turkey faces major
challenges in implementing the acquis. Major chal-
lenges also must be overcome in realizing the poten-
tial gains associated with increased labor flows from
Turkey—even if they will probably be relatively
small compared with the size of the EU labor force.
The same is true of decision making and manage-
ment of the net annual budgetary cost of Turkish
membership to the EU. The Baldwin-Widgrén
analysis in chapter 13 points to the importance of
passage of the EU Constitutional Treaty and the
acceptance by existing members of a significant role
for Turkey in decision making. Estimates reported
by Flam in chapter 14 and in Togan (2004) suggest
that budgetary costs will be quite high unless the
rules on the CAP and Structural Funds are
changed—constituting yet another challenge that
will have to be negotiated successfully before
accession.
Notes
1. Decision No. 1/95 of the EC-Turkey Association Council
of December 22, 1995, on implementing the final phase of the
customs union (96/142/EC).
2. “By [their] very nature, [accession negotiations are] an
open-ended process whose outcome cannot be guaranteed
beforehand” (European Commission 2004b: 10).
3. The Copenhagen criteria for membership were established
in preparation for the eastern enlargement and cover political
and human rights as well as economic criteria. Membership cri-
teria include “stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy,
the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of
minorities.” As noted by many observers, such as Flam (2003),
Turkey confronts serious problems in meeting the political and
human rights criteria: they imply placing the military under
political control and ridding it of its power in the judicial
system, and they have direct implications for recognizing indi-
vidual and collective cultural rights for minorities (i.e., the
Kurds). In its recommendation to launch accession negotiations,
the Commission argued that in “order to guarantee the sustain-
ability and irreversibility of the political reform process, the EU
should continue to monitor progress of the political reforms
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closely, on the basis of an Accession Partnership setting out pri-
orities for the reform process. The Commission will, following
the analysis in the Regular Report, propose to revise the Acces-
sion Partnership in spring 2005. On this basis, a general review
of the way in which political reforms are consolidated and
broadened will take place on a yearly basis starting from the end
of 2005. The pace of the reforms will determine the progress in
negotiations. In line with the Treaty on European Union and the
Constitution for Europe the Commission will recommend the
suspension of negotiations in the case of a serious and persistent
breach of the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law on which
the Union is founded. The Council should be able to decide on
such recommendation by a qualified majority.” See European
Commission (2004c, 6).
4. The European Commission reports on Turkey provide an
extensive list of actions taken by the government (European
Commission 2004b, 2004c).
5. In this volume, EU15 refers to the 15 members of the EU
prior to the 2004 enlargement in which 10 more countries
became members, creating the EU25. The 15 original member
countries were Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Those added
during the enlargement were Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovak Republic, and
Slovenia.
6. All dollar amounts are U.S. dollars unless otherwise
indicated.
7. The short maturity of debt stock and the large share of
foreign currency–linked securities imply particularly high rates
of rollover on domestic and international markets, increasing
the vulnerability to interest rate and currency rate shocks.
8. The major standards-setting bodies in the EU are CEN,
CENELEC, and the European Telecommunication Standards
Institute (ETSI).
9. The competition authorities have an important role to
play. The Turkish Competition Authority has taken action in the
transport sector, such as investigating a price-fixing cartel in
Black Sea maritime shipping (see OECD 2004b).
10. See http://inweb18.worldbank.org/ECA/Transport.NSF/
Countries/Turkey? Opendocument.
11. The ratio of nonperforming loans to gross loans of the
banking system in Turkey reached about 22 percent in 2001.
The situation improved during 2002 due to acceleration of
out-of-court settlements and voluntary debt restructuring
arrangements.
12. The average excess return on Turkish government bonds
over the London Interbank Offered Rate, or LIBOR (both meas-
ured in U.S. dollars), amounted to only 4 percent over the period
1990–93, but was 22.9 percent over the period 1995–November
2000. In chapter 6, Pazarbas¸ıog˘lu argues that the fiscal cost of the
2001 financial crisis has initially amounted to €50 billion (some
34 percent of GDP). If Turkey had adopted the legislative, regu-
latory, and institutional framework of the EU banking system at
the beginning of the 1990s and had enforced these rules, then
the cost of the crisis would have been much smaller.
13. The state banks to be privatized within three years are
Ziraat Bank and Halk Bank. The government has withdrawn the
banking license of Emlakbank, and it will resume the privatiza-
tion process of Vakifbank as soon as market conditions allow.
14. See World Bank (2004) for an in-depth discussion of the
challenges in and policy options for introducing greater compe-
tition into the Turkish natural gas market, including an analysis
of the sector’s strengths and weaknesses.
15. This is equivalent to about a 2.8 percent increase in real
GDP.
16. The 2004 European Commission recommendation
states: “The negotiations will be complex and reflect . . . the need
for provisions facilitating the harmonious integration of Turkey
into the EU. The application in Turkey of the common agricul-
tural policy and the cohesion policy are two examples. The rules
regarding the free movement of persons are a third. It is likely
that there will be, as in previous enlargement rounds, a need for
substantial and specific arrangements and in some areas long
transition periods. In the case of free movement of persons per-
manent safeguards can be considered. . . . The EU will need to
prepare itself because . . . the Union’s capacity to absorb new
members, while maintaining the momentum of European
integration, is also an important consideration in the general
interest of both the Union and the candidate countries. . . . In
any event, the EU will need to define its financial perspective for
the period from 2014 before the financial implications of certain
negotiating chapters can be tackled” (European Commission
2004b: 7–8).
17. For a survey, see Ghatak, Levine, and Wheatley Price
(1996).
18. Flam obtains a number of 1.3 million for Germany, based
on an initial Turkish-origin population there of 2.2 million. The
number in the text takes into account the additional 800,000
Turks in the rest of the EU as of 2002.
19. Borjas, Freeman, and Katz (1992, 1997) found that
unskilled immigrants, particularly from Mexico, increased the
ratio of unskilled to skilled workers in the United States by some
20 percent, whereas trade flows were found to have increased the
(implicit) ratio by only 4 percent. Freeman (2004) notes that
industries that export still hire a sizable number of unskilled
workers, while import-competing industries have large numbers
of skilled workers. He also observes that the evidence that immi-
gration has a larger impact on the ratio of skilled to unskilled
workers does not necessarily mean that large wage impacts are
associated with immigration. Even large-scale inflows of work-
ers into specific locations are not found to have big effects on
wages (Borjas, Freeman, and Katz, 1996).
20. In principle, any country can choose to adopt the com-
mon external tariff of the EU, so that even if a customs union is
not on the table any country with a free trade agreement with
the EU could emulate the Turkish solution in this dimension.
But better than adopting the idiosyncrasies of the EU political
economy of protection would be to move toward a system of low
and uniform tariffs.
21. The Turkish experience, like that elsewhere in the world,
illustrates the need for a competition authority. The Black Sea
maritime case of restrictive business practices (see note 10) is a
case in point.
22. This may explain the support provided to EU member-
ship by followers of the Islamist political parties as well as by
representatives of different minority groups.
23. During the Tanzimat period (1839–77), Westernizing
reforms were responsible for the adoption of a series of Western
law codes, creation of a judicial organization with secular law
courts, introduction of French-style provincial administration
(1864), and use of the so-called millet system, which made it
possible for the Christian minorities to have their own religious
autonomous administration with representative councils. These
liberal reforms culminated in the declaration of a constitution
and the convocation of a parliament in 1876–77. The process of
reforms continued after the national War of Independence
of 1919–23. Under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s leadership, the
newly founded Republic of Turkey carried out an extensive and
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comprehensive program of modernization and secularization.
Atatürk believed that total Westernization of the country was an
absolute precondition for Turkey’s becoming a member of the
Western family of nations. He succeeded in forging a modern
nation out of a failing empire and a traditional community,
based on the model of the Western countries. Turkey’s
aspiration to membership in the EU stems from the process of
modernization and Westernization, the roots of which may be
traced to Atatürk’s reforms designed to establish a secular order
in a country with a predominantly Muslim population. The
Turkish elite consider membership in the EU a natural, desir-
able, and inevitable step in this process. Furthermore, Turkey
realizes that it sits strategically at the edge of three regions of
conflict—the Balkans, the Middle East, and the Caucasus.
Because of the complexity of its security, Turkey seeks to culti-
vate stability in order to minimize the potential for conflict. For
Turkey, EU membership can help to secure this stability and
contain conflict, particularly in the Balkans. Furthermore, the
EU and Turkey have a mutual interest in preventing and con-
taining any instability that could arise in the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) region.
24. In addition to chapter 14 by Flam, see the studies by
Zimmerman (1995), Haisken-De New and Zimmerman (1996),
Winter-Ebmer and Zimmerman (1998), and Storesletten (2000).
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1Part I
Macroeconomic
Policies for EU
Accession

Despite some notable achievements, a worsening
current account and a fragile banking system led in
late 2000 to a liquidity crisis that turned into a full-
blown banking crisis in February 2001. In response,
the government decided to abandon the crawling
peg regime and floated the currency. In May 2001,
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) increased
its assistance to Turkey under a new standby
arrangement. But just as the revised program was
beginning to show results, the terrorist events of
September 11, 2001, in the United States triggered
the reemergence of serious financing problems. In
February 2002, the IMF approved a new three-year
standby credit for Turkey to support the govern-
ment’s economic program. With the implementa-
tion of the stabilization program, Turkey envisages
a gradual but steady improvement in its economic
conditions. In August 2004 Turkey approached the
IMF for a final three-year standby agreement—an
exit program from instability and excessive debt.
Monetary Developments and Inflation
During the past two decades, Turkey has experienced
high and variable inflation. There is strong evidence
that, in the medium and long term, a close correla-
tion exists between the rate of growth of monetary
aggregates and inflation. This correlation appears in
figure 1.1 between the monthly series of annual con-
sumer price index (CPI) inflation and the monthly
series of the annual growth rate of base money
over the period January 1987–September 2004.
This chapter investigates the macroeconomic poli-
cies appropriate for Turkey both before and after its
accession to the European Union (EU).1 The first
section of the chapter considers the recent macro-
economic developments in Turkey, and the second
examines the macroeconomic policy framework for
EU membership. The third section analyzes the
macroeconomic challenges faced by Turkey, empha-
sizing the issues related to inflation, fiscal policy,
public debt, sustainability of current account, and
exchange rate regimes. The final section offers
conclusions.
Macroeconomic Developments 
in Turkey
Over the past decade, economic crises began to
affect the Turkish economy with increasing fre-
quency. Periods of economic expansion alternated
with periods of equally rapid decline. Although
inflation during the period 1990–2000 fluctuated
between 54.9 percent and 106.3 percent, the average
inflation rate amounted to 75.2 percent. Currently,
Turkey is in the midst of a determined campaign to
turn around decades of weak performance stem-
ming from pervasive structural rigidities and weak
public finances. The past few years have witnessed
three major attempts at addressing underlying
weaknesses. The first was during 2000 under the
three-year standby agreement initiated in Decem-
ber 1999 after a significant drop in output caused by
mostly external factors, including the earthquake.
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A close relation also exists between the annual infla-
tion rate and the annual rate of change in the
exchange rate on a monthly basis over the same
period (see figure 1.2).2
Recent empirical studies of Turkish inflation
have drawn attention to a set of factors that affect
inflation in Turkey.3 Besides the obvious relation
between the aggregate demand and supply, public
sector deficits and exchange rate developments
seem to be the major factors affecting the rate of
inflation.
In equation 1.1, the relation between total
demand and supply is proxied by the output gap.
Almost all researchers agree that, besides the output
gap, public sector deficits play a significant role in
explaining inflation in Turkey. We model the effect
of public sector deficits on inflation through two
variables. The first variable is the noninterest
expenditures. In contrast to interest expenditures,
this portion of the public expenditures is deter-
mined by the government and is the major factor
behind the changes in public sector deficits. The
4 Turkey: Economic Reform and Accession to the European Union
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FIGURE 1.1 Inflation and the Growth Rate of Reserve Money: 
January 1987–September 2004
Source: Central Bank of Turkey.
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FIGURE 1.2 Inflation and the Rate of Depreciation of the Turkish Lira: 
January 1987–September 2004
Source: Central Bank of Turkey.
second variable is the public sector component of
the wholesale price index. The movement of this
variable is almost totally determined by administra-
tive decisions. Adjustments in these prices, regard-
less of their relation with public sector deficits, have
an impact on inflation. Because most of the goods
and services produced by the public sector are used
as inputs, changes in these prices have an impact on
private sector costs. Yet as these changes are publicly
announced, they have a signaling effect. In this
sense, the role of public sector prices is very similar
to that of the exchange rate. The third variable
influencing inflation in the equation is the exchange
rate, which affects the prices of imported commodi-
ties. Fourth, in this equation the effect of monetary
expansion on inflation is captured by movements in
the base money. Thus one can now estimate Turkish
inflation by using monthly data to solve
(1.1) d log(CPI) =
β0 + β1d log( ppublic) + β2(d log(E )
+ d log(E (−1))) + β3 OG(−1)
+ β4NIEXP + β5(d log(M(−1))
+ d log(M(−2))) + β6d log(CPI(−12))
+ β6 Dummy
where CPI denotes the consumer price index, ppublic
the public sector component of the wholesale price
index, E the Turkish lira/U.S. dollar exchange rate,
OG the output gap measured by the difference of
the monthly industrial production index from its
trend, NIEXP the moving average of the consoli-
dated budget noninterest expenditures over the past
12 months, M the base money supply, and Dummy
the dummy variable taking the value of 1 during
the summer months of June, July, and August of
each year and 0 otherwise. When we checked all the
variables used in the estimation for unit roots, we
learned that the series as used in the equation are all
stationary. The results of the estimation are pre-
sented in table 1.1.
To deal with the problem of identifying the
long-run determinants of inflation, we carried out
the Johansen cointegration test with the variables
that were significant in the short-term inflation
equation and that were found to be I(1)—that is,
CPI, NIEXP, M, ppublic, and E.
4 The significant coin-
tegration equation found among four of these vari-
ables can be expressed as
(1.2) CPI = −2.234 + 0.000357 M
+ 0.279695 ppublic + 0.000315 E
As one would expect from economic theory, base
money and exchange rate play an important role in
explaining inflation in the long run. By contrast, the
presence of the public sector component of the
wholesale price index reflects an invariant charac-
teristic of policymaking in Turkey. The rather popu-
lar political instrument used to achieve short-term
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TABLE 1.1 Estimated Inflation (Monthly)
Coefficient t-Statistic
Constant 0.01 1.872
Public price (d log(ppublic)) 0.31 14.35
Exchange rate (d log(E) + d log(E(−1)) 0.04 2.753
Output gap (OG) 0.033 2.567
Noninterest expenditures (NIEXP) 0.012 1.822
Base money (d log (M(−1)) + d log(M(−2)) 0.025 1.963
CPI inflation (d log(CPI(−12))) 0.192 4.282
Dummy −0.016 −6.072
AR(1) 0.463 6.364
R-squared: 0.802
Adjusted R-squared: 0.792
Durbin Watson statistic: 1.884
Note: The dependent variable was d log(CPI), and the estimation period was January
1990–November 2003. The diagnostic tests for this regression indicate that there is no
evidence of deviation from normality, autocorrelation, and heteroscedasticity.
Source: The authors.
objectives seems to have had a strong inflationary
impact in the long run.
Real Exchange Rate and Current Account
Until the end of the 1970s, Turkey followed a fixed
and multiple exchange rate policy while experienc-
ing relatively high inflation rates. The policy led to
a loss of competitiveness and eventually to the
foreign exchange crisis of the late 1970s. The gross
national product (GNP) shrank by 0.5 percent in
1979 and by 2.8 percent in 1980. With the stabiliza-
tion measures of 1980, Turkey devalued its lira by
100 percent and eliminated the multiple exchange
rate system, except for imports of fertilizers and fer-
tilizer inputs. After May 1981, the exchange rate was
adjusted daily against major currencies to maintain
the competitiveness of Turkish exports. Multiple
currency practices were phased out during the first
two years of the 1980 stabilization program, and
the government pursued a policy of depreciating
the real exchange rate (RER)—on average by about
6 percent annually over the period 1980–88.5
In January 1984, domestic commercial banks
were allowed to engage in foreign exchange opera-
tions within certain limits, and restrictions on for-
eign travel and investment from abroad were eased
and simplified. Determination of the exchange rate
was further liberalized by permitting banks to set
their own rates within a specified band around the
central bank rate. In August 1988, major reform
was introduced, and a system in which the market
set foreign exchange rates was adopted. In 1989 for-
eign exchange operations and international capital
movements were liberalized entirely.6
A drawback of the RER depreciation policy pur-
sued during the 1980s was the decline in real wages,
measured in terms of foreign currency.7 By the sec-
ond half of the 1980s, popular support for the gov-
ernment had begun to fall off. In the local elections
of March 1989, the governing political party suf-
fered heavy losses. To increase political support, the
government conceded substantial pay increases
during collective bargaining in the public sector.
Pressure then built up in the private sector to arrive
at similarly high wage settlements, real wages began
to increase, and the RER started to appreciate.
According to the government, the appreciation
of the RER after 1989 stemmed from market
forces. During the 1990s, Turkey’s public finances
deteriorated considerably. The large public sector
deficits were financed by borrowing from the mar-
ket at very high real interest rates. Significant capital
flowed into the country because it was offering not
only high real interest rates but also the prospect of
steady real appreciation of the exchange rate. Thus
the government’s implicit commitment to the RER
appreciation insured the private sector, domestic
and foreign, against currency risk. It encouraged
capital inflows from abroad and lending to the
public sector, giving rise to the phenomenon of
large, arbitrage-related, short-term capital inflows.
The policy pursued during the first half of the
1990s was not sustainable. By 1993 the current-
account-deficit-to-GDP (gross domestic product)
ratio had reached 3.6 percent. In 1994 the country
faced balance of payments crises from which the
GDP shrank by 5.5 percent. But with the introduc-
tion of stabilization measures, the trend in the RER
reversed. The RER depreciated by 64 percent dur-
ing January 1994 and April 1994. The country had
to reverse its economic policies, however, because
of the relatively weak coalition governments. The
RER began to appreciate again after April 1994, and
by September 1995 it had appreciated by about
23.5 percent.
Between 1995 and 1997, the economy went
through a boom period of above-trend growth,
only to find itself badly hit in 1998 by the Russian
crisis. In August 1999, a severe earthquake hit the
Marmara area of Turkey, and another large shock
hit the Bolu area in November 1999. Because of
these shocks, real GDP shrank by 4.7 percent in
1999. At the end of that year, Turkey embarked on
an ambitious stabilization program. Central to the
program has been the policy of using a predeter-
mined exchange rate path as a nominal anchor for
reducing inflationary expectations.
During 2000, the RER appreciated considerably,
which aggravated further the current account
deficits, leading to concerns about the sustainability
of the exchange rate regime. The current-account-
deficit-to-GDP ratio reached 4.9 percent in 2000.
This episode ended with a severe currency crisis in
February 2001. There was a serious run on the
Turkish lira (TL), interest rates skyrocketed, and
foreign exchange reserves began to decline rapidly.
The government decided to abandon the crawling
peg regime and to float the currency. The exchange
rate then depreciated sharply.
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On May 15, 2001, the IMF increased its assistance
under a new standby arrangement. This program
aimed to strengthen the balance of public finances in
a way that would prevent deterioration in the future.
During 2001, Turkey introduced a set of structural
reforms. But the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001, threatened the progress of the reforms. Turkey
responded with a strengthened medium-term pro-
gram intended to clean up the banking sector, con-
solidate fiscal adjustments, and achieve disinflation,
and in February 2002 the IMF approved a three-year
standby credit for Turkey to support the govern-
ment’s economic program. During 2001, the GNP
contracted by 9.5 percent, and the loss in employ-
ment was put at more than 1 million.8 Toward the
end of 2001, the RER began to appreciate again.
With the appreciation of the RER, considerable eco-
nomic recovery was observed during 2002–04.
Figure 1.3 shows developments in the current
account-to-GDP ratio over the period 1975–2003.
Currency crises arose in the late 1970s, 1994, and
2001. The figure indicates that the probability of a
balance of payments crisis increases in Turkey as
the current-account-deficit-to-GDP ratio increases
above the critical level of 5 percent.9 By October
2004, the annual current account deficit had
reached $14.17 billion, and the current-account-
deficit-to-GDP ratio had increased to about 5 per-
cent by the third quarter of 2004.
Figure 1.4 shows the time path of the RER over
the past two decades, and it reveals four episodes of
RER developments. After the foreign exchange cri-
sis of the late 1970s, the RER began to depreciate
sharply in response to the stabilization measures of
1980. It continued to depreciate until 1988, when it
began to appreciate—that is, until 1994, when the
country was faced with another currency crisis. In
1994 the RER depreciated sharply, but it appreci-
ated again from April 1994 to February 2001, when
the country was faced with yet another currency
crisis. After the sharp depreciation of the RER from
February 2001 to April 2001, it began to appreciate,
especially after October 2001. It appreciated until
March 2004 by about 36.3 percent. During March
2004 and May 2004, the RER depreciated by about
11 percent, and thereafter it stayed relatively con-
stant until October 2004.
Fiscal Developments
Table 1.2 shows the structure of the revenues and
expenditures of the public sector from 1998 to
2002. The public sector consists of the central gov-
ernment, revolving funds, social security institu-
tions, extrabudgetary funds, local governments, and
state economic enterprises (SEEs). The table reveals
that, on average, during 1998–2002 revenues made
up 29.24 percent of GNP, expenditures 42.4 percent
Macroeconomic Policies for Turkey’s Accession to the EU 7
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TABLE 1.2 Structure of Revenues, Expenditures, and Public Sector Borrowing Requirements (PSBR), 1998–2002
Share of Total Revenue Share of Total Expenditure
Nontax Factor Social Privatization Current Investment Interest Other Stock
Taxes Income Income Funds Revenues Expenditures Expenditures Payments Transfers Changes Fund Revenue/GNP Expenditure/GNP PSBR/GNP
1998 80.62 4.94 19.93 −9.27 3.78 31.63 19.43 35.88 9.89 3.16 25.56 34.99 9.42
1999 87.01 5.93 18.60 −11.84 0.31 32.45 16.17 37.21 10.82 3.35 25.57 41.09 15.52
2000 82.51 7.37 11.41 −6.30 5.00 29.19 16.34 41.30 11.07 2.10 30.45 42.23 11.78
2001 81.64 6.63 16.31 −7.34 2.76 26.41 11.21 49.31 9.80 3.27 33.26 49.65 16.39
2002 76.60 9.74 23.38 −10.24 0.53 28.74 14.21 44.66 10.82 1.57 31.38 44.06 12.68
Average 81.67 6.92 17.93 −9.00 2.48 29.68 15.47 41.67 10.48 2.69 29.24 42.40 13.16
Source: Turkish State Planning Organization.
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of GNP, and public sector borrowing requirements
(PSBR) 13.16 percent of GNP. Taxes are the main
source of revenues, forming about 81.67 percent of
the total; indirect taxes make up about 70 percent of
tax revenue. Although factor incomes generated by
the profits of SEEs have constituted, on average,
17.93 percent of total revenues, the social funds
have not generated revenue; they have been subsi-
dized from the budget. On the expenditures side,
current expenditures and investments constitute,
on average, 29.68 percent and 15.47 percent of total
expenditures, respectively. The most important
expenditure item during the period 1998–2002 was
the interest payments—on average, they were
41.67 percent of total expenditures.
Public Sector Borrowing Requirements and Public
Debt During the 1990s, the PSBR amounted on
average to 12 percent of GNP. The high deficit
incurred during the period was financed by borrow-
ing from the market at very high real interest rates, as
shown in figure 1.5.10 Table 1.3 reveals that between
the end of 1995 and the end of 2001 Turkey’s debt
stock more than doubled in terms of the debt-to-
GDP ratio and reached 95 percent at the end of 2001.
In 2002 the debt stock shrank somewhat, but it
remained at almost twice its level in 1995. By 2002
external and foreign exchange (FX) indexed debt had
reached 59.4 percent of total debt.
The evolution of public debt is best explained by
decomposing the annual change in debt into vari-
ous components as shown in table 1.3. Concentrat-
ing on developments during the past two years, the
World Bank (2003) notes that the debt-to-GNP
ratio in 2001 alone rose by 37.6 percent. Although
the country ran a primary surplus of 5.5 percent of
its GNP with the introduction of the IMF stabiliza-
tion program, three factors mainly contributed to
the increase in the debt-to-GNP ratio: (1) the high
interest rates prevailing in the country; (2) depreci-
ation of the real exchange rate, leading to increases
in the ratio of FX-denominated debt to GNP; and
(3) the costs of the banking crisis. In response to
the banking crisis, the government issued new
bonds in order to recapitalize failing banks. The
bonds issued for this purpose amounted to 20 per-
cent of GNP (table 1.3). In 2002 the debt picture
improved, but this time it stemmed mainly from
the real appreciation of the real exchange rate.
The PSBR-to-GNP and debt-to-GNP ratios
given earlier are based on data from Turkey’s State
Planning Organization (SPO). Two other sets of
data on the PSBR-to-GNP ratio, and thus on the
debt-to-GNP ratio in Turkey, are also available—
the first from the IMF and the second from the EU,
consistent with the European System of Accounts
1995 (ESA 95) codes. The differences among the
three sets of data are mainly attributable to the
large duty losses. During the 1990s, the state banks
faced unrecovered costs from duties carried out on
behalf of the government, and they covered their
financing needs from markets by borrowing at very
high interest rates and at short maturities. The
direct subsidies given through the state banks to
farmers and small business were not shown in the
government budget figures of the SPO; instead,
they were shown on state banks’ balance sheets as
performing assets accruing interest income. The
PSBR-to-GNP ratios of the SPO do not reflect the
subsidy components given through the state banks,
whereas the figures estimated by the IMF and EU
do. A close look at the data in table 1.4 will reveal
that the public sector, according to the IMF defini-
tion, ran a deficit equal to 18.9 percent in 2000,
21.1 percent in 2001, 12.1 percent in 2002, and
10 percent in 2003. As a result, the net debt-to-GNP
ratio, according to the IMF definition, increased
Macroeconomic Policies for Turkey’s Accession to the EU 9
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TABLE 1.3 Debt and Fiscal Sustainability, 1994–2002
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Stock of public debt (% of GNP)
Domestic debt 14.0 12.2 20.5 20.4 24.4 40.9 39.1 57.2 47.7
FX-denominated/indexed 2.7 20.4 15.3
Floating rate 28.6 20.5
External debt 30.7 29.1 26.0 22.5 19.3 20.1 18.3 37.7 32.1
External + FX-denominated/indexed 30.7 29.1 26.0 22.5 19.3 20.1 21.0 58.1 47.4
Total debt 44.7 41.3 46.5 42.9 43.7 61.0 57.4 95.0 79.8
Public debt dynamics (% of GNP)
Change in debt −3.4 5.2 −3.6 0.8 17.3 −3.6 37.6 −15.2
Debt-creating items
Interest payments 7.3 10.0 11.0 16.2 22.1 21.9 23.5 16.3
Debt-reducing items
Primary balance 2.7 −1.2 −2.1 0.9 −2.0 2.7 5.5 3.9
Growth effect 1.7 1.5 2.0 0.9 −1.8 2.4 −3.9 4.8
Inflation effect 6.5 5.3 9.2 8.8 8.7 13.8 13.0 11.2
Revaluation effect 4.4 1.9 1.6 2.5 −1.2 3.8 −13.2 10.1
Seigniorage 3.0 2.4 2.9 2.4 3.2 1.8 1.4 1.5
Other 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.5 0.1 1.6 −18.1 −1.8
Privatization 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.5 0.1 1.6 1.9 0.1
Cost of financial sector bailout 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 −20.0 −1.9
Source: World Bank 2003.
from 57.4 percent in 2000 to 93.9 percent in 2001,
and then decreased to 79.2 percent in 2002 and to
70.9 percent in 2003. Public debt, according to the
IMF definition, is a net debt that is measured in
percent of centered GNP, defined as the sum of
quarterly GNP in the last two quarters of the year
and in the first two quarters of the following year.11
By contrast, the EU measures the debt in gross
terms. Thus total gross public debt, according to
the EU definition, decreased from 102.6 percent of
GDP in 2001 to 89.5 percent in 2002 and 80.2 per-
cent in 2003.
Structure of Taxes Because taxes constituted
about 80.25 percent of total revenues during
2000–02, this section will consider the tax burden
in Turkey, compare the composition of tax rev-
enues in Turkey with that of tax revenues in the EU,
and compare the main features of personal, corpo-
rate, and value added tax (VAT) systems in Turkey
and the EU.
Turkey is an upper-middle-income country,
whose per capita income falls at the lower end of
those of this group of countries. A comparison of
the central government tax revenues of Turkey with
those of other countries reveals that Turkey has a
relatively high tax burden in its per capita income
group (see World Bank 2003). When compared
with those of lower-middle-income countries,
Turkey’s tax burden is markedly above the revenue
average of 13.6 percent of the lower-income group.
It is also significantly above the average of 21.3 per-
cent for all upper-middle-income countries. In fact,
it is comparable with that of Ireland (see table 1.5),
but it is still below the tax/GDP figures in the mem-
ber countries of the EU.12
Table 1.6, which shows the composition of tax
revenues in Turkey and the EU, reveals that EU
countries obtain a significantly larger percentage of
tax revenues from social security and payroll taxes
(32.7 percent) compared with Turkey (14.3 per-
cent). In Turkey, the share of taxes on goods and
services (35.7 percent) is higher than the similar
share in the EU (28.8 percent).
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TABLE 1.4 Ratios of Public Sector Borrowing Requirements (PSBR) and of Debt to
GNP and GDP, 2000–03
PSBR/GNP PSBR/GDP Debt/GNP Debt/GDP
SPO IMF EU SPO IMF EU
2000 11.8 18.9 9.8 57.5 57.4 65.4
2001 16.4 21.1 15.9 91.0 93.9 102.6
2002 12.8 12.1 13.6 78.7 79.2 89.5
2003 9.4 10.0 10.1 70.5 70.9 80.2
Note: The debt/GNP figures of the IMF refer to the net debt of the public sector as a ratio of centered GNP,
where centered GNP is defined as the sum of quarterly GNP in the last two quarters of the year and in the first
two quarters of the next year. The debt/GDP figures of the EU refer to the ratio of the gross debt of the public
sector to GDP.
Sources: IMF 2004; Turkish State Planning Organization (SPO) 2004; http://www.treasury.gov.tr.
TABLE 1.5 Total Tax Revenue as Percentage
of GDP, 1998–2000
1998 1999 2000
Austria 44.3 44.1 43.7
Belgium 45.8 45.4 45.6
Denmark 50.1 51.2 48.8
Finland 46.1 46.8 46.9
France 45.1 45.7 45.3
Germany 37.1 37.8 37.9
Greece 35.6 36.9 37.8
Ireland 31.7 31.3 31.1
Italy 42.5 43.3 42.0
Luxembourg 39.8 40.9 41.7
Netherlands 40.0 41.2 41.4
Portugal 33.3 34.1 34.5
Spain 34.0 35.0 35.2
Sweden 51.6 52.0 54.2
United Kingdom 36.9 36.4 37.4
Turkey 28.4 31.3 33.4
Source: OECD 2003.
Table 1.7 compares for 2002 the personal tax,
corporate tax, and VAT systems of Turkey and the
EU countries. The table reveals that the average
income tax and social security contribution rate on
gross labor income in Turkey amounts to 43.2 per-
cent, whereas the same tax rate is 25.8 percent in
Ireland and 29.7 percent in the United Kingdom.
The corporate income tax in Turkey is 44.1 percent,
whereas it is 16 percent in Ireland and 30 percent
in United Kingdom. By contrast, the VAT rate in
Turkey is 18 percent, whereas it is 15 percent in
Luxembourg and 16 percent in Germany and
Spain. According to the table, tax rates are in gen-
eral very high in Turkey. With such high tax rates,
Turkey should have achieved a much higher total-
tax-to-GNP ratio than the 31.8 percent achieved
in 1999. Currently, the country has a large share
of employment declared to be at the minimum
wage because of attempts by both employees and
employers to reduce their tax burden, and it has rel-
atively large employment in the informal sector. As
a result, Turkey’s tax base is rather narrow.
Employment and Growth
Table 1.8, which shows developments in the labor
market for 2001–03, reveals that Turkey, with a
population of 70.7 million and a labor force partici-
pation rate of 48.3 percent in 2003, has created jobs
for about 21 million people. During 2003, 33.9 per-
cent of the labor force was employed in agriculture,
18.2 percent in industry, and 47.9 percent in serv-
ices. The unemployment rate was 10.5 percent. The
average unemployment rate during 1990–2000 was
7.6 percent, but it increased considerably with the
financial crisis of 2001.
These figures indicate that Turkey must create
jobs for its unemployed workers, as well as for those
entering the labor force for the first time at the
average rate of 900,000 persons a year. In addition,
Turkey has to increase the labor force participation
rate from its current low level of 48.3 percent to the
levels that prevailed at the beginning of the 1990s.
At that time, the labor force participation rate was
56.5 percent. By contrast, the comparable level in
the EU was about 63 percent. Job creation, then, is a
major challenge that Turkey must meet over time.
The Turkish labor market is extremely flexible
because of the country’s formidable informal sector,
whose wage-setting mechanism is quite different
from that of the formal sector. The informal sector
is largely free from most types of labor regulation,
and it does not pay most taxes and related charges.
Activities in this sector rely largely on the provision
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TABLE 1.6 Revenue from Major Taxes as a Percentage of Total Tax Revenue, 1998
Personal Corporate Social Security Goods and General 
Income Income and Other Payroll Property Services Consumption Taxes
Austria 22.5 4.8 40.3 1.3 27.9 18.7
Belgium 30.7 8.5 31.5 3.2 24.9 15.3
Denmark 51.6 5.6 3.9 3.6 33.2 19.6
Finland 32.3 9.0 25.2 2.4 30.7 18.5
France 17.4 5.9 39.5 7.3 26.6 17.5
Germany 25.0 4.4 40.4 2.4 27.4 17.9
Greece (1997) 13.2 6.4 32.3 3.8 41.0 22.6
Ireland 30.9 10.7 13.8 5.2 38.7 22.2
Italy 25.0 7.0 29.5 4.8 27.4 14.2
Luxembourg 18.8 19.7 25.6 8.4 26.1 13.7
Netherlands 15.2 10.6 39.9 4.9 27.7 16.9
Portugal 17.1 11.6 25.5 2.9 41.3 23.3
Spain 20.8 7.3 35.2 6.0 29.4 16.6
Sweden 35.0 5.7 33.5 3.7 21.6 13.6
United Kingdom 27.5 11.0 17.6 10.7 32.6 18.1
EU 23.9 7.1 32.7 5.4 28.8 17.2
Turkey 27.0 5.8 14.3 2.8 35.7 30.0
Source: Noord and Heady 2001.
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TABLE 1.7 Personal Tax, Corporate Tax, and VAT System: Turkey and EU
Countries, 2002
Marginal Income Average Income
Tax and Social Tax and Social
Security Contribution Security Contribution Corporate Standard
Rate on Gross Rate on Gross Income Tax VAT
Labor Income Labor Income Rate Rate
Austria 55.3 44.7 34.0 20.0
Belgium 66.7 55.6 40.2 21.0
Denmark 50.4 44.2 30.0 25.0
Finland 57.4 45.9 29.0 22.0
France 53.0 48.3 — 19.6
Germany 63.9 50.7 38.9 16.0
Greece 44.1 36.0 — 18.0
Ireland 33.9 25.8 16.0 21.0
Italy 54.5 46.2 — 20.0
Luxembourg 47.9 34.2 30.4 15.0
Netherlands 51.0 42.3 34.5 19.0
Portugal 39.4 32.5 33.0 19.0
Spain 45.5 37.9 35.0 16.0
Sweden 50.4 48.6 28.0 25.0
United Kingdom 39.2 29.7 30.0 17.5
Turkey 45.6 43.2 44.1 18.0
— Not available.
Note: The first two columns report marginal and average personal income tax and social security
contribution rates for a single person without dependents at 100 percent of the average production wage.
The corporate income tax rate for Turkey refers to the total effective tax burden of a nonpublicly owned
company. In the case of a publicly owned company, the tax burden goes down to 36.7 percent.
Source: OECD tax database (http://www.oecd.org).
TABLE 1.8 Labor Market Indicators: Turkey, 2001–03
2001 2002 2003
Population (thousands) 68,610 69,626 70,712
Population 15 and over (thousands) 47,158 48,041 48,912
Labor force (thousands) 23,491 23,818 23,640
Participation ratio (%) 49.8 49.6 48.3
Civilian employment (thousands) 21,524 21,354 21,147
Unemployment (thousands) 1,967 2,464 2,493
Unemployment rate (%) 8.4 10.3 10.5
Employment by sector (thousands)
Agriculture 8,089 7,458 7,165
Industry 3,774 3,954 3,847
Services 9,661 9,942 10,135
Sectoral distribution of employment (%)
Agriculture 37.6 34.9 33.9
Industry 17.5 18.5 18.2
Services 44.9 46.6 47.9
Source: Treasury statistics, 1980–2003.
of labor without formal employment contracts. Job
insecurity is pervasive, and workers receive very few
benefits from their employers. Because wages in the
informal sector are determined by demand and sup-
ply conditions, the informal sector itself is flexible.
By contrast, the formal sector observes labor regula-
tions, and it pays all taxes and related charges such
as social security contributions and payments to
various funds. Thus, this sector is not as flexible as
the informal sector. Until now, Turkey has success-
fully solved the unemployment problem by means
of its large informal sector.13 Indeed, over time this
sector has grown considerably through the lax
enforcement of tax, social security, and labor laws.
But the current system of formal and informal sec-
tors, with the informal sector accounting for about
60 percent of total employment, does not seem to be
sustainable in the long run.14
As for the growth of GDP, over the period
1950–2002, GDP increased at an average annual
rate of 4.9 percent.15 However, over the same period
the average growth rate declined. The growth rate
of GDP was 7.1 percent during 1950–59, 5.4 per-
cent during 1960–69, 4.7 percent during 1970–79,
4.1 percent during 1980–89, and 3.6 percent over the
period 1990–2002. Besides experiencing decreasing
average growth rates of real income, Turkey has
recently faced greater economic volatility, because
economic crises have begun to affect the Turkish
economy with increasing frequency. As noted ear-
lier, during the last decade periods of economic
expansion have alternated with periods of equally
rapid decline.
Macroeconomic Policy Framework
for EU Membership 
Upon accession, Turkey, according to Article 122 of
the treaty establishing the European Community
(hereafter known as the “Treaty”), will be treated as
a “Member State with a derogation” until it fulfills
the convergence criteria.16 The Central and Eastern
European (CEE) countries, when signing the acces-
sion treaty, have accepted the goal of monetary
union as part of the acquis communautaire, the
entire body of legislation of the European Commu-
nities and Union. To become members of the
European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU),
the CEE countries must fulfill the convergence cri-
teria, which involve conditions on price stability,
interest rate convergence, budget deficits, govern-
ment debt, and exchange rate stability.17
Macroeconomic Policy Framework 
for EMU Members 
On January 1, 1999, 11 of the 15 member countries
of the EU entered the third and final stage of the
process leading to the formation of the EMU. At
that time, the exchange rates among the currencies
of the participating countries were irrevocably
fixed in relation to the new single currency, the
euro, and the newly formed European Central Bank
(ECB) had taken over responsibility for monetary
policy in the Euro Area. Individual member coun-
tries of the EMU therefore no longer have control
over either monetary policy or exchange rate
policy; they have surrendered their sovereignty in
monetary and exchange rate policy to the suprana-
tional authority, the ECB.
Monetary Policy The European System of Cen-
tral Banks (ESCB) is composed of the European
Central Bank and the national central banks
(NCBs) of all 15 EU member states.18 Because not
all members joined the monetary union from the
outset, the term Eurosystem was adopted to
describe the ECB and the NCBs of the 11 member
states that have adopted the euro. All decisions
related to the Eurosystem are made by the decision-
making bodies of the ECB, the Executive Board,
and the Governing Council. The Executive Board
comprises the president and the vice president of
the ECB and four other members. It implements
monetary policy in accordance with the guidelines
and decisions laid down by the Governing Council.
The Governing Council comprises the members of
the Executive Board and the governors of the NCBs
participating in the Euro Area. It is the primary
decision-making body of the ECB.
The Treaty specifies that the main task of the
Eurosystem is to deliver price stability (Article 105).
According to Article 107 of the Treaty, the Eurosys-
tem is solely responsible for the Euro Area’s single
monetary policy, and it is to pursue the goal of
price stability free from political pressure by EU
institutions, interest groups, or individuals. The
Treaty does not precisely define price stability. The
Eurosystem interprets it as a year-to-year increase in
the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP)
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for the Euro Area of below 2 percent (European
Central Bank 2003b), which is to be maintained
over the medium term. The phrase “below 2 per-
cent’’ delineates the upper bound for the rate of
measured inflation in the HICP.
To achieve price stability, the Eurosystem uses
two pillars. The first pillar is what the Eurosystem
calls “economic analysis.” It consists of a broadly
based assessment of the outlook for price develop-
ments and the risks to price stability in the Euro
Area as a whole. The assessment concentrates on
the medium impact of the current conditions of
inflation. The second pillar is an assessment of the
evolution of monetary aggregates (M3) and credit.
It analyzes the longer-run impact of monetary
aggregates on inflation. The two perspectives offer
complementary analytical frameworks to support
the Governing Council’s overall assessment of risks
to price stability. The inflation forecast is published
twice a year. If the forecast exceeds the target (i.e.,
the 2 percent definition of price stability), the pre-
sumption under an inflation targeting strategy is
that monetary policy will be tightened. Although
the Eurosystem’s strategy resembles inflation tar-
geting, the Eurosystem does not want to give the
appearance that it acts mechanically.
In conducting monetary policy, the Eurosystem
uses mainly short-term interest rates and focuses on
the overnight rate EONIA (European Over-Night
Index Average, a weighted average of overnight
lending transactions in the Euro Area’s interbank
market). Control over EONIA is achieved in two
ways. First, the Eurosystem has two facilities at its
disposal: a marginal lending facility and a deposit
facility. These facilities operate under overnight
maturity and are available to counterparties at their
own initiative. They are administered on a decen-
tralized basis, with their features harmonized across
the Eurosystem. Overnight liquidity is provided at a
prespecified interest rate against eligible collateral.
In normal circumstances, the interest rate on the
marginal lending facility defines the ceiling for
EONIA in the market. Similarly, the deposit facility
defines the floor for overnight market rates. All
financial institutions fulfilling the general eligibility
criteria may access this facility. Access is granted
through the NCB in the country in which the finan-
cial institution is established and on all days that the
national payment and securities settlement systems
are operational.
The second way in which control is exercised over
EONIA is ECB auctions, usually weekly, with a
maturity of two weeks at a rate the ECB chooses.
These auctions, called refinancing operations, pro-
vide the liquidity needed by the banking system, and
the chosen interest rate serves as a guide for EONIA.
Transactions related to weekly tenders are conducted
by the NCBs in the form of standard (fixed-rate or
variable-rate) tenders. The NCBs are responsible for
collecting the tender offers and transmitting them to
the ECB. They also inform credit institutions about
the results of the tenders and arrange the settlement
aspects—that is, receiving the collateral and provid-
ing the liquidity. Both the ECB and the NCBs con-
duct longer-term refinancing operations monthly,
with a maturity of three months. These operations
provide the financial sector with additional longer-
term liquidity. In addition, the NCBs may carry out
structural open-market operations. The Governing
Council can authorize fine-tuning, outright transac-
tions of securities, foreign exchange swaps, and the
collection of deposits to be conducted, in excep-
tional circumstances, by the ECB itself.
Although in conducting monetary policy the
Eurosystem uses mainly short-term interest rates, it
is the long-term interest rate that affects the econ-
omy. Indeed, households and firms borrow for rel-
atively long periods. Thus central banks control the
short maturity, while it is the long maturity that
really matters. Yet these banks do influence the
long-term rates by being clear about their longer-
run aims and intentions.
Overall, the Eurosystem constitutionally enjoys
considerable independence, both in defining its
objectives and in deciding how to conduct mone-
tary policy. The ECB is accountable to the European
Parliament.
Fiscal Policy The Euro Area does not have a cen-
tral fiscal authority.19 There is a budget for the EU
as a whole, but it is relatively small. Spending
amounts to only a little over 1 percent of GDP,
devoted mostly to common agricultural policy and
the structural funds, and deficit financing is pro-
hibited. Thus, budgetary decisions in the Euro Area
will remain almost exclusively the province of
member states, albeit subject to surveillance by the
EU as a whole in the context of the requirements set
out in the Maastricht Treaty and subsequently the
Stability and Growth Pact.
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For countries seeking to qualify for EMU mem-
bership and those already members, the Maastricht
Treaty and the SGP established certain targets on
the size of debt and deficits and other obligations.
For countries already in the EMU, the targets were
intended to achieve and maintain “sound” budget-
ary positions and to avoid harsh penalties. Article
104 of the Treaty establishes that “member states
shall avoid excessive government deficits” and that
compliance with budgetary discipline will be
judged on the basis of two criteria:
(a) whether the ratio of the planned or actual
government deficit to gross domestic product
exceeds a reference value, unless either the ratio
has declined substantially and continuously and
reached a level that comes close to the reference
value, or, alternatively, the excess over the refer-
ence value is only exceptional and temporary and
the ratio remains close to the reference value
(b) whether the ratio of government debt to
gross domestic product exceeds a reference
value, unless the ratio is sufficiently diminishing
and approaching the reference value at a satis-
factory pace.
As is well known, these two reference values were
set at 3 percent and 60 percent, respectively.
The SGP was designed to provide concreteness
to several provisions of the Treaty on economic
policies in the EU. It consists of a resolution of
the European Council and of two regulations
(No. 1466/97 and No. 1467/97) of the Council for
Economic and Financial Affairs (ECOFIN).20 The
resolution reaffirms the commitment to fiscal disci-
pline and introduces the notion that the “medium-
term budgetary objective of positions close to
balance or in surplus” should be respected by mem-
ber states in order to “allow all Member States to
deal with normal cyclical fluctuations while keep-
ing the government deficit within the reference
value of 3 percent of GDP.” The medium term is
understood to represent about three years.
Regulation No. 1466/97 clarifies the procedures
to be followed in implementing the surveillance of
the Stability and Growth Pact, as envisioned in gen-
eral terms in Article 99 of the Treaty. In particular,
it establishes, first, that member states must every
year submit an update to the stability program that
contains a medium-term objective for the budget-
ary position, as well as a description of the assump-
tions and of the main economic policy measures
the country intends to take to achieve the targets;
and, second, that the European Council, on a rec-
ommendation from the Commission, must deliver
an opinion on each program and its yearly updates
and, if deemed necessary, a recommendation.
Three types of recommendations are possible. First,
the Council could issue a recommendation that the
program be adjusted if deemed deficient in some
respect. Second, if after approving the program
the Council identifies a “significant divergence
of the budgetary position from the medium-
term budgetary objective, or the adjustment path
towards it,” the Commission can issue a recom-
mendation (early warning) in accordance with
Article 103(4). Third, if the divergence persists, the
Council can issue a recommendation to take cor-
rective action, and can make the recommendation
public.
Regulation No. 1467/97 first tries to make more
precise the notion of “exceptional and temporary”
excess of the deficit over the 3 percent of GDP
threshold, as introduced by Article 104 of the
Treaty. Article 2(1) of the regulation specifies that
an “exceptional and temporary” excess of the deficit
is allowed “when resulting from an unusual event
outside the control of the Member State concerned
and which has a major impact on the financial
position of the general government or when result-
ing from a severe economic downturn.” Arti-
cles 2(2) and 2(3) further specify that a deficit will
be considered exceptional “if there is an annual fall
of real GDP of at least 2 percent” or if a member
state can argue successfully that the circumstances
are “exceptional,” based on “the abruptness of the
downturn or on the accumulated loss of output
relative to past trends.” The regulation then clarifies
the “excessive deficit procedure” set out in Arti-
cle 104 of the Treaty, including the imposition of
fines.
Countries found exceeding the 3 percent of
GDP limit must take corrective action “as quickly as
possible after [its] emergence.” The timing of the
policy decisions and the rhythm at which the Com-
mission, which monitors the process, prepares its
reports imply that a country can run deficits in
excess of 3 percent of GDP for two years in a row
without incurring sanctions. If a country fails
to take corrective action and to bring its deficit
below 3 percent of GDP by the deadline set by the
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Council, it is sanctioned. The sanction takes the
form of a nonremunerated deposit. The deposit
starts at 0.2 percent of GDP and rises by 1/10th of
the excess deficit, up to a maximum of 0.5 percent
of GDP. Deposits are imposed each year until the
excessive deficit is corrected. If the excess is not cor-
rected within two years, the deposit is converted
into a fine; otherwise, it is returned.21
Exchange Rate Policy The exchange rate of the
euro in relation to other currencies such as the dol-
lar and the yen is determined by the market,
although market misalignments and excessive
exchange rate fluctuations are corrected through a
combination of economic policy dialogue, the
occasional use of interventions, and verbal exchange
rate management.
Macroeconomic Policy Framework 
for Accession Countries
Based on the Treaty, three distinct phases for the
adoption of the EMU acquis by accession countries
can be identified: (1) the preaccession period,
(2) the period from accession to the adoption of the
euro, and (3) the Euro Area phase, after adopting
the euro.22
Preaccession Phase During the preaccession
phase, accession countries carry out the economic
reforms and policies needed to fulfill the Copen-
hagen economic criteria, which are the existence of
a market economy and the capacity to cope with
competitive pressure and market forces within the
EU.23 In this context, countries have to establish
functioning property rights, competition, free price
formation, and a well-developed financial sector. If
a country is to be able to cope with international
competition and if capital is to be channeled
smoothly within a country, it is of paramount
importance that the domestic banking and finan-
cial sector are efficient. Such efficiency requires a
high degree of financial intermediation, liquid cap-
ital markets, banks with a sufficient capital base, a
functioning system of banking and securities
supervision, and a sound payments system. In
addition, the accession countries must adopt the
EMU legislation in order to acquire the status of
“Member State with a derogation,” which they need
to adopt the euro (Article 122). According to
Italianer (2002), the requirements of the legislation
are 
• Completion of the orderly liberalization of capi-
tal movements (Article 56)
• Prohibition of any direct public sector financing
by the central bank (Article 101)
• Prohibition of privileged access of the public
sector to financial institutions (Article 102) 
• Alignment of the national central bank statutes
with the Treaty, including the independence of
the monetary authorities (Articles 108 and 109).
The first requirement—that capital movements
be completely liberalized—underpins the efficient
allocation of resources in the internal market.24 The
second and third requirements are related to central
bank economic independence, which rests on
the condition that operating procedures not be
restricted by government policies. Traditionally, the
greatest threat to central bank economic independ-
ence is pressures to monetize the fiscal deficit. As a
result of the second and third requirements, the
central bank is prohibited from having primary
dealings with the fiscal authorities. Essentially, this
prohibition means no automatic overdraft facility
for treasuries and no central bank purchases of debt
directly from the government. The prohibition of
privileged access complements the prohibition of
central bank financing, imposes market discipline
in public sector borrowing, reinforces freedom of
capital movements, and gets rid of the distortions in
the allocation of financial resources toward the pub-
lic sector. The two requirements force the market to
establish the relevant price, thereby making conces-
sionary finance more difficult, and they make trans-
actions more visible, thereby making the monitor-
ing of central bank performance much easier. The
fourth requirement related to central bank inde-
pendence prepares the national central bank for its
future assignment of seeking price stability, and it
reinforces fiscal discipline.
Policy coordination in the preaccession phase
between the EU and the accession country is
achieved through (1) preparation of an annual Pre-
accession Economic Programme (PEP) by the
accession country, (2) annual evaluation of the PEP
by the European Commission, (3) a fiscal notifica-
tion system, (4) a report on the macroeconomic and
financial sector stability developments in candidate
countries, (5) macroeconomic forecasts by the
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Commission, (6) meetings between the ECB and
candidate countries aimed at bringing financial and
payment systems in line with those in the Eurosys-
tem, and (7) the Commission’s regular reports on
progress toward accession.
The PEP concentrates on the economic reforms
needed for EU accession, and the PEP procedure
offers an opportunity to develop the institutional
and analytical capacity necessary to participate in
the EMU upon accession, particularly in the areas of
economic analysis and medium-term policy plan-
ning. The PEP consists of four parts: (1) a review of
recent economic developments, (2) a detailed
macroeconomic framework, (3) a discussion of
public finance issues, and (4) an outline of the
structural reform agenda. It places special emphasis
on public finance by presenting the medium-term
fiscal objectives in terms of the general government
deficit, the primary balance, and the public indebt-
edness. Moreover, the candidate countries specify
and explain the factors underpinning their choice of
objectives, and the programs undertaken to achieve
the objectives should demonstrate the feasibility of
the government’s fiscal objectives by means of a
projection of the main fiscal aggregates. Shortly
after submission of the PEP, the Commission evalu-
ates the program. The evaluation does not make an
assessment of whether a country has made progress
toward meeting the Copenhagen criteria—this is
provided on an annual basis by the Commission’s
regular report on progress toward accession. Yet the
accession countries report to the Commission
through the fiscal notification system the debt and
deficit figures calculated in accordance with the
EU methodology based on the ESA 95 system of
national accounts. These notifications use the same
format as the fiscal notifications provided by mem-
ber states in the framework of the excessive deficit
procedure (see European Commission 2002).
From Accession to Adoption of the Euro Phase
Upon accession, the new member state will have
the status of “Member State with a derogation”
granted in the accession treaty. It will have to show
adherence to the aim of economic and monetary
union and compliance with the relevant parts of
Title VII of the European Commission Treaty and
the other EMU acquis. These parts are 
• Treatment of exchange rate policy as a matter of
common interest and, eventually, participation
in the exchange rate mechanism (Article 124)
• Treatment of economic policies as a matter of
common concern and coordination of eco-
nomic policies between the member states
through participation in Community proce-
dures (Articles 98 and 99)
• Avoidance of excessive government deficits and
adherence to the relevant provisions of the SGP
(Article 104)
• Further adaptation of the national central bank’s
statutes with a view toward integration into the
European System of Central Banks (Article 109)
• Progress toward achieving a high degree of sus-
tainable convergence (Article 121).
With accession, the common macroeconomic
policy framework becomes more constraining, with
a strong reinforcement of fiscal discipline and the
integration of other economic policies. Budgetary
policy and outcomes become subject to the excessive
deficit procedure and the nonpunitive parts of the
SGP. The Maastricht Treaty specifies that these coun-
tries will have to make progress toward fulfillment of
the Maastricht criteria, and, under the conditions of
the SGP, they will have to endeavor to avoid excessive
deficits. Furthermore, the exchange rate policy
becomes a matter of common interest. This develop-
ment means that, to protect the smooth functioning
of the single market, competitive devaluations are
not allowed. Thus, new member states must avoid
policies leading to excessive fluctuations of the
exchange rate.Participation in the ERM II is expected
sometime after accession. Such participation implies
setting the central rate to the euro and the fluctuation
bands within ±15 percent by mutual agreement.
Because the economic policies of the accession
countries become a matter of common concern,
these policies will be subject to policy coordination
and multilateral surveillance procedures. Shortly
after accession, the new member states will be
required to submit a full notification of govern-
ment debt, deficit, and associated data. New mem-
ber states also will have to prepare convergence
programs, which will set out their budgetary strate-
gies for the coming years, in particular with respect
to the medium-term objective of reaching a budg-
etary position “close to balance or surplus.” The
European Council will examine the programs, and,
based on the Commission’s recommendation, will
adopt an opinion on each of the programs.
In addition to the convergence programs,
economic and fiscal policy coordination and
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surveillance in the EU are achieved through the
Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPG). These
guidelines, which are prepared on an annual basis,
present the member states’ consensus opinion on
macroeconomic and other structural economic
policies in the medium term. Each year, the Euro-
pean Commission reviews in its annual economic
report the implementation of the guidelines by the
member states.25
Participation in the Euro Area will be the ulti-
mate goal for each new member state. A favorable
decision is made when the conditions for adoption
of the single currency are met, after determining
whether a new member state has achieved a high
degree of sustainable convergence. Prior to acces-
sion, there is no requirement that the EU assess
progress made on convergence criteria, or that can-
didates for accession meet the criteria. As it was for
the present member states, adoption of the euro
occurs when a high degree of sustainable conver-
gence has been demonstrated within the internal
market.
Euro Area Phase The adoption of the euro will
add two key elements to the macroeconomic
framework of “Member States with a derogation.”
One is the single stability-oriented monetary policy
and the ensuing single exchange rate policy. The
second is implementation of the sanction provi-
sions of the SGP, by which member states surpass-
ing the 3 percent ceiling in their deficit will be
subjected to substantial fines. The aim is to allow
the ECB to conduct an independent monetary
policy supported by prudent national fiscal poli-
cies, which are subjected to the SGP and policy
coordination. The Treaty does not specify any
mandatory timetable for fulfillment of the condi-
tions for introduction of the euro. In other
words, although the economic policies of the new
member states will have to pursue a high degree
of sustainable convergence, the speed at which
this should happen is left undetermined by EU
legislation.
Prospects for Central and Eastern European
Countries The Central and Eastern European
countries that acceded to the EU on May 1, 2004,
will have to coordinate their economic and fiscal
policies with the Community in the ECOFIN
Council. They must submit annual convergence
programs, and restrictions on capital movements
will no longer be permitted. The EU expects each of
the acceding countries to join the ERM II—that is,
to agree to an exchange rate arrangement between
the euro and each country’s currency. This phase
will last at least two years. The test period for the
exchange rate criterion will probably be from May 1,
2004, to April 30, 2006. It is crucial that a country
avoid devaluation within the two-year test period,
because that country would fail the exchange rate
criterion.
During the second half of 2006, the convergence
test will probably be conducted by the ECB and the
European Commission. The decision on acceptance
into the EMU will be made by ECOFIN on the basis
of a proposal of the European Commission and
after consultation with the European Parliament
and after a discussion in the European Council. The
examination of the budget and of government debt
will likely be based on the data for 2005 or the latest
available figures. In January 1, 2007, the euro will
probably be adopted as national currency. The cen-
tral bank governor of each new EMU country then
becomes a member of the Governing Council, the
main decision-making body of the ECB.26
The Macroeconomic Challenges
Facing Turkey
Turkey realizes that, in the long run, price stability
and fiscal discipline create the best conditions for
sustained, robust economic growth, but currently
the situation is problematic. The data in table 1.9
show the EMU convergence criteria for Turkey and
the Central and Eastern European countries. The
table reveals that the CEE countries are about to
satisfy the criteria, but that Turkey is far from satis-
fying the conditions. In 2003 the inflation rate in
Turkey was 25.3 percent, compared with a reference
value of 2.7 percent for the EU; the budget deficit as
a percentage of GDP was 8.8 percent, compared
with a reference value of 3 percent for the EU; the
debt-to-GDP ratio was 80.2 percent, compared
with a reference value of 60 percent for the EU; and
interest rates were 28.5 percent, compared with a
reference value of 6.2 percent for the EU.27
The challenge facing Turkey is how to move
from the current state of affairs to one in which the
Maastricht criteria will be satisfied. The main issues
are reducing the inflation rate to about 3 percent
over time and reducing the debt-to-GDP ratio to
60 percent over time, while attaining sustainability
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TABLE 1.9 European Economic and Monetary Union Convergence Criteria, 2000–03
Interest Exchange
Rates, Rate against
Inflation Rate (%) Budget Deficit (% of GDP) Government Debt (% of GDP) 10Y Bonds Parity
2000 2001 2002 2003 2000 2001 2002 2003 2000 2001 2002 2003 (last) (max, 2Y) Currency Regime
Czech Rep. 3.9 4.7 1.8 0.1 −4.0 −3.2 −4.6 −6.6 29.2 29.0 22.4 37.6 5.1 −5.0 Managed float (EUR)
Estonia 4.0 5.8 3.6 1.3 −0.7 1.1 1.2 2.4 6.6 6.2 5.4 5.1 2.3 −0.4 Currency board (EUR)
Hungary 9.8 9.2 5.3 4.7 −3.5 −5.0 −9.6 −5.7 56.1 51.5 50.4 58.6 8.4 −9.3 Target zone (EUR)
Latvia 2.7 2.5 1.8 2.9 −2.8 −1.9 −2.7 −1.6 10.0 12.2 13.9 16.3 7.4 −9.9 Peg (SDR)
Lithuania 1.0 1.3 0.3 −1.2 −2.8 −1.4 −2.8 −1.7 28.3 29.0 25.0 23.6 6.4 0.2 Currency board (EUR)
Poland 10.1 5.5 1.9 0.7 −2.7 −6.3 −5.4 −4.5 43.8 38.0 48.0 51.0 7.3 −17.2 Float
Slovakia 12.0 7.3 3.3 8.5 −6.8 −7.2 −1.9 −3.6 32.9 42.7 32.0 42.8 5.1 −6.3 Managed float (EUR)
Slovenia 8.9 8.5 7.5 5.6 −1.4 −1.3 −1.1 −1.4 25.1 25.4 32.2 26.8 4.0 −4.3 Managed float (EUR)
Bulgaria 10.1 7.9 5.8 2.3 −1.1 −1.0 0.2 0.0 83.8 72.5 60.9 53.7 5.4 −0.8 Currency board (EUR)
Romania 45.7 34.5 22.5 15.3 −4.1 −3.7 −1.7 −2.3 29.2 31.2 25.7 26.2 17.3 −19.2 Managed float (US$)
Turkey 54.9 54.4 45.0 25.3 −6.1 −29.8 −12.6 −8.8 65.4 102.6 89.5 80.2 28.5 16.3 Float
Reference value 2.8 3.3 3.0 2.7 −3.0 −3.0 −3.0 −3.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 6.2 +/− 15%
Note: Parity refers to the last three-year average exchange rate against the euro. In the case of Turkey, the interest rate is the annual compound interest rate obtained in the auction
of treasury bills and government bonds during November 2004. SDR = special drawing rights.
Sources: Deutsche Bank Research, EU Enlargement Monitor, April 2002, and EU Monitor, September 2004; State Planning Organization 2004; Central Bank of Turkey
(http://www.tcmb.gov.tr).
of the current account and decreasing the unem-
ployment rate in the economy.
Inflation
As of November 2004, the annual inflation rate in
Turkey was 9.8 percent, and the government was
aiming to reduce the inflation rate to 8 percent in
2005. To satisfy the Maastricht criteria on inflation,
Turkey must reduce the inflation rate further, to
3 percent. The annual inflation rate in Turkey has
been reduced in recent years through strict imple-
mentation of the IMF economic program, which
calls for controlling the growth of base money.
Another factor leading to a lower inflation rate has
been the decrease in the cost of imported goods,
achieved as a result of real appreciation of the
Turkish lira. But reducing the inflation rate over
time through real appreciation of the currency is
not sustainable in the long run, because the real
appreciation of the currency will lead to problems
of sustainability of the current account. Current
account sustainability in Turkey as of December
2004 requires that the real exchange rate be depre-
ciated to its long-run equilibrium level.28 Yet reduc-
ing the inflation rate by reducing the public sector
component of the wholesale price level, ppublic, is
also not sustainable, because this policy will lead to
increases in the ratio of the public sector borrowing
requirement to GDP, leading, in turn, to problems
related to the sustainability of fiscal policy. Thus
ppublic should be increased at least at the same rate as
the inflation rate in the economy. The only policy
option for reducing the rate of inflation is therefore
to control the growth rate of base money.
To reduce the inflation rate from its current level
of 9.8 percent to around 3 percent, Turkey will
probably go through a disinflation period. But dis-
inflation in general entails costs, and the most
commonly used measure of the costs of disinflation
is the “sacrifice ratio,” which can be defined as the
number of percentage points of lost output associ-
ated with a policy-induced 1 percent reduction in
inflation. Following Ball (1994), we identify disin-
flation episodes as the time range within which
trend inflation falls substantially and define trend
inflation as a centered five-quarter moving average
of the actual inflation rate.29 During the time period
between the first quarter of 1987 and the third quar-
ter of 2003, we identify in Turkey two disinflation
episodes. The first episode starts at the fourth quar-
ter of 1994 and ends during the fourth quarter of
1996. The second episode starts at the first quarter
of 1998 and ends during the first quarter of 2001.
The trend inflation rate decreases by 29.62 percent
during the first episode and by 43.05 percent dur-
ing the second episode. We assume that output is at
its potential level at the start of the disinflation
episode. For potential output and output gap pro-
jections, we consider the estimates provided by the
Turkish State Planning Organization (SPO).30 They
have estimated the potential output using the linear
method, the Hodrick-Prescott method, and the
production function method (see State Planning
Organization 2003). The sacrifice ratio is then cal-
culated by the formula
(1.3) SR =
[
Z+4∑
t=S
(yt − y∗t )
]/
(πt − πt−1)
where yt stands for the natural logarithm of real
output, y∗t for the natural logarithm of potential
output, πt−1 for the trend inflation rate at the
beginning of the episode, πt for the trend inflation
rate at the end of the episode, and the disinflation
episode starts at period S and ends at period Z. The
calculations are presented in table 1.10. In the table,
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TABLE 1.10 Estimates of the Sacrifice Ratio
Production Linear
Episode HP Filter Function Method
April 1994–April 1997 0.000 0.000 −0.013
April 1994–April 1996 0.005 0.006 −0.003
January 1998–January 2002 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
January 1998–January 2001 0.005 0.005 0.007
Source: The authors.
the first line of each episode denotes the estimate of
the sacrifice ratio obtained under the assumption
that output returns to its potential level four quar-
ters after the end of an episode, as in Ball (1994). By
contrast, the second line of each episode denotes
the estimate of the sacrifice ratio obtained under
the assumption that output returns to its potential
level right at the end of the episode.
The table reveals that the estimates of the sacri-
fice ratio in Turkey are not very much different from
zero,31 which indicates, in turn, that disinflation in
Turkey will entail relatively little output cost. The
result probably stems from the extreme flexibility of
the Turkish labor market.32 But the output costs of
disinflation will increase as the Turkish labor mar-
ket becomes less flexible.33 Thus it would be advis-
able for Turkey to follow the disinflationary policies
as long as the labor market is flexible.
Public Debt and Fiscal Policy
To analyze the issues associated with reducing the
debt-to-GDP ratio from 80.2 percent in 2003 to
60 percent over time, we consider the government
budget constraint represented by
(1.4) G t − Tt + it Bt−1 + i∗ E t B∗t−1 + FSBt
= (Bt − Bt−1) + E t (B∗t − B∗t−1)
+ Mt − Mt−1 + PRIVt
where G refers to government expenditures exclud-
ing the interest payments, T government revenues,
B the TL-denominated debt stock of the public
sector, B∗ the FX-denominated debt stock of
the public sector, i the nominal interest rate on
the TL-denominated government debt, i∗ the
interest rate on the FX-denominated government
debt, E the exchange rate, FSB the public expen-
diture for the financial sector bailout, M the
monetary base, and PRIV privatization revenues.
Let Yt = pt, yt be the nominal GDP, p the GDP
deflator, and y real GDP. Denoting the primary-
surplus-to-GDP ratio by pst = (Tt − G t )/Yt , the
TL-denominated debt-to-GDP ratio by bt =
(Bt/Yt), the FX-denominated-debt-to-GDP ratio
by b∗t = (E t B∗t )/Yt , the privatization-revenues-to-
GDP ratio by privt = (PRIVt/Yt), the financial-
sector-bailout-to-GDP ratio by fsbt = (FSBt/Yt),
the domestic rate of inflation by π, the foreign rate
of inflation by π∗, the growth rate of real GDP by g,
the real rate of interest by r, the foreign real interest
rate by r ∗, the real exchange rate by q, the rate of
depreciation of the real exchange rate by η, and the
velocity of money by V, we get the equation deter-
mining the time path of the total-debt-to-GDP
ratio dt = bt + b∗t :
(1.5) dt = −pst + (1 + r )
(1 + g ) bt−1
+ (1 + r
∗)(1 + η)
(1 + g ) b
∗
t−1
− 1
V
[
g + π + πg
(1 + π)(1 + g )
]
−privt + fsbt
The equation shows that debt-to-GDP ratio
decreases with increases in the primary-surplus-to-
GDP ratio ps, the growth rate of real GDP g, the
privatization-revenues-to-GDP ratio priv, and
the seigniorage-revenues-to-GDP ratio, defined as
1
V
[
g+π+πg
(1+π)(1+g )
]
. By contrast, the debt-to-GDP ratio 
increases with increases in the real domestic inter-
est rate r, the real foreign interest rate r ∗, the rate of
depreciation of the real exchange rate η, and the
financial-sector-bailout-to-GDP ratio fsb.
Over 2000–03, seigniorage and privatization
revenues were running at about 1.3 and 1.7 percent
of GDP, respectively. The crucial parameters deter-
mining the time path of the debt-to-GDP ratio turn
out to be the primary-surplus-to-GDP ratio, the
domestic and foreign real rates of interest, and the
rate of real exchange rate depreciation. Turkey is
committed to the primary surplus target of 6.5 per-
cent of GNP over the next few years. In 2004 the
domestic real interest rate was running at about
12 percent and the foreign real interest rate at about
8 percent (see OECD 2002 and IMF 2004). Finally, it
is noteworthy that Turkey, after appreciating the
real exchange rate by 13 percent in 2002, appreci-
ated the real exchange rate by a further 23.8 percent
in 2003. All these factors have contributed to reduc-
ing the debt-to-GDP ratio. But even under these
favorable circumstances, it will take quite a long
time to reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio from its level
of 80.2 percent in 2003 to 60 percent and below.
Here three issues deserve careful analysis.
First, the real appreciation of the exchange rate
contributed substantially to the reduction in the
22 Turkey: Economic Reform and Accession to the European Union
debt-to-GDP ratio during 2002 and 2003. But this
policy is not sustainable in the long run, because
the real appreciation of the currency will lead to
problems of sustainability in the current account,
as explained later in this chapter in some detail.
Second, EU accession will entail costs for Turkey
that must be identified and financed. These costs
will include the social consequences of economic
restructuring, such as those in the agriculture sec-
tor, where restructuring presents particular prob-
lems for small farmers. The process of adopting the
acquis communautaire entails, among other things,
comprehensive structural reforms of the public
administration and the productive sectors, as well
as extensive investment in human resources and the
environment. From a budgetary perspective, the
fiscal costs of EU accession in the other accession
countries have been estimated to be over 3 percent
of GNP annually. Turkey would also face significant
fiscal costs—costs that would have to be financed
in the context of continuing fiscal adjustment.34
This situation implies either a reduction in the
primary-surplus-to-GDP ratio by the same amount
or further increases in the revenues of the public
sector.
Third, to reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio from its
level of 80.2 percent in 2003 to 60 percent over
time, Turkey, even in the face of the higher costs of
EU accession, must stick to the primary surplus tar-
get of at least 6.5 percent of GNP over the next few
years. Any downward deviation from the target will
postpone achievement of the 60 percent debt-to-
GDP ratio. Achievement of the primary surplus
target of at least 6.5 percent of GNP over time
requires that Turkey increase its tax revenue by
broadening its tax base. In this context, Turkey
could introduce, like Russia and Ukraine, a flat tax
on income at a relatively low rate. The introduction
of such a flat tax at a low rate would improve tax
compliance and efficiency,35 and it would increase
the tax base and thus the tax revenue, as long as the
necessary steps are taken simultaneously to mod-
ernize the tax administration and improve tax
compliance.36 Such measures also will help to
decrease the share of the informal sector in the
economy.
Finally, the government’s desire to achieve a pri-
mary surplus target of at least 6.5 percent of GNP
over the next few years will constrain its use of fis-
cal policy for decreasing the unemployment rate in
the economy, which was 9.5 percent during the
third quarter of 2004. That constraint may have
serious political implications, unless the country
tries to broaden its tax base, reduce the tax burden
of economic units in the formal sector, and
improve tax compliance in the country.
Sustainability of Current Account
The basic presumption of our approach is that the
current account is sustainable. If not, Turkey could
face an exchange rate collapse or an external debt
default, which, in turn, would imply a reduction in
real income and employment, deviating from the
long-run growth path. Starting from the notion
that under current account sustainability the coun-
try must satisfy its lifetime budget constraint, we
contend that the current policies are sustainable if
continuation of the current government policy
stance and private sector behavior into the future
does not entail a drastic policy shift or lead to a cur-
rency or balance of payments crisis.
Here we emphasize the points stressed earlier by
considering the balance of payments relation,
which can be written as
(1.6) TB$t − i∗ Dt−1 + FDIt + Dt − Dt−1
−Rt = 0
where TB$ denotes the noninterest current account
(NICA), i∗ the foreign rate of interest, D the stock of
foreign debt, FDI the net foreign direct investment, R
the foreign exchange reserves of the country,andRt
the change in reserves. Also, (TB $t − i∗ Dt−1) =
Current Accountt and (FDIt + Dt − Dt−1) = Capi-
tal Accountt. All variables are measured in terms of
foreign currency. If dt = E t Dtpt yt is the foreign-debt-
to-GDP ratio, tbt = E t T B
$
t
pt yt
the noninterest-current-
account-to-GDP ratio, fdit = FDIt Etpt yt the FDI-to-
GDP ratio, and rt = (Rt )E tpt yt the change-in-
reserves-to-GDP ratio, the equation determining
the time path of dt can be written as
(1.7) dt = −tbt + (1 + r
∗)(1 + η)
1 + g dt−1
− fdit + rt
where r ∗ denotes the foreign real rate of interest
and η the rate of depreciation of the RER. The
equation reveals that the external-debt-to-GDP
ratio decreases with increases in the noninterest-
current-account-to-GDP ratio tb, the FDI-to-GDP
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ratio fdi, and the growth rate of GDP g. By contrast,
the debt-to-GDP ratio increases with increases in
the foreign real interest rate r ∗, rate of depreciation
of the RER η, and changes in the reserves-to-GDP
ratio r .
Following the approach of von Hagen and
Harden (1994), we solve this expression forward for
n periods and obtain
(1.8) dt = t δt,n dt+n + t
n∑
i=1
δt, i At+i
where 
δt,k
k∏
i=1
1 + gi
(1 + r ∗i )(1 + ηi )
and
At = tbt + fdit − rr .
Here, δt,k can be interpreted as the “k-periods
ahead” discount factor used to calculate the present
value of assets and liabilities in period t + k for
period t. t xt+k denotes the period t expectation of
the variable x in period t + k. The equation shows
that current-debt-to-GDP ratio equals the expected
discounted present value of foreign debt outstand-
ing in period t + n relative to GDP, plus the sum of
all discounted At’s between period t and period
t + n. Theoretically, the intertemporal budget
constraint requires that lim t δt,n dt+n ≤ 0 as n
becomes very large, so that foreign debt remains
bounded relative to GDP. If the intertemporal
budget constraint were violated, private investors
would realize that the government’s liabilities
would eventually exceed its revenue-raising capa-
bilities. As a result, the price of the debt of the
country would fall to zero, and the country would
see itself barred from international capital markets.
To translate the intertemporal budget constraint
into a practically more relevant requirement, we
consider the above relation for a limited period of
time n∗ and add the condition that the discounted-
debt-to-GDP ratio at the end of period t + n∗
should not exceed the debt-to-GDP ratio at time t.
We use actual data on dt, tbt , and fdit for any year
during the time period 1984–2003. For each year t
of the time period, we estimate the expected dis-
counted present value at time t of foreign debt out-
standing in period t + n∗ relative to GDP, plus the
sum of all discounted At’s between period t and
period t + n∗. As for the government policy stance
and the private sector behavior over the period t to
t + n∗, we assume that the values of tbt+i and fdit+i
for i = 1, . . . , n∗ will remain unchanged at their
initial values of tbt and fdit. Thus we assume that
the government, private sector, and rest of the
world will not change the policies they pursue in
period t over the time period t + 1 and t + n∗.
A look at Turkey’s annual GDP growth rate over
the period 1980–2003 reveals that the average growth
rate of GDP amounted to 4.1 percent during
1980–1989 and to 3.7 percent during 1990–2003.
Thus for the growth rate of GDP over the time period
t to t + n∗ we take the figure of 4 percent. By con-
trast, the foreign real interest rate is to equal 8 per-
cent. Finally, we assume in the following calculations
that r = 0 for each year of the period t to t + n∗
and that over the same period η equals zero.
Following the approach of von Hagen and Harden
(1994), the current account is not sustainable if
(1.9) S(n∗) = dt − t δt,n dt+n
= t
n∑
i=1
δt, i At+i < 0 .
This is a rather mild sustainability condition. Here
dt denotes the actual debt-to-GDP ratio in period t,
and At+i = (tbt + fdit) for i = 1, . . . , n∗ . The
result of the calculations for n∗ = 10, n∗ = 20, and
n∗ = 25 are shown in table 1.11.
The table reveals that during 1993 the current
account was unsustainable in the sense that the actual
debt-to-GDP ratio in 1993 fell short of the expected
discounted present value of foreign debt outstanding
in period 2003 relative to GDP by 14.03 percent when
n∗ = 10 and that the actual debt-to-GDP ratio in
1993 fell short of the expected discounted present
value of foreign debt outstanding in period 2018 rel-
ative to GDP by 27.26 percent when n∗ = 25. This
finding indicates that the current account needed
adjustment in the NICA-to-GDP and FDI-to-GDP
ratios. During 1994, Turkey increased the NICA-to-
GDP ratio considerably, but there was not much
change in the FDI-to-GDP ratio. The table indicates
that the policy was successful; the sustainability
measure was positive thereafter. The warning signals
for the 2001 currency crisis were evident in the nega-
tive figures of the sustainability measure for the year
2000. The situation improved after the crisis, when
the sustainability measure increased and became
positive at the end of 2001. Although the current
account was sustainable in 2001 and 2002, the system
was not sustainable again in 2003.
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A look at the sustainability measure for 2003 with
n∗ = 25 reveals that the actual-debt-to-GDP ratio
in 2003 fell short of the expected discounted present
value of foreign debt outstanding in the period 2028
by 17.07 percent. The system is not sustainable. The
sustainability of the current account requires that
the value of the sustainability measure be increased
so that it becomes positive. This goal can be achieved
either through an increase in the NICA-to-GDP
ratio tbt or through an increase in the FDI-to-GDP
ratio fdit during each year of the period 2004–28 or
through a combination of increases in both the
NICA-to-GDP and FDI-to-GDP ratios during the
same time period. During 2003, the actual value of
At = (tbt + fdit) was −1.08 percent. For Turkey to
achieve the minimal condition for external sustain-
ability, the value of At during each time period of the
interval 2004–29 would have to be 0 percent. Thus
Turkey has to increase the sum of its noninterest-
current-account-to-GDP ratio and its FDI-to-GDP
ratio during each period of the interval 2004–29 by
at least 1.08 percent. Supposing that fdit during the
time period 2004–28 remains constant at its 2003
level of 0.03 percent, we next turn to the study of
the determinants of noninterest-current-account-
to-GDP ratio.37
Using quarterly data from 1988 (first quarter) to
2003 (second quarter) we note that one of the main
determinants of this ratio is the RER. A second fac-
tor that strongly affects the NICA-to-GDP ratio is
the aggregate demand for domestic goods and serv-
ices, consisting of total consumption plus invest-
ment demand in the home country as well as the
rest of the world. As the aggregate domestic
demand for goods and services in the home coun-
try increases, it triggers imports, and, other things
being equal, the NICA-to-GDP ratio is expected to
decline. Similarly, as aggregate domestic demand
for goods and services increases in the rest of the
world, it triggers imports of the foreign country,
and, other things being equal, the NICA-to-GDP
ratio in the home country is expected to increase.
To explain the developments in the NICA, the
following equation is estimated:
(1.10) (NICA/GDP)
= β0 + β1 d log(ADD)
+ β2 d log(ADDF) + β3 RER + β4DQ3
+ β5 D1999 + β6 D93ST + β7 D2000
where d log(ADD) denotes the annual growth rate
of real aggregate domestic demand in the home
country; d log(ADDF) the annual growth rate of real
aggregate domestic demand in the rest of the world;
DQ3 the third-quarter seasonal dummy; D1999 the
recession and earthquake dummy for the year 1999,
taking the value of 1 for the second, third, and fourth
quarters of 1999 and 0 otherwise; D93ST the struc-
tural break dummy in 1993, taking the value of 1
after 1993 and 0 otherwise; and D2000 the exchange
rate–based stabilization measures, taking the value
of 1 for all quarters of 2000 and 0 otherwise. The
D93ST dummy refers to the structural break in
Turkey’s balance of payments that took place after
the liberalization of the capital account in 1990.
Because economic agents respond with lag to such
decisions, a series of tests were conducted to identify
the structural break resulting from this decision. All
of the variables used in the estimation were checked
for unit roots, and it was learned that the series are
all stationary. Because of the simultaneity problems
faced in the model, we use instrumental variable
techniques to estimate the parameters.38 The results
of the estimation are presented in table 1.12.
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TABLE 1.11 Current Account Sustainability
Measures, 1984–2003
(values of S (n*), percent)
10 Years 20 Years 25 Years
1984 1.55 2.61 3.00
1985 6.53 11.01 12.69
1986 4.85 8.18 9.43
1987 12.30 20.73 23.89
1988 39.31 66.27 76.38
1989 29.16 49.15 56.65
1990 2.20 3.71 4.28
1991 19.12 32.23 37.15
1992 11.54 19.46 22.43
1993 −14.03 −23.65 −27.26
1994 36.46 61.45 70.83
1995 3.00 5.06 5.83
1996 1.74 2.93 3.38
1997 3.06 5.16 5.95
1998 21.57 36.37 41.91
1999 9.89 16.67 19.21
2000 −25.41 −42.83 −49.36
2001 58.32 98.31 113.31
2002 12.70 21.40 24.67
2003 −8.79 −14.81 −17.07
Source: The authors.
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TABLE 1.12 Results for Quarterly Instrumental Variable Regression
of Ratio of Noninerest Current Account (NICA) to GDP
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic
C −2.56863 −1.41186
d log (aggregate domestic demand, home country) −29.89038 −12.12362
d log (aggregate domestic demand, foreign country) 38.84045 1.95129
Real exchange rate 0.03719 1.97118
DQ3 1.84541 4.52182
D1999 −3.82977 −4.34096
D93ST −0.91545 −2.34142
D2000 −2.72463 −3.18816
R-squared 0.82106
Adjusted R-squared 0.79787
Durbin-Watson statistic 2.14602
Source: The authors.
The coefficients of the variables are all statisti-
cally significant, and all have the expected signs. An
increase in the growth rate of aggregate domestic
demand in the home country reduces the NICA-to-
GDP ratio; an increase in the growth rate of aggre-
gate domestic demand in the rest of the world
increases that ratio. The ratio increases as the RER
depreciates. The coefficient of the structural change
dummy is negative, which indicates that liberaliza-
tion of the capital account had a negative impact on
the NICA-to-GDP ratio, as expected.
The above considerations reveal that the NICA-
to-GDP ratio can be increased by decreasing aggre-
gate demand for domestic goods and services and/or
by depreciating the RER. Decreasing the aggregate
demand for goods and services requires that the
country aims for a more ambitious fiscal objective
than the constant primary surplus of 6.5 percent of
GDP. But this will be very painful after so many
failed stabilization attempts. The alternative is to
depreciate the RER and keep the RER at its “long-
run equilibrium level” over time.39
To determine the extent of depreciation in the
RER,we consider the regression equation reported in
table 1-12. But, this equation yields rather high levels
of required rates of depreciation of the RER for alter-
native specifications of the sustainability condition.
We therefore consider a different approach in order
to determine the extent of the required rate of depre-
ciation of the RER for achieving current account sus-
tainability. We consider the elasticity of the ratio of
noninterest-current account-to-GDP with respect to
the RER, θ =
(
d NICA/GDP
d RER
RER
NICA/GDP
)
. Then starting
from initial trade balance we derive that
θ = (ηim + ηexp − 1),
where ηim and ηexp denote the import and export
elasticities with respect to the RER. Estimates based
on estimated Turkish import and export functions
range quite widely. Here we consider the estimates
of Tansel and Togan (1987) who determine the
export price elasticity as 0.933 and import price
elasticity as 0.472. Thus, θ = 0.405. Considering the
ratio of exports to GDP of 19.6 percent, the param-
eter values imply that a reduction of the ratio of
noninterest-current account-to-GDP of 1 percent
requires a depreciation of the RER by 12.6 percent.
Thus sustainability of the current account follow-
ing the approach of von Hagen and Harden (1994)
requires that the RER at the end of 2003 be depreci-
ated by 13.6 percent.
An alternative specification of the sustainability
condition requires that the ratio of the stock of for-
eign liabilities to GDP stay constant over time at its
initial value in time period 2003. In that case, the
equation determining the time path of the debt-to-
GDP ratio d can be solved for the equilibrium value
of the sum of tb and fdi, under the assumption that
r = 0, as
(1.11) (tb + fdi) = −
[
(g − r ∗ − η − r ∗η)
(1 + g )
]
d
Assuming that η equals 0 and setting the values of
g = 0.04, r ∗ = 0.08, and d = 0.612 of the year
2003, the equilibrium value of (tb + fdi) is deter-
mined to be 2.354 percent. Because in 2003 the
actual value of (tbt + fdit) equaled −1.08 percent,
Turkey must increase the sum of its noninterest-
current-account-to-GDP and FDI-to-GDP ratios
over time by 3.4 percent. Suppose again that fdit
over time stays constant at its 2003 level of 0.03 per-
cent. Then the increase in tbt, and thus in At over
time, can be achieved by depreciating the RER by
about 42.8 percent and maintaining it at about that
level over time.
Finally, following the suggestion of Reinhart,
Rogoff, and Savastano (2003), we consider cases in
which the country tries to decrease its ratio of stock
of foreign liabilities to GDP from its initial value of
0.612 to 0.5 and 0.4 over a period of 10 years. In
those cases, Turkey has to increase the sum of its
noninterest-current-account-to-GDP ratio and its
FDI-to-GDP ratio over time by 4.3 and 5.2 percent,
respectively. This change, under the assumption
that fdit over time stays constant at its 2003 level,
requires that the RER be depreciated by 54.2 per-
cent and 65.5 percent, respectively.
Consider now the issue of increasing the FDI-
to-GDP ratio. A striking feature of foreign direct
investment flows to Turkey is that the level is too
low compared with that of FDI flows to developing
countries with similar levels of GDP per capita. In
particular, the FDI flows to Central and Eastern
European countries are much larger than those to
Turkey. However, in terms of population, Turkey’s
is larger than that of Poland, the Czech Republic,
and Hungary combined. In terms of GDP, Turkey’s
economy is four times larger than that of the Czech
Republic or Hungary, and one-quarter larger than
that of Poland in 2000. In terms of gross fixed capital
formation, Turkey’s investments during 2000 were
three to four times larger than those of the Czech
Republic and Hungary and roughly a sixth larger
than those of Poland. In terms of average annual
inflows of FDI during the 1990s, Turkey attracted
inflows valued at US$800 million, which is roughly
one-fifth of the US$4.1 billion in FDI inflows to
Poland and significantly lower than the inflows to
the Czech Republic and Hungary, each of which
attracted about US$2.1 billion per year.
An explanation of the factors determining the
FDI flows must begin with a definition of the
investment climate in the country. It is the policy,
institutional, and behavioral environment, present
and expected, that influences the perceived returns
and risks associated with investment in terms of
both quantity and productivity of investment
flows. Investment climate thus defined depends on
a wide array of factors that can be grouped under
the headings of (1) macroeconomic and trade poli-
cies, (2) infrastructure, and (3) governance and
institutions.
Although Turkey had an open trade regime over
the past two decades, it was unable to attract large
FDI inflows. One of the main culprits behind this
failure was the uncertain macroeconomic environ-
ment, which, along with the uncertainties stem-
ming from domestic politics and the ensuing high
real interest rates, produced a very erratic growth
performance. Throughout the past two decades,
Turkey put on hold many decisions that could help
foreign investors cope with high inflation. One of
the critical measures that Turkey did not introduce
was the inflation accounting framework in the
context of the highly inflationary environment.
Infrastructure-related factors were at play as well.
Although the quantity and quality of Turkey’s
broadly defined infrastructure—including its geo-
graphic and demographic endowments and its
physical and financial infrastructure—help to posi-
tion Turkey as a potentially powerful magnet for
FDI inflows, these factors were ineffective in
Turkey’s effort to increase those flows. The main
bottlenecks, as emphasized by Dutz, Us, and Yılmaz
in chapter 10 of this volume, seem to have been
insufficient respect for the rule of law and weak
competition in local markets, reinforced by an
uneven application of bureaucratic red tape.
To attract higher levels of FDI flows in the future,
Turkey must therefore not only improve its macro-
economic environment, but also increase respect
for the rule of law, increase competition in local
markets, and reduce the bureaucratic red tape.
Once Turkey is able to attract higher levels of
FDI into the country, it does not need to depreciate
its RER by as much as before in order to attain sus-
tainability in its current account. With increases in
the FDI-to-GDP ratios, the calculated required
rates of depreciation of the RER decreases. When
the net FDI-to-GDP ratio increases by 1.08 percent
to 1.11 percent of GDP while the non-interest-
current-account-to-GDP ratio stays constant at its
2003 value of −1.11 percent, then the system
becomes sustainable under the approach of von
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Hagen and Harden (1994) with no change in the
RER. For increases in net FDI-to-GDP ratio below
1.08 percent, the required rate of depreciation of
the RER will be positive but less than 13.6 percent.
In the second case when sustainability requires that
debt-to-GDP ratio stays constant over time the
system becomes sustainable with no change in RER
when the net FDI-to-GDP ratio increases by 3.4 per-
cent while the non-interest-current-account-to-
GDP ratio stays again at its 2003 value of −1.11 per-
cent. In this case for increases in net FDI-to-GDP
ratio below 3.4 percent, the required rate of depre-
ciation of the RER will again be positive but less
than 42.8 percent. Finally, under the third approach
when sustainability requires that debt-to-GDP
ratio decreases over a period of 10 years from its
initial value of 0.612 to 0.4, the system becomes
sustainable with no change in RER when the net
FDI-to-GDP ratio increases by 5.2 percent while the
non-interest-current-account-to-GDP ratio stays at
its 2003 value of −1.11 percent. For increases in net
FDI-to-GDP ratio below 5.2 percent, the required
rate of depreciation of the RER again be positive but
less than 65.5 percent.
Employment and Growth
As emphasized earlier in this chapter, the unem-
ployment rate in 2003 was high in Turkey. The
employment challenge facing the country is to cre-
ate jobs for those unemployed, to create new jobs
for those entering the labor force for the first time
at an average rate of 900 thousand persons per year,
and to increase the labor force participation rate
from its low level of 48.3 percent.
To solve the unemployment problem over time,
Turkey has to preserve the flexibility of the labor
market and achieve a relatively high but sustainable
growth rate of GDP over the next decades. Turkey
can no longer sustain the flexibility of the labor
market through the lax enforcement of laws on tax-
ation and social security, because such enforcement
tends to create different problems for Turkish soci-
ety.40 Instead, the country has to attack the root of
the problem, which is the large wedge between
labor costs and workers’ disposable income because
of the high labor taxes. Such a high tax wedge raises
labor costs, discourages work in the formal econ-
omy, and contributes to high nonemployment in
the working-age population. The challenge facing
Turkey is to reduce the high labor taxes without
increasing the fiscal deficits. The country has to
introduce tax reforms that will aim to lower the
personal income and social security taxes, while
broadening the tax base through, for example, the
introduction of a relatively low flat tax and simulta-
neously modernizing the tax administration.
Achieving a relatively high but sustainable
growth rate of GDP is also a challenge for Turkey.
According to a recent study by Togan (2003), the
problem can be analyzed in terms of the growth of
productivity and the growth of employment.41
Noting that Turkey achieved annual productivity
growth of 3.12 percent over the period 1950–99,
Togan emphasizes that the percentage contribution
of the three sources of growth to productivity
growth were (1) 38.1 percent from growth in the
amount of capital per worker in the economy (cap-
ital deepening), (2) 25.15 percent from improve-
ments in labor quality, and (3) 36.75 percent from
total factor productivity (TFP) growth.42 Thus if
Turkey wants to achieve higher growth rates of
GDP than the 3.6 percent a year achieved over the
period 1990–2002, it has to increase, on the one
hand, the productivity growth rate—through capi-
tal deepening, improvements in labor quality, and
increases in the growth rate of the TFP—and, on
the other hand, the growth rate of employment.43
Togan (2003) points out that Turkey, to increase
the amount of capital per worker, has to increase
not only its investment ratio but also its domestic
savings rate, because too much reliance on foreign
savings over considerably long periods of time may
lead to problems of solvency and sustainability of
the current account. In addition, Turkey has to
increase its investment in human capital formation.
It must increase not only the proportion of the
adult population with primary, secondary, and
higher education, but also the quality of education
at each of these levels. Turkey also must increase
TFP growth. Because the sources of TFP growth are
better technology, better organization, specializa-
tion, and innovations on the shop floor, Turkey has
to increase the channels of acquiring knowledge,
as well as the competitive pressure in the economies
under consideration. Besides creating the knowl-
edge itself through strict enforcement of intel-
lectual property rights, Turkey can adopt the
knowledge created by others, mainly through inter-
national trade, FDI, and licensing. Finally, various
economists have shown that trade liberalization
affects productivity change positively.44 TFP
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growth also depends on the macroeconomic poli-
cies followed.
To elaborate statistically the relationship between
the TFP and trade and macroeconomic policies, we
follow the approach of Burnside and Dollar (2000)
in which 
(1.12) TFP = α0 + α1 INFLATION
+ α2 OPEN
+ α3 BUDGET SURPLUS
where INFLATION refers to the rate of inflation
measured by the GDP deflator, OPEN to the trade
indicator, and BUDGET SURPLUS to the ratio of
budget surplus to GDP. In the equation, the second
term indicates the effect of instability in macro
policies. It is hypothesized that instability in
macroeconomic policies negatively influences the
TFP and that its coefficient should therefore be
negative. The third term refers to trade policies
measured by the ratio of exports and imports to
GDP. The coefficient would be positive if trade lib-
eralization contributes to increases in the TFP.
Finally, it is hypothesized that a budget surplus pos-
itively influences the TFP. Insolvent debt paths
characterized by large budget deficits will require
monetization of debts and thus inflation, leading to
instability in the economy. Uncertainty from insta-
bility reduces both the willingness and the capabil-
ity of economic units to take a long-term view
toward increasing efficiency, which eventually
decreases the TFP. Furthermore, falling budget
deficits will lead to greater private use of private
savings, leading to increases in the TFP.
Based on annual data for 1951–99, the estima-
tion yields
(1.13) TFP = 0.593 − 0.0713 INFLATION
(0.477) (–2.741)
+ 0.2454 OPEN
(2.693)
+ 0.6832 BUDGET SURPLUS
(1.996)
n = 49 (1951–99); R2 = 0.311; DW = 2.2686.
The variables have the expected signs. Instability in
macroeconomic policies proxied by the inflation
rate negatively influences the TFP. Yet trade liberal-
ization and budget surplus positively affect the TFP.
The factors just mentioned determine produc-
tivity and its growth rate, which, in turn, influence
the growth rate of GDP. However, for a given level
of productivity growth, GDP growth depends posi-
tively on the growth rate of employment, and the
level of employment in the economy is determined
largely by the flexibility in labor markets. Increases
in labor market flexibility increase employment
and reduce the unemployment rate in the econ-
omy. Thus, GDP increases until labor is fully
employed with increases in labor market flexibility.
In summary, to increase the growth rate of its
GDP, Turkey must (1) increase not only its invest-
ment ratio but also its domestic savings rate,
(2) increase its investment in human capital forma-
tion, (3) follow outward-oriented and prudent
macroeconomic policies, and (4) increase the flexi-
bility in the labor market. The pursuit of these
policies, however, should not jeopardize the sus-
tainability of fiscal policy or the sustainability of
the current account.
Exchange Rate Policy
As for an appropriate exchange rate regime, the
Maastricht criteria do put restrictions on the per-
missible exchange rate regime after accession.
Floating within a band or target zone measuring no
more than 15 percent from a euro central rate, with
intervention at or within margins of the band, is
permissible. Even without adopting a formal target
zone, the country could manage to maintain its
exchange rate within 15 percent of some euro
central rate. Definitely permissible under the
Maastricht exchange rate criterion are a conven-
tional fixed exchange rate regime and a currency
board with the euro. Furthermore, any of the previ-
ous regimes could be combined with the adoption
of the euro as a parallel currency. Under such a
scheme, the euro would be joint legal tender with
the domestic currency. However, full, unilateral
euroization, with the abolition of the domestic cur-
rency, is not compatible with the Maastricht criteria
for joining the EMU. The argument is that, once
the domestic currency has been abolished, the
Council of Ministers can no longer determine
the conversion rate at which the candidate EMU
member’s currency eventually joins the EMU.
Before we turn to the question of what the
exchange rate arrangement for Turkey ought to be
during the preaccession period, a quick glance
at current practice by the 10 new members and
candidate countries is useful. Table 1.9 character-
izes the current exchange rate regime of each of
these countries. Among the 10 CEE countries,
Bulgaria, Estonia and Lithuania have currency
boards with respect to the euro; Latvia has a fixed
exchange rate regime with a peg against the special
drawing rights (SDR); Hungary has a target zone
with a central rate fixed against the euro and a 15 per-
cent fluctuation band on either side; the Czech
Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Romania have
managed float; Poland has floating currency.
The countries under consideration had opted
during the early 1990s for different exchange rate
regimes. Although most of them chose some kind
of fixed exchange rate arrangements, others such as
Slovenia opted for more flexible solutions. Since
then, most of these countries have moved toward
more flexible exchange rate arrangments. For
example, Poland now has fully flexible exchange
rates. Meanwhile, in all of these countries except
Romania inflation is under control, and as of 2003
five countries satisfied the Maastricht condition on
inflation (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania,
Poland, and Bulgaria). All of these countries are
interested in adopting the euro as early as possible.
According to Nuti (2002), the benefits of early
adoption of the euro include greater exchange rate
certainty, greater policy credibility, lower transac-
tion costs, lower interest rates, greater macroeco-
nomic stability, and greater economic integration
through both trade and investment. The costs of
euroization are loss of seigniorage, loss of a lender
of last resort, and, more generally, loss of monetary
policy.
According to the optimum currency area litera-
ture of Mundell (1961) and McKinnon (1963), the
costs will exceed the benefits of joining the cur-
rency area as long as the country exhibits a high
degree of nominal rigidity in domestic prices and
costs, a relatively large size in terms of GDP and low
degree of openness to trade in real goods and serv-
ices, a high incidence of asymmetric (nation-
specific) shocks as opposed to symmetric shocks,
a less diversified structure of production and
demand, a low degree of real factor mobility across
national boundaries, and an absence of significant
international (and supranational) fiscal tax transfer
mechanisms. Consider the case of asymmetric
shocks and assume that the monetary policy of the
Eurosystem does not take into account the business
cycle in the accession country. Also assume that
a shock calls for depreciation of the accession
country’s real exchange rate. Under these assump-
tions, the Eurosystem’s monetary policy will not
change, and real depreciation will call for a lower
price level in the accession country. Thus if prices
and wages are downward inflexible in the accession
country, higher unemployment or capacity utiliza-
tion may result—a situation that might be avoided
if the accession country conducted its own mone-
tary policy and devalued it currency in nominal
terms. Yet as long as the accession country conducts
a large share of its trade with countries in the Euro
Area, the likelihood of the country being hit hard
by an external shock originating from a country or
region outside the EU is rather small. A high degree
of real factor mobility can be an effective substitute
for nominal exchange rate adjustments in the face
of sysmmetric shocks. Real factors, whose mobility
matters, are labor and physical capital. Finally, the
existence of international (and supranational) fis-
cal tax transfer mechanisms with serious redistrib-
utive powers spanning the member countries of the
currency area will ensure compensation of the loss
of the exchange rate instrument if the accession
country were to give up monetary autonomy.
The optimum currency area literature empha-
sizes that during the period in which the conditions
just stated are not satisfied, it is advisable for the
accession country to adopt a flexible exchange rate
regime. Clearly, any individual CEE country should
have doubts about the net advantage of giving up
national monetary independence. The migration of
workers is not free, and all the candidate countries
are relatively small compared with the Euro Area,
with the exception of Poland and Romania, and then
only in terms of population. The candidate countries
are all very open to the EU, and the diversification of
exports to the EU is growing. As for the instruments
to absorb asymmetric shocks in the absence of inde-
pendent monetary and exchange rate policies, the
picture for the CEEs does not look worse than that
for the existing EMU members.45 Maurel (2002)
notes that one cannot assess ex ante the optimal cur-
rency area criteria, because the mere fact of entering
a monetary union also influences the way in which
those criteria are satisfied. Corricelli (2002) empha-
sizes that the 10 candidate countries would incur rel-
atively small losses from asymmetric shocks and that
the CEE countries do qualify to join the EMU.
Buiter and Grafe (2002) point out that only two
exchange rate regimes are sustainable in the long
run. These are the free-floating exchange rate and a
symmetric monetary union, which is defined to be
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a monetary union with a monetary authority that
satisfies the following conditions: (1) its mandate
spans the entire monetary union, (2) it acts as
lender of last resort on the same terms in every
union member state, (3) seigniorage is shared fairly
among all union member states, and (4) it is
accountable to the legitimate political representa-
tives of the citizens of the whole union. To join a
monetary union with a fixed exchange rate, a coun-
try must resolve its fiscal problems, attain price sta-
bility, achieve a sound banking sector, and ensure
its current account is sustainable. Until these condi-
tions are satisfied, Turkey should avoid adopting
a fixed exchange rate regime. Currency board
arrangements and euroization should not be alter-
natives for Turkey.46 Because participation in the
EMU is a must for Turkey, it will ultimately be part
of a symmetric monetary union.47 But during the
period before accession, Turkey could pursue an
exchange rate policy with central bank interven-
tions aimed at attaining the long-run equilibrium
value of the RER. In the terminology of the IMF’s
“Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restric-
tions Annual Report,” we thus refer to “Crawling
Band” with a +/− 10 percent width.48 The country
could pursue this policy until it resolves its fiscal
problems, attains price stability, and achieves sound
banking sector and sustainability in the current
account.
Conclusion
The criteria for accession to the EMU include a ceil-
ing for the permissable rate of inflation one year
prior to accession and a constraint on the permit-
ted variations of the nominal exchange rate—
membership in the ERM for a two-year period prior
to accession while observing the normal fluctuation
limits of the ERM. This constraint means that
Turkey would be free to choose the exchange rate
regime until accession. During this period, the risk
of speculative attacks on the Turkish currency will be
unavoidable, unless Turkey establishes a sound fiscal
framework, achieves a sound banking sector, and
ensures that its real exchange rate equals its long-run
equilibrium level. In addition, Turkey should pursue
a policy of maintaining the real exchange rate at
around its long-run equilibrium level. By contrast, a
look at fiscal issues reveals that Turkey, to reduce its
debt-to-GDP ratio from its 2003 level of 80.2 per-
cent to 60 percent over time, must stick to the
primary surplus target of at least 6.5 percent of GNP,
even in the face of the increased costs of EU acces-
sion for a considerable period of time. Any down-
ward deviation from the target will postpone
achievement of the 60 percent debt-to-GDP ratio.
The primary surplus target of at least 6.5 should be
achieved within the context of a fiscal reform that
will broaden the tax base by reducing the tax burden
substantially on both labor and capital.
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2. The value of the correlation coefficient between the
monthly series of annual CPI inflation and the monthly series of
the annual growth rate of base money is 0.7572, and that
between the monthly series of annual CPI inflation and the
monthly series of the annual rate of change in the exchange rate
is 0.7698.
3. See, for example, Metin (1995, 1998), Lim and Papi
(1997), and Kibritçiog˘lu (2002).
4. The output gap, which has been found to be stationary,
and the dummy variable have been included in the Johansen
cointegration test as exogenous variables.
5. Anyone constructing real exchange rate indices is faced
with choosing the price index, the currency basket, weights, and
a mathematical formula. In formulating the RER, we use the
CPI, because these data are available on a monthly basis for a
large number of countries. For the currency basket, we consider
countries that are major competitors of Turkey in world mar-
kets, as well as major suppliers of imported commodities to
Turkey. These countries are the following: Western Europe:
Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands,
Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom; America:
Brazil, Canada, Mexico, and the United States; Middle East and
North Africa: Egypt, Iran, Syria, Tunisia; Central and Eastern
European and Commonwealth of Independent States countries:
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Russia; Asia: China,
Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan (China),
Thailand. To determine the weights of different countries, we
use the approach developed by Zanello and Desruelle (1997), in
which overall trade weights are derived by combining the
bilateral import weights with the double export weights, using
the relative size of Turkish imports and exports in overall
Turkish trade to average both sets of weights. In formal terms,
the import weight can be expressed as wmi = (Mi /M), the
export weight as
wxi =
(
Xi
X
) yiyi + ∑
h
Xih


+
∑
k =i
(
Xki
X
) X
k
i
yk +
∑
h
Xkh


Macroeconomic Policies for Turkey’s Accession to the EU 31
and the overall weight as
wi =
(
M
X + M
)
wmi +
(
X
X + M
)
wxi
where Mi denotes Turkish imports from country i, M the total
value of Turkish imports, Xi Turkish exports to country i, X the
total value of Turkish exports, yi the value of domestic manufac-
turing production for the home market of country i, and Xki
exports of country k to country i. The formula used to estimate
the RER is
RER =
∏[ CPIi /E i
CPI/E
]wi
where 
∏
stands for the product sign, i for the index that runs
over the country’s trade partners, Ei for the exchange rate
defined as domestic currency per unit of U.S. dollar of country i,
E for the Turkish lira/U.S. dollar exchange rate, and wi for the
competitiveness weight attached by Turkey to country i, calcu-
lated using the method of Zanello and Desruelle (1997).
6. Turkey opened the capital account in 1989 before it had
taken measures to upgrade banking and financial market super-
vision and regulation, adopt international auditing and
accounting standards, strengthen corporate governance and
shareholder rights, and modernize bankruptcy and insolvency
procedures. The 1994 and 2001 crises occurred while the coun-
try was facing large fiscal deficits, public debts, and high infla-
tion rates. Problems of competitiveness led to substantial cur-
rent account deficits. In addition, the currency and maturity
mismatches on the balance sheets of the banks had left the
authorities with little leeway for using either interest rate or
exchange rate adjustments to restore balance without under-
mining the stability of the banking sector. Finally, there was an
excessive dependence on short-term foreign borrowing to
finance the current account deficits. These weaknesses con-
tributed substantially to the balance of payments crisis of 1994
and 2001.
7. Let p∗ E/p be the RER where p∗ denotes the gross domes-
tic product (GDP) deflator in the foreign country, E the
exchange rate, and p the GDP deflator in the home country, and
let py = wL + rK be the nominal GDP where y stands for real
GDP, w the nominal wage rate, L total employment, r the return
on capital, and K the stock of capital. Expressing the capital
income in this equation as rK = λ (wL), where λ stands for the
profit margin, the RER can be written as 
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p
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where (y/L) denotes labor productivity in the home country,
(y∗/L∗) labor productivity in the foreign country, λ∗ the profit
rate in the foreign country, and w∗ the wage rate in the foreign
country. Thus for given values of productivities and profit rates
in the two countries, depreciation of the RER leads to a decrease
in wages measured in foreign currency (w/E).
8. The severity of the 2001 crisis when compared with the
effect of the previous foreign exchange crisis is explained by the
fact that by 2001 Turkey had a high level of “liability dollarization,”
with high public and private foreign debt denominated in foreign
currencies, and a high share of foreign currency–denominated
bank deposits. The sharp depreciation caused a large increase in
both the gross and the net indebtedness of the economy, which
more than offset the positive effect of depreciation on the demand
for exports.
9. In addition to the size of the current account deficits, the
quality of the sources of financing the deficit is important. A
high percentage of short-term debt increases the probability that
sudden capital outflows will lead to a crisis. It is recognized that
foreign direct investment (FDI) is by far the surest form of exter-
nal financing. But FDI flows into Turkey have been rather low.
Thus external sustainability is an important issue for Turkey.
10. Real interest rate is defined as
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where it denotes the annual rate of interest on government
bonds and treasury bills, attained as the weighted average rate in
auctions during the month t weighted by total sales during the
month, and πt denotes the expected annual rate of inflation at
time t over the period t to t + 12. In the calculations of the real
interest rate, we set the expected annual rate of inflation at time
t over the period t to t + 12 equal to the actual annual rate of
inflation over the period t to t + 12. The average level of real
interest rates over the period February 1994 to October 2003 was
25.5 percent.
11. Net debt figures are from IMF (2004), measured in per-
cent of centered GNP, defined as the sum of quarterly GNP in
the last two quarters of the year and in the first two quarters of
the following year, in line with the IMF definition.
12. Consideration of total tax revenues, including social
security contributions, reveals that total tax receipts in Turkey
amounted in 1999 to 31.3 percent of GDP, compared with gen-
eral government receipts of 40.7 percent in EU countries.
According to Noord and Heady (2001), the unweighted average
of total tax revenue as a percent of GDP in the EU is 42.1 per-
cent, and the GDP weighted average is 40.7 percent.
13. Other factors contributing to the country’s relatively
low unemployment rate are labor migration from the country
and the achievement of relatively high growth rates of GDP
over time.
14. Various methods can be used to estimate the size of the
informal sector in the labor market.
Castells and Portes (1989) define informal employment as
the sum of unpaid family workers, domestic servants, and the
self-employed, minus professionals and technicians.
An alternative approach to determining the size of the infor-
mal sector considers the coverage of workers by social security
institutions (Assaad 1997). Workers are divided into two groups:
those who are covered by a social security program and those
who are not. The covered workers are considered to be part of
the formal sector and uncovered workers to be part of the infor-
mal sector.
A third approach to determining the size of the informal sec-
tor is provided by Bulutay (1999). He considers the data pro-
vided by Turkish Household Labour Force Survey Results on
“employed persons by size of workplace and status in employ-
ment.” As he defines the informal sector, it consists of (1) the
self-employed, (2) unpaid family workers, (3) employers who
employ two or three workers, and (4) regular and casual
employees in private sector work places that employ one to three
workers.
In his estimation of informal employment, Togan (1997)
defines employment in the informal sector as the sum of
employment in the agricultural sector and in the private, non-
agricultural informal sector. He determines employment in
the private, nonagricultural informal sector by deducting from
regular and casual employers in the nonagricultural sector
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(reported by the State Institute of Statistics) the number of reg-
istered wage earners reported by the Ministry of Labor.
A fifth estimation method used to determine the size of the
informal sector considers the share of subcontracting activity in
the economy.
Calculations by each of these methods reveals that, on aver-
age, informal labor makes up about 60 percent of total employ-
ment in Turkey.
15. The growth rate of GDP at time period t is calculated as
[GDP(t) − GDP(t − 1)]∗100/GDP(t − 1). The average annual
growth rate over the time period under consideration is then the
average of these growth rates over the indicated time period.
16. According to Italianer (2002), there are two formal rea-
sons a new member state has this status. First, the procedures
foreseen in Article 121(1) for assessment of the conditions for
adoption of the euro cannot be applied before accession. Sec-
ond, one of these conditions cannot possibly be met upon acces-
sion, because it requires participation in the Exchange Rate
Mechanism (ERM II), which is not open to nonmembers. More
important, the economic rationale for the construction of the
EMU presupposes participation in the internal market before
adoption of the euro. The free movement of goods, the freedom
to provide services, the free movement of persons, and full liber-
alization of capital movements are expected to be accomplished
before adoption of the euro, except for negotiated transition
periods in a limited number of areas.
17. Price stability requires that, over a period of one year
before the examination, a country’s inflation rate not exceed the
average rate of the three best-performing EU member states in
price stability by more than 1.5 percentage points. Interest rate
convergence requires that the average long-term interest rate not
exceed that of the three EU countries with the best inflation per-
formance by more than two percentage points. The budget
deficit criterion requires that the ratio of general government
deficit to GDP not exceed 3 percent. The government debt crite-
rion requires that the ratio of general government debt to GDP
not exceed 60 percent. Finally, the exchange rate stability crite-
rion requires that the country observe the normal fluctuation
margins of the ERM II for at least two years without devaluing.
In the ERM II, the euro is the anchor currency. Although the
standard fluctuation band for the exchange rates of the partner
countries is ±15 percent around the central rate, narrower
bands are possible.
18. This section is largely based on Mottiar (1999).
19. This section is based mainly on the work of Gali and
Perotti (2003).
20. ECOFIN, a formation of the Council of the European
Union, is made up of the ministers responsible for economic
affairs and finance in the EU countries.
21. In late 2003, France, Portugal, and Germany faced exces-
sive deficit proceedings after violating the 3 percent limit for
three years in a row. In January 2004, this situation culminated
in the European Commission taking legal action against the
council of finance ministers over the latter’s decision to suspend
the SGP. These events have led to substantial public debate on
the effectiveness of the SGP for ensuring fiscal discipline, and
on the wider issue of the optimal institutional structure for fiscal
policy within the EU. See, for example, Fatas and others (2003).
22. This section draws heavily on European Commission
(1998), European Parliament (1999), and Italianer (2002).
23. At the Copenhagen summit of June 1993, the EU mem-
ber states agreed that “accession will take place as soon as an
associated country is able to assume the obligations of member-
ship by satisfying the economic and political conditions
required. Membership requires that the candidate country has
achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the
rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of
minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as
well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and mar-
ket force within the Union. Membership presupposes the candi-
date’s ability to take on the obligations of membership including
adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary
union” (European Council 1993). These criteria have from then
on been referred to as the Copenhagen criteria.
24. With the entry into force of the Treaty on European
Union on November 1, 1993, the principle of full freedom of
capital movements was incorporated into the treaty. As of Janu-
ary 1, 1994, which corresponds to the start of the second stage of
the economic and monetary union, Articles 73a–73g of the
Treaty on European Union introduced new arrangements for
capital movements. Article 73a states that as of January 1, 1994,
Articles 67–73 of the Treaty of Rome no longer apply and are
replaced by Articles 73b–73g of the Maastricht Treaty. Article 73b
introduces the principle of full freedom of capital movements
and payments, both between member states and between
member states and third countries. This article is directly appli-
cable. Article 73c introduces the possibility of maintaining cer-
tain existing restrictions vis-à-vis third countries. Article 73d sets
out the areas in which member states can maintain information,
prudential supervision, and taxation requirements without capi-
tal movements being hindered. Article 73e provides for the dero-
gations adopted prior to the entry into force of the Treaty on
European Union to be maintained for a transitional period. Arti-
cle 73f provides for the possibility of taking safeguard measures if
movements of capital to or from third countries cause serious
difficulties for the operation of the economic and monetary
union. Article 73g allows the European Community or a mem-
ber state to take measures on movements of capital to or from
third countries for security or foreign policy reasons.
25. In addition, member states participating in the Euro Area
have to prepare yearly stability programs that will report on the
medium-term budgetary objectives and on measures the mem-
ber states intend to take toward fiscal convergence.
26. On voting modalities in the Governing Council after
enlargement, see European Central Bank (2003a).
27. The figures for the government-deficit-to-GDP ratio and
the debt-to-GDP ratio were obtained from State Planning Orga-
nization (2004). These figures have been harmonized with the
deficit and debt definitions of the EU.
28. Consideration of current account sustainability in
Turkey reveals that under perfect capital mobility there will
always be an unavoidable risk of speculative attacks on the Turk-
ish currency, unless the country resolves its fiscal problems,
attains price stability, achieves a sound banking sector, and
brings its real exchange rate equal to the RER’s long-run equilib-
rium level. Currently, Turkey is trying hard to satisfy the first
three conditions, but its RER is, as emphasized later in this chap-
ter, overvalued.
29. Ball (1994) defines trend inflation as a centered nine-
quarter moving average of the actual inflation rate. In our calcu-
lations, we start with the monthly consumer price index series
and determine the quarterly CPI series as the average of the three
monthly CPI series. Thereafter, we determine the annual quar-
terly inflation rate as ( p(t) − p(t − 4))100/p(t − 4), where p(t)
denotes the CPI value during quarter t. The trend inflation is
then defined as the average of inflation rates between (t − 2) and
(t + 2).
30. We are grateful to Zafer Mustafaoglu of the SPO for
providing the estimates of potential output and output gap
projections.
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31. Similar results were obtained by Yavuz and Çetinkaya
(2002).
32. As emphasized earlier, the reason for this flexibility lies in
the existence of a formidable informal sector, whose wage-
setting mechanism is quite different from that of the formal
sector.
33. As Turkey begins to enforce the labor, tax, and social
security laws within the economy, labor market flexibility will
decrease, unless the country decreases the tax and social security
contribution rates substantially and changes the labor law
accordingly.
34. For estimates of the costs of EU accession for Turkey, see
in this volume chapter 2 on agriculture, chapter 9 on labor mar-
kets, and chapter 11 on the environment.
35. A flat tax on income of 13 percent was introduced in
Russia in 2001. The income tax revenue growth then outstripped
the rates of economic growth and inflation in both 2001 and
2002. The flat tax has also boosted the share of total tax revenue
held by the personal income tax. After the adoption and success
of the flat tax in Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, and Ukraine adopted it,
and other countries are in the process of adopting it as well.
36. If tax rates are reduced and the tax system is simplified
but taxes cannot be effectively enforced in the private sector, the
country may find itself facing major revenue shortfalls.
37. During 2003, inward and outward FDI flows amounted
to 0.23899 percent and 0.20990 percent of GDP, respectively.
Thus the net FDI inflow was 0.0290946 percent of GDP.
38. To deal with the simultaneity problem in a simple way, a
four-quarter lagged value of RER is used as the instrumental
variable.
39. The literature basically includes two approaches to deter-
mining the long-run equilibrium value of the RER. According to
Williamson (1994) and Wren-Lewis and Driver (1998), the funda-
mental equilibrium exchange rate (FEER) is the real exchange rate
that would exist when the economy is at full employment (internal
balance) and in current account equilibrium (external balance).
Thus the FEER is the RER that will bring the current account into
equality with the “sustainable” capital account, where home and
foreign aggregate outputs are set at their full employment values.
By contrast, the model of a behavioral equilibrium exchange rate
(BEER) by Clark and MacDonald (1998) analyzes the actual
behavior of the RER using econometric techniques, where the
reduced form equation is estimated with assumed longer-term
fundamentals and short-term variables using cointegration analy-
sis. MacDonald and Stein (1999) and Hinkle and Montiel (1999)
consider productivity and net foreign assets as fundamental vari-
ables. Other variables identified in the literature include real inter-
est differentials, measures of openness of trade and the exchange
system, and size of fiscal balance. Finally, Stein and Allen (1995)
distinguish between medium- and long-term factors influencing
the RER. The approach developed in this chapter can be consid-
ered an extension of the FEER approach. The latter approach
requires that the NICA-to-GDP ratio be sustainable.
40. The economic units may begin to assume they can avoid
the rule of law.
41. Productivity is defined as GDP measured at constant
prices, Q, divided by employment, L—that is, Q/L.
42. Letting Q stand for GDP, K for capital, L for labor, and
H for the index of labor quality, total factor productivity,
using the Cobb-Douglas production function, is defined as
Q/[K α(H L )(1−α)], where α denotes the output elasticity with
respect to capital.
43. Symbolically, the relations can be expressed by the
equations
q˙ = A˙ + αk˙ + (1 − α)H˙
and
Q˙ = q˙ + L˙
where Q˙ denotes the growth rate of output, q˙ the growth rate of
labor productivity, A˙ the growth rate of technical progress, k˙ the
growth rate of the capital-to-labor ratio, H˙ the growth rate of
labor quality, L˙ the growth rate of employment, and α the out-
put elasticity with respect to capital.
44. See, for example, Özler and Yılmaz (2003). Yet many
economists argue to the contrary. They maintain that if trade
liberalization reduces the domestic market shares of domestic
producers, the incentives of those producers to invest in superior
technologies might decrease as protection is lifted. Furthermore,
they stress that liberalization of trade under asymmetric infor-
mation in markets may prove fragile for developing economies.
45. On the similarity of business cycles of countries in the
Euro Area and the accession countries, see European Forecasting
Network (2003).
46. Before the collapse of its currency regime in 2001, Turkey
did have a regime very close to the currency board. But the sys-
tem failed, because Turkey had neither a sound fiscal framework
nor a sound banking sector and had not attained price stability.
Furthermore, it did not have a graceful exit strategy.
47. The European Monetary Union is such a symmetric
monetary union that has strict conditions on fiscal policy. The
budgetary decisions by member countries are subject to surveil-
lance by the EMU as a whole in the context of the requirements
set out in the Maastricht Treaty and subsequently the Stability
and Growth Pact.
48. “Crawling pegs” refers to pegs with central parity period-
ically adjusted in fixed amounts at a preannounced rate or in
response to changes in selected quantitative indicators. “Crawl-
ing band” refers to crawling pegs combined with bands larger
than 1 percent. “Managed Floating with no Preannounced
Path for the Exchange Rate” refers to regimes in which the
monetary authority intervenes in the foreign exchange market
without precommitment to a preannounced path for the
exchange rate. Finally, “Independent Floating” refers to regimes
in which the exchange rate is market-determined, with any
foreign exchange intervention aimed only at preventing exces-
sive volatility in the exchange rate movement. For a system of
classification of exchange rate regimes different from that of the
IMF, see Reinhart and Rogoff (2002).
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Part II
Agriculture,
Manufacturing,
Services, and
Network
Industries

gross domestic product (GDP), while the corre-
sponding figure for the EU15 is 1.7 percent.2
Although the Turkish GDP grew at 4 percent per
year over the period 1980–2003, the growth rate of
agriculture was only 1.1 percent per year, and it
fluctuated widely over the period. As a result, the
sector shrank as a share of the economy, from
25 percent in 1980 to 12 percent in 2003. The sector
still accounts for a very large share of employment,
although this share has also fallen considerably.
Between 1980 and 2003, the number of people
employed in agriculture fluctuated between 7.2 mil-
lion and 9.2 million, but because of a steady increase
in employment in other sectors, agriculture’s share in
civilian employment dropped from 54.2 percent
in 1980 to 33.9 percent in 2003.
Turkey has a total land area of 78 million
hectares (see table 2.1 for land use in Turkey). The
total agricultural area of 39 million hectares con-
sists of arable land (24 million hectares), the area
used for permanent crops (2.5 million hectares),
and permanent meadows and pastures (12.7 mil-
lion hectares). Fallow land makes up more than
20 percent of total arable cropland. In addition,
Turkey has slightly more than 20 million hectares
of forested land. The total irrigated area is about
4.5 million hectares, or 19 percent of total arable
area. It is estimated that the country can potentially
irrigate about 8.5 million hectares.
Turkey’s agricultural land, exposed to both mar-
itime and continental weather conditions, tolerates
Integration into the European Union (EU) is one of
Turkey’s central foreign policy priorities.1 As a part
of this integration, Turkey will have to adopt an
agricultural policy and institutional framework
compatible with the EU’s Common Agricultural
Policy (CAP) and accept the full body of the legisla-
tion and policies on agriculture in the EU as it exists
on the date of accession. For Turkey, the adoption of
EU-like agricultural policies will constitute a signif-
icant modification of current policies, and such
policies will have enormous implications for the
incomes of both farmers and the wider population.
The purpose of this chapter is to explore these
issues of EU enlargement to Turkey. The chapter is
organized as follows. The first section reviews the
agricultural situation in Turkey. The second and
third sections consider the agricultural policies in
Turkey and in the EU, respectively, as they are now
and as they may evolve in line with changes recently
proposed formally by the European Commission
(the administrative arm of the EU government).
The impact of introducing the CAP is analyzed in
the fourth section using a partial equilibrium model
of the agricultural sector. The fifth section discusses
issues related to institutional development. Conclu-
sions are presented in the final section.
Agricultural Situation
Agriculture is an important part of the Turkish
economy; it contributes about 12 percent to the
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a wide range of crops. Climate and geography also
have an important bearing on the location and type
of animal husbandry carried out in Turkey. Accord-
ing to table 2.2, which shows the value of agricul-
tural production during 2000, crops account for
69 percent of production value, livestock products
for 26 percent, forestry for 3 percent, and fishing
products for 3 percent.
In Turkey, the family-owned farm is the basic
unit of agricultural production, and family mem-
bers provide most of the farm labor. The number
and size of holdings are inferred from agricultural
censuses, which are conducted every 10 years on
the basis of small sample surveys. The picture
that emerges from these censuses is that of a large
number of small farms. The 2001 census revealed
that 83.4 percent of farms had less than 10 hectares
of land. The average size of farm holdings was
6.1 hectares (see table 2.3).3
An examination of Turkey’s foreign trade in the
agricultural commodities HS (Harmonized Sys-
tem) 01–24, HS 41.01–41.03, HS 51.01–51.03, and
HS 52.01–52.03 reveals that over the period
1999–2001 the average annual agricultural exports
amounted to US$4.06 billion, or about 14.2 percent
of total exports.4 Turkey’s agricultural exports to
the EU of $1.8 billion made up about 12 percent of
its total exports to the EU. By contrast, Turkey’s
total agricultural imports amounted on average to
$2.7 billion, or about 6.2 percent of total imports.
Agricultural imports from the EU, valued at
$0.7 billion, made up about 3.2 percent of Turkey’s
total imports from the EU.
Table 2.4 shows that the three agricultural com-
modities with the highest shares of total agricul-
tural exports were edible fruits and citrus fruits,
28.5 percent; foods made of vegetables, fruits, and
other plants, 13.0 percent; and processed tobacco
and substitutes, 12.2 percent. The three agricultural
commodities with the highest shares of exports to
the EU, of total agricultural exports to the EU, were
edible fruits and citrus fruits; foods made of vegeta-
bles, fruits, and other plants; and processed tobacco
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TABLE 2.1 Land Use in Turkey, 1995 and 2000
1995 2000
(thousand Percentage (thousand Percentage
hectares) Distribution hectares) Distribution
Arable land 24,373 31.5 23,826 30.8
Area sown 18,464 23.8 18,207 23.5
Vegetable gardens 785 1.0 793 1.0
Fallow land 5,124 6.6 4,826 6.2
Permanent crops 2,461 3.2 2,553 3.3
Vineyards 565 0.7 535 0.7
Orchards 1,340 1.7 1,418 1.8
Olive groves 556 0.7 600 0.8
Permanent meadows and pastures 12,659 16.3 12,671 16.4
Total agricultural land 39,493 51.0 39,050 50.4
Forests and woodland 20,199 26.1 20,703 26.7
Other land 17,271 22.3 17,210 22.2
Total land area 76,963 99.3 76,963 99.3
Total area 77,482 100 77,482 100
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization Statistical Database.
TABLE 2.2 Value of Agricultural
Production: Turkey, 2000
Value Percentage
Product (US$ millions) Distribution
Crops 28,163 68.48
Livestock 10,600 25.77
Forestry 1,101 2.68
Fishing 1,246 3.03
Total 41,129 100.00
Source: Turkish State Planning Organization.
and substitutes. Yet the three agricultural com-
modities with the highest shares of exports to the
EU, of total sectoral exports, were other animal
products, 95.3 percent; products made from meat,
fish, and crustacea, 83.9; and plants and floriculture
products, 76.1. Overall, exports of agricultural
commodities to the EU formed 44.3 percent of all
of Turkey’s agricultural exports.
As for imports of agricultural commodities, the
three commodities with the highest shares of total
agricultural imports were cotton, 19.0 percent; ani-
mal or vegetable oils and fats, 13.6 percent; and cere-
als, 12.0 percent. The three agricultural commodi-
ties with the highest shares of imports from the EU,
of total agricultural imports from the EU, were
cotton, hides and skin, and animal or vegetable oils
and fats. Finally, the three agricultural commodities
with the highest shares of imports from the EU, of
total sectoral imports, were plants and floriculture
products, 89.4 percent; cereal products, wheat flour,
and pastries, 89.3 percent; and vegetable lacquers,
resins, and balsams, 86.4 percent. Overall, imports
of agricultural commodities from the EU made up
25.7 percent of all agricultural imports.
Table 2.4 further reveals that Turkey is a net
exporter of commodities such as edible fruits and
citrus fruits; foods made of vegetables, fruits, and
other plants; and sugar and sweets. It is a net
importer of commodities such as cotton and
oilseeds, various seeds and fruits, and industrial
plants. By contrast, in its trade with the EU, Turkey
is a net exporter of edible fruits and citrus fruits;
foods made of vegetables, fruits, and other plants;
and processed tobacco and substitutes. It is a net
importer of hides and skin, cotton, and various
foods.
Agricultural Policies in Turkey
The main objectives of agricultural policies in
Turkey are set out in the government’s five-year de-
velopment plans. These objectives are to (1) ensure
adequate levels of nutrition, (2) increase yield and
output, (3) reduce the vulnerability of production
to adverse weather conditions, (4) raise levels
of self-sufficiency, (5) provide adequate, stable
incomes for those working in the agricultural
sector, (6) increase exports, and (7) develop rural
areas. In pursuit of these objectives, the government
has implemented various measures. In the crops
sector, government interventions have primarily
taken the form of price supports, augmented by
high tariffs. In the livestock sector, quantitative
restrictions and tariffs have been the main mecha-
nism used to support prices. In addition, farmers
were given input subsidies and credits to improve
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TABLE 2.3 Agricultural Holdings and Land Engaged in Crop Production, Turkey
Average Size
of Farm
Size of Holdings
Holdings Total Area
Holdings
(decares) Number Percent Decares Percent (decares)
Less than 5 177,893 5.89 481,605 0.26 3
5–9 290,327 9.61 1,951,672 1.06 7
10–19 539,507 17.86 7,374,515 4.00 14
20–49 950,539 31.46 29,523,341 16.02 31
50–99 559,999 18.54 38,123,216 20.68 68
100–199 327,330 10.83 43,881,626 23.81 134
200–499 153,688 5.09 42,076,313 22.83 274
500–999 17,431 0.58 11,218,554 6.09 644
1,000–2,499 4,198 0.14 5,476,930 2.97 1,305
2,500–4,999 222 0.01 695,541 0.38 3,133
5,000 + 56 0.00 3,526,174 1.91 62,967
Total 3,021,190 100 184,329,487 100 61
Note: The figures on the number of holdings and area are from the 2001 census.
Source: Turkish State Institute of Statistics.
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TABLE 2.4 Exports and Imports of Agricultural Commodities: Turkey, 1999–2001
Net Exports
Exports Exports Imports Net in TradeExports
to EU, from 
Imports
from EU, Imports from Exports, with EU,
Average, Average EU as a Average, Average EU as a Average Average
Harmonized 1999–2001 1999–2001 Share of 1999–2001 1999–2001 Share of 1999–2001 1999–2001
System (HS) (US$ Percentage (US$ Total (US$ Percentage (US$ Total (US$ (US$ 
Code Description thousands) Distribution thousands) Exports thousands) Distribution thousands) Imports thousands) thousands)
Live animals and animal products
01 Live animals 19,159 0.47 1,471 7.68 26,326 0.98 15,467 58.75 7,168 13,996
02 Meat and edible offal 13,916 0.34 708 5.09 418 0.02 64 15.41 13,498 643
03 Fish and sea products 54,154 1.33 38,532 71.15 22,508 0.83 12,378 54.99 31,647 26,154
04 Milk and dairy products; eggs; 35,301 0.87 6,316 17.89 30,824 1.14 20,828 67.57 4,477 14,512
honey
05 Other animal products 36,423 0.90 34,701 95.27 18,860 0.70 2,516 13.34 17,563 32,185
Vegetable products
06 Plants and floriculture products 15,262 0.38 11,613 76.09 16,203 0.60 14,490 89.43 941 2,877
07 Vegetables, plants, roots, tubers 304,529 7.50 100,117 32.88 75,451 2.80 6,605 8.75 229,079 93,512
08 Edible fruits; citrus fruits 1,159,461 28.54 743,676 64.14 57,082 2.12 6,103 10.69 1,102,379 737,573
09 Coffee, tea, spices 58,123 1.43 22,574 38.84 27,450 1.02 3,135 11.42 30,673 19,439
10 Cereals 203,561 5.01 33,582 16.50 323,726 12.00 57,506 17.76 120,165 23,923
11 Products of the milling industry 82,013 2.02 26,202 31.95 5,175 0.19 4,431 85.61 76,838 21,772
12 Oilseeds, various seeds/fruits; 52,430 1.29 28,351 54.07 233,454 8.66 31,223 13.37 181,024 2,872
industrial plants
13 Vegetable lacquers, resins, 1,341 0.03 145 10.84 14,110 0.52 12,194 86.42 12,770 12,049
balsams
14 Vegetable plaiting materials 16,471 0.41 10,819 65.68 2,695 0.10 62 2.28 13,776 10,757
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Animal or vegetable oils and fats
15 Animal or vegetable oils and 241,189 5.94 81,999 34.00 366,550 13.59 74,579 20.35 125,361 7,419
fats
Foodstuffs, beverages, tobacco
16 Products made from meat, 34,964 0.86 29,342 83.92 830 0.03 369 44.43 34,134 28,973
fish, crustacea
17 Sugar and sweets 258,178 6.36 25,237 9.77 14,019 0.52 9,125 65.09 244,158 16,112
18 Cocoa and cocoa products 81,023 1.99 12,256 15.13 68,351 2.53 22,007 32.20 12,672 9,751
19 Cereal products, wheat flour, 116,732 2.87 13,538 11.60 30,841 1.14 27,544 89.31 85,891 14,006
pastries
20 Foods made of vegetables, 528,298 13.00 352,375 66.70 17,542 0.65 12,057 68.73 510,757 340,319
fruits, and other plants
21 Various foods 93,845 2.31 11,226 11.96 101,011 3.75 81,416 80.60 7,165 70,190
22 Alcoholic and nonalcoholic 38,877 0.96 18,984 48.83 14,331 0.53 12,365 86.28 24,546 6,619
beverages
23 Residues of food industry; 13,271 0.33 357 2.69 167,152 6.20 17,820 10.66 153,881 17,463
fodders
24 Processed tobacco and 496,247 12.22 145,360 29.29 308,653 11.45 11,652 3.77 187,594 133,708
substitutes
Hides, wool, and cotton
4101–4103 Hides and skin 21,519 0.53 209 0.97 199,473 7.40 106,243 53.26 177,954 106,035
5101–5103 Wool and animal hair 6,553 0.16 3,255 49.67 42,362 1.57 1,905 4.50 35,809 1,350
5201–5203 Cotton 79,630 1.96 46,330 58.18 511,392 18.96 129,916 25.40 431,762 83,586
Total 4,062,470 100.00 1,799,277 44.29 2,696,790 100.00 694,001 25.73 1,365,680 1,105,276
Source: The authors.
yields and income and to counterbalance the
implicit protection given to domestic input indus-
tries through border measures. Finally, administra-
tive controls have been applied to the production of
a few important crops.
Output Price Supports, Input Subsidies, and Supply
Control Measures
Output price supports, input subsidies, and supply
control measures are three important components
of agricultural support policies. Government price
supports for most major crops (such as grains,
oilseeds, cotton, sugar beet, tobacco, hazelnut, and
tea) have in the past been announced by decree
each year, but this practice is changing because of
the reform program discussed later in this section
on agricultural policies. Related state-owned enter-
prises (SOEs) and agricultural sales cooperative
unions (ASCUs) were commissioned to buy at the
announced floor prices. Crops could also be sold to
independent buyers. For some crops, a system of
“deficiency payments” or premiums was intro-
duced in 1993 in place of floor prices. The High
Planning Council announced a target price for
those crops as well as an intervention price, and the
target price moved in parallel with the world prices.
Farmers selling their crop to ASCUs or commodity
exchanges received the difference between the price
obtained and the target price in the form of a pay-
ment directly from the state-owned Turkish Bank
of Agriculture. The payment was then reimbursed
by the Treasury. The deficiency payments were
implemented for sunflower seed, soybean, cotton,
and olive oil. Tea growers were also fully compen-
sated for the costs incurred in implementing the
strict pruning requirements to control supply.
Direct payments were, until recently, only a minor
part of the agricultural support system. The main
types of direct payments were natural disaster
relief, the return on sugar beet pulp, deficiency
payments for oilseeds and cotton, and incentive
premiums for milk and meat.
Input subsidies are a second important compo-
nent of agricultural support policies. The most
important have been the credit, fertilizer, and irri-
gation subsidies. Short-term and investment credit
for agriculture has long been subsidized by the gov-
ernment at interest rates well below inflation and
commercial rates. The result is that interest rates on
loans from the Turkish Bank of Agriculture have
been significantly negative in real terms. In addi-
tion, the unpaid loans of the ASCUs have been rou-
tinely covered as “duty losses” of the Treasury.
The domestic manufacturers and consumers of
fertilizers have received subsidies since 1961. The
subsidy was set until recently as a percentage of
market price, with the percentage varying consider-
ably over the years. In 1996 and 1997, the subsidy
was about 40–50 percent of the market price,
depending on the type of fertilizer. In November
1997, the government decided to fix the fertilizer
subsidy at a nominal amount of Turkish lira (TL)
per kilogram. This shift in policy has reduced the
fertilizer subsidy substantially in real terms, and
inflation has eroded its value.
Agriculture has also received substantial subsi-
dies through irrigation projects. The Turkish gov-
ernment has been investing heavily in irrigation,
financing the associated capital investments largely
through the budget. Farmers have paid no fee for
the resource value of water they have used for irri-
gation, whether privately extracted or supplied by a
public scheme, even though farmers who grew
crops on irrigated land did contribute to the cost of
operating and maintaining the infrastructure. But
even in this situation the bulk of operating and
maintenance costs were financed through budget
allocations.
Supply control measures, the third component of
Turkish agricultural policies, have been used to
control the fiscal cost of support policies. Tobacco,
hazelnuts, and tea have been under area or produc-
tion control. Sugar beet output has been indirectly
controlled to some extent by the state-owned sugar
company (S¸eker) through contracts with growers.
Tobacco farmers have received payments to com-
pensate for the area controls, and tea producers to
compensate for lost production from pruning.
Agricultural producers have also received gen-
eral services either free or at subsidized prices. The
measures taken to improve the production basis
of agriculture were mainly research, training and
extension services, inspection, pest and disease
control, and land improvements (including capital
investments in small-scale irrigation works). In
addition, only the large farms are required to pay
income tax. In all transactions related to agricul-
ture, a 5 percent sales tax is applied at the point of
sale. Consumers have not benefited from subsidies
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directly. They are protected indirectly through price
controls, market intervention, and a lower value-
added tax on food.
Agricultural Trade Policy
Table 2.5 shows the applied most-favored-nation
(MFN) tariff rates for the major agricultural com-
modity groups during 2002. The table reveals that
the agricultural sector is highly protected in Turkey.
The three sectors with highest simple average tariff
rates applied to imports from third countries are
the products made from meat, fish, and crustacea
(HS 16) with a tariff rate of 132.70 percent; meat and
edible offal (HS 02), 116.52 percent; and milk and
dairy products (HS 04), 105.20 percent. The three
sectors with the highest weighted average tariff
rates applied to imports from third countries are
products made from meat, fish, and crustacea (HS
16) with a tariff rate of 124.08 percent; sugar and
sweets (HS 17), 124.08 percent; and edible fruits
and citrus fruits (HS 08), 120.17 percent. The table
also reveals that Turkey, upon becoming a member
of the EU, could have to change its tariff schedule
on agricultural commodities substantially. To align
its tariff schedule with the current EU schedule,
Turkey would have to increase its tariffs on cereals;
processed tobacco and substitutes; residues of the
food industry and fodders; alcoholic and nonalco-
holic beverages; vegetable lacquers, resins, and bal-
sams; cotton; and vegetable plaiting materials. In all
other categories, Turkey would have to decrease its
tariff rates.
As for the market access conditions for agricul-
tural commodities imported from the EU, the pref-
erential regime applied by Turkey to imports of
agricultural products originating in the EU is
determined by Decision No. 1/98 of the EC–Turkey
Association Council of 1998. Under this decision,
Turkey must grant a large number of commodities
duty-free access to the Turkish market up to the
quota limits specified in the decision. A look at the
quota levels and trade data for the agricultural
commodities specified in Decision No. 1/98 of the
EC–Turkey Association Council reveals that for
most of the commodities the quota limits have
been exceeded. Thus “out of quota” tariff rates are,
in general, applicable to imports of these com-
modities from the EU. Consideration of the “out of
quota” tariff rates for these commodities, together
with the MFN tariff rates shown in table 2.5 for the
other agricultural commodities, reveals that the
three sectors with the highest simple average tariff
rates are meat and edible offal (HS 02), with a tariff
rate of 116.52 percent; milk and dairy products
(HS 04), 99.60 percent; and products made from
meat, fish, and crustacea (HS 16), 76.90 percent.
The three sectors with the highest weighted average
tariff rates applied on imports from the EU are edi-
ble fruits and citrus fruits (HS 08) with a tariff of
120.17; milk and dairy products (HS 04), 101.79;
and meat and edible offal (HS 02), 71.40 percent.
The preferential regime applied by the EU to
imports of agricultural products originating in
Turkey is determined by Decisions No. 1/72, 1/80,
and 1/98 of the EC–Turkey Association Councils of
1972, 1980, and 1998, respectively. Under these
decisions, almost all of the agricultural commodi-
ties originating in Turkey are imported by the
European Community free from ad valorem duties,
and the EU applies tariff quotas only for a relatively
small number of commodities (see chapter annex
tables 2.17 and 2.18). These tables reveal that those
commodities made up about 30 percent of Turkish
exports to the EU during 1999. In addition, the EU
applies an entry price system for about 30 fruits and
vegetables such as tomatoes, artichokes, courgettes,
tangerines, lemons, and apples. For these com-
modities, specific duties are applied as long as the
value of consignment falls below the entry price.
These commodities, shown in annex table 2.19,
made up about 4.8 percent of Turkish agricultural
exports to the EU during 1999.
Finally, a sanitary ban on the import of livestock
and meat products has remained in place. Export
subsidies, applied to a number of products and
limited to a maximum of between 10 percent and
20 percent of the export values and between 29 per-
cent and 100 percent of the quantities exported,
have continued for processed fruits and vegetables,
fruit juices, olive oil, potatoes, apples, poultry meat,
and eggs.
The considerations just described reveal that
substantial border measures still affect trade be-
tween the EU and Turkey and that the external
tariffs applied by the EU and Turkey to third coun-
tries’ imports differ significantly. Completion of the
customs union between the EU and Turkey to cover
agricultural products implies the abolition of all
border measures and the adoption of the EU external
Analysis of the Impact of EU Enlargement on the Agricultural Markets and Incomes of Turkey 45
4
6
TABLE 2.5 Most-Favored-Nation Tariff Rates of EU and Turkey, 2002
Tariff Rates Tariff Rates Tariff Rates Tariff Rates
Tariff Rates Tariff Rates Applied by EU Applied by Turkey Applied by EU Applied by Turkey
Number of Applied by Turkey Applied by Turkey to Imports from to Imports from to Imports from to Imports from
HS Tariff to Imports from to Imports from Third Countries Third Countries Third Countries Third Countries
Code Description Lines EU (simple) EU (weighted) (simple) (simple) (weighted) (weighted)
Live animals and animal products
01 Live animals 27 27.85 1.72 19.72 27.85 56.69 1.72
02 Meat and edible offal 10 116.52 71.40 55.89 116.52 68.55 71.40
03 Fish and sea products 89 38.90 19.61 11.39 78.30 11.61 37.60
04 Milk and dairy products; 72 99.60 101.79 55.16 105.20 69.17 103.22
eggs; honey
05 Other animal products 30 2.50 7.00 0.35 2.80 0.11 7.09
Vegetable products
06 Plants and floriculture 37 17.90 7.49 9.25 18.50 12.90 8.46
products
07 Vegetables, plants, roots, 78 22.20 20.44 13.30 22.30 13.80 20.44
tubers
08 Edible fruits; citrus fruits 93 48.10 120.17 8.56 48.10 12.15 120.17
09 Coffee, tea, spices 45 37.70 46.13 6.11 38.00 4.32 47.27
10 Cereals 39 25.60 16.97 66.35 25.70 79.15 16.97
11 Products of the milling 40 36.30 28.86 35.87 36.70 44.47 29.65
industry
12 Oilseeds, various seeds/ 88 16.40 5.29 3.65 17.20 0.98 5.55
fruits; industrial plants
13 Vegetable lacquers, resins, 29 1.40 1.54 2.88 2.60 2.76 2.06
balsams
14 Vegetable plaiting materials 14 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.01 0.00
4
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Animal or vegetable oils and fats
15 Animal or vegetable oils 107 18.10 17.74 15.49 20.20 22.90 17.86
and fats
Foodstuffs, beverages, tobacco
16 Products made from meat, 39 76.90 65.27 21.32 132.70 22.79 124.08
fish, crustacea
17 Sugar and sweets 53 58.90 63.18 22.79 79.70 48.46 124.08
18 Cocoa and cocoa products 24 38.60 22.38 7.12 99.30 3.06 51.11
19 Cereal products, wheat 66 58.20 54.45 26.05 83.90 22.88 78.96
floor, pastries
20 Foods made of vegetables, 173 58.50 62.41 25.47 60.80 27.59 73.92
fruits, and other plants
21 Various foods 54 25.20 28.64 13.42 42.02 15.89 42.37
22 Alcoholic and nonalcoholic 41 11.90 2.01 22.52 17.04 13.87 6.27
beverages
23 Residues of food industry; 49 6.30 1.12 18.03 7.81 26.96 2.84
fodders
24 Processed tobacco and 17 14.70 0.22 51.55 33.78 51.01 23.98
substitutes
Hides, wool and cotton
4101–4103 Hides and skin 44 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
5101–5103 Wool and animal hair 36 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
5201–5203 Cotton 15 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.01 0.00
Source: The authors.
tariff applied to third countries.5 As a result, the
prices of agricultural products for which border
measures still exist would become much closer in
the EU and Turkey, with the remaining differences
due to quality and to transportation and marketing
costs. Such a development would, however, require
that the parties harmonize their agricultural price
policies.
Agricultural Reform Implementation Project
The overly generous system of agricultural support
policies pursued until the late 1990s was fiscally
expensive and unsustainable, and they encouraged
waste and abuse (World Bank 2000). They did not
provide a cost-effective way for addressing policy
objectives such as alleviation of rural poverty and
regional development, and the “duty loss” system
of administration burdened the Treasury with
enormous debts. There were other problems as
well. Support and administered prices were
announced only after key production decisions had
been made, and payments were delayed by inter-
vention agencies. These problems confirm the dif-
ficulties inherent in trying to administer outcomes
in a dynamic, complex market. Neither the overall
demand-supply balance nor the equilibrium in the
very complex intertemporal, spatial, and quality
dimensions could be achieved. The Turkish gov-
ernment recently tried to replicate the market by
establishing more quality-differentiated prices. But
success in duplicating the price flexibility of freely
functioning commodities market was limited.
In the late 1990s, Turkey decided to reform its
agricultural policies. Beginning in late 1999, with
support from the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and the World Bank, the government devel-
oped the Agricultural Reform Implementation
Project (ARIP) to phase out current production- and
input-oriented support and replace it with area-
based income support payments during the 2001–04
period. ARIP was intended to achieve following:
• To phase out the unsustainable and distor-
tionary system of subsidies for fertilizer—credit
and price supports that disproportionately ben-
efited large farmers, placed a regressive tax on
consumers, and cost about $5 billion a year.
ARIP was determined to link domestic prices to
world prices.
• To privatize most state enterprises in agriculture
and to turn the agricultural sales cooperative
unions (ASCU) into true private sector unions
of producer-owned cooperatives in order to
reduce government involvement in the market-
ing and processing of agricultural products.
• To introduce a unified national program of
direct income support (DIS). These reforms are
intended to increase the efficiency of the agri-
cultural sector and thereby help Turkey meet the
preconditions for accession to the EU.
Implementation of ARIP began in 2000 with a
pilot program of income support payments applied
to four regions. An important part of the pilot pro-
gram was preparation of a farm registry and testing
of the eligibility conditions. All agricultural land
users received $50 per hectare of agricultural land,
up to a maximum of 20 hectares per farmer. The
program was extended nationwide in 2001–02.
Table 2.6 shows the intervention prices and direct
payments for selected commodities over the period
1998–2002. The table reveals how the government
has tried to compensate for the drop in interven-
tion prices with increases in direct payments.
The intention of direct income support is not to
fully compensate every farmer for income lost by
removal of the old subsidy system, but rather to
cushion the blow and continue to provide adequate
support to the agricultural sector in an incentive-
neutral way. Within the existing legal framework,
the DIS payments should be usable as collateral,
thereby giving farmers enhanced access to credit.
Payments under the DIS system will be ongoing but
should become more explicitly targeted or merged
with the general social safety net system. Thus DIS
allows the government to disengage from its current
support mechanism in a politically acceptable and
humane way. The government is also easing the
transition for growers of certain crops that were
grossly overproduced (i.e., tobacco and hazelnut)
by making onetime payments to farmers to cover
their cost of switching to alternative activities. This
program is distinct from, and in addition to, DIS.
After the policy change, the fertilizer subsidy
decreased from 31 percent in 1999 to almost 20 per-
cent by the end of 2000,and it was phased out in 2002.
By 2002, credit subsidies channeled through Ziraat
Bank, as well as most other input subsidies, were also
phased out. In addition, price supports for grains
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were reduced, with the aim of eliminating the sup-
ports completely by 2002.Even though grain support
prices were not announced by a decree by the govern-
ment in 2002, the Turkish Grain Board (TMO)
announced its purchasing prices based on produc-
tion, its stocks, and expected market conditions.
Estimates of Support in Agriculture
Agricultural production in Turkey is protected.
According to the official estimates of the Organisa-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD), total transfers from consumers and
taxpayers to agricultural producers, as measured by
the producer support estimate (PSE), amounted to
a peak of $9.955 billion in 1998 (almost 25 percent
of producers’ receipts) and fell slightly to $6.8 bil-
lion (21 percent) in 2000. As a result of the reform
efforts, the PSE decreased to $2.251 billion (10 per-
cent) in 2001, but increased to $6.1 billion (23 per-
cent) in 2002. According to the OECD (2003a),
market price support remained the most important
type of support, for a share of 69 percent of total
support to producers in 2001 and 75 percent in
2002. Payments based on input use are the other
category of support to producers. This category as a
share of total support decreased from 22 percent in
1999 to 8 percent in 2001, and further to 2 percent
in 2002. By contrast, the total transfers to the agri-
cultural sector measured by the total support esti-
mate (TSE) amounted to $13.84 billion in 1998
(6.9 percent of GDP) and $12.1 billion in 1999
(6.6 percent of GDP). The TSE decreased to
$5.4 billion (3.6 percent of GDP) in 2001, but
increased again to $7.7 billion (4.1 percent of GDP)
in 2002. At the same time, the corresponding fig-
ures for all OECD countries fell from 1.39 percent
of GDP in 1998 and 1999 to 1.2 percent in 2002.
The TSE for the EU fell from 1.52 percent of GDP
in 1999 to 1.3 percent in 2002. Over the same
period, the PSE in the EU, as a percentage of pro-
ducers’ receipts, fell from 43 percent to 36 percent.
The Common Agricultural 
Policy of the EU
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the
European Union, which was set up against the
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TABLE 2.6 Agricultural Supports: Turkey, 1998–2002
(US$ millions)
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Market price support
Cereals 425.8 356.7 183.0 27.8 0.0
Tobacco 276.9 146.6 81.8 43.3 26.7
Sugar beet 245.2 141.6 70.5 40.1 0.0
Payments based on inputs used
Fertilizer 476.7 238.6 153.4 60.5 0.0
Pesticides 33.0 24.7 19.2 14.7 0.0
Seed 6.6 3.4 4.6 0.8 0.0
Development of animal husbandry 0.0 0.0 19.2 31.9 50.1a
Incentive premiums
Milk 31.5 25.6 19.2 9.8 0.0
Compensation payment
Tea 13.8 7.1 25.2 22.1 26.7
Natural disaster relief 29.7 37.2 22.4 0.0 0.0
Credit subsidy 1,663.2 1,675.3 562.7 274.8 0.0
Deficiency payments 0.0 265.8 298.2 280.5 145.1
Direct income support 0.0 0.0 0.0 68.1 1,159.0
Total 3,202.4 2,922.6 1,459.6 874.4 1,357.5
a. The figure includes the milk premium.
Source: Turkish Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs.
backdrop of the food shortages and rations that
followed World War II, had five founding aims:
(1) higher productivity, (2) a fair standard of living
for farmers, (3) stable markets, (4) regular food
supplies, and (5) reasonable prices for consumers.
It was based on the principles of a single market in
farm products with common prices and the free
movement of agricultural goods within the com-
munity, preference for community members, and
shared costs. Its main mechanisms were support
prices set above world price levels and the use of
import taxes, nontariff barriers to imports, and
export subsidies to maintain the higher internal
prices. As production responded to higher prices,
surpluses became chronic and increasingly expen-
sive. As a result, the CAP has been subjected to var-
ious reforms. In particular, production has been
artificially constrained by mechanisms such as milk
quotas and compulsory set-asides for arable crops;
prices have been cut, and producers have normally
been given direct payments in compensation; and
more emphasis has been put on rural development
and encouraging farmers to look to markets and
diversified forms of income to reduce their depend-
ence on subsidies.
The CAP is financed by the European Agricul-
tural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF),
which is an integral part of the EU’s budget. In the
2003 EU budget of €99.69 billion, appropriations
for the EAGGF accounted for about €44.78 billion.
In addition to budget costs, the CAP imposes a cost
on EU consumers through higher food costs. The
additional cost to consumers varies according to
movements in world prices, but in 2003 it was esti-
mated by the OECD at about €55.5 billion.
In the EU, like in Turkey, it eventually became
clear that price supports, import tariffs and nontar-
iff barriers, export subsidies, and the other govern-
ment interventions required by the CAP were creat-
ing unsustainable pressures on the EU budget and
friction in international trade relations. Further-
more, they were not achieving the social objectives
of environmental preservation and equity. The EU
therefore embarked on a far-reaching reform pro-
gram for CAP that is still under way. The reform
began with the McSharry reforms of 1992 and was
accelerated with the Agenda 2000 agreement, which
was approved at the Berlin Council in March 1999.
The underlying principle of the reform was the
same as that of ARIP: to minimize the government’s
role in setting prices and allow prices to be closely
linked to world prices, while compensating farmers
for income losses with area-based direct payments
that would not be linked to output or input use.
Under the Agenda 2000 agreement, some interven-
tion prices were set at levels so low that they would
be binding only in years of very low world prices,
and other intervention prices were reduced greatly,
with producers compensated by direct income sup-
port payments. The agreement represented a signif-
icant shift from price supports to direct payments,
and it helped to reduce the economic distortions of
the CAP. It will go some way toward helping agri-
culture to meet the challenges of further trade lib-
eralization and enable the formulation of an inte-
grated EU rural development policy that shifts the
emphasis from production support to environmen-
tal and rural economy measures in the future. But,
as described in the rest of this section, further
reforms also are under way.
Common Organization of Market
Within the CAP framework, the Common Organi-
zation of Market (COM) is the basic instrument
used to manage agricultural production and to sta-
bilize markets in accord with the declared objec-
tives of the CAP. COMs, which were introduced
gradually, now cover most EU agricultural prod-
ucts, accounting for 90 percent of the final agricul-
tural output of the European Community. The
essential features of the current CAP under Agenda
2000 reform is summarized in the following sections
(see Europarl 2002 and Csaki and others 2002).
COM for Cereals In the past, at the core of the
COM for cereals was a state intervention system
based on guaranteed prices, but after the 1993/94
marketing year, compensation payments per
hectare became the main mechanism.6 The inter-
vention price was set at a very low level to serve as
only a safety net in years of extremely low world
prices. It was €101.31 per metric ton from the
2001/02 marketing year, and it would decline fur-
ther, to a little over €90 per metric ton under the
CAP Mid-term Review proposals described later in
this chapter. This intervention price applies to a
predefined “standard quality” that meets the regu-
lations on moisture content and specific weight.
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Direct area payments to cereal producers, set in
euros per metric ton, were introduced to compen-
sate farmers for reductions in price supports. To
receive such compensation, farmers must withdraw
10 percent of their land from production. Small
farmers with a total output of less than 92 metric
tons are exempt from set-aside as a compulsory
requirement to receive compensation payments.
For the 2001/02 marketing year, these direct pay-
ments were fixed at €63 per metric ton of the his-
torical yield. For durum wheat, the supplementary
direct area–based income payment per hectare
amounts to €344.5 in traditional areas (traditional
durum wheat aid) and €138.9 in other areas (well-
established durum wheat aid).
To apply for direct area payments, each member
state must draw up a regionalization plan by taking
into account specific factors that influence yields
such as soil fertility. The area concerned must not
exceed the region’s “base area”—that is, the average
number of hectares in the region allocated to grow-
ing crops or set aside within the context of the pub-
lic assistance scheme in 1989, 1990, and 1991.7 If
the total eligible claims exceed the base area, then
all claims are reduced proportionately. Article 9 of
Council Regulation No. 1251/1999 states that the
base areas of future member states will be estab-
lished by the European Commission. Finally, aid for
the production of “traditional durum wheat” is
limited to certain regions that are mentioned in
Annex II to Council Regulation No. 1251/1999, and
per member state a maximum area that may be eli-
gible for the “traditional durum wheat aid” is fixed
in Annex III of that regulation.8
According to Article 3 of Council Regulation
No. 1252/1999, the historical reference yield for
cereals should be the average of the median three
years of the five-year period 1986/87–1990/91.9 For
maize, a specific yield can be set, possibly distin-
guishing between irrigated and nonirrigated areas.
In the areas thus defined, per hectare payments are
calculated by multiplying the basic amount per
metric ton by the historical average cereal yield for
the area. Article 7 of Council Regulation No. 1252/
1999 states that applications for payments may not
be made for land that on December 31, 1991, was
under permanent pasture, permanent crops, or
trees, or was used for nonagricultural purposes.10
As for import duties, export taxes, and export
refunds, under commitments to the World Trade
Organization (WTO), the EU can levy an import
duty on cereal imports from third countries, which
is payable by the European Community importer.
Within the limit of the agreement, the duty cannot
exceed the intervention price, increased by 55 per-
cent less the representative CIF (cost, insurance,
freight) price. Under these rules, the EU is allowed
to vary the tariffs for cereals over time.
COM for Oilseeds The McSharry reforms
removed  the system of institutional prices for
oilseeds (i.e., rapeseed, sunflowers, and soybeans),
but since the 1993/94 marketing year their produc-
ers also qualify for compensatory payments.11
These payments are aligned with the one applicable
for cereals (€63 per metric ton of reference yield
since 2002). The area grown with oilseeds is taken
into account in determining the individual farmer’s
set-aside obligation as described under the regula-
tions for cereals. As a prerequisite for the imposi-
tion of specific oilseed production provisions, pro-
duction area constraints for the member countries
have been implemented under the Blair House
agreement. This agreement includes a system of
reduced aids for regions where the predetermined
agricultural area is exceeded. For nonedible oilseeds
for industrial use, specific regulations apply and
require that set-aside areas, for example, be planted
with several oil-bearing crops for industrial pur-
poses. Currently, there is no regulatory levy on
imports, and the Common Customs Tariff rates
apply.
COM for Sugar Beet The EU sugar market is
highly protected.12 Besides protection at the border,
the CAP on sugar is implemented through a mar-
keting quota system. Sugar beet quotas are allo-
cated to and administered through sugar refineries
on the basis of equity shares. The intervention price
for refined beet sugar is set, since the 1998/99 mar-
keting year, at €631.9 per metric ton for white sugar
and €523.7 per metric ton for raw sugar in order to
guarantee a basic price for sugar beet of €47.67 per
metric ton. Intervention is provided for limited
quantities corresponding to a production quota for
which there is an almost total guarantee (quota A)
and a quota with a partially guaranteed price
(quota B). For net importers, quota A equals net
production, and quota B equals 10 percent of quota
A. For net exporters, quota A equals that part of net
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production consumed domestically, and quota B
equals net exports. The EU insists that the total of
quotas A and B should not exceed internal con-
sumption plus the quantity that can be exported
within the limits of the WTO commitments. Fur-
thermore, the COM is based on a system of sugar
and isoglucose production levies to cover the cost
of storage and production refunds for the manu-
facture of certain chemical products. The regula-
tions are complemented with import tariffs and
warrants of export refunds. Agricultural areas
planted with sugar beets are not eligible for com-
pensatory area payments and are not subject to set-
aside obligations.
COM for Fruits and Vegetables In late July 1996,
the European Council reached a political agreement
to reform the fresh and processed fruit and vegetable
sector.13 The reform was intended to improve the
organization of supply by strengthening producer
organizations (POs), tightening up the criteria for
recognizing POs, and setting up an operation fund
co-financed by the EU for promotion and quality
campaigns and the cessation of farming operations
that are not covered by European Community com-
pensation schemes, which, with this reform, will
provide on-retributive compensation—that is, they
will not encourage production. Based on the first
year’s experience, some rules were modified in 2001
to simplify the regime, to make it more flexible, and
to increase producer responsibility.
EU-wide aid schemes are in place to assist pro-
ducer organizations supplying tomatoes, peaches,
pears, and citrus fruits. This aid is granted for the
fresh produce delivered during prescribed periods.
Aid is paid to recognized producer organizations,
which then pay out to the growers. Delivery
to approved processors is based on contracts
specifying the quantities they cover, the price,
and the schedule of supply. These contracts require
the processor to process the products delivered.
The minimum characteristics of the raw material
supplied for processing and the minimum quality
requirements for the finished products are defined.
Annual EU thresholds have been established to
limit the total volume of aid, and there are penalties
for overrunning thresholds. Aid per hectare is avail-
able to growers of grapes for use as dried muscatel
grapes, sultanas, and currants, within a maximum
guaranteed area. Contracts must be concluded
between the producer or producer organizations
and processors. The aid level is fixed per hectare of
specialized area harvested, on the basis of the aver-
age yield per hectare of the area concerned.
COM for the Wine-Growing Sector The com-
mon market organization for wine (Council Regu-
lation No. 1493/1999) aims to maintain a balance
between supply and demand in the European Com-
munity market, thereby giving producers a chance
to bring production into line with market develop-
ments and to allow the sector to become competi-
tive. This goal is pursued by financing the restruc-
turing of a large portion of the present vineyards,
and it should give rise to products in demand at
home and abroad. The Common Customs Tariff
rates apply to imports of wine into the European
Community. To prevent imports from having
adverse effects, and subject to compliance with the
rules of the WTO, an additional import duty may
be imposed.
COM for Milk and Dairy Products The market
for milk and dairy products is one of the most
important (about 18 percent of the total value of
agricultural production) and most regulated mar-
kets in the EU.14 The current market regime com-
prises the target price for milk (2000–05, €309.80
per metric ton), intervention price for butter
(2000–05, €3282.00 per metric ton), interven-
tion price for skimmed milk powder (2000–05,
€2,055.20 per metric ton), a producer quota sys-
tem, support of prices by the imposition of tariffs
on dairy products, warrant of export subsidies, the
guaranteed purchase and storage of butter and
skimmed milk powder through intervention agen-
cies, and a milk quota system introduced in 1984
(117.49 million metric tons, EU total). Farmers
who exceed this reference amount of their quota
are subject to a payable levy. Since 1998, milk quo-
tas have been transferable from one individual to
another within one EU member state through sale,
lease, or inheritance. Also related to these measures
are a public intervention scheme, private storage,
production aids for using milk in animal feedstuffs
and processing milk into casein, special measures to
reduce stocks, and some aids for reducing or ceas-
ing production. Import levies and export refunds
are also applied.
From 2005 on, intervention prices for butter and
skimmed milk powder will be reduced by 15 per-
cent in three equal steps of 5 percent each. In the
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final stages of reform, they will amount to
€2,789.70 per metric ton and €1,746.90 per metric
ton, respectively. According to the EU’s impact
analyses, these changes will put the intervention
price after 2007 below the expected world price lev-
els. Benefits for farmers will be provided by three
complementary measures: (1) increasing available
milk quotas by 1.5 percent in three equal steps over
three years in parallel with the price reductions
starting in 2005, (2) retaining a crop premium for
silage cereals, and (3) implementing a new yearly
payment for dairy cows. The payment for dairy
cows is to be paid on a flat rate basis per metric ton
of the quota held in the 1999/2000 marketing year
and amounting to €17.24 per metric ton in the
final stages of reform.
On June 26, 2003, EU farm ministers adopted a
fundamental reform of the CAP. With the reform,
the intervention price for butter will be reduced by
25 percent over four years, which is an additional
price cut of 10 percent compared with that of
Agenda 2000 reforms.
COM for Beef and Veal In 1999 the beef support
“regime” was altered significantly as part of the
Agenda 2000 CAP reform process; the practice of
EU-subsidized purchases of surplus beef from the
market (intervention buying) was reduced to a min-
imal“safety net.”In return for this reduction in mar-
ket price support, farmers received direct aid in the
form of premiums based on the number of cattle
they held in a reference period.
Direct aid includes various types of direct
farmer support measures (Council Regulation [EC]
No. 1254/1999 and Commission Regulation [EC]
No. 2342/1999). They are designed to compensate
for the reductions in the intervention price
(slaughtering premium and the special beef pre-
mium), support the incomes of producers who are
specialized in beef production (suckler cow
premium), encourage producers to undertake
extensive farming (extensification payment), assist
producers in less favored areas or in member states
highly specialized in beef production (additional
suckler cow premium), balance the market
throughout the year (deseasonalization premium),
and permit member states to support specific pro-
duction systems (national expenditure envelopes).
The intervention price was set for the 2001/02
marketing year at €3,013 per metric ton of carcass
weight (for R3 classification) and was replaced in
July 2002 by a basic price for storage, fixed at €2,224
per metric ton. The payment for private storage is
granted when the average Community market price
level is less than 103 percent of the basic price. As of
July 2002, producers also could benefit from a safety
net intervention system. When the average market
price for bulls or steers in a member state falls to less
than €1,560 per metric ton of carcass weight, the
EU buys beef into intervention stores.
Since 2002, steer and bull premiums have been
set at €150 and €210 per head, and the premium for
suckler cows at €200 per year. Although the bull pre-
mium is paid once a lifetime for bulls older than
nine months or at a minimum carcass weight of
185 kilograms, the steer premiums are paid twice a
lifetime, at the age of 9 months and after 21 months.
The suckler cow premium is granted per calendar
year and per holding within the limits of regional
ceilings for not more than 90 animals. These premi-
ums are granted provided that the stocking density
on the holding is not more than two livestock units
per unit of forage area used for these animals. In
addition to these premiums, a slaughter premium
applicable at slaughter or export to a third country
of €80 has been introduced for bulls, steers, suckler
cows, and heifers over the age of eight months, and
of €50 for calves more than one and less than seven
months in age (with an upper limit of 160 kilo-
grams).15 The slaughter premium is paid directly to
the farmer, provided that the eligible animals have
been held for a minimum period of two months.
Extensive production (stocking density less than
1.4 livestock units per hectare) may qualify for an
additional payment of €100 per premium granted.16
The reform of the CAP agreed to in June 2003
changes the way the EU supports its farm sector. In
January 1, 2005, a single-payment scheme replaced
most of the direct aid payments currently offered to
farmers, and it is not linked to what a farmer
produces. The amount of the payment is calculated
on the basis of the direct aids a farmer received in a
reference period (2000–02). Member states may
delay implementation of this scheme up to 2007, but
by 2007, at the latest, all member states must have at
least introduced the scheme. Full decoupling is the
general principle from 2005 onward. However,
member states may decide to partially implement
the single-payment scheme and grant additional
payment to the beef producers by way of choosing
from the options for partial decoupling of direct
payments. Under such partial decoupling, member
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states may opt to keep up to 100 percent of the
slaughter premium for calves. However, member
states may also opt to keep up to 100 percent of the
suckler cow premium and up to 40 percent of the
slaughter premium for calves coupled. Alternatively,
they could keep up to 100 percent of the slaughter
premium coupled or, instead, up to 75 percent of the
special male premium.
The relatively high internal price supports are
complemented by measures affecting imports of
beef and veal to the EU and by refunds on EU
exports to third countries. A basic import tariff (less
than 20 percent for most beef products) and an
additional variable levy (ranging from 180 to 390
percent) are imposed. Exports are subsidized, and
the refunds are set by the European Commission,
depending on world market conditions, the present
and anticipated condition of the EU market, and
the competitive environment in third-country mar-
kets. Under the WTO Uruguay Round agreement,
these levels are to be reduced in the future.
COM for Ovine Meat This COM comprises a
safety net intervention system and a direct payment
for ewes of €21 (€16.8 for female goats and for
ewes kept for milk production) per head and year
since 2002.17 Each member state has an upper limit
on the number of animals eligible for direct pay-
ment for ewes.
The reform of the CAP agreed to in June 2003
means that this simplified premium system will be
incorporated into a new support structure. Full
decoupling will be the general principle from 2005
onward. However, member states may decide to
maintain a proportion of direct aids to farmers in
their existing forms, notably where the states
believe agricultural markets may be disturbed or
production may be abandoned because of the move
to the single-payment scheme. Fifty percent of the
sheep and goat premiums under the 2001 system
can continue to be granted as coupled payments.
Future Evolution of the CAP 
Although the Agenda 2000 reforms made the CAP
much more efficient, it is recognized that the budg-
etary pressures of accession and international trade
obligations will require further reform in the same
direction.
Reforms from the Mid-term Review and Future
Directions In June 2003, the EU endorsed a series
of additional reforms that had been proposed in the
Mid-term Review of the CAP in January. The thrust
of the reforms is to continue to reduce the reliance of
the CAP on market-distorting measures such as price
supports and to channel more of the support given to
farmers through payments linked to environmental,
food safety, general rural development, and animal
welfare objectives (i.e., to receive direct income pay-
ments, farmers would have to comply with the con-
ditions tied to these objectives). The catchphrase for
this refocusing of the mechanisms of support is
“support for producers, not for production.” The
reform program is supposed to be budget-neutral.
The key elements of the reforms are as follows:18
• Most support will take the form of a single
decoupled farm payment for EU farmers, inde-
pendent from production, with member states
allowed to maintain limited coupled elements
(up to 25 percent of the value of current pay-
ments) to avoid abandonment of production.
• This payment will be linked to the respect for
environmental, food safety, animal and plant
health, and animal welfare standards, as well
as to the requirement to keep all farmland in
good agricultural and environmental condition
(“cross-compliance”).
• There will be a strengthened rural development
policy with more EU money and new measures
to promote the environment, quality, and
animal welfare and to help farmers meet EU
production standards starting in 2005.
• Direct payments for bigger farms will be reduced
(“modulation”) to finance the new rural devel-
opment policy.
• A mechanism will be implemented for financial
discipline to ensure that the farm budget fixed
until 2013 is not exceeded.
• Specific revisions to the market policy of the
CAP include:
— Making asymmetric price cuts in the milk sec-
tor, with the intervention price for butter
reduced, as noted earlier, by 25 percent over
four years.For skimmed milk powder, a 15 per-
cent reduction over three years, as agreed on in
Agenda 2000, is retained.
— Reducing the monthly increments in the
cereals sector by half while maintaining the
current intervention price.
— Implementing reforms in the rice, durum
wheat, nuts, starch potatoes, and dried fodder
sectors.
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According to the Mid-term Review, the reforms
have the following objectives:
• First, enhance the competitiveness of EU agricul-
ture by setting intervention as a real safety net
measure, allowing EU producers to respond to
market signals (i.e., world prices), while protect-
ing them from extreme price fluctuations. The
reforms as adopted by the member states did not
go as far as was proposed in the Mid-term Review,
which had included further reduction in the sup-
port price for cereals, but they still represented
progress toward this goal.
• Second, promote market-oriented, sustainable
agriculture by completing the shift from product
to producer support with the introduction of a
decoupled system of payments per farm, based on
historical references and conditional upon cross-
compliance toenvironmental,animalwelfare,and
food quality criteria. Again, the Mid-term Review
proposal was more ambitious than the program
actually adopted, because it will allow member
states to pay up to 25 percent of support (or more
for durum wheat and certain kinds of beef pay-
ments) as coupled payments if necessary to avoid
abandonment of production. It is expected, how-
ever, that few states will use this exception.
• Third, strengthen rural development by transfer-
ring funds from the first pillar (payments to
producers) to the second pillar (funding to
promote rural development) of the CAP. This
transfer process is known as “dynamic modula-
tion.” Payments under the second pillar will be
increased to 30 percent of the CAP budget from
its current 10 percent. Because small farmers
will be exempt from modulation, it would affect
25 percent of farmers, who now receive about
80 percent of the direct payments. Funds saved
by “modulation” will be redistributed to the
member states based on several criteria, and the
southern states are expected to be the net gain-
ers. The reform will also expand the scope of the
currently available instruments for rural devel-
opment to promote food quality, meet higher
standards, and foster animal welfare.
Although this reform process is being
driven largely by the internal needs of the EU—
particularly the need to simplify the CAP and
control the potentially explosive budgetary impli-
cations that accession of the Central and Eastern
European countries would have for an unreformed
CAP—the reforms would have other salutary
effects outside the EU. Most important, they will
reduce the need to rely on export subsidies to dis-
pose of surplus production, and they will provide
an alternative way to support farmers’ incomes
without high domestic prices. Thus the reforms
will increase the EU’s flexibility to agree in the
Doha negotiations to phase out export subsidies
and increase market access (i.e., to reduce tariffs
and nontariff barriers). This point is important,
because the EU is almost alone in its position—
maintained throughout the WTO’s Cancun minis-
terial meeting in September 2003—that export
subsidies should not be phased out (only reduced)
under the Doha Round agreement. Most other
WTO members interpret the Doha Declaration’s
wording that export subsidies would be reduced
“with a view to eliminating” them as meaning that
the eventual agreement will require that these sub-
sidies eventually be totally eliminated.
Although the magnitudes have not been esti-
mated definitively, the reform process would also
lead to some direct improvements in international
market conditions for developing country (and
other) producers. The European Commission’s
simulations estimate that by 2009–10 EU exports of
cereals will fall by 3.8 percent and exports of beef
by 60 percent. Eurocare estimates that the EU will
become a net importer of beef. Other simulations
indicate an effect on world cereal prices of 2 per-
cent or less, although, because it would entail a
move from a very trade-distorting mechanism
of support to one with relatively small trade-
distorting effects,19 there is some reason to think
that the impact may be more substantial.
Beyond the Mid-term Review The adoption of
the proposals in the Mid-term Review would
essentially decouple payments from production in
the grain and oilseed markets and partially decou-
ple them in beef, but some important sectors are
not touched by the reforms, including sugar and
tobacco. The same motivations for reform are
present in these sectors, and other pressures will be
operating to ensure that these sectors also are
eventually reformed, using much the same model
used for grains and oilseeds. One of these motiva-
tions is the Doha negotiations. As noted, the EU
will be under tremendous pressure to agree to the
elimination of export subsidies. Another very
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important motivation—especially for sugar—is
the “Everything but Arms” (EBA) initiative. Under
the EBA, the EU has eliminated tariff and nontariff
barriers20 to the imports of all products from the
developing countries. For most products, this sys-
tem has been in effect since 2001, but for rice,
bananas, and sugar there are phase-in periods. For
sugar, the phase-in period is until 2009, but after
2009 sugar will enter the EU duty- and quota-free
from developing countries, clearly ending the
sugar regime under the CAP. Before the regime
ends, sugar prices in the EU will have to fall to
something much closer to world prices, and pro-
ducers may have to be brought under the direct
payment system. The EU is also currently negotiat-
ing Economic Partnership Agreements with many
other developing countries. Although it is not clear
what form these agreements will take, the basic
intention is that essentially they will be reciprocal
free trade agreements. Such agreements will put
even more pressure on the CAP to complete the
transition to a regime of very low import barriers
for products that can be produced in developing
countries and a regime in which farmers are com-
pensated for income losses by decoupled direct
payments.
In September 2003, the European Commission
tabled its proposal for reforms in the cotton,
tobacco, sugar, and olive oil sectors. The main fea-
tures of the proposals are the following:
• Tobacco. The production-coupled premium on
tobacco would be completely eliminated, with
most of it rolled into the decoupled single-farm
payment and the rest put into a fund for restruc-
turing tobacco-producing areas.
• Olives. The current system of production-linked
payments would be eliminated. For farms under
0.3 hectares, coupled payments would be elimi-
nated and replaced with only single-farm pay-
ments. For large farms, 60 percent of their cou-
pled payments would be converted into
single-farm payments. The rest of the budget
that would have funded the coupled payments
for these farms would be converted into pay-
ments based on hectares or number of trees to
ensure the permanence of olive trees in marginal
areas or low-output olive groves. This measure
may act as a production incentive, but it is
intended to be an environmental measure.
• Cotton. Sixty percent of the current coupled pay-
ments would be converted into single-farm pay-
ments. The other 40 percent would be retained
as an area-based payment, based on cotton hec-
tarage. Thus this 40 percent would remain fully
coupled, though based on area rather than pro-
duction. The new area payment would be given
for a maximum number of hectares, but admin-
istered in the same way as current blue box
measures, with area ceilings set on a regional
basis and any excess in the region resulting in a
reduction in payments to all farmers in the
region.21 This situation implies that the measure
may not be very effective in controlling the area
planted, because farmers have little incentive to
stay below the ceiling.
• Sugar. There is no specific proposal but rather
two options: (1) relatively small changes in the
current system, or (2) radical reform, with
domestic prices lowered to world market levels
and direct support payments increased in com-
pensation. In view of the pressures facing the
CAP sugar regime, it seems likely that some-
thing close to the second option will have to be
adopted.
Impact of Introducing the Common
Agricultural Policy in Turkey
This section employs a partial equilibrium model
of the Turkish agricultural sector to simulate the
effects of introducing the CAP.22 The model pro-
vides information about the likely impact of the
CAP on farmers’ and consumers’ incomes and
its budgetary implications. Because the CAP has
been a “moving target,” the model does not incor-
porate the most recent reforms, but rather uses the
Agenda 2000 scenario. Subsequent reforms have
been of the same variety as those in the Agenda
2000 program, but they have moved further in
reducing support prices and distributing support as
decoupled payments. These later reforms could
then be generally expected to result in lower
domestic producer and consumer prices than those
produced by Agenda 2000 reforms, but with higher
direct payments.
The model considers 11 major agricultural prod-
ucts: wheat, barley, maize, sunflower, sugar beet,
potato, grapes, milk, beef, poultry, and ovine meat.
Table 2.7 shows the base period results for the major
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TABLE 2.7 Base Period Results of Model for Major Activities
Border
Equivalent Quantity VA, Inclusive
Actual Price Price Produced GOV Direct
(thousand TL (thousand TL (thousand GOV (billions Share Payments VA Share
per metric ton) per metric ton) metric tons) of TL) (percent) (billions of TL) (percent)
Wheat 97,325 73,412 15,866.67 1,544,223.37 18.10 781,454.26 16.16
Barley 80,765 56,850 6,189.17 499,868.64 5.86 284,464.38 5.88
Maize 90,000 64,475 2,152.33 193,709.97 2.27 74,848.48 1.55
Sunflower 292,692 141,069 816.67 260,259.67 3.05 205,825.27 4.26
Sugar beet 36,612 20,585 16,807.79 618,223.98 7.25 543,851.74 11.25
Potato 132,444 100,017 5,081.33 672,992.07 7.89 595,596.29 12.32
Grapes 280,139 222,260 3,250.67 910,638.60 10.67 847,373.01 17.52
Milk 167,041 97,945 7,466.33 1,450,093.01 16.99 682,852.63 14.12
Beef 2,153,528 1,085,793 444.67 1,086,378.40 12.73 326,386.03 6.75
Poultry 748,350 469,748 725.00 542,553.75 6.36 180,598.86 3.73
Sheep 2,244,433 1,762,319 237.67 753,628.09 8.83 312,353.42 6.46
Intermediate Intermediate VA, Border
Inputs, Inputs, Border VA, Actual Price NPR on
Actual Price Price Equivalent Price Equivalent Tradable
(thousand TL (thousand TL (thousand TL (thousand TL NPR EPR Inputs
per metric ton) per metric ton) per metric ton) per metric ton) (percent) (percent) (percent)
Wheat 48,074 45,462 49,251 27,949 32.57 76.22 5.74
Barley 34,803 32,153 45,962 24,697 42.07 86.10 8.24
Maize 55,224 52,335 34,776 12,140 39.59 186.45 5.52
Sunflower 66,654 59,687 252,031 81,381 107.48 209.69 11.67
Sugar beet 4,425 4,243 32,357 16,342 77.86 98.00 4.29
Potato 15,231 13,486 117,213 86,531 32.42 35.46 12.94
Grapes 19,462 19,684 260,677 202,576 26.04 28.68 -1.13
Milk 102,760 76,925 91,458 47,712 70.55 91.69 33.59
Beef 1,709,127 1,301,899 734,001 83,372 98.34 780.39 31.28
Poultry 499,248 382,865 249,102 86,882 59.31 186.71 30.40
Sheep 1,856,693 1,370,015 1,314,248 1,350,414 27.36 2.68 35.52
Note: Gross output value (GOV) comprises the output value from main products and, if applicable, from by-products. Consequently, value added (VA) is calculated
on the basis of these gross output values. All variables are measured in terms of 2000 prices. TL = Turkish liras; NPR = nominal protection rate; 
EPR = effective protection rate.
Source: The authors.
activities carried out under the agricultural policies
followed during 2000.23 From the table it follows
that wheat, milk, and beef are the most important
commodities considered, because these commodi-
ties have the highest shares of total gross output. But
the order changes to grapes, wheat, and milk when
we consider the value added shares, and to grapes,
wheat, and potato when we consider the value
added shares measured at border price equiva-
lents.24 The table reveals that crop products consti-
tute 68.93 percent of total value added generated by
the 11 commodities and that animal products
account for 31.07 percent of the total value added.
Impact on Producers
The domestic prices of the commodities shown in
table 2.7 diverge considerably from the border price
equivalents. Examination of the profile of nominal
protection rates (NPRs)25 reveals the height of pro-
tection in agriculture in Turkey observed earlier in
table 2.5 for aggregates such as cereals and oilseeds.
Table 2.7 shows a similar picture for the 11 com-
modities analyzed. The NPRs of these commodities
are all positive, and NPR exceeds 100 percent for
sunflower. Indeed, the NPRs lie between 50 percent
and 100 percent for beef, sugar beet, milk, and
poultry, and are between 20 percent and 50 percent
for barley, maize, wheat, potato, sheep, and grapes.
To examine the effects of agricultural policies on
farmers’ incomes, we consider first the NPRs of
purchased intermediary inputs to agriculture. Con-
sider, for example, wheat production. Although the
cost of intermediate inputs per metric ton of wheat
amounts to TL 48.074 million, the cost of interme-
diate inputs evaluated at border price equivalents
amount to TL 45.463 million. Thus, the intermedi-
ate inputs are taxed on average by 5.74 percent.
Among the inputs, the most important cost posi-
tions are fertilizers (28.2 percent), seeds (25 per-
cent), and fuel (21.4 percent). A comparison of the
domestic prices of each of these inputs with their
border price equivalents reveals an implicit taxa-
tion of 32.6 percent for seed and subsidization of
3.4 percent for fertilizers.
Farmers’ income is determined by the difference
between input costs and revenues originating from
the sale of agricultural produce, and by any non-
price-related monetary transfers to farmers (e.g., per
hectare payments for crops or per head payments for
livestock). Agricultural policies with an impact on
input prices, output prices, or other direct monetary
transfers translate into changes in the value added,
defined as the difference between the value of gross
output and the value of intermediate inputs, or, in
terms of factor payments, the return to land, labor,
and owned capital. This effect is computed using the
effective protection rate (EPR).26 Table 2.7 displays
the value added of the analyzed activities at domestic
prices in relation to value added at border price
equivalents. As expected, the levels of effective pro-
tection are more pronounced than those of nominal
protection. The incomes of producers of crop and
livestock products are all implicitly subsidized under
the agricultural policies followed during 2000 except
for the incomes of producers of sheep. The extent of
relative subsidization measured by the EPR is highest
for beef, and this measure decreases for sunflower,
poultry, maize, sugar beet, milk, barley, wheat,
potato, and grape production. Sheep production has
a negative EPR, with an absolute value less than 100,
indicating the comparative advantage of the country
in the production of sheep.
Alternative Agricultural Policy Options 
for Turkey
We assume that, as a new entrant, Turkey will have to
adjust to the EU and accept its legislation and poli-
cies. Accession negotiations will therefore focus on
how long Turkey will have to adopt the EU legisla-
tion and how it will do so. However, agricultural pol-
icy in the EU is also evolving beyond the changes
introduced under the McSharry reforms and Agenda
2000. Because it is not easy to anticipate what EU
agricultural policies will be at the time of Turkey’s
accession, we use a simulation approach to analyze
the potential impacts, using the following scenarios:
• Scenario A1: partial adoption of Agenda 2000
without direct payments 
• Scenario A2: complete adoption of Agenda
2000, including direct payments equal to those
currently applied in the EU
• Scenario B: adoption of the European Commis-
sion proposal similar to that given CEE coun-
tries, including direct payments at a level of
35 percent of payments granted in the EU mem-
ber countries
• Scenario C: free trade with direct payments.
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Simulation results for Scenario A1 are presented
in table 2.8a. When Turkey adopts Agenda 2000
without direct payments, domestic prices decrease
substantially for all commodities except grapes,
milk, and poultry. For example, the price of wheat
decreases from TL 97,325,000 per metric ton in the
base case scenario to TL 73,412,000 per metric ton.
Similarly, the prices of barley, maize, sunflower,
sugar beet, potatoes, beef, and sheep fall signifi-
cantly. With the decrease in output prices, the gross
output value decreases for all commodities under
consideration except poultry and milk. Similar con-
siderations hold for the value added; it decreases for
all commodities except grapes, milk, poultry, and
sheep. Relative to the base case scenario, the largest
decreases occur for sunflower, beef, and wheat.
Finally, the share of crop products in total value
added generated by the 11 commodities decreases
from 68.93 percent in the base case scenario to
62.66 percent in Scenario A1.
In Scenario A2 Turkey adopts Agenda 2000 in full
and introduces direct payments to agricultural pro-
ducers equal to those applied in the EU (table 2.8b).
Because prices are basically the same as in Scenario
A1, only those activities to which the direct payment
schemes apply will be affected. Among the produc-
tion activities considered are wheat, barley, maize,
sunflower, milk, beef, and sheep. As a result of the
direct payments, the value added relative to the base
period increases as shown in table 2.8b by 71.42 per-
cent for barley, 57.72 percent for beef, and 48.06 per-
cent for sheep. For sunflower, the decline in value
added in Scenario A2 (Agenda 2000 with direct pay-
ments) is smaller than that in Scenario A1 (Agenda
2000 with no direct payments). For wheat, barley,
maize,and beef, the decline in value added turns into
increases in value added.Whereas wheat production
declines by 41.78 percent in Scenario A1, it increases
in Scenario A2 by 38.62 percent relative to the base
run. Similar considerations apply for barley, maize,
and beef. The increase in milk production goes up
from 24.47 percent in Scenario A1 to 45.82 percent
in Scenario A2, and the increase in sheep production
goes up from 6.28 percent in Scenario A1 to
48.06 percent in Scenario A2.As for the share of crop
products generated by the 11 commodities, in total
value added, it decreases from 68.93 percent in the
base case to 62.32 percent in Scenario A2.
Table 2.9a displays the results of Scenario B. In
this scenario, direct payments are introduced, but,
following the EU proposals for Central and Eastern
European countries, on a level of 35 percent of
direct payments granted to agricultural producers
in the EU. The final results of the introduction of
the CAP will depend on the positions taken by the
government of Turkey and the European Commis-
sion. Because the negotiations have not yet started,
we analyze only the effects of the introduction of
direct payments at the rate of 35 percent of EU lev-
els.27 Table 2.10 shows the positions taken in agri-
cultural negotiations between the Slovak Republic
and the European Commission. The table reveals
that the main issues in the agricultural negotiations
will be the shares of compensation payments for
crops and livestock as a percentage of the EU direct
payments, the level of reference yield for crop com-
pensation payments, the level of quotas for sugar
and milk, slaughter premiums, suckler cow premi-
ums, and ewe ceilings.
In Scenario B, the value added generated in the
production of wheat, barley, maize, sunflower,
milk, beef, and sheep decreases considerably com-
pared with the value added generated in Scenario
A2. The change in value added compared with the
base case becomes negative for wheat, maize, and
beef production, indicating the extreme vulnerabil-
ity of the sectors to changes in direct payments. The
share of crop products in total value added gener-
ated by the 11 commodities decreases now from
68.93 percent in the base case to 62.52 percent in
Scenario B.
Table 2.9b presents the results of Scenario C—
removal of current trade interventions but with
direct payments as under Agenda 2000. In the free
trade scenario with direct payments, the value
added increases compared with the base case for
wheat, barley, beef, and sheep production. For all
other commodities, the value added decreases.
The share of crop products of total value added
generated by the 11 commodities remains almost
unchanged.
Effects of Policies on Producers’ Incomes 
in the Medium Term: Adjusting for Supply
Response Effects
The discussion so far has been based on the
assumption that the output levels for all analyzed
activities remain constant (i.e., the assumption of
totally inelastic supply). This is a simplifying
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TABLE 2.8b Simulation Results for Adoption of Agenda 2000 with Direct Payments (Scenario A2)
Quantity Direct GOV Change VA Change
Domestic Price Produced Payments GOV Relative to VA VA Relative to
(thousand TL (thousand (billions (billions Base Run (billions Share EPR Base Run
per metric ton) metric tons) of TL) of TL) (percent) of TL) (percent) (percent) (percent)
Wheat 73,412 15,867 628,217 1,793,013 16.11 1,083,218 17.85 144.26 38.62
Barley 74,155 6,189 238,716 697,671 39.57 487,616 8.04 219.01 71.42
Maize 76,283 2,152 41,339 205,526 6.10 90,665 1.49 246.98 21.13
Sunflower 141,069 817 70,112 185,318 −28.80 137,889 2.27 107.47 −33.01
Sugar beet 26,867 16,808 0 451,569 −26.96 379,559 6.26 38.19 −30.21
Potato 100,017 5,081 0 508,220 −24.48 441,846 7.28 0.49 −25.81
Grapes 376,586 3,251 0 1,224,157 34.43 1,160,892 19.13 76.29 37.00
Milk 180,301 7,466 145,791 1,658,707 14.39 995,757 16.41 179.52 45.82
Beef 1,614,137 445 339,577 1,186,106 9.18 514,770 8.48 1288.54 57.72
Poultry 888,077 725 0 643,856 18.67 313,190 5.16 397.21 73.42
Sheep 2,055,348 238 130,488 839,176 11.35 462,468 7.62 44.09 48.06
Note: All variables are measured in terms of 2000 prices. TL = Turkish liras; NPR = nominal protection rate; GOV = gross output value; VA = value added; EPR = effective
protection rate.
Source: The authors.
TABLE 2.8a Simulation Results for Partial Adoption of Agenda 2000 without Direct Payments (Scenario A1)
Domestic NPR, Quantity GOV Change NPR, VA Change
Price Main Produced GOV Relative Intermediary VA VA Relative
(thousand TL Outputs (thousand (billions to Base Run Inputs (billions Share EPR to Base Run
per metric ton) (percent) metric tons) of TL) (percent) (percent) of TL) (percent) (percent) (percent)
Wheat 73,412 0.00 15,867 1,164,796 −24.57 −1.60 455,001 10.17 2.60 −41.78
Barley 74,155 30.44 6,189 458,955 −8.18 5.56 248,900 5.56 62.84 −12.50
Maize 76,283 18.31 2,152 164,187 −15.24 1.97 49,326 1.10 88.78 −34.10
Sunflower 141,069 0.00 817 115,206 −55.73 −2.70 67,777 1.52 1.98 −67.07
Sugar beet 26,867 30.52 16,808 451,569 −26.96 0.98 379,559 8.48 38.19 −30.21
Potato 100,017 0.00 5,081 508,220 −24.48 −3.14 441,846 9.88 0.49 −25.81
Grapes 376,586 69.43 3,251 1,224,157 34.43 −1.13 1,160,892 25.95 76.29 37.00
Milk 180,301 84.08 7,466 1,512,916 4.33 15.43 849,966 19.00 138.60 24.47
Beef 1,614,137 48.66 445 846,529 −22.08 15.97 175,193 3.92 372.56 −46.32
Poultry 888,077 89.05 725 643,856 18.67 19.13 313,190 7.00 397.21 73.42
Sheep 2,055,348 16.63 238 708,689 −5.96 15.69 331,980 7.42 3.44 6.28
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TABLE 2.9b Simulation Results for Adoption of Free Trade with Direct Payments (Scenario 2C)
Domestic Quantity Direct GOV Change VA Change
Price Produced Payments GOV Relative to VA VA Relative to
(thousand TL (thousand (billions (billions Base Run (billions Share EPR Base Run
per metric ton) metric tons) of TL) of TL) (percent) of TL) (percent) (percent) (percent)
Wheat 73,412 15,867 628,217 1,793,013 16.11 1,071,679 24.17 141.66 37.14
Barley 56,850 6,189 238,716 590,568 18.14 391,569 8.83 156.17 37.65
Maize 64,475 2,152 41,339 180,111 −7.02 67,468 1.52 158.21 −9.86
Sunflower 141,069 817 70,112 185,318 −28.80 136,573 3.08 105.49 −33.65
Sugar beet 20,585 16,808 0 345,981 −44.04 274,666 6.20 0.00 −49.50
Potato 100,017 5,081 0 508,220 −24.48 439,691 9.92 0.00 −26.18
Grapes 222,260 3,251 0 722,494 −20.66 658,508 14.85 0.00 −22.29
Milk 97,945 7,466 145,791 1,076,369 −25.77 502,024 11.32 40.93 −26.48
Beef 1,085,793 445 339,577 955,562 −12.04 376,650 8.50 915.98 15.40
Poultry 469,748 725 0 340,567 −37.23 62,990 1.42 0.00 −65.12
Sheep 1,762,319 238 130,488 777,044 3.11 451,437 10.18 40.66 44.53
Note: All variables are measured in terms of 2000 prices. TL = Turkish liras; NPR = nominal protection rate; GOV = gross output value; VA = value added;
EPR = effective protection rate.
Source: The authors.
TABLE 2.9a Simulation Results for Adoption of Agenda 2000 with Direct Payments at 35 Percent (Scenario 2B)
Border GOV Change VA Change
Equivalent NPR Domestic Quantity Direct Relative NPR Relative
Price Main Price Produced Payments GOV to Base Intermediary VA VA to Base
(thousand TL Outputs (thousand TL (thousand (billions (billions Run Inputs (billions Share EPR Run
per metric ton) (percent) per metric ton) metric tons) of TL) of TL) (percent) (percent) of TL) (percent) (percent) (percent)
Wheat 73,412 0.00 73,412 15,867 219,876 1,384,672 −10.33 −1.60 674,877 13.41 52.18 −13.64
Barley 56,850 30.44 74,155 6,189 83,550 542,506 8.53 5.56 332,451 6.61 117.50 16.87
Maize 64,475 18.31 76,283 2,152 14,469 178,656 −7.77 1.97 63,794 1.27 144.15 −14.77
Sunflower 141,069 0.00 141,069 817 24,539 139,745 −46.31 −2.70 92,316 1.83 38.90 −55.15
Sugar beet 20,585 30.52 26,867 16,808 0 451,569 −26.96 0.98 379,559 7.54 38.19 −30.21
Potato 100,017 0.00 100,017 5,081 0 508,220 −24.48 −3.14 441,846 8.78 0.49 −25.81
Grapes 222,260 69.43 376,586 3,251 0 1,224,157 34.43 −1.13 1,160,892 23.07 76.29 37.00
Milk 97,945 84.08 180,301 7,466 51,027 1,563,943 7.85 15.43 900,993 17.91 152.92 31.95
Beef 1,085,793 48.66 1,614,137 445 118,852 965,381 −11.14 15.97 294,045 5.84 693.16 −9.91
Poultry 469,748 89.05 888,077 725 0 643,856 18.67 19.13 313,190 6.22 397.21 73.42
Sheep 1,762,319 16.63 2,055,348 238 45,671 754,360 0.10 15.69 377,651 7.51 17.67 20.90
assumption, but one that presumably captures the
essence of short-run effects. However, after some
time producers would begin to adjust to the new
price situation, readjusting the output mix and the
overall level of resource intensity. The medium- to
long-term supply response in the model is deter-
mined by the elasticities of supply.28
When supply effects are taken into considera-
tion, modeling the impact of introducing the CAP
with direct payments becomes tricky for the follow-
ing reason: the direct payments are made per
hectare currently planted, with the amount per
hectare computed by multiplying a basic per metric
ton payment amount by a historical regional yield
for the 1986–91 baseline period. The payments are
not based on the individual farmer’s current levels
of production (yield). For this reason, the direct
payment should not affect the farmer’s cultivation
decisions,29 but it does affect the farmer’s decision
on how many hectares to plant. Under Agenda
2000, these payments were originally crop-specific
for large farmers (the “professional farmer”
scheme) and non-crop-specific for small farmers
(the “small producer” scheme). However, even for
large farmers, under Agenda 2000 the payments per
hectare for cereals and oilseeds have been progres-
sively aligned, and by the end of the Agenda 2000
period they will be virtually equal.30 Thus the pay-
ments will not affect whether a large farmer
chooses to plant, say, wheat or sunflower, or the
farmer’s decision on how much seed or fertilizer to
use. They will, however, affect the amount of arable
land in cultivation. In this sense, the direct pay-
ments do have an impact on agricultural produc-
tion, but they do not have as much of an effect on
incentives to plant individual crops as would addi-
tional income from higher prices for the products.
This factor makes it difficult to model the pay-
ments’ effects. In the simulations, we first treat the
payments as if they do not come from higher prices.
The resulting supply response should then be
regarded as a lower bound (Case I).31 In Case I, the
payments do not produce any supply response, but
they do increase value added. Next, we treat the
payments as if they come from higher prices and
thus generate an increase in production. The result-
ing supply response should be regarded as an upper
bound (Case II).
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TABLE 2.10 Selected Positions in Agricultural Negotiation between the Slovak
Republic and European Commission (EC)
Slovak
EC Proposal Proposal
Share of compensation payments for crops and livestock (% of EU)a 35 100
Reference yield for crop compensation payments 
(cereal metric ton per hectare)b 4.16 4.99
Sugar quota—type A (metric tons)c 189,800 190,000
Sugar quota—type B (metric tons)c 19,000 45,000
Milk quota (metric tons) 946,150 1,235,000
Slaughter premium—adults (head)d 204,062 260,000
Slaughter premium—calves (head)d 62,841 60,000
Suckler cow premium (head)d 39,708 50,000
Ewe ceilings (head)d 219,360 370,000
a. As percent of payments granted to farmers in EU member countries.
b. Reference yield used in calculation of compensatory payments for crops.
c. Sugar beets used to produce sugar up to the A quota secure a higher price (about €46.72 per
metric ton in 2000). Sugar beets used to produce sugar above the A quota and up to the B quota secure
a slightly lower price (about €32.42 per metric ton in 2000). Sugar production exceeding the sum of
both quotas has to be exported at world market prices (i.e., without export refunds). It is known as 
C sugar.
d. Number of head eligible for compensation payments.
Source: Csaki and others 2002.
We adjust the medium-run supply elasticities, ei ,
to capture the difference in the ratio of value added
to price. In particular, the adjusted elasticities, εi ,
are calculated (as emphasized by Valdes 1973) by
multiplying the unadjusted elasticities with the
ratio of value added to product price so that
ε = ei vi, where vi is the ratio of the per unit value
added at base run prices to the base period price.
The supply response is then computed by applying
the relation
(2.1)
qj
qj
= ε
(
VAjA2
VAjBase
− 1
)
where qj indicates the quantity of product j, VAjA2
the value added generated in the production of
commodity j in Scenario A2 (Agenda 2000 with
direct payments), and VAjBase the value added gen-
erated in the production of commodity j in the base
case. Here we first incorporate the direct payments
under Agenda 2000 as part of the value added;
thereafter we abstract from considering direct pay-
ment as part of value added.
Table 2.11 shows the effects of the alignment to
Agenda 2000 under alternative elasticities of sup-
ply. For each commodity, the first column shows
the results under the assumed medium-run supply
elasticities and the second column the results under
the assumption of a completely inelastic supply
response. The table reveals that output quantities
under the Agenda 2000 scenarios decrease, on aver-
age, by 3.7 percent for Scenario A1 and increase by
2.5 percent for Scenario A2 under Case II. As
expected, the introduction of direct payments gives
incentives to increase the output relative to the case
in Scenario A1.
Furthermore, the changes in total value added in
the simulations with a supply response are larger
than under a totally inelastic response. Similarly,
Case II results in higher changes in total value added
compared with Case I. Consider, for example, wheat
production. Whereas total value added generated in
wheat production increases by 38.62 percent in Sce-
nario A2 (Agenda 2000 with direct payments) under
the inelastic response assumption and Case II, the
increase goes up to 46.20 percent under the elastic
supply assumption and Case II. By contrast, under
elastic supply the value added under Case I increases
by only 30.41 percent. Under free trade with direct
payments (Scenario C) and Case II, value added gen-
erated in wheat production goes up by 37.14 percent
under inelastic supply and by 44.36 percent under
the elastic supply assumption. Note that in Scenario
C, the value added increases despite the lower prices
for wheat, barley, beef, and sheep. As a result, the
quantity produced increases under elastic supply
and Case II—5.26 percent for wheat, 4.50 percent
for barley, 1.78 percent for beef, and 15.64 percent
for sheep production. In all other cases, the quantity
produced decreases by 0.53 percent for maize,
4.64 percent for sunflower, 14.87 percent for sugar
beet, 21.78 percent for potato, 2.07 percent for
grapes, 17.11 percent for milk, and 40.75 percent
for poultry.
Impact on Consumers
Changes in agricultural output prices also have an
impact on consumers through food prices. Lower
food prices lead to a decrease in consumer spend-
ing on food. A consumer with a fixed, nominal dis-
posable income (i.e., a fixed amount of money
available for consumption) is able to increase his or
her overall consumption of total goods and services
by a percentage derived from multiplying the
absolute value of the percentage decrease in food
expenditure by the share that food expenditure
makes up of total consumption. This increase in the
consumer’s ability to purchase goods and services is
equivalent to an increase in his or her real income.
The relative increase in real consumer incomes is
highest for households with low disposable
incomes, because poor households allocate a higher
share of expenditures to food products. In the
medium to long term, consumers will adjust to
the new set of relative prices, moving away from the
consumption of foods that have become relatively
more expensive as a result of the policy changes.
The medium- to long-term impact on income,
therefore, is expected to be more moderate than the
short-run impact. The exact amount will be deter-
mined by the price elasticity of demand for each
product, which regulates the extent of consumers’
adjustments to changes in food prices.
To trace the effects of changes in output prices
on consumers, we start with the information on
expenditure given in table 2.12 and annex table 2.20
for the average consumer and for the average
consumer in urban and rural areas, respectively.
Consider a commodity such as bread. Annex table
2.20 reveals that for the average consumer the
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TABLE 2.11 Simulation Results for Alignment to Agenda 2000 under Positive Supply Response
(percent change relative to 2000 base run)
Wheat Barley Maize Sunflower Sugar Beet
Elastic Inelastic Elastic Inelastic Elastic Inelastic Elastic Inelastic Elastic Inelastic
Scenario A1
Price change 24.57 24.57 8.18 8.18 15.24 15.24 51.80 51.80 26.62 26.62
Quantity change 5.92 0.00 1.49 0.00 1.84 0.00 9.24 0.00 9.08 0.00
GOV change 29.04 24.57 9.56 8.18 16.80 15.24 59.82 55.73 33.59 26.96
Total VA change 45.22 41.78 13.81 12.50 35.31 34.10 70.11 67.07 36.54 30.21
Scenario A2(a)
Price change 24.57 24.57 8.18 8.18 15.24 15.24 51.80 51.80 26.62 26.62
Quantity change 5.92 0.00 1.49 0.00 1.84 0.00 9.24 0.00 9.08 0.00
GOV change 9.24 16.11 37.49 39.57 4.14 6.10 35.37 28.80 33.59 26.96
Total VA change 30.41 38.62 68.85 71.42 18.90 21.13 39.20 33.01 36.54 30.21
Scenario A2(b)
Price change 24.57 24.57 8.18 8.18 15.24 15.24 51.80 51.80 26.62 26.62
Quantity change 5.47 0.00 8.53 0.00 1.14 0.00 4.55 0.00 9.08 0.00
GOV change 22.46 16.11 51.48 39.57 7.31 6.10 32.03 28.80 33.59 26.96
Per unit VA change 38.62 38.62 71.42 71.42 21.13 21.13 33.01 33.01 30.21 30.21
Total VA change 46.20 38.62 86.05 71.42 22.52 21.13 36.05 33.01 36.54 30.21
Scenario C(a)
Price change 24.57 24.57 29.61 29.61 28.36 28.36 51.80 51.80 43.78 43.78
Quantity change 6.13 0.00 5.53 0.00 3.52 0.00 9.33 0.00 14.87 0.00
GOV change 9.00 16.11 11.61 18.14 10.29 7.02 35.44 28.80 52.36 44.04
Total VA change 28.73 37.14 30.04 37.65 13.03 9.86 39.84 33.65 57.01 49.50
Scenario C(b)
Price change 24.57 24.57 29.61 29.61 28.36 28.36 51.80 51.80 43.78 43.78
Quantity change 5.26 0.00 4.50 0.00 0.53 0.00 4.64 0.00 14.87 0.00
GOV change 22.22 16.11 23.46 18.14 7.52 7.02 32.10 28.80 52.36 44.04
Total VA change 44.36 37.14 43.84 37.65 10.34 9.86 36.72 33.65 57.01 49.50
Note: GOV = gross output value; VA = value added.
Source: The authors.
Potato Grapes Milk Beef Poultry Sheep
Elastic Inelastic Elastic Inelastic Elastic Inelastic Elastic Inelastic Elastic Inelastic Elastic Inelastic
24.48 24.48 34.43 34.43 7.94 7.94 25.05 25.05 18.67 18.67 8.42 8.42
21.48 0.00 3.44 0.00 15.81 0.00 5.37 0.00 45.94 0.00 2.21 0.00
40.70 24.48 39.06 34.43 20.83 4.33 26.26 22.08 73.19 18.67 3.89 5.96
41.75 25.81 41.72 37.00 44.15 24.47 49.21 46.32 153.09 73.42 8.63 6.28
24.48 24.48 34.43 34.43 7.94 7.94 25.05 25.05 18.67 18.67 8.42 8.42
21.48 0.00 3.44 0.00 15.81 0.00 5.37 0.00 45.94 0.00 2.21 0.00
40.70 24.48 39.06 34.43 32.47 14.39 3.32 9.18 73.19 18.67 13.81 11.35
41.75 25.81 41.72 37.00 68.88 45.82 49.25 57.72 153.09 73.42 51.33 48.06
24.48 24.48 34.43 34.43 7.94 7.94 25.05 25.05 18.67 18.67 8.42 8.42
21.48 0.00 3.44 0.00 29.60 0.00 6.69 0.00 45.94 0.00 16.88 0.00
40.70 24.48 39.06 34.43 48.25 14.39 16.48 9.18 73.19 18.67 30.15 11.35
25.81 25.81 37.00 37.00 45.82 45.82 57.72 57.72 73.42 73.42 48.06 48.06
41.75 25.81 41.72 37.00 88.99 45.82 68.27 57.72 153.09 73.42 73.06 48.06
24.48 24.48 20.66 20.66 41.36 41.36 49.58 49.58 37.23 37.23 21.48 21.48
21.78 0.00 2.07 0.00 30.90 0.00 10.27 0.00 40.75 0.00 0.97 0.00
40.93 24.48 22.31 20.66 48.71 25.77 21.08 12.04 62.81 37.23 4.10 3.11
42.25 26.18 23.90 22.29 49.20 26.48 3.55 15.40 79.34 65.12 45.92 44.53
24.48 24.48 20.66 20.66 41.36 41.36 49.58 49.58 37.23 37.23 21.48 21.48
21.78 0.00 2.07 0.00 17.11 0.00 1.78 0.00 40.75 0.00 15.64 0.00
40.93 24.48 22.31 20.66 38.47 25.77 10.47 12.04 62.81 37.23 19.24 3.11
42.25 26.18 23.90 22.29 39.06 26.48 17.46 15.40 79.34 65.12 67.14 44.53
Alignment, excluding direct compensatory payments
Complete alignment, including direct compensatory payments (Case I)
Complete alignment, including direct compensatory payments (Case II)
Free trade with direct payments (Case I)
Free trade with direct payments (Case II)
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expenditure share for bread is 3.5371 percent.
Next, we consider the value share of the primary
commodity in bread, wheat. Multiplying the expen-
diture on bread with this share, we obtain the value
of the analyzed primary commodity (wheat) in the
bread expenditure. Considering the price relation
pi = p∗i (1 + NPRi ), where pi denotes the domes-
tic price, p∗i the Agenda 2000 price of wheat, and
NPRi the nominal protection rate on wheat, we
obtain the relation p∗i = Pi1+NPRi . We then normalize
the domestic price so that pi = 1 for wheat in the
base case. By means of the NPR, we determine
the foreign price of wheat. Then, by multiplying the
expenditure on bread in the form of wheat with the
foreign price, we can determine the value of the pri-
mary commodity (wheat) evaluated at foreign
prices in the bread expenditure. By adding the value
of the contents of bread other than wheat, we arrive
at the value of bread evaluated at Agenda 2000
prices. Based on the expenditure of the average
income group on bread evaluated at base year
prices and the expenditure on bread evaluated at
Agenda 2000 prices, we determine the effect of
Agenda 2000 on the bread expenditure in percent-
age terms. Once we conduct similar calculations for
all the commodities under consideration, we obtain
the expenditure on food, beverages, and tobacco
evaluated at Agenda 2000 prices. If E stands for total
expenditure, F for food expenditure in the base
case, and F ∗ for food expenditure evaluated
at Agenda 2000 prices, F ∗ can be defined as
E ∗ = F ∗ + (E − F ). The effect on consumer wel-
fare is then calculated as (E − E ∗)100/E ∗ .32
Table 2.13 summarizes the main results of the
simulations. For each scenario, we estimated the
impact of changes in food prices on, first, the nom-
inal expenditure (change of food expenditure
relative to the base period food expenditure) and
second, consumers’ real income (reduction in pur-
chasing power of nominal income induced by
changes in the expenditure on food). The table
reveals that, on average, the price changes under the
Agenda 2000 scenario (Scenarios A and B) produce
a 5.91 percent decrease in the expenditure on food,
beverages, and tobacco. As for the expenditure on
food and nonalcoholic beverages only, consumers
would have to spend 6.41 percent less than under
the current base period market conditions. In the
Agenda 2000 scenario, the greatest decreases in
expenditure occur in the groups fat (30.53 percent),
sugar and sugar products (13.44 percent), and meat
and meat products (9.48 percent). Because of the
significant price changes in the main agricultural
products of the Agenda 2000 scenario (compared
with the prevailing prices in Turkey), decreases in
expenditure were recorded for all food product
TABLE 2.12 Structure of Household Expenditures
(1994 prices, Turkish liras)
Average Rural Urban
Total expenses per household 111,044,759 66,698,941 167,764,049
Food, beverages, and tobacco per household 39,552,432 30,202,155 51,511,644
Food and nonalcoholic beverages per household 36,457,528 28,287,252 46,907,494
Expenditure shares (% of total expenditure)
Cereals and pasta 7.24 9.54 6.07
Meat and meat products 5.18 5.69 4.92
Milk, dairy products, and eggs 4.61 5.84 3.99
Fat 3.00 4.76 2.10
Fruit, fresh or dried 7.82 9.65 6.89
Sugar and sugar products 1.95 3.07 1.38
Other food and nonalcoholic beverages 3.03 3.86 2.61
Alcoholic beverages 0.34 0.30 0.36
Tobacco 2.45 2.57 2.39
Total food, beverages, and tobacco 35.62 45.28 30.70
Source: Turkish State Institute of Statistics.
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groups under the assumptions of Scenarios A and B
except for milk and dairy products. Scenario C (free
trade with direct payments) also induces a decrease
in consumers’ expenditure on food, beverages, and
tobacco of about 14.64 percent. Expenditures for
almost all product groups will be reduced.
The results in table 2.13 of the simulated intro-
duction of EU-type agricultural policies in Turkey
reveal an increase in consumers’ real income of
2.15 percent as an impact of food price changes on
average households. The increase is more pro-
nounced in the lower-income group, the rural sector.
Because food makes up a higher share of their total
expenditures and because their food consumption
basket has a different mix, lower-income households
experience a more significant change in real income
TABLE 2.13 Simulation of Scenario Effects on Real Income, Selected
Household Types
Inelastic Demand Own Price Elasticities
Reference Scenario (removal of all 
divergences) Average Rural Urban Average Rural Urban
Change in real income 5.50 8.09 4.23 3.91 5.97 2.89
Change in nominal expenditure (%)
Food, beverages, and tobacco 14.64 16.53 13.23 10.56 12.45 9.14
Food, and nonalcoholic beverages 15.88 17.64 14.52 11.45 13.29 10.03
Cereals and pasta 13.21 18.41 9.06 12.04 16.90 8.16
Meat and meat products 29.12 27.79 29.90 13.20 12.63 13.54
Fish and fish products 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Milk, dairy products, and eggs 25.85 26.44 25.40 18.75 19.14 19.82
Fat 37.10 37.11 37.10 29.16 28.56 29.86
Fruits, fresh and dried 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Vegetables and potatoes 2.54 3.01 2.15 2.34 2.78 1.98
Sugar and sugar products 22.10 24.39 19.51 20.68 22.82 18.24
Other food and nonalcoholic beverages 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Alcoholic beverages 1.08 1.09 1.08 0.87 0.88 0.87
Tobacco products 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Inelastic Demand Own Price Elasticities
Agenda 2000 Scenario Average Rural Urban Average Rural Urban
Change in real income 2.15 3.43 1.51 1.87 3.03 1.28
Change in nominal expenditure (%)
Food, beverages, and tobacco 5.91 7.32 4.85 5.14 6.49 4.13
Food, and nonalcoholic beverages 6.41 7.82 5.33 5.58 6.93 4.53
Cereals and pasta 8.03 11.19 5.51 7.22 10.11 4.91
Meat and meat products 9.48 9.44 9.50 5.20 4.86 5.41
Fish and fish products 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Milk, dairy products, and eggs 4.96 5.07 4.88 2.87 2.92 2.83
Fat 30.53 29.36 31.88 27.96 27.14 28.91
Fruits, fresh and dried 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Vegetables and potatoes 2.54 3.01 2.15 2.34 2.78 1.98
Sugar and sugar products 13.44 14.83 11.86 12.44 13.73 10.98
Other food and nonalcoholic beverages 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Alcoholic beverages 0.12 0.14 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.09
Tobacco products 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Source: The authors.
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than the average of all groups. The immediate intro-
duction of Agenda 2000 in Turkey would increase
the real incomes of the households with the lowest
incomes by 3.43 percent, which is significantly
higher than the increase of 1.51 percent for house-
holds with the highest income—that is, the urban
sector.
Columns 4–6 of table 2.13 present the results of
the simulation of changes in consumers’ real income
and in nominal expenditures under the elastic
demand assumption.33 As expected, the effects of
the “elastic” scenarios are substantially lower than
those of the “inelastic” scenarios. Under the Agenda
2000 scenario, real income increases in the elastic
variant are 1.87 percent instead of 2.15 percent in
the inelastic demand. The pattern of impacts on the
different groups of households under the elastic
variant is principally the same as just described.
Impact on the State Budget
In addition to the implications for farmers’ incomes
and for consumers, the implementation of EU poli-
cies would have wide budgetary implications. The
most important budgetary effects are the direct
effects on internal price support measures (e.g., inter-
vention purchases and border measures) and those
stemming from direct income transfers.
When estimating the effects of the policy changes
on tariff revenues and export refunds, we assume
that before accession Turkey will adopt the EU-like
agricultural policies on its own and will not receive
any compensation from the EU budget for doing so.
Under this assumption, we suppose that any subsi-
dies to agriculture resulting from adoption of the
EU-like agricultural policies will have to be financed
from the Turkish Treasury.34 Later, we relax this
assumption by considering the case in which Turkey
would receive compensation from the EU budget for
introducing the EU-like agricultural policies. It
should be noted that the total trade-related budget-
ary effects under Scenarios A1, A2, and B are similar,
because the level of domestic support prices is the
same for all scenarios under consideration.
The trade-related budgetary implications of
adopting EU-like agricultural policies are analyzed
by multiplying the net traded quantity by the dif-
ference between the base period domestic price and
the Agenda 2000 price. Whenever the base period
domestic price exceeds the Agenda 2000 price, the
product determines the loss in tariff revenue for
imported commodities such as sunflower. For
exported commodities, the product can be consid-
ered the decrease in export subsidies, as long as the
base period domestic price exceeds the Agenda
2000 price, such as for wheat. Finally, for poultry
the Agenda 2000 price exceeds the base period
domestic price. Because poultry is an imported
commodity, the product is considered to be an
increase in tariff revenue.
Table 2.14 shows that after adoption of the
Agenda 2000 policies Turkey will incur a net trade-
related revenue loss of €226 million. In the longer
term, the losses could become even greater as pro-
ducers and consumers adjust to the new price lev-
els. These results account only for expenditure on
the commodities analyzed in this study. Thus they
are likely to underestimate the true trade-related
budgetary effects of an implementation of CAP-
type market regimes in Turkey.
The budgetary effects of direct income transfers
can be determined for each agricultural commod-
ity such as wheat, barley, maize, and beef. For
wheat, direct income support can be determined
from the relation [direct payments (euros/metric
ton)] ∗ [exchange rate (lira/euro)] ∗ [historical
grain yield for the EU compensatory area payments
(metric tons/hectare)] ∗ [quantity of wheat pro-
duced (metric tons)]/[actual yield in 2000 per
hectare (metric tons/hectare)]. The direct income
support for other commodities can be similarly
determined. A close look at the figures in table 2.14
reveals that direct payments to agriculture will
amount to €2.772 billion under Scenarios A1 and
A2 and to €970 million under Scenario B.
Overall, the budgetary costs to Turkey of
adopting EU-like agricultural policies when
uncompensated by the EU budget for introducing
those policies will be €2.998 billion under Scen-
ario A policies and €1.196 billion under Scenario B
policies.
After accession to the EU, Turkey will be eligible
for payments under the EU’s Structural Funds and
Cohesion Fund. But after accession, Turkey will also
have to contribute to the EU budget in the form of
VAT-based and GNP-based contributions. The VAT-
based contribution is determined by the relation
0.008522 ∗ 0.55 ∗ GDP, where the value of 0.008522
denotes the proportion used in calculation of the
VAT-based contribution, and the parameter value
of 0.55 is derived from the relation that the VAT
base may not exceed 55 percent of national GDP.
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Table 2.15 shows that Turkey’s VAT-based contribu-
tion will amount to €1.023 billion. The GNP-based
contribution is determined by the relation 34.46 ∗
(exchange rate) ∗ (share of Turkish GDP in EU
GDP), where 34.46 denotes the amount measured
in terms of billions of euros that must be met by the
EU budget requirement by the GNP-based contri-
bution.35 From table 2.15, we note that Turkey’s
GNP-based contribution will be €878 million.
After accession, Turkey will receive from the EU
budget direct income support payments, trade-
related net subsidies, payments under the Structural
Funds and Cohesion Fund. The direct income sup-
port will amount to €2.772 billion in Scenarios A1
and A2 and to €970 million in Scenario B. Trade-
related net subsidies, consisting of subsidies on
exports minus tariff revenues on imports, are deter-
mined by multiplying the net traded quantity
(exports minus imports) from third countries by
the difference between the Agenda 2000 price and
the border price. Basing the calculations on the
average 1999–2001 net trade figures with third
countries, trade-related net subsidies from the EU
will be €23 million. The payments under the Struc-
tural Funds that Turkey may receive from the EU
after accession can be calculated, assuming that
Turkey falls under Objective 1 of the Structural
Funds.36 According to the European Commission
(2002), per capita payments under Objective 1 cur-
rently amount to €217 per inhabitant per year.
Therefore, assuming Objective 1 applies to Turkey,
the country would receive about €14.6 billion—
that is, about 6.75 percent of the 2000 GDP. Turkey’s
potential gains from the Cohesion Fund have
been estimated on the basis of the payments
granted to Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain.
Cohesion Fund payments are granted to countries
with a per capita GNP of less than 90 percent of the
EU average. The total amount to be spent in 2002
was about €45 per inhabitant. If Turkey receives
equal payments, it could expect to receive about
€3 billion.
The calculations just presented are optimistic,
because, according to EU rules, transfers from the
TABLE 2.14 Trade-Related Budget Effects and Direct Payments under Agenda 2000
Agenda 2000
Net Exports, Trade-Related Direct
1999–2001 Effects on Payments
Average Budget (billions of TL)
(metric tons) (billions of TL) Scenario A Scenario B
Wheat EX 617,845 16,729 628,217 219,876
Barley EX 160,508 1,061 238,716 83,550
Maize IM 881,072 12,085 41,339 14,469
Sunflower IM 394,310 66,002 70,112 24,539
Sugar beet IM 31,675 309 0 0
Potato EX 91,237 3,467 0 0
Grapes EX 470,095 45,339 0 0
Milk IM 146,669 1,945 145,791 51,027
Beef IM 69,392 37,429 339,577 118,852
Poultry IM 374 52 0 0
Sheep EX 42,162 7,972 130,488 45,671
Total 129,939 1,594,239 557,984
Total (€ millions) 226 2,772 970
Total budgetary cost (€ millions):
Scenario A 2,998
Scenario B 1,196
Note: Because of the prevailing sanitary ban by Turkey on imports of livestock and meat products, the
1990–96 average of net exports for beef, sheep, and poultry is used. TL = Turkish liras; 
EX = export; IM = import.
Source: The authors.
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Structural Funds and Cohesion Fund cannot
exceed 4 percent of GDP. Thus this requirement
places an upper bound on the amount that Turkey
can receive from the EU under these funds. For
Turkey, this requirement is binding, and therefore
the payments under the Structural Funds and
Cohesion Fund cannot exceed €8.664 billion.
The total annual net revenue that Turkey can
receive from the EU under accession will therefore
be about €9.557 billion under Scenario A and
€7.755 billion under Scenario B.
Furthermore, an assessment of Turkey’s poten-
tial gains from the Structural Funds must bear in
mind that funding of projects under the priority
objectives are subject to a co-financing mecha-
nism. The amount just estimated therefore consti-
tutes the EU’s share of project funding and must
be complemented by funds from the national
budget. The EU’s contribution to structural fund-
ing is subject to two ceilings. The first is a maxi-
mum of 75 percent of the total eligible cost and, as
general rule, is at least 50 percent of the eligible
public expenditure for measures carried out in the
regions covered by Objective 1. When the regions
are located in a member state covered by the
Cohesion Fund, the European Community contri-
bution may rise, in exceptional cases, to a maxi-
mum of 80 percent of the total eligible cost. The
second ceiling is a maximum of 50 percent of the
total eligible cost and, as a general rule, is at least
25 percent of the eligible public expenditure for
measures carried out in areas covered by Objec-
tives 2 and 3. Assuming that Turkey will qualify for
assistance under Objective 1 and the Cohesion
Fund, and assuming an EU participation rate (on
average) of 75 percent, the EU’s contribution of
€8.664 billion would have to be accompanied by a
Turkish co-financing share of about €2.9 billion
from the national budget.
Welfare Effects 
The situation just described reveals that, in Turkey,
integration into the EU will lead to substantial
changes in the agricultural incomes of producers,
the welfare levels of the consumers, and the budget
revenues of the government. On the effects of inte-
gration into the EU, we have five observations.
TABLE 2.15 Contributions to and Revenues from EU Budget
Turkish Liras Euros
(billions) (millions)
Contributions to EU budget
VAT-based contribution 588,682 1,023
GNP-based contribution 505,112 878
Total contribution 1,093,793 1,902
Revenues from EU budget
Direct payments to agriculture Scenario A 1,594,239 2,772
Direct payments to agriculture Scenario B 557,984 970
Trade-related budgetary effects 13,473 23
Structural Funds 8,421,079 14,641
Cohesion Fund 1,746,307 3,036
Total revenue Scenario A 11,775,099 20,472
Total revenue Scenario B 10,738,843 18,670
Net revenue from EU budget
Unrestricted Scenario A 10,681,305 18,570
Unrestricted Scenario B 9,645,050 16,768
Structural operations (restricted) Agenda 2000 4,983,338 8,664
Restricted Scenario A 5,497,258 9,557
Restricted Scenario B 4,461,002 7,755
Source: The authors.
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First, the impact on farmers’ incomes of the intro-
duction of EU-type agricultural policies (Scenarios
A1, A2, B, and C) will be driven mainly by the
amount of CAP-like compensation payments
granted to the farmers (see table 2.16), and the
impact will be greater in the medium to long term
as farmers adjust to the new policies. The largest
reduction in farmers’ incomes is produced by
Agenda 2000 policies without direct payments
(Scenario A1). From the point of view of the farm-
ers, the best alternative among the various EU poli-
cies considered is the Agenda 2000 scenario with
direct payments given at the EU levels.
Second, the impact will not be uniformly dis-
tributed across all agricultural products; some
farmers will gain and others will lose from the
reforms as a result of changes in relative rates of
protection.
Third, EU-type agricultural policies will reduce
agricultural prices substantially in Turkey, leading
to lower food prices. In the short term, food expen-
ditures are projected to fall by as much as 5.91 per-
cent compared with the current base period condi-
tions. In the medium to long term, EU-like changes
in agricultural policies (Scenarios A1, A2, and B)
would induce a 5.14 percent average drop in food
expenditures. Expenditures are projected to fall for
the major food product groups, with the largest
decreases projected for fat products (30.53 per-
cent), sugar and sugar products (13.44 percent),
and meat and meat products (9.48 percent).
Fourth, because Turkish households spend on
average about 36 percent of their disposable
income on food and beverages, policy reforms that
affect food prices will undoubtedly affect con-
sumers’ real income. In fact, the model estimates
that, in the medium to long term, EU-like policies
(Scenarios A1, A2, and B) will lead to a 1.87 percent
increase in real household incomes in Turkey. This
impact is higher (2.15 percent) in the short term,
before consumers can adjust to the higher prices for
some food products. Therefore, although farmers
as a group could lose from the new policies,
depending on the amount of direct payments, the
population as a whole stands to gain from the
introduction of these policies. Furthermore,
because food makes up a higher share of their total
expenditures and their food consumption basket
has different mixes, lower-income households (i.e.,
rural households) experience a more significant
increase in real income.
Fifth, the budgetary costs to Turkey of adopting
EU-like agricultural policies (when Turkey will not
receive any compensation from the EU budget for
introducing these policies) will amount to €2.998
billion under Scenario A policies and to €1.196
billion under Scenario B policies. Yet after the EU
accession, Turkey will be a net recipient of funds
from the EU; it can expect to receive from the EU
€9.557 billion in net transfers under Scenario A and
€7.755 billion in net transfers under Scenario B.37
Institutional Development 
and EU Accession
The institutional and human capital enhancements
implied by EU membership require significant
effort and investment during the preaccession
period. Not only is the alignment of legislation
necessary; Turkey also must develop the judicial
TABLE 2.16 Impact of Changes in Agricultural Policies on Agricultural Incomes
Value Added
Gross Agricultural Inclusive Direct
Output Payments 
(billions of TL) (billions of TL)
Base run with current policies 8,532,570 4,835,604
Agenda 2000 without direct payments 7,799,080 4,473,629
Agenda 2000 with direct payments 9,393,319 6,067,868
Agenda 2000 with 35 percent direct payments 8,357,064 5,031,613
Free trade with direct payments 7,475,246 4,433,256
Note: All variables are measured in terms of 2000 prices. TL = Turkish liras.
Source: The authors.
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and administrative capacity to implement and
enforce the acquis communautaire. In preparation
for joining the EU and adopting regulations and
policies of the EU, Turkey will have to strengthen
some institutions and create others. This section
first outlines Turkey’s key institutions for agriculture
in the context of implementation of the acquis and,
in particular, the mechanisms to operate the CAP.
The section then briefly discusses Turkey’s status
and ability to adopt and implement the acquis.
Implementing Agencies for Agricultural Policies
The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs
(MARA), Ministry of Industry and Trade, Turkish
Bank of Agriculture, and Treasury are the main
organizations responsible for the formulation and
implementation of agricultural policy in Turkey.
The main task of MARA is to assist in the elabora-
tion and implementation of agricultural policies,
particularly services such as research and develop-
ment, quarantine and inspection, rural develop-
ment, and small-scale irrigation works.
MARA also carries out commercial functions
through the Turkish Grain Board (TMO), an affili-
ated state economic enterprise. For more than six
decades, the TMO has functioned as a buffer stock
agency in order to stabilize the grain prices received
by producers and paid by consumers. The board
announces the purchase prices, which are later re-
determined based on market conditions. The TMO
uses its stock capacity to regulate the market, so
that prices in the bread and pasta industries are sta-
bilized, and so producers and consumers do not face
high price fluctuations (MARA 2002). Under the
Agricultural Reform Implementation Project,
the prices of the TMO will be increasingly linked
to the world price (with a margin equal to the tariff)
in order to allow state procurement to function only
as a “buyer of last resort,” which is now the case in
the EU. The TMO also declares a sales price for
grain no less than either (1) the TMO’s purchase
price plus the storage cost up to the date of sale,
including imputed interest charges on stocks, or (2)
the tariff-inclusive import parity price for grain of
equivalent quality as of the time the grain is sold.
Prices increase in general to take into account the
depreciation of the Turkish lira. This system dis-
courages wheat buyers from letting the TMO incur
all of the storage costs and then buying the grain at
a subsidized price later in the year, which has been
the case in the past. TMO’s new purchase and sales
pricing policies have been very successful in elimi-
nating its deficit (TMO 2002).
The Turkish Bank of Agriculture is, as explained
early in this chapter, the principal supplier of agri-
cultural credit for crop and livestock production. It
was the channel through which the bulk of the
credit was extended to farmers through the agricul-
tural credit cooperatives (ACCs) and the agricul-
tural sales cooperatives unions (ASCUs). Virtually
all of these loans carried negative real interest rates,
with losses covered by the Treasury. The ACCs pro-
vided short- and medium-term credit in the form
of a limited cash payment (up to 25 percent of the
total loan) plus production inputs (e.g., seed, fertil-
izer, feed, and machinery.). The ACC system was a
retail network of the Turkish Bank of Agriculture
for the distribution of subsidized credit in kind to
small farmers, with some independence from the
government since 1995. It was the only source of
production credit for smallholder farmers. Because
almost all of the financial requirements were pro-
vided by the Turkish Bank of Agriculture, the cost-
effectiveness of the ACCs was never a concern.
Recently, the Turkish Bank of Agriculture was com-
mercialized (about 500 branches were closed in
rural areas), and the credit subsidy was eliminated.
Since then, an alternative arrangement for provid-
ing small farmers with credit has not yet been
established.
In the past, the ASCUs operated under the con-
trol of the Ministry of Industry and Trade.They were
authorized to set prices for members’ commodities
and to implement support purchases from produc-
ers on behalf of the state. They also were authorized
to set up facilities such as warehouses and primary
processing and packing plants and to market com-
modities in accordance with wholesale and retail
market practices. Today, within the framework of
the Agricultural Reform Implementation Project
(ARIP), financial aid is granted to assist the restruc-
turing and transformation of ASCUs into genuine
cooperative organizations—that is, independent,
financially autonomous, self-managed cooperatives
that sell and process members’ production.
Financial aid is also provided for improving pub-
lic services to facilitate reform implementation. Reg-
ulations are in place to control water and soil pollu-
tion and to protect wetlands. National and regional
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plans distribute information on ways to combat
desertification and reduce discharges of nutrients.
The government plays a large role in investment in
infrastructure, especially irrigation works.
Status of Implementation of the Acquis
in Agriculture
This section examines Turkey’s status and ability to
assume the obligations of EU membership.
Adoption of the Common Market Organizations
The markets policy is the most important instru-
ment of the CAP. As noted earlier, it places products
or a group of products under a particular regime,
the Common Organization of the Market (COM),
so that common rules govern production and trade.
The CAP is seeking to gradually reduce institutional
prices toward the world market levels, while consol-
idating direct aid as the basic support mechanism
for European Community farming. The acquis
requires that the intervention agencies be capable of
carrying out tasks such as regular market and price
monitoring, buying-in, public storage, and sales
and stock control in premises that meet Commu-
nity standards. Furthermore, the acquis specifies
precise rules for producer organizations, which
must be fulfilled if such an organization is to
benefit from Community support. Finally, the
COMs require specific administrative structures for
operation of the Community supply-management
instruments such as production quotas in the sugar,
dairy, and starch sectors.
During late 1990s, Turkey, with the introduction
of ARIP, completely reformed its prevailing output
price support and input subsidy policies. The
ASCUs were restructured, and the TMO was down-
sized. The TMO will preserve the assets needed to
carry out a minimum level of purchases and stor-
age and will liquidate the rest of its assets.
In addition, a process of privatizing the agricul-
tural state economic enterprises has begun. The
sugar law adopted on April 19, 2001, opens the
market to competition, reduces state interference,
and aims to maintain stable and self-sufficient
sugar production. The state-owned sugar company
will operate on a commercial basis, and sugar mills
will be transferred to the Privatization Agency. In
addition, a sugar board was established. The sugar
law aims to maintain the demand and supply
balance through a system of production quotas like
that used in the EU. In the tobacco sector, the Turk-
ish Parliament adopted a new law restructuring the
Directorate General for the Tobacco and Tobacco
Products, Salt and Alcohol Industry (TEKEL). The
law converts TEKEL from a monopoly to a com-
mercial enterprise that will operate under free-
market conditions. Parliament also adopted new
regulations on tobacco, tobacco products, and alco-
holic beverages. The processing facilities of TEKEL
are to be privatized. In January 2002, a tobacco law
was adopted that aimed to end state-subsidized
tobacco purchases as of 2002 and to introduce auc-
tion sales, individual purchasing contracts between
producers and buyers, and liberalization of the
market.
In this restructuring, some firms were liqui-
dated, such as the Turkish Agricultural Supply
Corporation, the state firm responsible for input
supply. Although the achievements described are
considerable, Turkey, according to the European
Commission (2004), lags behind in adopting the
EU’s common market organizations.
Implementation of the Integrated Administra-
tion and Control System of Payments Accord-
ing to the acquis, the administrative structures
and systems needed for handling the CAP expendi-
ture under the Guarantee Section of the European
Agricultural Guarantee and Guidance Fund must
meet certain requirements. In particular, the pay-
ing agencies must be accredited and must offer
sufficient guarantees that the admissibility of
claims and compliance with European Community
rules are checked before payment is authorized
and that the payments effected are correctly and
fully recorded in accounts. To help combat fraud
and ensure that the direct payments scheme is
effectively applied, the EU introduced the Inte-
grated Administration and Control System. Farm-
ers wishing to claim direct payments must com-
plete detailed IACS forms, which are designed to
ensure that only eligible land is entered into the
scheme and that only one claim is made on any
individual piece of land. According to the acquis,
the IACS must have a computerized database, an
alphanumeric identification system for agricultural
parcels, and a system for identifying and recording
animals.
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Turkey realizes that direct income support is at
the heart of ARIP and that registration of farmers is
a critical part of the DIS program. Two approaches
have been used to build an adequate registry of
farmers in Turkey. The first approach is based on
the existing land registry records (cadastre), and
the second is based on certificates of farmers. Land
registry was used where it exists, but it was comple-
mented by farmer certificates. In addition, MARA
developed a farm registry system in collaboration
with related organizations. The database of this sys-
tem includes information on the number of farm-
ers, their demographic characteristics and assets,
the number and the size of land parcels, and land
use. This information is more accurate than formal
statistics, and to access it, all provinces and districts
are provided an online connection to the MARA
Registration Center. The 2.6 million farmers regis-
tered hold a total of 16.4 million hectares of land, of
which 16.3 million hectares are eligible for direct
income support. The number of parcels registered
is 15.5 million. In 2001, direct payments of about
TL 500 trillion were made, paid in two installments.
DIS continued in 2002 with a payment of TL 135 mil-
lion ($85) per hectare of land up to 50 hectares.
Transition payments to help farmers divert from
hazelnut and tobacco increased in 2002 to $0.2 mil-
lion, and transition payments were to be granted
until 2004. In addition to the farmer registry, a
Geographic Information System (GIS) and Remote
Sensing Department was established within MARA
to classify and map agricultural land, estimate
production and production capacity for various
products, and create a database for land use plan-
ning purposes.
These are considerable achievements. Yet,
according to the European Commission (2004),
Turkey has achieved little progress in introducing
an IACS for payments. This situation is particularly
serious because the data required for IACS are not
easily available. It requires a uniform, centralized
database that would allow payments control at the
central level, and an integrated system of on-the-
spot controls needs to be developed. According to
EU legislation, the individual member states are
obliged to control areas that have at least 5 percent
of applicants for payments. Fifty percent of the
requested area must be verified—one part on-site
and one part perhaps from aerial photography. The
registration system in Turkey developed under the
DIS is certainly a start on an IACS. It includes a
very comprehensive audit and financial manage-
ment system that is in line with the kind of control
system mentioned earlier.
By the end of 2004, all EU member states will
be required to use a land register and parcel identi-
fication control system based on GIS analysis of
digital images. Turkey could adopt this system
from the outset. Over time, GIS maps of the whole
territory of Turkey should be prepared. Such a sys-
tem will derive the basic data from the cadastre
map of the Turkish territory, which needs to be
digitized. The cadastre data will then be superim-
posed with ortho-photomaps, which will allow
identification of the exact borders of cultivated
agricultural land and of less favored areas. The
processed ortho-photomaps, along with other rele-
vant cadastre data (on disadvantaged areas, pro-
tected areas, environmentally sensitive areas, and
so forth), will be given to an institution in charge
of the data processing, and the result is expected to
be an entirely new register of land use. Because
introduction of the IACS and establishment of an
agency to disburse direct payments and other sub-
sidies to farmers are prerequisites for the function-
ing of the CAP, it appears that Turkey must extend
the present system in order to develop the land
register and parcel identification control system
like those of the EU and establish the associated
payment agency.
Food Safety and Quality Standards Food safety
issues in the EU are spread over food, veterinary,
phytosanitary, and animal nutrition legislation.
Food legislation includes general rules for hygiene
and control, food labeling, food additives, food
packaging, and genetically modified foods. Veteri-
nary legislation addresses animal health, animal
welfare, animal identification and registration,
internal market control systems, external border
controls, and public health requirements for
establishments in relation to animal products.
Phytosanitary legislation includes plant health
(harmful organisms, pesticides), seeds and propa-
gating material, and plant hygiene. Finally, animal
feed legislation includes the safety of feed materials
and additives, labeling, contaminants in feed, con-
trols, and inspections.
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The acquis requires that each member state have
appropriate administrative structures to inspect and
control the implementation of all food legislation.
In particular, the various hygiene control officials
must be trained in inspection and in the Hazard
Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) sys-
tem. Food operators must implement HACCP, and
laboratories used in hygiene and foodstuff analysis
must comply with the European Community sys-
tem on accreditation, method of sampling, and
analysis.38 In the realm of plant and animal health
and nutrition, the acquis requires that appropriate
inspection arrangements be available at the site of
origin, that nondiscriminatory checks be performed
during transport and at the destination point, and
that satisfactory testing arrangements be available.
A recent white paper on food safety stated that
the commission is determined to set the highest
standards of food safety (see European Commis-
sion 2000). The white paper proposes the follow-
ing: (1) establishment of an independent European
Food Authority with responsibility for independent
scientific advice on all aspects of food safety, opera-
tion of rapid alert systems, and communication of
risks; (2) an improved legislative framework cover-
ing all aspects of food products “from farm to
table”; (3) greater harmonization of national con-
trol systems; and (4) dialogue with consumers and
other stakeholders. According to the white paper,
imported foodstuffs and animal feed should meet
health requirements at least equivalent to those set
by the European Community for its own products.
The white paper on food safety also states that it is
essential that the EU candidate countries imple-
ment the basic principles of the treaty establishing
the European Community, pass food safety legisla-
tion, and put in place control systems equivalent to
those in place within the European Community.
Similar considerations will certainly apply to
Turkey. Because the EU will not take any risks that
might lead to lower food safety standards or affect
EU consumers, it is of prime importance that
Turkey comply with the EU’s acquis on food safety.
In Turkey, food legislation has been updated
continually since 1985. The harmonization of
“Good Agricultural Practices” has been completed,
and the regulation on agricultural quarantine has
been in force, and regularly strengthened, since
1991.39 A food act was passed in 1995, according to
which all stages of food production are targeted for
inspection. Turkey has formally adopted a number
of typical elements of food safety regulations and
control systems by adopting some of the EU rules
and regulations. In particular, Turkey has started to
set up the Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed,
and has revised the regulation on the Establishment
and Duties of Province Control Laboratories.
Accreditation has been initiated for some of the
laboratories involved in the ring test organized by
the Food Analysis Performance Assessment Scheme
and Turkish Scientific and Technical Council. Fif-
teen provincial laboratories have been brought up
to EU standards. The Plant Health Regulations,
which are the Turkish equivalent of the basic
Council Directive 2000/29/EC, dating back to 1991,
were amended in 2003. HACCP control instruc-
tions have been prepared to improve food process-
ing. In the veterinary area, Turkey amended the
Law on Animal Health and Surveillance in 2004,
creating the legal bases for banning the administra-
tion of certain substances to animals and imposing
sanctions in this regard. It has also upgraded the
control performance of the veterinary service,
including the implementation of residue monitor-
ing plans.40
Trade and Border Control Implementation of the
CAP requires the establishment of effective customs
control for trade with third countries. Because
Turkey’s borders will become EU borders at the point
of accession, Turkey will have to protect its long bor-
ders and ensure, for example, an adequate veterinary
infrastructure to manage livestock inspection and
control disease. Thus Turkey needs to assess the cur-
rent conditions and to design technical specifications
for construction of other veterinary and phytosani-
tary border crossings along its future EU border.
EU controls on third-country imports require
that a system of border inspection posts (BIPs) be
completed to EU standards at external borders with
third countries. Currently, some 283 EU BIPs are
operated by national authorities. Most of these are
at ports and airports; others are at road or rail links
located, in particular, on the eastern borders of
the EU.
The accession of Turkey will extend the EU’s east-
ern frontier with Georgia, Armenia, Iran, Iraq, and
Syria. Veterinary checks on imports at the BIPs
include documentary, identity, and physical checks
of the animals or animal products.After these checks
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at the first border crossing into the EU, animals and
products can in principle circulate freely in the inter-
nal market. It is therefore essential that BIP facilities
and procedures are adequate to maintain animal and
public health safety. Setting up border inspection
posts for veterinary and other controls in the new
member states requires that buildings, equipment,
and staff be in place to carry out the required border
checks. EU legislation sets out minimum standards
for BIP facilities, depending on the types of products
to be checked.
Conclusion
Accession to the EU implies some major changes,
both in the incentive structure for agricultural pro-
duction and in the institutions of the sector. This
chapter modeled and quantified the probable
changes in the incentive structure and examined
their implications for the structure of production,
value added in primary agriculture, and welfare of
producers and consumers. It also investigated qual-
itatively what changes will be needed in major
institutions by comparing those existing currently
in Turkey with those of the EU’s Common Agricul-
tural Policy.
The results of any modeling exercise should be
taken with a grain of salt, and that is even truer of
those in this chapter. One reason is that the CAP is a
moving target undergoing fundamental reforms.
The general direction of the reform program is clear,
but how far it will have gone by the time of Turkey’s
accession is not. It is quite possible—some would
argue likely—that the price structure in the EU will
in another 5–10 years be very close to that prevailing
in world markets, but this development depends on
some future political decisions,and so is by no means
certain. Clearly, however, prices will be much lower
than they are at present. Because of the uncertainties,
this chapter modeled several different scenarios, but
all results should be interpreted as indicative of gen-
eral orders of magnitude rather than as precise
numerical forecasts. If the model were run using the
scenario of the recently adopted reform program
that is an extension of Agenda 2000, Turkey’s
producers and consumers would face lower prices.
Turkish consumers would gain even more than they
would under the Agenda 2000 scenario, and produc-
ers would lose more in price supports but would
receive substantially higher direct payments.
One important difference between Turkey and
the accession countries of Central and Eastern
Europe is that in most of the latter, agricultural
prices were lower than those in the EU at the time
those countries began accession negotiations. In
Turkey, the converse is true, which implies that the
prices for many major agricultural products in
Turkey will have to be reduced at some point
between now and accession. As quantified in this
chapter, such a reduction would be of great benefit
to Turkish consumers, especially the poor. It
would, however, require adjustments on the part of
Turkish farmers. Under its current reform pro-
gram, ARIP, Turkey has made a good start in this
adjustment process. The way in which it has done
this—by partially compensating farmers by means
of an incentive-neutral, WTO-compatible direct
income support system—is fully consistent with
the mechanisms of the CAP. By bringing agricul-
tural prices in Turkey more in line with world
prices, the reforms will begin to make Turkish agri-
culture more efficient. This improvement, in turn,
would help Turkey to meet one of the EU’s pri-
mary criteria for accession countries—that its pro-
ducers be able to compete in the unified market
that follows from membership. Of course, an
important lesson from other reform-minded
countries is that to realize the benefits of the
reform program in increased competitiveness, pro-
ducers must be supported by having the appropri-
ate infrastructure and services, as well as continued
sectoral and economy-wide reforms.
As for institutions, Turkey has made a good start
in some areas, but it still has a long way to go in
others. The DIS system in Turkey lays the founda-
tion for a system to administer direct payments
under the CAP, and the financial management sys-
tem of the DIS should be a good basis on which to
build the Integrated Administrative and Control
System of payments. But some improvements will
clearly be needed. For example, the system will have
to be based on GIS analysis of digital images,
implying that GIS maps will have to be prepared for
all of Turkey. Food safety and quality standards will
have to be improved, as will veterinary border
posts. But with a good investment program and
support from the EU and international commu-
nity, Turkey should find it feasible to complete
the improvements in the period leading up to
accession.
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Annex
TABLE 2.17 Arrangements Applicable to European Community Importation of Agricultural Products, Other than Fruits 
and Vegetables Originating in Turkey
Ad Valorem Duty Specific Duty
Tariff Rates on Imports from Turkey on Imports from Turkey Over-
1999 Applied by EU Tariff Tariff Quota Duty
Turkish Exports on Imports from Ad Valorem Quota In-Quota Quota on Imports
HS Description to EU (US$) Third Countries Duty (metric tons) Duty (metric tons) from Turkey
0204 Meat of sheep or goat 123,880 78.10–157.20 0 — 0 200
020725 Frozen turkeys — 20.85 1,000
02072510 — ECU/t 170
02072590 — ECU/t 186
020727 Frozen cuts of turkeys — 27.64
02072730 — ECU/t 134
02072740 — ECU/t 93
02072750 — ECU/t 339
02072760 — ECU/t 127
02072770 — ECU/t 230
040690 Cheese 67.76
04069029 338 0 1,500 ECU 67.19/100 kg
04069031 804,042
04069050 —
04069086 —
04069087 —
04069088 —
0811 100
08111011 Frozen strawberries 125,928 25.27 0 — 0
08112011 Frozen raspberries — 19.89 0 — 0
08119019 Other fruits, frozen 1,122 18.93 0 — 0
10020000 Rye — 103.90 Reduction according to 
Article 3(4)
1107 Malt 1,538
110710 50.40 Reduction of ECU/t 6.57
11072000 29.30 Reduction of ECU/t 6.57
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1509 Olive oil
15091010 — 81.30 10% reduction
15091090 121,068,014 81.30 10% reduction
15099000 — 69.90 5% reduction
151000 Other olive oil
15100010 — 79.20 10% reduction
15100090 2,201,779 79.20 5% reduction
2002 Prepared tomatoes 8,000
200210 3,622,783 16.80 0
20029011 485,353 16.80 0
20029019 78,337 16.80 0
2002 Prepared tomatoes
20029031 12,924,543 16.80 0 30,000 t
20029039 4,760,473 16.80 0
20029091 5,718,862 16.80 0
20029099 256,187 16.80 0
2007
20079130 Prep. of citrus fruit, 
with sugar — 32.50 0 — 0 100
20079939 Other preparations 
with sugar 1,000,696 39.26 0 — 0 100
200850 Apricot pulp 600
ex 20085092 481,445 25.39 0
ex 20085094 27,604 25.39 0
2204 Wine
220410 Sparkling wine 32,099 9.80 0 —
220421 Other wine, 2 liters or less 4,196,588 8.70 0 —
220429 Other 2,224,958 17.70 0 —
220600 Other fermented beverages 2,358 8.51 0 —
ex 2007 Undenatured ethyl alcohol — 28.00–39.26 0 —
200900 Vinegar and substitutes — 0 —
Note: ECU/t = European currency unit per metric ton.
Source: Decision 1/98 of the EC-Turkey Association Council of February 25, 1998.
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TABLE 2.18 Arrangements Applicable to European Community Importation of Fruits and Vegetables Originating in Turkey
Tariff Rates
Applied by EU 
1999 Tariff Rates on Imports from
Turkish Exports Applied by EU Turkey during Tariff
to EU on Imports from Specified Quota
HS (US$) Third Countries Time Period Time Periods (metric tons)
ex 070190 Potatoes 805,142 13.85 January 1–March 31 0 —
070310 Onions 444,377 11.20
ex 07031011 February 15–May 15 0 —
ex 07031019 February 15–May 15 0 —
ex 07031011 May 16–February 14 0 2,000
ex 07031019 May 16–February 14 0 2,000
070820 Beans 460,017 13.37
ex 07082020 November 1–April 30 0 —
ex 07082095 November 1–April 30 0 —
ex 07089000 July 1–April 30 0 —
070930 Aubergines 1,546,945 14.90
ex 070930 January 15–April 30 0 —
ex 070930 May 1–January 14 0 1,000
070940 Stick celery 8,598 14.90
ex 07094000 January 1–April 30 0 —
070990 Fresh or chilled vegetables 
NES 179,561 13.08
07099071 Courgettes December 1–end of February 0 —
ex 07099073 Courgettes December 1–end of February 0 —
ex 07099079 Courgettes December 1–end of February 0 —
070990 Fresh or chilled vegetables 
NES 500
ex 07099073 Courgettes March 1–November 30 0 —
07099075 Courgettes March 1–November 30 0 —
07099077 Courgettes March 1–November 30 0 —
ex 07099079 Courgettes March 1–November 30 0 —
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ex 07099090 Pumpkins and courges December 1–end of February 0 —
ex 07099090 Other wild onion February 15–May 15 0 —
080221- 22 Fresh or dried hazelnuts 354,662,275 3.70
08022100 3 —
08022200 3 —
080610 Fresh table grapes 21,850,312 16.10
08061021 Nov. 15–April 30, June 18–July 31 0 —
ex 08061029 Nov. 15–April 30, June 18–July 31 0 —
08061030 Nov. 15–April 30, June 18–July 31 0 —
ex 08061040 Nov. 15–April 30, June 18–July 31 0 —
ex 08061050 Nov. 15–April 30, June 18–July 31 0 —
08061061 Nov. 15–April 30, June 18–July 31 0 —
08061069 Nov. 15–April 30, June 18–July 31 0 —
080711 Watermelon 784,893
ex 08071100 April 1–June 15 0 —
ex 08071100 June 16–March 31 0 14,000
080719 Melons 1,437,680
ex 08071900 November 1–May 31 0 —
080940 Plums 1,278,413
ex 08094010 May 1–June 15 0 —
ex 08094020 May 1–June 15 0 —
Note: NES = not elsewhere classified.
Source: Decision 1/98 of the EC-Turkey Association Council of February 25, 1998.
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TABLE 2.19 Agricultural Products for Which EU Entry Price
System Applies
1999 
Turkish Exports
to EU
HS Description (US$)
07020000 Tomatoes 2,306,800
07070005 Cucumbers 1,303,757
07091000 Artichokes 9,307
07099070 Courgettes 1,417,562
08051030 Oranges 5,191,270
08051050 Oranges 174,027
08052010 Clementine 439,670
08052030 Satsumas 69,803
08052050 Mandarins —
08052070 Tangerines —
08052090 Citrus hybrids 8,010,676
08053010 Lemons 13,367,259
08061010 Grapes 21,834,061
08081000 Apples —
08081050 Apples—Granny Smith 1,735
08081090 Other Apples 5,350
08082010 Pears —
08082050 Other pears 1,520,560
08091000 Apicots 674,115
08092005 Sour cherries 189,787
08092095 Table cherries 37,176,175
08093010 Peaches —
08093090 Other peaches 310,744
08094005 Plums 1,270,287
20096011 Fruit juices —
20096019 Fruit juices—grapes 410,950
20096051 Fruit juices—grapes 271,163
20096059 Fruit juices—grapes 768
22043092 Wine of fresh grapes —
22043094 Wine of fresh grapes —
22043096 Wine of fresh grapes —
22043098 Wine of fresh grapes 16,965
Total 95,972,791
Source: Turkish State Institute of Statistics.
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TABLE 2.20 Structure of Household Expenditures
(1994 prices, Turkish liras)
Average Rural Urban
Total expenses per household 111,044,759 66,698,941 167,764,049
Food, beverages, and tobacco per household 39,552,432 30,202,155 51,511,644
Food and nonalcoholic beverages per household 36,457,528 28,287,252 46,907,494
Expenditure shares (% of total expenditure)
Cereals and pasta
Rice 0.7659 1.1584 0.5663
Flour 1.6416 3.9502 0.4677
Bread 3.5371 2.6741 3.9759
Bread and bread products
Pasta 0.3113 0.5020 0.2144
Other bread products 0.4088 0.7150 0.2532
Confectionary products
Rolls (fancy cake) 0.2885 0.1857 0.3408
Rolls (ordinary) 0.0634 0.0730 0.0585
Rolls (durable) 0.2251 0.2840 0.1952
Meat and meat products
Meat
Pork
Veal 1.5659 1.2013 1.7513
Beef 0.5351 0.8484 0.3758
Sheep, lamb, and goat 1.5581 2.1953 1.2341
Poultry 0.7116 0.6450 0.7454
Subproducts and edible offal 0.1471 0.1772 0.1318
Smoked products 0.2997 0.2515 0.3243
Canned meat products
Fish and fish products
Fresh and frozen fish 0.3588 0.3698 0.3532
Processed fish
Other water animals 0.0011 0.0016 0.0008
Fish ready-to-cook and fish dishes
Milk, dairy products, and eggs 
Milk
Fresh milk 1.0733 1.2479 0.9845
Dry (powder) and condensed milk 0.8019 1.2451 0.5765
Dairy products
Cheese and curd 1.9321 2.4456 1.6710
Ice cream 0.0758 0.0290 0.0996
Other dairy products 0.0205 0.0395 0.0109
Eggs 0.7103 0.8310 0.6489
Fat
Vegetable fat
Vegetable oil 1.6869 2.6487 1.1977
Margarine 0.7650 1.0891 0.6001
Animal fat
Dairy butter 0.5337 0.9984 0.2974
Lard/fat 0.0117 0.0193 0.0078
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TABLE 2.20 (Continued)
Average Rural Urban
Fruit, fresh or dried
Fresh fruit
Fresh fruits, temperate zones 2.2800 2.4176 2.2101
Fresh fruits, tropical zones 0.1158 0.0812 0.1333
Dried fruit and nuts 0.4174 0.4317 0.4101
Fruit, canned
Frozen fruit 0.0068 0.0084 0.0060
Bottled fruit
Jam, marmalade, and jelly 0.2569 0.3638 0.2026
Fruit juices, syrups, and nectars 0.0845 0.0528 0.1006
Vegetables and potatoes
Fresh vegetables and mushrooms 3.0108 3.6075 2.7073
Dried vegetables 1.0826 1.7756 0.7302
Frozen vegetables 0.0587 0.0962 0.0396
Potatoes
Potatoes 0.5085 0.8146 0.3529
Potato products 0.0013 0.0007 0.0017
Sugar and sugar products
Sugar 1.3920 2.4582 0.8498
Sugar products—nonchocolate 0.2004 0.2435 0.1785
Chocolate products 0.1588 0.0993 0.1891
Honey 0.1953 0.2680 0.1583
Other food and nonalcoholic beverages 3.0312 3.8650 2.6072
Coffee, tea and cocoa
Coffee—all sorts 0.0840 0.0541 0.0991
Tea, including dried herb and others 1.0452 1.7319 0.6961
Cocoa 0.0067 0.0058 0.0071
Other food 1.5310 1.8555 1.3659
Soft drinks
Fizzy soft drinks 0.3415 0.2098 0.4085
Mineral water 0.0228 0.0078 0.0305
Alcoholic beverages
Spirits 0.2095 0.1852 0.2218
Wine 0.0151 0.0121 0.0166
Beer 0.1132 0.1017 0.1190
Tobacco
Cigarettes 2.4142 2.4970 2.3721
Tobacco products 0.0352 0.0749 0.0150
Source: Turkish State Institute of Statistics.
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Notes
1. The authors are grateful to Mr. Antonio Nucifora for his
assistance and advice on the model used in this paper to quanti-
tatively estimate the effects of adopting the Common Agricul-
tural Policy of the European Union.
2. EU15 refers to the 15 members of the EU prior to the 2004
enlargement in which 10 more countries joined the EU. The
15 countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
3. The last agricultural census was carried out in 2001, but the
results of this census are still not available. The large number of
multiparcel agricultural land holdings, the landless peasants in
some parts of eastern Turkey, and the feudal structures in eastern
and southeastern Anatolia are three of the major problems in Turk-
ish agriculture. The land fragmentation is in part a consequence of
the inheritance provisions of the 1926 Civil Code, which is pat-
terned after the Swiss Civil Code. To attack the problem of landless
peasants, the government has pursued various agrarian reforms
since the formation of the Republic, but more work needs to be
done.Finally, the local lord’s hegemony in eastern and southeastern
Turkey is a peculiarity of the Turkish agricultural setting.
4. All dollar amounts are U.S. dollars unless otherwise
indicated.
5. A review of the tariff binding commitments of Turkey and
the EU under the World Trade Organization (WTO) on agricul-
tural products reveals that by 2004 Turkey’s tariff bindings will
all be almost above the EU final bound levels under the Uruguay
Round agreement, which will be further reduced by the ongoing
Doha Round negotiations. Thus, under the accession process,
Turkey will have to conform to the lower EU levels.
6. For the COM on cereals, see Council Regulations (EC) No.
1251/1999 and No. 1253/1999.
7. See Article 2 of Council Regulation No. 1251/1999. In the
Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, the arable base
area for each accession country has been determined by taking
the average for the years 1997, 1998, and 1999.
8. In the CEE countries, aid for durum wheat applies to the
durum wheat used to produce pasta. The glassiness of the vari-
ety grown should be higher than 73 percent. Furthermore,
durum wheat must have been grown for a minimum of some
20 years to qualify for aid. Finally, aid is contingent on the area
under durum wheat production constituting at least 2 percent of
the total area under cereal production.
9. For CEE countries, the reference yields have been deter-
mined as the average of the median three years of the period
1994/95–1998/99. The reference yields have been set at 4.26 met-
ric tons per hectare for Hungary, 2.96 tons per hectare for
Poland, and 4.16 tons per hectare for Slovakia.
10. For CEE countries, the date is December 31, 2000.
11. The regulations that apply to sunflower seed are gov-
erned by Council Regulation (EC) No. 1251/1999 amending
Regulation No. 3405/93.
12. Sugar beets are governed by Council Regulation (EC)
No. 1260/2001.
13. Fruits and vegetables, including grapes, are governed by
Regulation (EC) No. 2699/2000 amending Council Regulation
(EC) No. 2200/1996, No. 2201/1996, and No. 2202/1996.
14. Milk and dairy products are governed by Council Regu-
lation (EC) No. 1255/1999 on the COM for milk and dairy prod-
ucts. Also applicable is Council Regulation (EC) No. 1256/1999
amending Regulation (EEC) No. 3950/1992 establishing an
additional levy in the milk and milk products sector.
15. Ceilings have been established per member state on the
basis of slaughterings and exports registered in 1995. Where the
national ceiling is exceeded, the premiums are reduced propor-
tionately.
16. In particular, member states may choose between two
formulas for granting additional extensification premiums on
suckler cows and special beef payments: (1) a simple supplement
of €100 per premium where the stocking intensity is less than
1.4 livestock units per hectare; or (2) as of 2002, €40 where the
stocking intensity is between 1.8 and 1.4 livestock units per
hectare and €80 if less than 1.4 livestock units per hectare.
17.Ovine meat is governed by Regulation (EC) No.2529/2001.
18. More information on the reforms is available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/mtr/index_en.htm.
19. Even decoupled payments involve some distortion as
they are currently administered. But, according to an analysis by
the OECD, this distortion is very small. See OECD (2001) and
Dewbre, Anton, and Thompson (2001).
20. This elimination of barriers does not include food safety,
sanitary, and phytosanitary requirements, and it is subject to
rules of origin.
21. In WTO terminology, subsidies in general are identified
by “boxes” given the colors of traffic lights: green (permitted),
amber (slow down—that is, will be reduced), and red (forbid-
den). The Uruguay Round agreement on agriculture has no red
box, although domestic support exceeding the reduction
commitment levels in the amber box is prohibited. A blue box
refers to an amber box with conditions designed to reduce dis-
tortions. Subsidies that are tied to programs that limit produc-
tion are included in the blue box.
22. For a discussion of the modeling methodology, see Csaki
and others (2002).
23. The policies have been projected using the 2000 price
and cost situation, because complete data for later periods were
not available at the time of preparation of this chapter.
24. The exchange rates used in the study for 2000 were TL
624,325 to the U.S. dollar and TL 575,179.98 to the euro.
25. Given the domestic price of commodity i, pi, and its bor-
der equivalent price, p∗i , the nominal protection rate (NPR) is
defined as 
NPRi =
(
Pi
P ∗i
− 1
)
∗ 100
26. The effective protection rate (EPR) is computed on the
basis of the ratio of value added in the production of i measured
at domestic prices (VAi ) over such value added at border prices
(VA∗i ) and is shown by
EPRi =
(
VAi
VA∗i
− 1
)
∗ 100
EPR > 0 implies direct protection of domestic producers of the
commodity; EPR < 0 implies underlying disincentives to
domestic producers of the commodity; and EPR = 0 implies a
neutral structure of net incentives.
27. We do not consider the effects of the imposition of quo-
tas on sugar and milk production by the EU.
28. The assumed output supply elasticities, taken largely
from Koç, Uzunlu, and Bayaner (2001), are 0.28 for wheat, 0.21
for barley, 0.14 for maize, 0.16 for sunflower, 0.34 for sugar beet,
0.94 for potato, 0.10 for grapes, 1.18 for milk, 0.34 for beef, 1.88
for poultry, and 0.60 for sheep.
29. This is why these kinds of payments are classified under
WTO rules as “green box”—that is, payments that minimally
distort trade.
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30. For a description of the direct payments and an estimate
of their effects, see OECD (2003b).
31. In Case I, there is a negative supply response to the drop
in prices due to the alignment with Agenda 2000 prices (except
grapes, the price of which increases), and no compensating
increase in price or production from the direct payments. In
Case II, the negative effect of alignment with Agenda 2000 prices
is offset by the direct payments.
32. Note that this approach determines the equivalent varia-
tion in consumer income. Alternatively, one could determine the
change in consumer surplus.
33. The assumed price elasticities of demand, taken largely
from Koç, Uzunlu, and Bayaner (2001), are 0.12 for bread and
pasta, 0.81 for beef, 0.7 for sheep meat, 1.23 for poultry, 0.5 for
milk, 0.3 for dairy products, 0.2 for fat, and 1.09 for butter.
34. This assumption helps to highlight the impact of EU-like
agricultural policies on the state budget.
35. Note that the EU budget must be balanced during each
fiscal year. So this value of 34.46 will change from year to year by
the requirements of the budget during that year.
36. Structural Funds allow the EU to grant financial assis-
tance to resolve structural economic and social objectives.
Objective 1 of the Structural Funds is the main priority of the
EU’s cohesion policy. The EU aims to narrow the gap between
the development levels of the various regions. “Objective 1
regions” refers to areas lagging behind in their development and
in which GDP is below 75 percent of the European Community
average. Objective 2 of the Structural Funds aims to revitalize all
areas facing structural difficulties, whether industrial, rural,
urban, or dependent on fisheries. Objective 3 covers the entire
EU territory outside of areas covered by Objective 1 and serves
as a reference framework for all measures to promote human
resources in the member states. It takes account of the title on
employment in the Treaty of Amsterdam and the new European
strategy for employment.
37. For alternative quantitative analyses of the effects of
adopting the CAP, see Çakmak and Kasnakog˘lu (2001); Çag˘atay,
Saunders, and Amor (2001); Grethe (2004); and Oskam and
others (2004). Whereas Çakmak and Kasnakog˘lu (2001) study
the impact of the CAP on producers, consumers, and foreign
trade, Çag˘atay, Saunders, and Amor (2001) concentrate only on
the effects on producers and foreign trade. Both papers abstract
from consideration of the impact on the state budget. According
to Çakmak and Kasnakog˘lu (2001), adoption of Agenda 2000
policies with direct payments equal to those currently applied in
the EU will lead to reductions in producers’ welfare, which is
contrary to our results summarized in table 2.16. The compre-
hensive study by Oskam and others (2004) analyzes the likely
consequences for Turkey’s agricultural and agrifood sectors
should it become an EU member in 2015.
38. HACCP is a system that establishes process control
through identification of the production points most critical to
controlling and monitoring the production process. It involves
seven principles. First, analyze hazards. Potential hazards associ-
ated with a food and measures to control those hazards are iden-
tified. The hazard could be biological such as a microbe, chemi-
cal such as a toxin, or physical such as ground glass or metal
fragments. Second, identify critical control points. These are
points in a food’s production—from its raw state through pro-
cessing and shipping to consumption by the consumer—at
which the potential hazard can be controlled or eliminated.
Examples are cooking, cooling, packaging, and metal detection.
Third, establish preventive measures with critical limits for each
control point. For a cooked food, for example, this might include
setting the minimum cooking temperature and time required to
ensure the elimination of any harmful microbes. Fourth, estab-
lish procedures to monitor the critical control points. Such pro-
cedures might include determining how and by whom cooking
time and temperature should be monitored. Fifth, establish the
corrective actions to be taken when monitoring shows that a crit-
ical limit has not been met—for example, reprocessing or dis-
posing of food if the minimum cooking temperature is not met.
Sixth, establish procedures to verify that the system is working
properly—for example, testing time and temperature recording
devices to verify that a cooking unit is working properly. Seventh,
establish effective recordkeeping to document the HACCP sys-
tem. This documentation would include records of hazards and
their control methods, the monitoring of safety requirements,
and action taken to correct potential problems. Each of these
principles must be backed by sound scientific knowledge—for
example, published microbiological studies on time and temper-
ature factors for controlling food-borne pathogens.
39. “Good Agricultural Practices” refers to applying available
knowledge to use of the natural resource base in a sustainable
way for the production of safe, healthy food and nonfood agri-
cultural products in a humane manner, while achieving eco-
nomic viability and social stability.
40. See chapter 10 of Oskam and others (2004) for a discus-
sion of animal and plant health issues in Turkey.
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1996, to adopt by 2001 all of the preferential trade
agreements the EU has concluded over time,
and to implement on the commercial policy side
measures similar to those of the European
Community’s commercial policy. Adhering to the
stipulations of the Customs Union Decision,
Turkey maintained rates of protection above those
specified in the CCT for certain “sensitive” prod-
ucts until 2001. In order to adopt EU’s preferential
trade agreements, Turkey signed FTAs with the
European Free Trade Association countries, Israel,
and the Central and Eastern European (CEE)
countries. FTAs are being discussed with the
Mediterranean countries. As for export subsidies,
Turkey joined the Tokyo Round Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Duties of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),
agreeing to eliminate export subsidies by 1989.
Recently, Turkey eliminated most of the export
incentives that were introduced during the 1970s
and 1980s. Within this context, GATT legal subsi-
dies such as research and development subsidies
and subsidies to facilitate the adaptation of plants
to new environmental regulations were introduced
in 1995.
Basic data on Turkey’s merchandise trade are
shown in table 3.1. The table reveals that in 2003
Turkish merchandise exports amounted to US$47.2
billion and merchandise imports to $69.3 billion.3
Exports to the EU15 made up 49.7 percent of total
exports, and imports from the EU made up
42.8 percent of total imports.4 The table further
This chapter studies the effects of European Union
(EU) integration on the manufacturing sector.1 The
first section describes the main developments in
Turkey’s trade regime and trade performance, and
the second examines the structure of protection-
ism. Market access issues emphasizing contingent
protectionism and the issues related to technical
barriers to trade are the subjects of the third and
fourth sections. The fifth section analyzes condi-
tions of competition, and the final section offers
conclusions.
Main Developments in Turkey’s
Trade Regime
In 1994 Turkey signed the agreement establishing
the World Trade Organization (WTO), and a cus-
toms union was created between Turkey and the
EU as of January 1, 1996. According to the Customs
Union Decision (CUD) of 1995, all industrial
goods, except products of the European Coal and
Steel Community (ECSC), that comply with the
European Community norms could circulate freely
between Turkey and the EU as of January 1, 1996.
For ECSC products, Turkey signed a free trade
agreement (FTA) with the EU in July 1996, and as
a result, ECSC products have received duty-free
treatment between the parties since 1999.2
The Customs Union Decision required Turkey
to implement the European Community’s Com-
mon Customs Tariffs (CCTs) on imports of indus-
trial goods from third countries as of January 1,
87
3
Integration and
the Manufacturing
Industry
Sübidey Togan, Hüsamettin Nebiog˘lu, and Saadettin Dog˘an
8
8 TABLE 3.1 Exports and Imports, Turkey, 1990–2003
Annual Annual 
Total Percentage Growth Rate Exports Percentage Share of Growth Rate of
Exports, Distribution, of Exports, to the EU, Distribution, Exports to EU Exports to EU,
2003 Total 1990–2003 2003 Exports of Sectoral 1990–2003
SITC Commodity (US$ millions) Exports (percent) (US$ millions) to EU Exports (percent)
Agricultural products
0 + 1 + 4 + 22 Food 4,735 10.03 2.01 1,949 8.31 41.17 2.32
2 − 22 − 27 − 28 Agricultural raw materials 522 1.11 2.56 220 0.94 42.24 0.41
Mining products
27 + 28 Ores and other minerals 572 1.21 4.23 246 1.05 42.95 2.56
3 Fuels 980 2.08 7.93 211 0.90 21.53 −0.31
68 Nonferrous metals 457 0.97 8.64 222 0.94 48.45 9.03
Manufactures
67 Iron and steel 3,342 7.08 5.12 939 4.00 28.09 16.52
Chemicals
51 Organic chemicals 171 0.36 1.53 107 0.46 62.55 4.28
57 + 58 Plastics 545 1.15 9.20 112 0.48 20.50 5.40
52 Inorganic chemicals 230 0.49 5.99 80 0.34 34.68 5.38
54 Pharmaceuticals 220 0.47 10.28 72 0.31 32.64 17.99
53 + 55 + 56 + 59 Other chemicals 726 1.54 10.19 65 0.28 8.97 4.00
6 − 65 − 67 − 68 Other semimanufactures 4,143 8.77 12.52 1,645 7.01 39.70 12.21
Machinery and transport
equipment
71 − 713 Power generating 246 0.52 24.80 85 0.36 34.47 22.77
machinery
72 + 73 + 74 Other nonelectrical 1,566 3.32 18.16 537 2.29 34.29 17.73
machinery
75 + 76 + 776 Office machines and 1,978 4.19 17.99 1,569 6.68 79.30 17.27
telecommunications 
equipment
77 − 776 − 7783 Electrical machinery 2,076 4.40 16.83 999 4.26 48.14 14.64
and apparatus
78 − 785 − 786 + Automotive products 4,928 10.44 24.42 3,139 13.38 63.70 29.30
7132 + 7783
79 + 785 + 786 + Other transport 1,542 3.27 20.70 853 3.63 55.31 23.07
7131 + 7133 + equipment
7138 + 7139
65 Textiles 5,262 11.14 10.14 2,340 9.97 44.48 7.50
84 Clothing 9,962 21.10 7.21 7,079 30.17 71.07 5.94
8 − 84 − 86 − 891 Other consumer goods 2,675 5.67 16.37 954 4.06 35.66 12.44
9 + 891 Other products 335 0.71 30.17 44 0.19 13.02 16.10
Total 47,211 100 9.01 23,466 100 49.70 8.56
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Annual Annual 
Total Percentage Growth Rate Imports Percentage Share of Growth Rate,
Imports, Distribution, of Imports, from EU, Distribution, Imports from EU Imports from EU,
2003 Total 1990–2003 2003 Imports of Sectoral 1990–2003
SITC Commodity (US$ million) Imports (percent) (US$ million) from EU Imports (percent)
Agricultural products
0 + 1 + 4 + 22 Food 2,789 4.03 3.29 548 1.85 19.65 1.70
2 − 22 − 27 − 28 Agricultural raw materials 2,471 3.57 6.42 894 3.01 36.19 6.76
Mining products
27 + 28 Ores and other minerals 2,262 3.26 4.58 670 2.26 29.61 −0.05
3 Fuels 11,575 16.71 8.06 460 1.55 3.97 7.71
68 Nonferrous metals 1,411 2.04 9.55 308 1.04 21.80 4.23
Manufactures
67 Iron and steel 3,282 4.74 5.46 1,232 4.15 37.53 1.91
Chemicals
51 Organic chemicals 2,102 3.03 7.39 1,059 3.57 50.39 6.83
57 + 58 Plastics 2,837 4.09 12.80 1,645 5.54 58.00 11.57
52 Inorganic chemicals 543 0.78 2.82 178 0.60 32.78 0.99
54 Pharmaceuticals 2,302 3.32 17.09 1,546 5.21 67.14 17.05
53 + 55 + 56 + 59 Other chemicals 2,643 3.82 7.00 1,560 5.26 59.03 7.65
6 − 65 − 67 − 68 Other semimanufactures 3,489 5.04 8.27 2,245 7.56 64.33 7.66
Machinery and transport
equipment
71 − 713 Power generating 758 1.09 12.52 382 1.29 50.34 12.44
machinery
72 + 73 + 74 Other nonelectrical 7,250 10.46 5.21 4,607 15.52 63.54 4.18
machinery
75 + 76 + 776 Office machines and 4,166 6.01 10.95 1,618 5.45 38.83 12.15
telecommunications 
equipment
77 − 776 − 7783 Electrical machinery 2,065 2.98 6.82 1,175 3.96 56.93 5.75
and apparatus
78 − 785 − 786 + Automotive products 6,209 8.96 11.67 5,150 17.35 82.95 13.91
7132 + 7783
79 + 785 + 786 + Other transport 1,012 1.46 1.80 711 2.40 70.29 4.88
7131 + 7133 + equipment
7138 + 7139
65 Textiles 3,441 4.97 13.03 1,185 3.99 34.43 13.49
84 Clothing 422 0.61 24.93 204 0.69 48.26 21.68
8 − 84 − 86 − 891 Other consumer goods 3,540 5.11 10.07 1,910 6.44 53.96 9.27
9 + 891 Other products 2,714 3.92 27.10 391 1.32 14.42 18.75
Total 69,283 100 8.27 29,678 100 42.84 8.06
Note: SITC = Standard International Trade Classification.
Source: The authors.
reveals that the three export commodities with
the highest shares of total exports were clothing,
21.1 percent; textiles, 11.1 percent; and automotive
products, 10.4 percent. The three import commodi-
ties with the highest shares of total imports were
fuels, 16.7 percent; other nonelectrical machinery,
10.5 percent; and automotive products, 9 percent.
Similarly, the three export commodities with the
highest shares of exports to the EU were clothing,
30.2 percent; automotive products, 13.4 percent;
and textiles, 10 percent. The three commodities
with the highest shares of imports from the EU
were automotive products, 17.4 percent; other non-
electrical machinery, 15.5 percent; and other semi-
manufactures, 7.6 percent.
During the period 1990–2003, Turkey’s total
exports grew at an annual rate of 9 percent and
total imports at a rate of 8.3 percent. The export
commodities with the highest annual growth rates
were other products, 30.2 percent; power generat-
ing machinery, 24.8 percent; and automotive prod-
ucts, 24.4 percent. The import commodities with
the highest growth rates were other products, 27.1
percent, clothing, 24.9 percent; and pharmaceuti-
cals, 17.1 percent. Similarly, the export commodi-
ties to the EU with the highest growth rates were
automotive products, 29.3 percent; other transport
equipment, 23.1 percent; and power generating
machinery, 22.8 percent. The imported commodi-
ties from the EU with the highest growth rates were
clothing, 21.7 percent; other products, 18.8 percent;
and pharmaceuticals, 17.1 percent.
A look at the EU’s share of total sectoral exports
reveals that the highest shares of exports to the EU
are held by office machines and telecommunica-
tions equipment, 79.3 percent; clothing, 71.1 per-
cent; and automotive products, 63.7 percent.
Among the sectors considered, other chemicals,
other products, and plastics have the lowest shares.
The three sectors with the highest EU shares of sec-
toral imports are automotive products, 83 percent;
other transport equipment, 70.3 percent; and phar-
maceuticals, 67.1 percent. Among the sectors con-
sidered, fuels, other products, and food have the
lowest EU shares of sectoral imports.
Table 3.2 shows similar information for the EU.
It reveals that in 2001 the EU’s merchandise exports
amounted to ECU (European currency unit)
982.6 billion and merchandise imports were ECU
1,028 billion. Exports to Turkey made up 2 percent
of total EU exports, and imports from Turkey were
also 2 percent of total EU imports. The table fur-
ther reveals that the three export commodities with
the highest shares of total EU exports were other
nonelectrical machinery, 12.1 percent; other con-
sumer goods, 10.3 percent; and automotive
products, 10 percent. The three import commodi-
ties with the highest shares of total EU imports
were office machines and telecommunications
equipment, 14.3 percent; fuels, 14.1 percent; and
other consumer goods, 10.3 percent. During the
period 1990–2001, total EU exports grew at an
annual rate of 8.2 percent and total imports at the
rate of 7.5 percent. The export commodities with
the highest growth rates were office machines
and telecommunications equipment, 15.4 percent;
pharmaceuticals, 14.2 percent; and organic chemi-
cals, 11 percent. The three import commodities
with the highest growth rates were pharmaceuticals,
12.4 percent; electrical machinery and apparatus,
12.1 percent; and office machines and telecommu-
nications equipment, 11.8 percent. Examination of
Turkey’s share of total sectoral EU exports reveals
that the highest shares of exports to Turkey are held
by ores and other minerals, 5.7 percent; plastics,
5 percent; and agricultural raw materials, 4.6 per-
cent. Among the sectors considered, food, clothing,
and fuels have the lowest shares of exports to
Turkey. The three sectors with the highest shares of
imports from Turkey of sectoral EU imports are
textiles, 11.7 percent; clothing, 11.2 percent; and
iron and steel, 6.4 percent. Among the sectors con-
sidered, fuels, pharmaceuticals, and other chemi-
cals have the lowest shares of imports from Turkey
of sectoral EU imports.
As noted earlier, as of January 1, 1996, Turkey
and the EU entered a customs union. Table 3.3
shows the evolution of Turkish trade with the EU
over the period 1990–2003. The data reveal that
with the formation of the customs union, the share
of imports from the EU of total imports went up
from 47.2 in 1995 to 53 percent in 1996, but then
began to decrease, reaching 45.4 percent in 2003.
Comparison of the growth rate of Turkish imports
from the EU prior to formation of the customs
union with that observed after formation of the
customs union shows that the average growth rate
of imports from the EU has even declined, from
9.1 percent during 1990–95 to 1.5 percent during
1996–2003. On the other hand, annual average
90 Turkey: Economic Reform and Accession to the European Union
9
1
TABLE 3.2 Exports and Imports, EU, 1990–2001
Total Annual Exports Share of Total Annual Imports Share of
Exports, Growth Rate to Turkey, Exports to Turkey Imports, Growth Rate from Turkey Imports from 
2001 of Exports, 2001 of Sectoral 2001 of Imports, 2001 Turkey in Sectoral
(thousands Percentage 1990–2001 (thousands Exports, (thousands Percentage 1990–2001 (thousands Imports,
SITC Commodity of ECU) Distribution (percent) of ECU) 2001 of ECU) Distribution (percent) of ECU) 2001
Agricultural products
0 + 1 + 4 + 22 Food 54,042,390 5.50 4.80 378,968 0.70 66,571,904 6.48 4.52 2,094,348 3.15
2 − 22 − 27 − 28 Agricultural raw 10,740,870 1.09 7.48 491,794 4.58 23,074,732 2.24 1.14 228,864 0.99
materials
Mining products
27 + 28 Ores and other 4,860,506 0.49 5.76 275,558 5.67 17,659,307 1.72 5.50 270,064 1.53
minerals
3 Fuels 23,892,389 2.43 7.25 311,131 1.30 144,980,806 14.10 5.81 246,383 0.17
68 Nonferrous metals 11,936,772 1.21 6.99 197,170 1.65 23,351,448 2.27 6.51 239,103 1.02
Manufactures
67 Iron and steel 19,976,063 2.03 2.97 667,511 3.34 14,075,992 1.37 4.47 905,075 6.43
Chemicals
51 Organic chemicals 33,838,441 3.44 11.04 676,813 2.00 20,696,334 2.01 9.25 89,717 0.43
57 + 58 Plastics 20,724,369 2.11 7.67 1,027,062 4.96 10,758,582 1.05 4.68 114,084 1.06
52 Inorganic chemicals 5,388,087 0.55 4.72 81,981 1.52 6,264,051 0.61 7.71 128,624 2.05
54 Pharmaceuticals 43,908,279 4.47 14.16 915,569 2.09 22,620,592 2.20 12.37 42,924 0.19
53 + 55 + 56 + 59 Other chemicals 38,460,679 3.91 7.48 1,229,805 3.20 17,193,103 1.67 7.44 44,913 0.26
6 − 65 − 67 − 68 Other semimanufactures 87,731,435 8.93 8.24 1,509,193 1.72 68,710,081 6.68 5.46 1,509,363 2.20
Machinery and 
transport equipment
71 − 713 Power generating 34,903,182 3.55 9.54 595,281 1.71 24,777,213 2.41 11.57 92,876 0.37
machinery
72 + 73 + 74 Other nonelectrical 118,584,299 12.07 6.77 2,719,502 2.29 53,724,194 5.23 6.99 404,780 0.75
machinery
75 + 76 + 776 Office machines and 96,408,088 9.81 15.37 1,909,617 1.98 146,734,704 14.27 11.75 1,005,984 0.69
telecommunications 
equipment
77 − 776 − 7783 Electrical machinery 50,751,415 5.17 10.10 896,479 1.77 47,678,281 4.64 12.06 845,547 1.77
and apparatus
78 − 785 − 786 + Automotive products 97,777,703 9.95 9.16 1,920,099 1.96 50,701,618 4.93 8.21 1,892,016 3.73
7132 + 7783
TABLE 3.2 (Continued)
Total Annual Exports Share of Total Annual Imports Share of
Exports, Growth Rate to Turkey, Exports to Turkey Imports, Growth Rate from Turkey Imports from Turkey
2001 of Exports, 2001 of Sectoral 2001 of Imports, 2001 in Sectoral
(thousands Percentage 1990–2001 (thousands Exports, (thousands Percentage 1990–2001 (thousands Imports,
SITC Commodity of ECU) Distribution (percent) of ECU) 2001 of ECU) Distribution (percent) of ECU) 2001
79 + 785 + 786 + Other transport 63,162,827 6.43 10.38 972,860 1.54 56,327,638 5.48 10.78 706,280 1.25
7131 + 7133 + equipment
7138 + 7139
65 Textiles 24,739,564 2.52 6.07 978,099 3.95 19,178,029 1.87 5.02 2,242,208 11.69
84 Clothing 17,559,440 1.79 4.29 218,928 1.25 53,910,204 5.24 8.05 6,060,245 11.24
8 − 84 − 86 − 891 Other consumer 101,086,773 10.29 7.32 1,443,680 1.43 106,259,111 10.34 8.11 867,501 0.82
goods
9 + 891 Other products 22,106,890 2.25 2.54 398,968 1.80 32,781,100 3.19 2.83 124,630 0.38
Total 982,580,462 100 8.23 19,816,069 2.02 1,028,029,024 100 7.48 20,155,528 1.96
Note: SITC = Standard International Trade Classification; ECU = European currency unit.
Sources: Data provided by Eurostat; the authors.
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TABLE 3.3 Trade with EU, 1990–2003
Growth Rate Growth Rate Growth Rate Growth Rate
Total Imports from of Total of Imports Share of Imports Total Exports to of Total of Exports Share of Exports Trade Balance Real
Imports EU Imports from EU from EU of Exports EU Exports to EU to EU of with EU Exchange
(US$ millions) (US$ millions) (percent) (percent) Total Imports (US$ millions) (US$ millions) (percent) (percent) Total Exports (US$ millions) Rate
1990 22,302 9,898 — — 44.38 12,959 7,177 — — 55.38 −2,721 99.67
1991 21,047 9,987 −5.63 0.90 47.45 13,594 7,348 4.90 2.38 54.05 −2,639 96.66
1992 22,870 10,656 8.66 6.70 46.59 14,719 7,937 8.28 8.02 53.92 −2,719 100.94
1993 29,429 13,875 28.68 30.21 47.15 15,348 7,599 4.27 −4.26 49.51 −6,276 91.59
1994 23,270 10,915 −20.93 −21.33 46.91 18,105 8,635 17.96 13.63 47.69 −2,280 124.35
1995 35,708 16,861 53.45 54.48 47.22 21,636 11,078 19.50 28.29 51.20 −5,783 116.72
1996 43,627 23,138 22.18 37.23 53.04 23,224 11,549 7.34 4.25 49.73 −11,589 116.67
1997 48,559 24,870 11.30 7.49 51.22 26,261 12,248 13.08 6.05 46.64 −12,622 110.32
1998 45,921 24,075 −5.43 −3.20 52.43 26,974 13,498 2.72 10.21 50.04 −10,577 100.42
1999 40,687 21,417 −11.40 −11.04 52.64 26,589 14,349 −1.43 6.30 53.97 −7,068 94.30
2000 54,509 26,610 33.97 24.25 48.82 27,775 14,510 4.46 1.12 52.24 −12,100 85.17
2001 41,399 18,280 −24.05 −31.30 44.16 31,334 16,118 12.81 11.08 51.44 −2,162 106.33
2002 51,554 23,321 24.53 27.57 45.24 36,059 18,459 15.08 14.52 51.19 −4,863 96.11
2003 69,340 31,496 34.50 35.05 45.42 47,253 24,350 31.04 31.92 51.53 −7,146 88.23
Average 1990–95 8.31 9.13 46.62 9.90 7.46 51.96
Average 1996–2003 4.20 1.46 50.38 8.39 9.30 50.68
— Not available.
Note: An increase in the real exchange rate (RER) indicates depreciation of the RER.
Source: State Planning Organization (http://www.dpt.gov.tr); the authors.
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growth rate of Turkish exports to the EU, which
was 7.5 percent prior to formation of the customs
union, increased to 9.3 percent over the period
1996–2003. Similarly, the share of exports to the EU
of total exports increased from 51.2 percent in 1995
to 54 percent in 1999, but thereafter the share
declined to 51.5 percent in 2003. Finally, table 3.3
reveals as well that Turkey has run a trade deficit
with the EU during every year of the period
1996–2003 and that the deficit has been substantial
by any standard. It reached $12.6 billion in 1997
and $7.1 billion in 2003.
These findings reveal that the formation of the
customs union between Turkey and the EU did not
lead initially to considerable increases in trade with
the EU. Substantial increases in trade with the EU
were achieved only during the period 2002–03. The
reasons vary. First, the formation of the customs
union did not lead to considerable reductions in
trade barriers on the EU side, because the EU had
abolished the nominal tariff rates on imports of
industrial goods from Turkey on September 1,
1971, long before the formation of the customs
union. But at that time certain exceptions were
made. The European Community had retained the
right to charge import duties on some oil products
over a fixed quota and to implement a phased
reduction of duties on imports of particular textile
products. Moreover, the trade in products within
the province of the ECSC have been protected by
the Community through the application of nontariff
barriers and, in particular, antidumping meas-
ures. With the formation of the customs union,
quotas applied by the EU were abolished, but the
EU retained the right to impose antidumping
duties.
Second, not until 2003 did Turkey incorporate
into its internal legal order the European Commu-
nity instruments related to removal of technical
barriers to trade that would allow Turkish industrial
products to enter into free circulation in the EU.
Third, during the 1990s economic crises began
to affect Turkey with increasing frequency. Periods
of economic expansion alternated with periods of
equally rapid decline. After a year of severe reces-
sion in 1994 when the gross national product
(GNP) shrank by 6.1 percent, the economy went
through a boom period of above-trend growth
between 1995 and 1997. Then, in 1998, the econ-
omy was badly hit by the Russian crisis. In August
1999, the Marmara area of Turkey was hit by a
severe earthquake, which was followed by a further
large shock in the Bolu area in November 1999. As a
result of these shocks, real GNP shrank by 6.1 per-
cent in 1999. At the end of 1999, Turkey embarked
upon a stabilization program, but a severe banking
crisis arose in November 2000. Developments in
February 2001 led to a total loss of confidence in
the government’s stabilization program and a seri-
ous run on the Turkish lira. With the floating of its
currency, the country faced its severest economic
crisis. The loss of income and wealth and the associ-
ated social and political stresses were unprecedented.
As a result of these developments, the country saw
substantial decreases in import demand during
1994, 1999, and 2001.
Fourth, with the substantial reductions in trade
barriers on the Turkish side during 1996, the increase
in imports was inevitable, so long as it was not
accompanied by a real devaluation of the Turkish
lira. As table 3.3 reveals, there was no change in the
real exchange rate during 1996, and it then began to
appreciate until the currency crisis of 2001. The real
appreciation of the Turkish lira stimulated the
import growth and hampered the growth of exports,
leading to higher trade balance deficits. Also during
the period 2001–03, the euro appreciated against the
U.S. dollar, leading to increases in the dollar value of
EU exports, which was then reflected in the higher
dollar trade values of Turkish imports from the EU
and of exports to the EU.
Table 3.4 shows the commodity composition of
Turkish exports to the EU and imports from the
EU, as well as the shares of Turkish exports to the
EU of total EU imports and the shares of Turkish
imports from the EU of total EU exports over
the period 1995–2001. The table reveals that in
absolute terms Turkey achieved large increases
in exports for clothing, automotive products, tex-
tiles, other semimanufactures, office machines and
telecommunications equipment, and iron and steel.
For these commodities, Turkey experienced consid-
erable increases in the shares of its exports to the
EU of total EU imports. As for Turkish imports,
again in absolute terms, large increases in imports
were observed for chemicals, office machines and
telecommunications equipment, automotive prod-
ucts, and other consumer goods. For those com-
modities, the shares of Turkish imports from the
EU of total EU exports also increased.
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TABLE 3.4 Effects of Customs Union between Turkey and EU, 1995–2001 
(thousands of ECU)
Turkish Exports to EU
SITC Commodity 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Agricultural products
0 + 1 + 4 + 22 Food 1,488,476 1,551,769 1,812,357 1,780,063 1,907,213 1,841,607 2,094,348
2 − 22 − 27 − 28 Agricultural raw 179,233 205,765 216,488 210,663 213,382 213,457 228,864
materials
Mining products
27 + 28 Ores and other 221,117 212,143 237,159 239,314 243,109 322,824 270,064
minerals
3 Fuels 128,412 122,060 125,193 81,415 127,553 191,871 246,383
68 Nonferrous metals 86,544 97,097 99,635 157,722 152,601 216,471 239,103
Manufactures
67 Iron and steel 294,209 229,501 371,900 545,231 592,639 791,231 905,075
5 Chemicals 237,583 198,285 258,291 274,909 297,999 386,476 420,262
6 − 65 − 67 − 68 Other semimanufactures 572,754 638,208 776,036 879,443 979,327 1,234,435 1,509,363
Machinery and transport
equipment
71 − 713 Power generating 31,551 48,097 73,328 81,867 86,265 89,163 92,876
machinery
72 + 73 + 74 Other nonelectrical 106,447 129,455 175,601 211,566 261,858 330,166 404,780
machinery
75 + 76 + 776 Office machines and 167,685 214,597 388,026 688,309 671,934 936,482 1,005,984
telecommunications 
equipment
77 − 776 − 7783 Electrical machinery 301,881 386,368 449,078 574,577 614,099 714,463 845,547
and apparatus
78 − 785 − 786 + Automotive products 270,766 357,760 301,337 389,917 995,122 1,212,181 1,892,016
7132 + 7783
79 + 785 + 786 + Other transport 391,498 625,377 485,647 670,554 665,531 675,812 706,280
7131 + 7133 + equipment
7138 + 7139
65 Textiles 1,013,714 1,110,291 1,440,550 1,663,269 1,774,158 2,041,595 2,242,208
84 Clothing 3,434,992 3,636,313 4,175,655 4,632,190 4,808,707 5,576,756 6,060,245
8 − 84 − 86 − 891 Other consumer goods 271,714 347,685 403,340 442,251 582,351 679,154 867,501
9 + 891 Other products 45,150 48,420 54,352 75,862 69,906 74,247 124,630
Total 9,243,725 10,159,191 11,843,971 13,599,124 15,043,754 17,528,392 20,155,528
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TABLE 3.4 (Continued)
Turkish Imports from EU
SITC Commodity 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Agricultural products
0 + 1 + 4 + 22 Food 615,174 607,284 632,062 605,447 501,142 579,811 378,968
2 − 22 − 27 − 28 Agricultural raw 393,666 459,321 589,606 447,182 379,080 533,469 491,794
materials
Mining products
27 + 28 Ores and other 487,556 528,444 462,002 269,811 152,588 261,142 275,558
minerals
3 Fuels 119,124 227,392 264,755 271,988 387,760 763,082 311,131
68 Nonferrous metals 183,778 228,589 260,355 224,136 180,355 253,115 197,170
Manufactures
67 Iron and steel 586,834 694,789 845,798 641,451 479,250 880,515 667,511
5 Chemicals 2,043,193 2,441,128 3,184,322 3,213,593 3,465,937 4,569,685 3,931,231
6 − 65 − 67 − 68 Other semimanufactures 978,841 1,339,036 1,568,580 1,567,096 1,400,645 1,912,605 1,509,193
Machinery and transport
equipment
71 − 713 Power generating 178,837 252,654 393,062 555,062 442,280 545,555 595,281
machinery
72 + 73 + 74 Other nonelectrical 2,372,464 3,786,516 3,994,368 3,678,348 2,596,553 3,538,331 2,719,502
machinery
75 + 76 + 776 Office machines and 765,742 1,023,595 1,523,088 1,995,757 2,799,791 4,055,137 1,909,617
telecommunications 
equipment
77 − 776 − 7783 Electrical machinery 546,930 769,613 1,065,654 1,226,264 1,059,906 1,300,772 896,479
and apparatus
78 − 785 − 786 + Automotive products 1,237,308 1,909,360 3,201,332 2,866,472 2,304,918 5,568,748 1,920,099
7132 + 7783
79 + 785 + 786 + Other transport 690,618 1,214,031 968,872 941,586 946,855 1,032,438 972,860
7131 + 7133 + equipment
7138 + 7139
65 Textiles 584,726 786,038 997,564 946,855 859,326 1,063,715 978,099
84 Clothing 64,034 122,894 171,487 205,098 174,845 248,766 218,928
8 − 84 − 86 − 891 Other consumer goods 808,246 1,041,430 1,324,120 1,391,441 1,331,107 1,750,501 1,443,680
9 + 891 Other products 690,158 514,377 185,256 447,875 406,893 567,749 398,968
Total 13,347,228 17,946,494 21,632,282 21,495,462 19,869,232 29,425,136 19,816,069
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Share of Imports from Turkey of EU Imports
SITC Commodity 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Agricultural Products
0 + 1 + 4 + 22 Food 2.955 2.948 3.225 3.075 3.327 2.966 3.146
2 − 22 − 27 − 28 Agricultural raw materials 0.871 1.151 1.067 1.058 1.099 0.850 0.992
Mining products
27 + 28 Ores and other minerals 1.767 1.718 1.597 1.650 1.778 1.798 1.529
3 Fuels 0.198 0.155 0.147 0.132 0.163 0.129 0.170
68 Nonferrous metals 0.531 0.719 0.586 0.885 0.889 0.855 1.024
Manufactures
67 Iron and steel 2.942 2.754 4.000 4.424 5.813 5.454 6.430
5 Chemicals 0.552 0.447 0.501 0.495 0.506 0.542 0.542
6 − 65 − 67 − 68 Other semimanufactures 1.490 1.578 1.688 1.816 1.827 1.861 2.197
Machinery and transport
equipment
71 − 713 Power generating machinery 0.349 0.438 0.529 0.497 0.439 0.360 0.375
72 + 73 + 74 Other nonelectrical machinery 0.371 0.413 0.500 0.529 0.605 0.618 0.753
75 + 76 + 776 Office machines and 0.245 0.290 0.440 0.681 0.584 0.581 0.686
telecommunications equipment
77 − 776 − 7783 Electrical machinery and apparatus 1.251 1.530 1.491 1.736 1.632 1.392 1.773
78 − 785 − 786 + Automotive products 1.278 1.555 1.024 1.073 2.309 2.506 3.732
7132 + 7783
79 + 785 + 786 + 7131 + Other transport equipment 1.797 2.549 1.458 1.665 1.407 1.219 1.254
7133 + 7138 + 7139
65 Textiles 7.796 8.397 9.287 10.134 11.041 10.800 11.692
84 Clothing 11.049 10.863 10.768 11.306 10.999 10.878 11.241
8 − 84 − 86 − 891 Other consumer goods 0.487 0.580 0.578 0.589 0.702 0.662 0.816
9 + 891 Other products 0.282 0.284 0.300 0.332 0.310 0.217 0.380
Total 1.695 1.749 1.761 1.914 1.929 1.696 1.961
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TABLE 3.4 (Continued)
Share of Exports to Turkey of EU Exports
SITC Commodity 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Agricultural Products
0 + 1 + 4 + 22 Food 1.488 1.399 1.296 1.286 1.078 1.101 0.701
2 − 22 − 27 − 28 Agricultural raw materials 4.901 5.835 6.835 5.484 4.259 4.812 4.579
Mining products
27 + 28 Ores and other minerals 14.852 15.620 10.797 8.375 4.228 5.376 5.669
3 Fuels 0.893 1.469 1.544 1.941 2.337 2.564 1.302
68 Nonferrous metals 2.635 3.061 3.021 2.716 2.190 2.122 1.652
Manufsactures
67 Iron and steel 3.532 3.959 4.475 3.625 3.204 4.515 3.342
5 Chemicals 2.781 3.081 3.414 3.349 3.250 3.529 2.762
6 − 65 − 67 − 68 Other semimanufactures 1.764 2.225 2.327 2.339 1.998 2.247 1.720
Machinery and transport
equipment
71 − 713 Power generating machinery 1.139 1.427 1.815 2.232 1.723 1.808 1.706
72 + 73 + 74 Other nonelectrical machinery 2.889 4.141 3.951 3.663 2.744 3.225 2.293
75 + 76 + 776 Office machines and 1.825 2.169 2.550 3.143 3.913 4.014 1.981
telecommunications equipment
77 − 776 − 7783 Electrical machinery and apparatus 1.945 2.417 2.899 3.228 2.715 2.700 1.766
78 − 785 − 786 + Automotive products 2.339 3.306 4.764 4.075 3.220 6.166 1.964
7132 + 7783
79 + 785 + 786 + 7131 + Other transport equipment 1.966 3.280 2.153 1.945 1.918 1.729 1.540
7133 + 7138 + 7139
65 Textiles 3.480 4.376 4.947 4.667 4.269 4.532 3.954
84 Clothing 0.561 0.953 1.235 1.450 1.275 1.565 1.247
8 − 84 − 86 − 891 Other consumer goods 1.354 1.611 1.781 1.865 1.701 1.833 1.428
9 + 891 Other products 6.328 3.878 1.296 2.557 1.965 2.486 1.805
Total 2.328 2.866 3.000 2.931 2.614 3.126 2.017
Note: For abbreviations, see table 3.2
Source: Data provided by Eurostat; the authors.
Structure of Protection
To study the structure of applied tariffs, we con-
sider tariff and tariff-like charges on imports in
trade with the EU, with countries with whom the
EU has free trade agreements, and with third coun-
tries. In each case, we use the 12-digit Harmonized
Commodity Description and Coding System (HS)
data on customs duties and the mass housing fund
tax.5 Let tic denote the rate of customs duty on com-
modity i and tis the ad valorem equivalent of the
mass housing fund tax rate. The relation between
domestic prices and foreign prices is written 
as pi = (1 + tic + ti s ) E p$i , where pi denotes the
domestic price of commodity i, p$i the foreign
price of commodity i, and E the nominal exchange
rate. To calculate the ad valorem equivalent of the
mass housing duty, we let Mi denote the CIF (cost,
insurance, freight) value of the import of commod-
ity i measured in Turkish liras; mi the quantity of
the import of commodity i measured in units (the
U.S. dollar–denominated housing fund tax is
reported); FUNDi1 the U.S. dollar–denominated
mass housing fund tax rate on commodity i;
FUNDi2 the ad valorem housing fund tax rate on
commodity i; and E the exchange rate (Turkish lira
per U.S. dollar).
The base of the customs duty is the CIF price.
Therefore, this duty is calculated as tic Mi . The mass
housing fund tax levy is usually specific. For those
taxes, the ad valorem equivalents of the specific
rates must be calculated. Given the foreign price of
the commodity, p$j = Mjmj E , the Turkish lira equiva-
lent of the U.S. dollar–denominated levy is calcu-
lated as FUNDi1mi E = (Mi (FUNDi1/p$i )). The ad
valorem mass housing fund tax rate is given by
FUNDi2 Mi . The sum total of all the above taxes and
surcharges is denoted by 
(3.1) ti =
(
tic +
(
FUNDi1
/
p$i
)
+ FUNDi2
)
Next we consider the tradable sectors in the 1996
input-output table. The average applied tariff in
sector j is then calculated as 
(3.2) applied tariff j =
k∑
i=1
t ji
(
M ji
/
M j
)
where t ji denotes the applied tariff rate on commod-
ity i of sector j, M ji the import of commodity i into
sector j, M j total imports of sector j, and k the
number of commodities in sector j ( j = 1, . . . , 68).
Table 3.5 shows the nominal and effective pro-
tection rates for the 68 tradable sectors of the 1996
input-output table prepared by Turkey’s State Insti-
tute of Statistics. The table reveals that the weighted
average nominal protection rate (NPR) during
2002 in trade with the EU is 1.95 percent; in trade
with Romania, a representative country among the
economies with which Turkey has free trade agree-
ments, 1.76 percent; and in trade with third coun-
tries, 5.3 percent. By contrast, the weighted average
effective protection rate (EPR) is 11.24 percent.6
Table 3.6 shows the frequency distribution of
the NPRs and EPRs. Forty-eight out of 68 sectors
have zero NPRs in trade with the EU and in trade
with the countries with which Turkey has FTAs. In
trade with the EU, five sectors have NPRs larger
than 50 percent, and seven sectors have NPRs of
between 10 percent and 50 percent. Similar consid-
erations apply for NPRs in trade with countries
with which Turkey has FTAs. The NPRs in trade
with third countries are larger than 50 percent in
seven sectors, between 10 percent and 50 percent
in 10 sectors, and positive but less than 5 percent in
38 sectors. Concomitant with the relatively low
NPRs are the low EPRs. Six sectors have EPRs above
50 percent,and six sectors have EPRs between 10 per-
cent and 50 percent. In 20 sectors the EPRs are neg-
ative but larger than −100. The EPR is less than
−100 in only one sector.
Table 3.5 shows that NPRs in trade with the EU
and with countries with which Turkey has FTAs are
all zero for industrial commodities and positive for
agricultural and processed agricultural commodi-
ties. For trade with third countries, the average
NPRs are high for food products, 11.1 percent for
iron and steel, 10.92 percent for wearing apparel,
10.28 percent for footwear, 7.01 percent for textiles,
and 6.74 percent for plastics. The most protected
sectors measured in terms of EPRs are the manu-
facture of sugar; manufacture of bakery products;
processing and preserving of fruits and vegetables;
growing of fruits, nuts, beverage and spice crops;
and manufacture of cocoa, chocolate, sugar confec-
tionary, and other food products. The sectors indi-
cating a clear-cut comparative advantage include
the manufacture of textiles; casting of metals; man-
ufacture of fabricated metal products; manufacture
of furniture; manufacture of office, accounting,
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NPR, NPR, NPR,
I-O Code Sector EU EU with FTAs Other EPR
01 Growing of cereals and other crops NEC 8.83 8.84 8.84 9.93
02 Growing of vegetables, horticultural 14.37 16.00 16.00 17.74
specialties, and nursery products
03 Growing of fruit, nuts, beverage and 74.23 70.49 78.46 82.18
spice crops
04 Farming of animals 2.33 2.29 2.74 −2.60
05 Agricultural and animal husbandry service 21.82 26.35 26.35 48.50
activities, except veterinary activities
06 Forestry, logging, and related service activities 0.22 0.28 0.28 0.08
07 Fishing 30.10 12.80 56.06 50.42
08 Mining of coal and lignite 0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.17
09 Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas 0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.17
10 Mining of metal ores 0.00 0.00 0.77 0.05
11 Quarrying of stone, sand and clay 0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.27
12 Mining and quarrying NEC 0.00 0.00 0.02 −0.16
13 Production, processing, and preserving 1.51 1.52 1.52 −1.52
of meat and meat products
14 Processing and preserving of fish and 14.25 9.48 28.48 19.92
fish products
15 Processing and preserving of fruit, 55.54 46.79 65.09 90.68
and vegetables
16 Manufacture of vegetable and animal 13.82 9.37 14.59 18.24
oils and fats
17 Manufacture of dairy products 107.61 107.46 109.49 a
18 Manufacture of grain mill products, starches, 21.71 17.12 24.78 46.99
and starch products
19 Manufacture of prepared animal feeds 6.36 6.36 6.57 −0.08
20 Manufacture of bakery products 83.23 8.72 109.61 b
21 Manufacture of sugar 78.49 78.49 78.49 b
22 Manufacture of cocoa, chocolate, sugar 34.64 12.16 55.61 54.49
confectionery and other food products NEC
23 Manufacture of alcoholic beverages 2.73 2.90 4.03 0.86
24 Manufacture of soft drinks; production 0.11 0.01 9.03 −5.47
of mineral waters
25 Manufacture of tobacco products 2.01 17.29 17.29 11.37
26 Manufacture of textiles 0.00 0.01 7.01 −2.95
27 Manufacture of other textiles 0.00 0.00 3.02 −0.07
28 Manufacture of knitted and crocheted 0.00 0.00 10.25 3.70
fabrics and articles
29 Manufacture of wearing apparel, except  0.00 0.00 10.92 7.01
fur apparel
30 Dressing and dyeing of fur; manufacture 0.00 0.00 2.05 0.62
of articles of fur
31 Tanning and dressing of leather; manuf. of 0.00 0.00 1.17 −0.85
luggage, handbags, saddlery, and harnesses
32 Manufacture of footwear 0.00 0.00 10.28 8.87
33 Sawmilling and planing of wood 0.00 0.00 0.71 −0.41
34 Manufacture of wood and of products of 0.00 0.00 4.95 3.23
wood and cork
35 Manufacture of paper and paper products 0.00 0.00 1.49 0.18
36 Publishing 0.00 0.00 1.53 0.55
37 Printing and service activities related to 0.00 0.00 2.18 0.88
printing
TABLE 3.5 Nominal and Effective Protection Rates, 2002
(percent)
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38 Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum 0.00 0.00 2.91 1.96
products
39 Manufacture of basic chemicals, plastics in 0.01 0.01 6.31 2.79
primary forms and synthetics rubber
40 Manufacture of fertilizers and nitrogen 0.00 0.00 6.49 4.00
compounds
41 Manufacture of pesticides, other  0.00 0.00 6.00 2.92
agrochemicals and paints, and varnishes
42 Manufacture of pharmaceuticals, medicinal  0.00 0.00 0.97 0.12
chemicals, and botanical products
43 Manufacture of cleaning materials, cosmetics, 0.01 0.02 4.29 1.07
and other chemicals and manmade fibers
44 Manufacture of rubber products 0.00 0.00 3.61 1.38
45 Manufacture of plastic products 0.00 0.00 6.74 3.30
46 Manufacture of glass and glass products 0.00 0.00 4.90 2.32
47 Manufacture of ceramic products 0.00 0.00 4.76 2.63
48 Manufacture of cement, lime, and  0.00 0.00 1.94 0.87
plaster-related articles of these items
49 Cutting and finishing of stone and man. of 0.00 0.00 1.21 0.40
other nonmetallic mineral products NEC
50 Manufacture of basic iron and steel 0.00 0.00 11.10 6.23
51 Manufacture of basic precious and 0.00 0.00 3.40 1.54
nonferrous metals
52 Casting of metals 0.00 0.00 0.00 −1.89
53 Manufacture of fabricated metal products,  0.00 0.00 2.29 −0.87
tanks, reservoirs, and steam generators
54 Manufacture of other fabricated metal  0.00 0.00 2.55 −0.06
products; metalworking service activities
55 Manufacture of general-purpose machinery 0.00 0.00 2.53 0.16
56 Manufacture of special-purpose machinery 0.00 0.00 1.65 −0.06
57 Manufacture of domestic appliances NEC 0.00 0.00 2.55 0.61
58 Manufacture of office, accounting, and 0.00 0.00 0.06 −0.35
computing machinery
59 Manufacture of electrical machinery and 0.00 0.00 2.77 0.58
apparatus NEC
60 Manufacture of radio, television, and 0.00 0.00 2.95 1.25
communication equipment and apparatus
61 Manufacture of medical, precision and optical 0.00 0.00 1.81 0.32
instruments, watches, and clocks
62 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers, 0.00 0.00 4.33 1.71
and semitrailers
63 Building and repairing of ships, pleasure 0.00 0.00 0.25 −0.22
and sporting boats
64 Manufacture of railway and tramway 0.00 0.00 1.69 0.48
locomotives and rolling stock
65 Manufacture of aircraft and spacecraft 0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.02
66 Manufacture of transport equipment NEC 0.00 0.00 4.03 1.60
67 Manufacture of furniture 0.00 0.00 1.14 −0.66
68 Manufacturing NEC 0.00 0.00 3.29 1.36
Average 1.95 1.76 5.30 11.24
Note: I-O = input-output table; NPR = nominal protection rate; FTA = free trade agreement; 
EPR = effective protection rate; NEC = not elsewhere classified.
a. Less than −100.
b. More than 100.
Source: Turkish State Institute of Statistics; the authors.
NPR, NPR, NPR,
I-O Code Sector EU EU with FTAs Other EPR
and computing machinery; manufacture of basic
precious and nonferrous metals; manufacture of
basic iron and steel; and mining products.7
Now we move from the structure of protection at
the industry level to a more aggregate level. Table 3.7
presents the NPR and EPR for broad industry
groups. In the upper part of this table, industries
have been classified into three industry groups.
In the lower part, they have been divided into
four trade categories: export, export and import
competing, import competing, and non-import
competing.8
Calculations presented in the upper part of
table 3.7 reveal that primary commodities receive the
most protection, contrary to the tendency for pro-
tection to escalate from the lower to higher stages of
fabrication. The lower part of the table shows that
the most protected sectors are the export industries
and the non-import-competing industries.
Contingent Protectionism
Article 36 of the Customs Union Decision of 1995
specifies that as long as a particular practice is
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TABLE 3.6 Frequency Distribution of Protection Rates, 2002
(percent)
NPR, NPR, NPR,
EU EU with FTAs Other EPR
 50.00 5 3 7 6
10.01–50.00 7 7 10 6
5.01–10.00 2 5 8 4
0.01–5.00 6 5 38 31
0 48 48 5 0
−0.01–100.00 0 0 0 20
 −100.00 0 0 0 1
Total 68 68 68 68
Note: For abbreviations, see table 3.5.
Source: The authors.
TABLE 3.7 Nominal and Effective Protection Rates, 2002
(percent)
NPR, NPR, NPR,
EU EU with FTAs Other EPR
Commodity groups
Primary commodities 18.23 18.06 20.21 25.57
Mining and energy 0.00 0.00 0.08 −0.17
Manufacturing 3.07 2.07 6.11 4.50
Trade categories
Export industries 11.64 10.06 22.26 21.54
Export- and import-
competing industries 0.53 0.36 5.89 1.81
Import-competing 
industries 3.90 3.90 5.73 3.82
Non-import-competing
industries 24.62 20.12 28.72 27.03
Note: For abbreviations, see table 3.5.
Source: The authors.
incompatible with the competition rules of the
customs union as specified in Articles 30–32 of the
decision and “in the absence of such rules if such
practice causes or threatens to cause serious preju-
dice to the interest of the other Party or material
injury to its domestic industry,” the European
Community or Turkey may take the appropriate
measures. Article 42 allows antidumping actions as
long as Turkey fails to implement effectively the
competition rules of the customs union and other
relevant parts of the acquis communautaire. In such
cases, Article 47 of the Additional Protocol signed
in 1970 between Turkey and the European Com-
munity remains in force. According to the article,
the Association Council, if it finds dumping, will
address recommendations to the persons with
whom such practices originate. The injured party
may take suitable measures if the Council has made
no decision within three months and if the dump-
ing practices continue. In the event a party needs an
immediate action, it may introduce an interim pro-
tection measure such as antidumping duties for a
limited duration. But the Council may recommend
the abolition of those interim measures. Finally,
Article 61, which addresses safeguards, states that
safeguard measures specified in Article 60 of the
Additional Protocol will remain valid. According to
Article 60, the Community or Turkey may take the
necessary protective measures if serious distur-
bances occur in a sector of the economy of the
Community or Turkey or if they prejudice the
external financial stability of one or more member
states or Turkey, or if difficulties arise that adversely
affect the economic situation in a region of the
Community or Turkey.
Table 3.8 shows the products that were subject to
definitive antidumping and antisubsidy measures
by both parties at the end of 1995 and those subject
to antidumping and antisubsidy investigations dur-
ing the period 1996–2002. The table reveals that at
the end of 1995, eight products exported from
Turkey were subject to definitive antidumping and
antisubsidy measures by the EU. Ad valorem duties
were imposed in five cases, a duty and “undertak-
ings” were imposed in one case, and in the remain-
ing cases undertakings were imposed. In undertak-
ings, the Turkish firms must commit themselves to
raising the export prices in the European Commu-
nity market to agreed-on levels or to restrict the
quantities exported to the Community to agreed-
on levels. These products were cotton yarn, poly-
ester fibers and yarns, semifinished products of
alloy steel, and asbestos cement pipes. After 1996,
the EU opened new investigations involving
Turkish exports of cotton fabrics, bed linen, iron
and steel products, paracetamol, color television
receivers, and hallow sections. By contrast, at the
end of 1995 Turkey had imposed duties on three
commodities: benzoic acids, printing and writing
papers, and polyester. After 1996, Turkey opened
two new investigations involving imports of ball
bearings and polyvinyl chloride from the EU and
imposed antidumping duties in the case of the
latter.
Both the EU and Turkey have been active users of
contingent protection measures, but the EU even
more so. The results indicate that the formation of
the customs union does not grant protection from
antidumping by the European Community. The EU
has continued to protect its sensitive sectors
through contingent protection measures and has
protected the sectors most where Turkish penetra-
tion measured by the share of Turkish exports of EU
imports was highest (see table 3.2). With Turkey’s
accession to the EU, the contingent protection
measures will no longer be available to both parties.
Technical Barriers to Trade
Technical barriers to trade are said to exist as long
as the EU and Turkey impose different technical
regulations as conditions for the entry, sale, and use
of commodities; as long as the two parties have dif-
ferent legal regulations on health, safety, and envi-
ronmental protection; and as long as the parties
have different procedures for testing and certifica-
tion to ensure conformity to existing regulations or
standards.9 The different country requirements for
the entry, sale, and use of commodities can be
imposed by governments in the form of technical
regulations and by nongovernmental organizations
in the form of standards. Technical regulations that
relate to either technical specifications or testing or
certification requirements are mandatory, and the
product must comply with the specifications to
which it is subjected. However, standards are volun-
tary, not legally binding, and arise from the desire
of producers or consumers to improve the infor-
mation in commercial transactions and to ensure
compatibility between products.
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TABLE 3.8 Products Subject to Antidumping Investigations, 1996–2002
Commodity OJ Reference Measure
Investigations by EU
Definitive antidumping and antisubsidy measures in force as of December 31, 1995
Cotton yarn L82, 27.03.1992 and L289, 24.11.1993 Duties
Cotton yarn L182, 27.07.1994 Duties
Polyester fibers and yarns L272, 28.09.1991 Undertakings (countervailing)
Polyester yarns (man-made staple fibers) L88, 3.04.1992 Duties
Polyester yarns (POY and PTY) L347, 16.12.1988 Duties
Semifinished products of alloy steel L182, 2.07.1992 Duties and undertakings
Synthetic textile fibers of polyester L306, 22.10.1992 Duties
Asbestos cement pipes L209, 31.07.1991 Undertakings
New investigations after January 1, 1996
Cotton fabrics, unbleached C50, 21.02.1996 Provisional duty imposed, but no definite measure imposed
Cotton fabrics, unbleached L295, 20.11.1996 Provisional duty imposed
Cotton fabrics L42, 20.02.1996 Terminated without the imposition of measures
Bed linen L171, 07.05.1996 Terminated without the imposition of measures
Cotton fabrics, unbleached C210, 11.07.1997 Terminated without the imposition of measures
Steel wire rod C144, 22.05.1999 Terminated without the imposition of measures
Steel ropes and cables C127, 05.05.2000 Duties
Paracetamol C134, 13.05.2000 Terminated without the imposition of measures
Colour television receivers C202, 15.07.2000 Terminated without the imposition of measures
Welded tubes and pipes, of iron and nonalloy steel C183, 29.06.2001 Duties
Flat rolled products of iron and nonalloy steel C364, 20.12.2001 Pending
Steel ropes and cables L34, 03.02.2001 and L211, 04.08.2001 Undertakings
Hallow sections C249, 16.10.2002 Pending
Investigations by Turkey
Definitive antidumping and antisubsidy measures in force as of December 31, 1995
Benzoic acids 14.08.1991 Duties
Printing and writing papers 20.05.1992 Duties
Polyester ELYAF 08.01.1993 Duties
New investigations after January 1, 1996
Ball bearings 26.12.1998 Terminated without the imposition of measures
Polyvinyl chloride 02.11.2001 Duties
Note: OJ = Official Journal of the EU.
Sources: Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade and various issues of the reports of the Commission on Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Activities.
Technical barriers have two aspects: (1) the con-
tent of the norms (regulations and standards), and
(2) the testing procedures needed to demonstrate
that a product complies with the norm. The techni-
cal barriers to trade (TBTs) thus come in two basic
forms, content-of-norm TBTs and testing TBTs. In
either case, the costs of the product design adapta-
tions, reorganization of production systems, and
multiple testing and certification needed by
exporters can be high. These costs are both up-
front and onetime—for example, learning about
the regulation and bringing the product into
conformity—and ongoing, such as periodic testing.
TBTs are said to distort trade when they raise the
costs of foreign firms relative to those of domestic
firms. As emphasized by Baldwin (2001), liberaliza-
tion requires closing the gap between the costs of
the foreign and domestic firms. The two main
dimensions to such a step are content of norms and
conformity assessment. Liberalization of the con-
tent of norms involves making product norms
more cosmopolitan and thus narrowing the cost
advantage of domestic firms. Liberalization of the
second involves lowering the excess costs that for-
eign firms face in demonstrating the compliance of
their goods to accepted norms. The European
Commission (1998) has pointed out that the
removal of technical barriers to trade will lead to
four types of benefits: (1) economies of scale;
(2) rationalization of products or production,
increased efficiency, and price reductions as a result
of increased competition; (3) restructuring of
industry (e.g., plant closures, mergers, reorganiza-
tion, relocation) to gain comparative advantage;
and (4) innovation, stimulated by the dynamics of
the single market.
The EU Approach to Technical Barriers to Trade
The basic objective of the EU policy and
approaches to removing technical barriers to trade
is to achieve free trade within the European Com-
munity. Currently, this policy has two approaches:
enforcement of the Mutual Recognition Principle
(MRP) and harmonization of technical regulations.
Mutual Recognition Principle Mutual recogni-
tion refers to the principles enshrined in the Treaty
Establishing the European Economic Community
(Treaty of Rome), interpreted by the European
Court of Justice, as set out in the 1979 Cassis de
Dijon judgment. In this ruling, the court stated that
Germany could prohibit imports of a French bever-
age (cassis de Dijon) only if it could invoke manda-
tory requirements such as public health, protection
of the environment, and fairness of commercial
transactions. In other words, the court introduced a
very wide definition of Article 28 (ex 30) of the
Treaty of Rome, which prohibits quantitative
restrictions on imports between member states and
“all measures having equivalent results.” As a result
of this ruling, the European Commission stated
that a product lawfully produced and marketed in
one member state shall be admitted to other mem-
ber states for sale, except in cases of mandatory
requirements (the Mutual Recognition Principle).
Thus, the basic EU approach under the MRP has
been to promote the idea that products manufac-
tured and tested in accordance with a partner
country’s regulations could offer levels of protec-
tion equivalent to those provided by corresponding
domestic rules and procedures. Mutual recogni-
tion, in other words, reflects the existence of ex ante
trust between the trading partners.
The European Commission (1998) divides the
traded products into regulated and nonregulated
commodities. The regulated products are those
whose commercialization is governed by the regu-
lations of member states, and the nonregulated
products are those for which no regulations have
an impact on commercialization. The regulated
products are further divided into commodities
under the harmonized sphere and those under the
nonharmonized sphere. Products under the har-
monized sphere are covered by European rules for
the harmonization of regulations and mandatory
specifications. Commodities under the nonhar-
monized sphere are governed by national rules.
The MRP is considered the first line of defense
against technical barriers in the regulated nonhar-
monized sphere.
The principal examples of success of the MRP
are those regulations that are new and have been
notified to the European Community under the
83/189 procedures, but then they have been negoti-
ated away or had specific mutual recognition
clauses inserted into the regulations.10 Any problem
in implementation of the MRP is harder to identify,
because it relies on complaints from firms or trade
associations.
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In its relations with third countries, the European
Community has advocated the use of mutual recog-
nition agreements (MRAs) in many regional or
bilateral forums. These agreements are based on the
mutual acceptance of test reports, certificates, and
marks of conformity issued by conformity assess-
ment bodies of one of the parties to the agreement,
in conformity with the legislation of the other party.
Such agreements were signed with Australia, Canada,
Israel, Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland, and the
United States. The European Community also nego-
tiated protocols to the Europe Agreements on Con-
formity Assessment and Acceptance of Industrial
Products (PECAs) with some of the then-candidate
countries. PECAs represent recognition of the
progress made in adopting and implementing the
relevant Community legislation on industrial prod-
ucts and in creating the necessary administrative
infrastructure. The agreements cover a wide range
of sectors, from medical devices to pressure vessels
and electrical equipment.
In 1992 the European Economic Area (EEA)
Agreement was signed between the European Free
Trade Association (EFTA) countries and the EU. In
extending the EU Single Market to the EFTA coun-
tries, the EU felt that ongoing and effective surveil-
lance and enforcement were essential. Accordingly,
the EFTA Court of Justice and the EFTA Surveil-
lance Authority were established in 1992. Through
the EEA Agreement, the EFTA countries Iceland,
Lichtenstein, and Norway participate fully in the
EU internal market and thus in the establishment
of common product requirements and methods of
conformity assessment. Outside the areas covered
by EEA legislation related to product requirements,
EEA states are permitted to introduce national
product requirements, if it can be proved that such
requirements are needed to meet public health,
environmental, safety, and other social considera-
tions. To ensure transparency, the EEA states are
required to notify the EFTA Surveillance Authority
and the European Commission of all draft national
technical rules for products. Finally, the EEA Agree-
ment forces the EFTA countries to accept future
European Council directives on the Single Market
without formal participation into the formation of
these new laws.
In summary, MRAs seek to facilitate trade while
safeguarding the health, safety, and environmental
objectives of each party. Each party is free to set its
health, consumer protection, environmental, or
other regulations at whatever level it deems neces-
sary, as long as they comply with international
obligations. These obligations require that each
side have full confidence that the certification
process on the other side can wholly satisfy its
requirements.
Harmonization of National Regulations and
Standards The EU legislation on harmonizing
technical specifications has followed two distinct
approaches, the old approach and the new
approach. The old approach was based on the idea
that the EU would become a unified economic area
functioning like a single national economy. It dealt
with the content-of-standards issue using negoti-
ated harmonization, and it sought adoption of a
single standard that laid out in detail technical reg-
ulations for single products or groups of products.
The regulations were implemented by the directives
of the European Council, and the designated bodies
in EU nations performed the conformity assess-
ments. Technical regulations were harmonized
using the old approach for products such as chemi-
cals, motor vehicles, pharmaceuticals, and food-
stuffs. Under this approach, the Council issued
directives such as Directive 70/220/EEC on the har-
monization of the member states’ laws related to the
measures to be taken against air pollution caused by
gases from positive-ignition engines of motor vehi-
cles. The directive detailed EU specifications apply-
ing to the related products and their testing require-
ments. Under the old approach, European standards
institutions such as CEN (Comité Européen de
Normalisation) and CENELEC (Comité Européen
de Normalisation Electrotechnique) were not man-
dated to draw up supplementary technical specifica-
tions. But over time, the need was recognized to
reduce the intervention of the public authorities
prior to a product being placed on the market. So
the “new approach” was adopted and applied to
products that have “similar characteristics” and that
have been subject to a widespread divergence of
technical regulations in EU countries.
Under the new approach, only “essential require-
ments” are indicated. This approach gives manufac-
turers greater freedom on how they satisfy those
requirements by dispensing with the “old” type of
exhaustively detailed directives. Directives under
the new approach provide for more flexibility by
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using the support of the established standardiza-
tion bodies—CEN, CENELEC, and the national
standards bodies. The standardization work is eas-
ier to update and involves greater participation
from industry.
Under the new approach, the European Coun-
cil issues a directive that lays down “essential
requirements”—the 1989 machinery directive is
one example. So far, 23 directives have been
adopted on the basis of this approach. Examples of
product sectors regulated in accordance with the
new approach are toys, machines, construction
products, medical equipment, telecommunications
terminal equipment, and recreational craft. Once a
new approach directive has been issued, member
states must conform their national laws and regula-
tions to it. The European Commission is empow-
ered to determine whether the national measures
are equivalent to the essential requirements. The
Council refers the task of formulating detailed
standards meeting the essential requirements to
CEN, CENELEC, and the European Telecommuni-
cations Standards Institute.
Conformity Assessment and Market Surveillance
To ensure that products meet the requirements laid
down in the new approach directives, special
conformity assessment procedures have been estab-
lished. They describe the controls to which prod-
ucts must be subjected before they are considered
compatible with the essential requirements and
thus placed on the internal market. The extent of
the controls a product must undergo varies accord-
ing to the risk attached to use of the product.
Requirements may range from a declaration by the
manufacturer stating that certain standards have
been applied, to extensive testing and certification
by independent, third-party conformity assessment
bodies (notified bodies). In 1993 Council Decision
93/465/EEC was adopted in connection with the
new approach directives. It provides an overview of
all the conformity assessment procedures available
under the directives, divided up into modules and
grouped by category of risk.
For products regulated by the new approach
directives, a CE (Conformité Européne) marking
confirms conformity with the essential require-
ments of the directives and is required for a product
to be placed on the internal market. The CE mark-
ing indicates not only that the product has been
manufactured in conformity with the requirements
of the directive, but also that the manufacturer has
followed all the prescribed procedures for conform-
ity assessment. It ensures free access to all of the EU.
Meanwhile, the manufacturer or its local represen-
tative is required to keep all necessary technical
documentation as proof for the relevant authorities
that the requirements have been satisfied.11
The final stage of implementation of the new
approach system consists of market surveillance
procedures that develop a common approach to
enforcement. Market surveillance consists of the
control that the relevant authorities in the member
states are required to carry out to ensure that the
criteria for CE marking have been satisfied—after
the products have been placed on the market. The
control is intended to prevent misuse of the CE
marking, to protect consumers, and to secure a
level playing field for producers. Basically, market
surveillance is carried out in the form of random
inspections to ensure that the technical documen-
tation as required by the directive is available, but it
also may include examination of the documenta-
tion or the product itself.
Coverage of EC Technical Regulations Table 3.9
provides crude estimates of the sectoral value
added covered under the old approach and the new
approach. A large proportion of European Com-
munity value added in manufacturing has been
covered by the Community’s technical regulations
policy: 33 percent by the old approach directives
and 42 percent by the new approach directives,
with each approach dominating different sectors.
Finally, columns four and five show the share that
each sector holds in intra-EC trade and world
trade. The table reveals that sectors dominated by
the old approach represent 29 percent of EC value
added, 26 percent of intra-EC trade, and 17 percent
of EC imports from the rest of the world. Sectors
dominated by the new approach represent 33 per-
cent of EC value added, 43.5 percent of intra-EC
trade, and 56 percent of EC imports from the rest
of the world.
Turkish Policies and Approaches 
With the formation of the EU-Turkey customs
union, Turkey has removed all customs duties and
equivalent charges as well as quantitative restrictions
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on industrial products.12 Thus industrial products
move freely between the EU and Turkey—with the
exception of contingent protection measures and
technical legislation. According to Decision 1/95 of
the EC-Turkey Association Council establishing the
customs union, Turkey must harmonize its techni-
cal legislation with that of the EU. Decision 2/97 of
the Association Council listed the areas in which
Turkey must align its legislation. This work should
have been finalized before the end of 2000, but,
unfortunately, it was not completed until the begin-
ning of 2005. According to Annex II of Decision
2/97, Turkey was supposed to incorporate into its
internal legal order 324 instruments that corre-
spond to various European Economic Community
or European Community regulations and directives.
Currently, Turkey has incorporated into its legal
order only 203 of these 324 instruments. In the
meantime, the number of instruments that Turkey
has to incorporate into its legal order has increased
to 560, and Turkey has incorporated 276 of them.
Thus, progress has been rather slow.
Turkey also must establish the so-called quality
infrastructure, a generic term encompassing the
operators and operation of standardization, testing,
certification, inspection, accreditation, and metrol-
ogy (industrial, scientific, and legal). In the EU,
national quality infrastructures that function
according to the same principles and obey the same
rules are a critical element of the free circulation of
goods in the Single Market. Turkey, as a member of
a customs union with the EU and as a candidate
country, has to align its national quality infrastruc-
ture to the European one. Products manufactured
in a future EU member state must satisfy the same
requirements prevailing in the EU, and conformity
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TABLE 3.9 EC Technical Regulation Directives and European Community (EC) Imports, 1995
Coverage of EC Technical 
Regulations (percent of Import Structure
sectoral value added) (percent)
Old New Intra-EC
ISIC Manufacturing Sector Approach Approach Total Imports World
200 Mining 96 0 96 0.4 2.4
311–312 Agribusiness 100 0 100 5.8 3.8
313 Beverages and sugar 63 37 100 3.2 1.1
321 Textiles 0 59 59 3.6 4.2
322 Clothing 0 77 77 2.3 5.6
323 Leather goods 0 0 0 0.4 1.0
331 Wood and wood products 0 100 100 1.9 2.2
341 Paper and paper products 63 0 63 4.7 2.5
351–352 Chemicals 22 76 98 14.7 9.2
353 Petroleum refineris 100 0 100 1.5 1.6
354 Petroleum and coal products 0 100 100 0.8 8.5
355 Rubber and rubber products 54 0 54 3.7 2.1
361 Pottery, china, etc. 0 79 79 0.3 0.6
369 Nonmetallic products 11 55 66 1.9 1.0
371 Iron and steel 0 24 24 6.9 7.1
381 Metal products 0 43 43 3.1 2.2
382 Machinery 0 93 93 14.0 16.5
383 Electrical and electronic goods 18 82 100 10.0 13.5
384 Transport equipment 74 19 93 15.6 8.3
Other manufactured goods 0 62 62 5.3 6.7
All sectors 33 42 75 100.0 100.0
Note: Coverage of EC technical regulation is measured in percentage value added. ISIC = International
Standard Industrial Classification.
Source: Messerlin 2001.
to these requirements must be demonstrated in the
same “harmonized” way and according to the same
principles.
Recently, Turkey has taken major steps to align
with the acquis. Law 4703 on the Preparation and
Implementation of Technical Legislation on Prod-
ucts, which entered into force in January 2002, has
been supplemented by secondary legislation. This
framework law provides the legal basis for harmo-
nization with the EC legislation. It defines the prin-
ciples for product safety and for implementation of
the old and new approach directives, including the
conditions for placing products on the market; the
obligations of the producers and distributors, con-
formity assessment bodies, and notified bodies;
market surveillance and inspection; withdrawal of
products from the market; and notification proce-
dures.13 The legislation on market surveillance, use
and affixing of the CE conformity mark, working
principles and procedures for the conformity
assessment bodies and notified bodies, and notifi-
cation procedures between Turkey and the EU for
technical regulations and standards which apply to
non-harmonized regulated area entered into force
during 2002.14 Furthermore, Turkey has adopted all
of the 23 new approach directives that require affix-
ing the CE conformity marking, and 18 of the
directives entered into force up to the present time.
They cover commodities and product groups such
as low-voltage equipment, toys, simple pressure
vessels, construction products, electromagnetic
compatibility, gas appliances, personal protective
equipment, machinery, medical devices, nonauto-
matic weighing instruments, telecommunications
terminal equipment, hot water boilers, civil explo-
sives, lifts, and recreational crafts.
Overall, then, Turkey has advanced the harmo-
nization of its technical legislation both on a sec-
toral (vertical) basis and at a horizontal level. It is in
the process of establishing the necessary structures
on conformity assessment and market surveillance.
By now Turkey has the legal basis on which accred-
itation could be based. In order to assign the noti-
fied bodies that would deal with the certification of
products, the ministries have established the crite-
ria for the selection of such bodies for the prod-
ucts covered by certain new approach directives.
Although in Europe, as in Turkey, accreditation is
not mandatory to be appointed as a notified body,
since the Turkish Ministries did not feel adequately
prepared to select notified bodies, they made
accreditation one of the criteria for their selection
by signing protocols with the Turkish National
Accreditation Body, TURKAK.15 However the fact
that TURKAK has been a member of European
Accreditation Agency since 2003 and yet has not
signed any multilateral agreement with the European
partners makes its accreditation non-functional.
Thus, even though TURKAK has given accreditation
to potential notified bodies, this accreditation is
meaningless in the eyes of national accreditation
bodies of the EU.
Because of this the market is also reluctant to
use TURKAK, because TURKAK accreditation is
not accepted within the EU. This situation presents
Turkish conformity assessment bodies with a dis-
advantage. The relatively large Turkish firms wish-
ing to obtain CE marking for products exported to
the EU market usually contact local subsidiaries of
European notified bodies that use their European
laboratories for testing. But for other Turkish com-
panies this process seems to be expensive and slow.
The small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs)
that export products find it particularly difficult to
pay the high costs. In Turkey, marking and certifi-
cation parallel to the EU system are implemented
only in the automotive sector, which is subject to
the old approach directives. Istanbul Technical Uni-
versity (ITU) does automotive testing under the
authorization of the Ministry of Industry and
Trade, and it performs acoustic, emissions, and
other tests. The Turkish Standards Institute (TSE),16
Tofas¸-Fiat, and Ford-Otosan also have engine and
emissions test facilities; Seger has an audible warn-
ing devices laboratory; Tam-Test is implementing
testing and certification in the case of agricultural
tractors; Fren Teknik has test facilities for brakes
and Brisa has a pneumatic tires laboratory. Turkey
is implementing all relevant automotive EC direc-
tives via these facilities.17 Crash tests, electromag-
netic compatibility (EMC), and other tests on com-
plete cars are largely conducted abroad; as of May
2003 the National Metrology Institute (UME) was
able to run the EMC tests on vehicles.18
Other than for the automotive sector, as of 2005
Turkey is suffering from a lack of certification bod-
ies (see European Committee for Standardization
2003). To make its conformity assessment compati-
ble with that in the EU, Turkey has opened up the
certification, testing, and calibration market to
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other Turkish actors. However, Turkish firms are
reluctant to enter the market for conformity assess-
ment bodies as long as uncertainties prevail regard-
ing the acceptance of notified bodies by the Euro-
pean Commission. Some of the Turkish firms in
cooperation with the notified bodies in the EU have
entered the Turkish market. Over time competition
will ensure lower costs for conformity assessment.
The expense, time, and unpredictability incurred in
obtaining approvals can then be reduced by having
products evaluated in Turkey once the Turkish
notified bodies are accepted by the European Com-
mission and joint ventures with notified bodies in
the EU increase. These savings can be particularly
important where rejection of products in the EU
can create delays and necessitate additional ship-
ping or other costs. In addition, the SMEs can ben-
efit from procedures in which all testing and certifi-
cation steps are carried out locally at lower costs.
Turkish firms, and in particular the SMEs, can then
be expected to increase their competitiveness in the
EU market
Although, in principle, standards are voluntary
in Turkey, in the absence of a proper market sur-
veillance system the technical ministries and the
Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade have turned the
standardization regime and licensing before pro-
duction into a mandatory regime in order to pro-
tect the market and the consumers. This pre-
market control system gives the TSE a great deal
power. According to the European Committee for
Standardization (2003), the TSE has misused its
power in several cases of imports and has created
technical barriers to trade. The TSE asked for the
technical files of the imported products when they
entered the Turkish market, and the processing of
the files took an usually long time. There are also
cases in which products bearing the CE marking
were asked for further inspection. Yet the Turkish
internal market is regulated largely through
mandatory standards and marking issued by the
TSE.Since 2004 products covered by directives on toy
safety, medical devices, active implantible medical
devices, low voltage electrical equipment, electro-
magnetic compatibility and machinery are not sub-
ject to mandatory controls when imported and
used in the internal market. But products covered
by the remaining 12 new approach directives are
subject to mandatory controls.
In Turkey, 500 standards are mandatory for the
domestic market as well as for imports. For all of
these the TSE occupies a monopoly position, and
for 500 of them TSE certification is mandatory. For
these mandatory standards, manufacturers mostly
need first a TSE certificate and then a Ministry of
Industry and Trade license to put the products on
the market.
The system in use in Europe, for those areas
under the new approach directives, is in-market
control. Under this system, the responsibility for
placing a product on the market is left to the pro-
ducer, so long as it is certified that the product sat-
isfies the minimum requirements set under the
directives. Market surveillance, the safeguard of the
system, is the responsibility of public authorities.
The market surveillance authorities carry out their
operations in an impartial and nondiscriminatory
way. They shall have the power, competence, and
resources to regularly visit commercial, industrial,
and storage facilities; to regularly visit, if appropri-
ate, workplaces and other premises where products
are put into service’ to organize random and spot
checks; to take samples of products and subject
them to examination and testing, and to require all
necessary information. Through this system, meas-
ures are taken in the EU to ensure that products
meet the requirements of the applicable directives,
that action is taken to bring noncompliant prod-
ucts into compliance, and that sanctions are
applied when necessary. Member states are free to
choose the type of sanction they are going to use.
The only requirement is that the penalties be effec-
tive, proportionate, and dissuasive.
Technical Barriers and Trade between
the EU and Turkey
To determine those sectors and products in which
technical regulations are important for Turkish
exporters, we used data produced by a study under-
taken by the European Commission (1998). This
study provides information, at the three-digit level
of the NACE (Nomenclature Générale des Activités
Économiques dans les Communautés Européennes)
classification, about whether trade is affected by
technical regulations and the dominant approach
used by the European Commission to remove
such barriers in the EU.19 It classifies the technical
regulations as follows: those in which barriers are
overcome using mutual recognition, old approach,
new approach, and those in which there are no
technical barriers.
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Table 3.10 shows the overall trade coverage of
technical regulations and of the different
approaches to their removal in the EU and to their
application to Turkish exports to the EU. Here we
aggregated, following the approach of Breton,
Sheehy, and Vancauteren (2001), the value of man-
ufacturing imports across the four-digit Standard
Identification Trade Classification (SITC) cate-
gories, which are subject to old approach directives,
new approach directives, mutual recognition, and a
residual.20 We then identified the proportion of total
imports value in sectors subject to old approach
directives, new approach directives, mutual recogni-
tion, and a residual.
The table demonstrates that a very high propor-
tion of EU manufacturing imports and of Turkish
manufacturing exports to the EU are subject to
technical barriers. The average value of the propor-
tion over the period 1990–2001 is 82.0 percent for
the EU and 84.2 percent for Turkey. In the EU,
sectors subject to old approach directives make up
on average 20.4 percent; mutual recognition and
new approach directives, 31 percent each; and sec-
tors subject to no technical barriers, 18.0 percent.
For Turkish exports to the EU, the average values of
the shares are 11.7 percent for old approach prod-
ucts; 60.0 percent, mutual recognition; 12.5 per-
cent, new approach products; and 15.8 percent,
TABLE 3.10 Trade Coverage of Technical Regulations and of Different Approaches
to Their Removal, 1990–2001 
(percent)
Subject to
Technical No Technical
Old Approach Mutual Recognition New Approach Barriers Barriers
Manufacturing Imports of EU
1990 24.507 28.463 29.869 82.838 17.162
1991 23.662 29.839 29.187 82.689 17.311
1992 23.550 29.692 29.165 82.407 17.593
1993 21.970 30.615 28.662 81.248 18.752
1994 21.925 29.543 30.041 81.508 18.492
1995 19.078 30.497 31.459 81.034 18.966
1996 18.593 31.266 31.331 81.189 18.811
1997 18.700 32.269 30.435 81.404 18.596
1998 18.795 32.990 30.632 82.418 17.582
1999 18.663 33.245 30.627 82.535 17.465
2000 17.407 31.318 33.835 82.560 17.440
2001 18.108 31.602 32.538 82.248 17.752
Manufacturing Exports of Turkey to EU
1990 8.815 63.561 14.911 87.287 12.713
1991 9.436 66.096 10.349 85.881 14.119
1992 8.735 66.411 10.694 85.840 14.160
1993 7.334 68.648 9.470 85.452 14.548
1994 9.048 64.839 10.607 84.494 15.506
1995 10.029 61.501 12.685 84.215 15.785
1996 10.143 61.589 12.267 83.998 16.002
1997 10.096 58.503 13.465 82.064 17.936
1998 12.474 56.552 13.042 82.069 17.931
1999 16.432 52.961 13.545 82.939 17.061
2000 17.634 50.762 14.332 82.728 17.272
2001 20.707 47.358 14.887 82.951 17.049
Note: The variables show the percentages of different approaches to the removal of technical barriers to
trade in total manufacturing imports for the EU and in Turkish manufacturing exports to the EU.
Source: The authors.
sectors subject to no technical barriers. Sectors with
no significant technical barriers to trade include
nonferrous metals, footwear, and sawing and pro-
cessing of wood. Old approach products include
mainly motor vehicles and parts, and new approach
products include sectors specified earlier, such as
machinery.
Developments in the proportions of sectors sub-
ject to technical barriers over the period 1990–2001
reveal that the proportion of manufacturing
imports subject to technical barriers has been rela-
tively stable in the EU and that for Turkish exports
to the EU declined from 87.3 percent in 1990 to
82.9 percent in 2001. In the EU, the proportion of
sectors subject to mutual recognition and new
approach directives has increased slightly over
time, and the proportion of sectors subject to old
approach directives has correspondingly declined.
As for Turkish exports to the EU, the proportion of
sectors subject to the new approach has been rela-
tively constant. As the share of sectors subject to
the old approach has increased, a corresponding
decline appears in the share of sectors subject to
mutual recognition.
We now turn to consideration of the index val-
ues of revealed comparative advantage (RCA)
defined as
(3.3) RCAi = ln
[
(Xi/X)
(MEUi /M
EU )
]
where Xi denotes Turkish exports of commodity i to
the EU, X the total value of Turkish manufacturing
exports to EU, Mi
EU the total EU imports of com-
modity i, and MEU the total value of EU imports.
Equation 3.3 considers the share of commodity i
exports to the EU of total Turkish exports to the EU
relative to the share of commodity i imports by the
EU to total EU imports. If this ratio is greater than
1, the natural logarithm of the variable will be posi-
tive. In that case, the country is said to have a com-
parative advantage in producing that product, and
the higher the value, the more competitive the
product. Using the index of revealed comparative
advantage, it is possible to determine in which
product categories Turkey has the greatest compar-
ative advantage. Table 3.11 shows the nine sectors
with the highest RCA values by the different EU
approaches to technical barriers to trade. The table
reveals that the highest RCA values are attained in
the sectors with no technical barriers. Turkey seems
also to be quite an efficient producer of goods from
the sectors under mutual recognition as well as
from the new approach sectors. Thus if trade
between Turkey and the EU is constrained by tech-
nical barriers to trade, then with the accession of
Turkey, competition in the EU for these products
may intensify.
This analysis reveals that, for Turkey, sectors
subject to technical regulations in the EU account
for considerable shares of Turkish exports to the
EU. The calculations demonstrate that accession
will affect the exports of Turkish old and new
approach products to the EU, and that Turkey has a
comparative advantage in sectors subject to new
approach directives. Therefore, it is of utmost
importance that Turkey establish the quality infra-
structure needed, encompassing the operators and
operation of standardization, testing, certification,
inspection, accreditation, and metrology. The
Turkish quality infrastructure has to function
according to EU principles and obey the same rules
as in the EU. Only then will Turkey be able to par-
ticipate in the free circulation of goods in the
enlarged Single Market.
Conditions of Competition
Over the past few decades, Turkey has used inten-
sively three tools of industrial policy: investment
incentives, export incentives, and a policy of state-
owned enterprises. In using these measures, the gov-
ernment has tried to obtain a preferred allocation of
resources. The purpose of the investment incentive
scheme has been to increase investment and over-
come the barriers imposed by capital market imper-
fections to entry into industry. But investment
incentives in Turkey have also been a barrier to com-
petition. Through the incentive system, established
firms have obtained cost advantages that have
helped them to consolidate their market position.
Entrants, competing with scarce fiscal resources,
have been at a disadvantage relative to well-
informed incumbents. The credit incentives, which
were supposed to promote entry, have often turned
into instruments that have reinforced the position
of large incumbents. Furthermore, the government,
with its large share of the banking system, has also
directly controlled the allocation of credit, and
credit from public banks has often been extended
on the basis of political considerations. Overall,
112 Turkey: Economic Reform and Accession to the European Union
TABLE 3.11 Sectors with Highest RCA Values in Each Category
Turkish 
Exports to EU,
RCA, 1999–2001 Average
SITC 1999–2001 (thousands of ECU)
Old approach
7831 Public transport-type passenger motor vehicles 3.2198 181,834
5238 Other metallic salts, peroxysalts of inorganic, acids 2.9270 65,203
7611 Television receivers, color, whether or not combined 2.2189 725,383
5323 Synthetic inorganic tanning matter; preparations 1.4908 895
5237 Percarbonates; commercial ammonium carbonate 1.3940 26,140
7139 Parts, NES, for the engines of 7132, 7133 and 7138 1.1439 217,582
5234 Polysulphides, dithionites, sulphites, sulphates 0.8834 5,148
5233 Hypochlorites; chlorites; chlorates; bromates; iodates 0.8047 1,190
8986 Magnetic tapes, recorded 0.7545 4,692
Mutual recognition
6534 Fabrics, woven,  85% synthetic staple fibers, mixed 3.1060 101,494
8462 Panty hose, socks, and other hosiery, knitted 2.5733 285,684
or crocheted
6542 Fabrics, woven,  85% wool or fine animal hair 2.4675 29,022
8454 T-shirts, singlets and other vests, knitted 2.4476 984,273
or crocheted
6529 Other woven fabrics of cotton 2.4372 4,265
8442 Suits, ensem., dresses, skirts, trousers, knitted, 2.3862 349,327
women
6513 Cotton yarn, other than sewing thread 2.3166 235,351
6524 Other woven fabrics > 85% cotton, 2.2850 85,496
weight  200 g/m2
6536 Fabrics, woven,  85% artificial staple fiber 2.2635 21,646
(excluding pile)
New approach
7753 Dishwashing machines of the household type 3.4565 11,569
6624 Nonrefractory ceramic bricks and similar products 2.7997 117,996
6762 Rods (excluding 6761), iron, steel, hot-rolled, 2.6528 188,512
hot-drawn
6761 Bar and rods, hot-rolled, irregular wound coils, 2.4310 114,585
iron, steel
6612 Hydraulic cements, whether or not colored, clinkers 2.4192 160,431
8121 Boilers (excluding 711), radiators, etc., not electrical 2.2241 83,012
6794 Other tubes, pipes, and hollow profiles of iron, steel 2.1659 132,205
7752 Household-type refrigerators and food freezers 2.0630 152,836
6652 Glassware for domestic use 1.8532 105,440
(excluding 66511, 66592, 66593)
No technical barriers
7753 Dishwashing machines of the household type 3.4565 11,569
6581 Sacks and bags of textile materials, for packing goods 2.8222 109,778
6579 Special products of textile materials 2.5383 39,282
6564 Tulles and other net fabrics; lace, in the piece 2.5145 10,051
8122 Ceramic sinks and similar sanitary fixtures 2.3625 58,256
6584 Bed, table, toilet, and kitchen linen 2.3485 471,456
6112 Composition leather, basis of leather, slabs, sheets 2.0423 1,380
6931 Stranded wire, ropes, slings, and the like, of metal 1.9921 44,441
6252 Other knitted or crocheted fabrics, noncoated, etc. 1.7149 70,236
Note: RCA = revealed comparative advantage; SITC = Standard International Trade Classification; NEC = not
elsewhere classified.
Source: The authors.
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established firms benefit from the investment incen-
tive schemes such as investment allowances, but new
entrants do not, because to benefit from devices
such as investment allowances, they must show pos-
itive profits in their income statements first.
In Turkey, the investment incentive scheme has
been used while no specific competition legislation
or competition policy has been enforced in the
country. To promote competition within the coun-
try, Turkey eliminated quantitative restrictions in
foreign trade during the 1980s and substantially
decreased the levels of nominal and effective pro-
tection rates. With the formation of the customs
union with the EU, all of the tariff barriers on
imports of industrial commodities from the EU
were completely eliminated, as noted earlier.
On the export side, over the 1980s Turkey used
various export incentive measures. But in 1985 it
agreed to eliminate export subsidies by 1989. After
1989, Turkey eliminated most of the export incen-
tives, introduced GATT legal subsidies, and
reduced substantially the nominal and effective
export subsidy rates. The reduction in the nominal
and effective protection and subsidy rates was not
sufficient, however, to ensure proper functioning of
markets in Turkey. During the 1950s, a similar situ-
ation in Europe had led to the adoption of compe-
tition policies aimed at ensuring effective competi-
tion, allocating resources efficiently, and creating
the best possible climate for fostering innovation
and technical progress.
In June 1989, Turkey adopted the law titled
On the Prevention of Unfair Competition in
Importation, containing both antidumping and
antisubsidy provisions. Turkey adopted its compe-
tition policy during December 1994 with the Law
on the Protection of Competition. The key provi-
sions of the competition law are based on the EU’s
competition law: agreements, decisions, and con-
certed practices in constraint of competition; abuse
of dominant position; and mergers and acquisi-
tions. The statute contains not only rules on forbid-
den practices and provisions against the abuse of
a dominant market position, but also regulations
on acquisitions and mergers. The Competition
Authority responsible for the implementation and
enforcement of the prohibitions set out in the law
opened its doors in October 1997. As indicated by
OECD (2002) competition policy, institutions in
Turkey are in place and active, but competition pol-
icy is not fully integrated into the general policy
framework for regulation. Turkey’s competition
law has no rule equivalent to Article 86 of the
Treaty Establishing the European Community to
govern the permissible operations of monopolies
providing public services. Nevertheless, special
rules limit competition in some sectors such as the
financial sector, tobacco industry, mineral prod-
ucts, agriculture, and postal services. In addition,
Turkey has to control its anticompetitive state aid
policy.21
It could be said, then, that Turkey has achieved
considerable progress in the fields of investment
and export incentives, but it has not achieved simi-
lar progress in dealing with public enterprises.
Although privatization has become a prominent
part of the Turkish structural adjustment program,
since 1983 privatization has not gained momentum.
Table 3.12 presents basic data on Turkey’s man-
ufacturing sector for 2000. The data are taken from
two surveys, “Annual Manufacturing Industry
Statistics” and “Small Manufacturing Industry Sta-
tistics,” published by the State Institute of Statistics.
The first survey covers all firms in the public sector
and private firms employing 10 or more employees.
The second survey covers all private firms employ-
ing less than 10 employees. The table reveals that
the sectors with the highest shares of total value
added of the manufacturing sector were petroleum
and coal, 12.49 percent; textiles, 12.29 percent; food
processing, 11.45 percent; and chemicals, 9.71 per-
cent. The sectors with the highest shares of total
manufacturing employment were textiles, 18.56 per-
cent; food processing, 15.41 percent; wearing apparel
and footwear, 9.62 percent; and metal products,
7.98 percent. The sixth column of the table gives
the share of 1998 public sector value added of the
total value added of the corresponding manufac-
turing subsector. From the table, it follows that the
average share of public sector value added of the
total manufacturing industry value added was
18.91 percent. Petroleum and coal had the highest
share with 89.83 percent, followed by the tobacco
industry with 78.25 percent, and the beverages
industry with 50.58 percent.
The seventh and eighth columns of table 3.12
indicate exposure to international trade. Column
seven provides a measure of competitiveness on the
domestic market measured by the rate of import
penetration. If Q, X, and M stand, respectively, for
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TABLE 3.12 Characteristics of Turkish Manufacturing Industries, 2000
Rate of
Share of Share of Public Sector Share of Public Exposure
Value Sector of Sector of Value Sector of Import Export to International
Added Total Manuf. Total Manuf. Added Total Sectoral Penetration Ratio Competition
(US$ millions) Value Added Employment Employment (US$ millions) Value Added (percent) (percent) (percent)
ISIC Sector (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
311 + 312 Food processing 4,687.9 11.45 255,437 15.41 609.8 13.01 7.47 9.44 16.20
313 Beverages 908.2 2.22 11,194 0.68 459.4 50.58 0.77 1.98 2.74
314 Tobacco 1,063.8 2.60 18,951 1.14 832.4 78.25 1.97 5.28 7.15
321 Textiles 5,030.6 12.29 307,689 18.56 56.0 1.11 17.31 39.88 50.29
322 + 324 Wearing apparel and footwear 1,533.9 3.75 159,561 9.62 19.1 1.25 30.70 86.35 90.54
323 Fur and leather products 110.8 0.27 10,358 0.62 0.0 0.00 50.93 38.19 69.67
331 Wood and cork products 526.7 1.29 67,688 4.08 0.0 0.01 12.03 3.99 15.54
332 Furniture and fixtures 449.2 1.10 72,072 4.35 0.0 0.01 53.63 44.26 74.16
34 Paper and products 1,314.5 3.21 56,459 3.41 111.5 8.48 27.49 5.30 31.33
351 + 352 Chemicals 3,977.7 9.71 59,537 3.59 287.9 7.24 49.13 13.66 56.08
353 + 354 Petroleum and coal 5,112.4 12.49 9,882 0.60 4,592.3 89.83 17.08 2.34 19.02
355 + 356 Rubber and plastic products 1,574.5 3.85 60,577 3.65 4.3 0.27 9.01 8.90 17.11
36 Nonmetallic minerals 2,712.5 6.62 92,160 5.56 23.1 0.85 9.01 20.84 27.98
37 Basic metals 2,216.0 5.41 65,729 3.96 454.8 20.52 40.04 27.04 56.25
381 Metal products 1,946.2 4.75 132,276 7.98 50.2 2.58 15.95 11.20 25.36
382 Machinery 1,822.5 4.45 100,594 6.07 96.5 5.29 63.39 18.98 70.34
383 Electrical machinery 2,218.8 5.42 68,616 4.14 44.4 2.00 62.00 38.25 76.53
384 Transport equipment 3,218.6 7.86 84,358 5.09 82.0 2.55 48.87 25.22 61.76
385 Professional and sci. measuring equip. 251.1 0.61 11,327 0.68 12.0 4.80 69.28 11.23 72.73
39 Other manufacturing industries 271.9 0.66 13,647 0.82 5.9 2.16 56.67 61.23 83.20
3 Manufacturing 40,947.8 100.00 1,658,112 100.00 7,741.6 18.91 33.10 21.78 47.67
Note: ISIC = International Standard Industrial Classification.
Source: Annual manufacturing industry statistics and small manufacturing industry statistics provided by Turkish State Institute of Statistics. 
sectoral output, exports, and imports, the domestic
demand D will be equal to D = Q – X + M, and
the rate of import penetration will equal
[M ∗ 100/D]. A low level of penetration does not
necessarily mean that there are barriers to entry.
The table reveals that the professional and scientific
measuring equipment sector had the highest
import penetration with 69.28 percent, followed by
the machinery sector with 63.39 percent and elec-
trical machinery with 62.00 percent. Column eight
of table 3.12 gives the export ratio, defined as
[X ∗ 100/Q]. From the table, it follows that the
wearing apparel and footwear sector had the
highest export ratio at 86.35 percent, followed by
other manufacturing industries at 61.23 percent,
furniture and fixtures at 44.26 percent, and textiles
at 39.88 percent. Finally, column nine gives the rate
of exposure to international competition, defined
as [(export ratio) + [1 – (export ratio/100)] ∗ import
penetration]. The construction of this indicator
rests on the idea that the exported share of produc-
tion is 100 percent exposed and that the share sold
on the domestic market is exposed in the same pro-
portion as the penetration of the market. The table
reveals that the wearing apparel and footwear sec-
tor had the highest exposure to international com-
petition with an index value of 90.54 percent, fol-
lowed by the other manufacturing industries sector
with an index value of 83.20 percent and the elec-
trical machinery sector with an index value of
76.53 percent.
Defining the markup by the relation 
(3.4) λ = (value added − labor cost)
labor cost
we note from the first two columns of table 3.13
that the markup calculated for three-digit Interna-
tional Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) sec-
tors in Turkey are much higher than the markup in
Belgium, a small open economy considered to be
the benchmark country in the analysis. The data in
this table were obtained from the “Annual Manu-
facturing Industry Statistics” of the State Institute
of Statistics for the period 1999–2000 for the Turk-
ish economy, and from the OECD STAN Database
for Belgium for the period 1997–99. The table
shows that the markups in all other sectors in
Turkey exceed those in Belgium, and that the aver-
age markup in Turkey relative to that in Belgium,
[(1 + λ)/(1 + λ′)], is highest in the sectors coke,
refined petroleum products, and nuclear fuel
(ISIC 353 + 354); other manufacturing (ISIC 39);
and wood and products of wood (ISIC 331). The
lowest average markups in Turkey relative to those
in Belgium, [(1 + λ)/(1 + λ′)], are found in the
sectors paper and paper products (ISIC 341);
leather, leather products, and footwear (ISIC 323 +
324); and nonferrous metals (ISIC 372). Figure 3.1
plots the average value of the markup for the man-
ufacturing industry over the period 1980–2000. On
the other hand, defining the markup as
(3.5) λ = (output − labor cost − material cost)
(labor cost + material cost)
we note from the last two columns of table 3.13 that
the markups in Turkey exceed those in Belgium
except in the sectors electrical and optical equip-
ment (ISIC 383 + 385); iron and steel (ISIC 371);
and publishing, printing, and reproduction of
recorded media (ISIC 342). The average markup in
Turkey relative to that in Belgium, [(1 + λ)/
(1 + λ′)], is now highest in the sectors tobacco
products (ISIC 314); other nonmetallic mineral
products (ISIC 36); and coke, refined petroleum
products, and nuclear fuel (ISIC 353 + 354). The
results are striking. They indicate the lack of com-
petition in the Turkish manufacturing sector.
To further illustrate the arguments about the
conditions of competition in the Turkish manufac-
turing sector, we consider in table 3.14 the four-firm
concentration ratios. The table reveals that the con-
centration ratios are relatively high and that the
most concentrated sectors are the manufacture of
coke coal and briquettes (ISIC 3542), manufacture
of sporting and athletic goods (ISIC 3903),
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Manufacturing, 1980–2000
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TABLE 3.13 Average Markups, Turkey and Belgium
(percent)
Markup I Markup II
Turkey, Belgium, Turkey, Belgium,
ISIC Commodity 1999–2000 1997–1999 1999–2000 1997–1999
31 Food and beverages and tobacco
311 + 312 + 313 Food products and beverages 347.52 80.03 46.49 29.66
314 Tobacco products 362.79 100.54 74.76 19.78
32 Textiles, apparel, and leather
321 Textiles 268.62 53.29 52.69 37.66
322 Wearing apparel, dressing, 252.56 45.01 45.73 26.52
and dyeing of fur
323 + 324 Leather, leather products, 211.08 55.45 49.84 47.96
and footwear
33 Wood products
331 Wood and products of 427.71 51.09 59.09 39.72
wood and cork
332 Furniture; manufacturing NEC 381.65 45.59 66.02 43.22
34 Paper, paper products
341 Paper and paper products 215.81 71.33 57.24 47.09
342 Publishing, printing, and 312.06 60.19 54.77 61.46
reproduction of recorded media
35 Chemical products
353 + 354 Coke, refined petroleum 1,628.89 174.81 52.48 14.53
products, and nuclear fuel
351 + 352 − 3522 Chemicals, excluding 384.18 80.80 67.88 43.63
pharmaceuticals
3522 Pharmaceuticals 404.26 115.64 107.81 76.67
355 + 356 Rubber and plastics products 312.54 66.59 66.74 42.76
36 Nonmetallic minerals
36 Other nonmetallic 387.83 60.35 109.65 56.55
mineral products
37 Basic metals
371 Iron and steel 202.95 37.78 34.65 38.63
372 Nonferrous metals 196.86 44.10 30.97 19.69
38 Fabricated metal
381 Fabricated metal products, 290.62 42.38 74.69 49.58
except machinery and equipment
382 Machinery and equipment NEC 239.35 50.04 62.49 54.58
383 + 385 Electrical and optical equipment 274.18 39.49 55.84 59.07
384 Transport equipment 274.78 36.18 47.63 24.37
39 Other manufacturing
39 Manufacturing NEC 479.38 51.03 49.40 37.72
Note: ISIC = International Standard Industrial Classification; NEC = not elsewhere classified.
Sources: OECD STAN Database and annual manufacturing industry statistics provided by the Turkish State Institute 
of Statistics.
manufacture of aircraft (ISIC 3845), manufacture of
watches and clocks (ISIC 3853), tire and tube indus-
tries (ISIC 3551), and petroleum refineries (ISIC
3530). The most competitive sectors are manufac-
ture of wearing apparel (ISIC 3222); spinning,
weaving, and finishing textiles (ISIC 3211); manu-
facture of plastic products (ISIC 3560); and knitting
mills (ISIC 3213).
In summary, with the formation of the EU-
Turkey customs union Turkish industries became
subject to greater competition. But markups and
concentration ratios are still high compared with
those in benchmark countries such as Belgium.22
It seems that Turkey has to complete the harmo-
nization of technical regulations, privatize its
public enterprises, liberalize entry and exit into
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TABLE 3.14 Concentration of Domestic Activity, 1997–2000
(four-firm concentration ratios)
ISIC
Rev 2 Commodity 1997 1998 1999 2000
3111 Slaughtering, preparing, and preserving meat 34.15 29.64 32.45 31.13
3112 Manufacture of dairy products 51.54 50.25 51.55 49.57
3113 Canning and preserving of fruits and vegetables 19.08 17.34 16.16 18.90
3114 Canning, preserving, and processing of 91.72 89.85 81.40 84.98
fish and crustacea
3115 Manufacture of vegetable and animal oils and fats 46.66 42.28 43.25 43.92
3116 Grain mill products 17.01 17.97 25.46 24.30
3117 Manufacture of bakery products 29.52 30.37 31.30 34.81
3118 Sugar factories and refineries 39.14 33.43 35.94 31.62
3119 Manufacture of cocoa, chocolate and sugar 58.61 49.26 51.03 53.03
confectionery
3121 Manufacture of food products NEC 25.47 28.75 21.88 24.94
3122 Manufacture of prepared animal feeds 22.66 26.41 27.40 28.95
3131 Distilling, rectifying, and blending spirits 60.97 66.08 71.99 74.50
3132 Wine industries 74.24 74.21 80.89 75.16
3133 Malt liquors and malt 74.56 80.12 69.04 76.49
3134 Soft drinks and carbonated waters industries 63.17 64.82 60.90 66.06
3140 Tobacco manufactures 54.81 58.92 57.64 70.82
3211 Spinning, weaving, and finishing textiles 9.90 7.68 9.44 11.08
3212 Manufacture of madeup textile goods, 21.74 22.99 24.71 25.32
except wearing apparel
3213 Knitting mills 14.93 12.20 22.89 13.95
3214 Manufacture of carpets and rugs 43.34 41.66 43.84 39.65
3215 Cordage, rope, and twine industries 82.12 88.77 70.69 95.91
3219 Manufacture of textiles NEC 67.88 65.07 66.28 65.04
3221 Manufacture of fur and leather products 23.98 23.95 22.03 24.89
3222 Manufacture of wearing apparel, except 12.03 7.45 8.79 9.21
fur and leather
3231 Tanneries and leather finishing 21.42 30.47 19.40 19.42
3233 Manufacture of products of leather and 58.23 68.77 57.75 61.04
leather substitutes
3240 Manufacture of footwear, except vulc. or 34.04 32.18 38.43 28.27
molded rubber
3311 Sawmills, planing, and other wood mills 37.98 34.23 38.27 35.16
3312 Manufacture of wooden and cane containers 61.99 47.05 64.11 51.02
and small cane ware
3319 Manufacture of wood and cork products NEC 67.83 60.53 63.29 60.22
3320 Manufacture of furniture and fixtures, except 45.99 44.06 44.37 49.66
primarily of metal
3411 Manufacture of pulp, paper, and paperboard 55.42 42.42 39.29 38.82
3412 Manufacture of containers and boxes of paper 24.46 25.52 27.95 26.09
and paperboard
3419 Manufacture of pulp, paper, and paperboard articles 45.79 41.45 56.87 47.00
3421 Printing, publishing, and allied industries 63.28 40.42 50.08 45.55
3511 Manufacture of basic industrial chemicals, 47.00 53.20 54.64 67.81
except fertilizers
3512 Manufacture of fertilizers and pesticides 56.58 54.43 55.28 54.65
3513 Manufacture of synthetic resins, plastic materials 92.64 88.30 90.34 86.91
3521 Manufacture of paints, varnishes, and laquers 49.15 45.49 39.82 38.84
3522 Manufacture of drugs and medicines 31.28 31.59 29.74 33.37
3523 Manufacture of soap and cleaning preparations, 62.17 66.35 71.32 63.36
perfumes
3529 Manufacture of chemical products NEC 37.67 44.02 44.98 43.68
3530 Petroleum refineries 97.81 97.86 97.51 97.39
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TABLE 3.14 (Continued)
3541 Manufacture of asphalt paving and 88.54 73.54 72.19 92.33
roofing materials
3542 Manufacture of coke coal and briquettes 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
3543 Compounded and blended lubricating 87.51 85.54 79.22 88.25
oils and grease
3544 Liquid petroleum gas tubing 88.96 84.60 87.49 84.17
3551 Tire and tube industries 97.88 98.03 98.24 99.08
3559 Manufacture of rubber products NEC 28.85 22.80 25.84 23.66
3560 Manufacture of plastic products NEC 18.01 16.38 16.48 14.41
3610 Manufacture of pottery, china, and earthenware 74.71 58.05 60.97 69.81
3620 Manufacture of glass and glass products 43.64 40.68 42.21 39.51
3691 Manufacture of structural clay products 47.09 43.91 41.59 42.78
3692 Manufacture of cement, lime, and plaster 31.23 29.52 33.68 34.95
3699 Manufacture of nonmetallic mineral products 27.70 26.82 25.89 20.08
3710 Iron and steel basic industries 32.29 31.76 36.69 32.91
3720 Nonferrous metal basic industries 40.27 42.40 44.92 49.06
3811 Manufacture of cutlery, hand tools, and 28.72 33.58 20.19 24.52
general hardware
3812 Manufacture of furniture and fixtures, primarily 49.40 43.18 45.58 40.87
of metal
3813 Manufacture of structural metal products 23.59 24.04 24.80 24.41
3819 Manufacture of fabricated metal products 26.31 25.96 27.67 23.85
3821 Manufacture of engines and turbines 92.31 88.68 86.78 92.53
3822 Manufacture of agricultural machinery 81.46 81.59 79.93 80.73
and equipment
3823 Manufacture of metal and wood working machinery 46.89 45.84 37.63 35.70
3824 Manufacture of special industrial machinery  26.99 26.61 21.65 21.16
and equipment
3825 Manufacture of office, computing, and accounting 75.13 86.06 82.19 90.88
machinery
3829 Machinery and equipment, except electrical 51.73 49.54 54.52 48.10
3831 Manufacture of electrical industrial machinery 58.63 56.01 57.51 53.22
and apparatus
3832 Manufacture of radio, television, and communication  75.40 69.75 64.74 62.37
equipment
3833 Manufacture of electrical appliances and housewares 48.54 51.99 51.95 45.45
3839 Manufacture of electrical apparatus and supplies 27.08 24.94 29.73 26.14
3841 Ship building and repairing 50.28 46.01 48.48 52.18
3842 Manufacture of railroad equipment 98.04 98.78 96.62 94.21
3843 Manufacture of motor vehicles 40.81 40.60 46.44 47.32
3844 Manufacture of motorcycles and bicycles 78.79 77.45 80.31 76.12
3845 Manufacture of aircraft 100.00 100.00 100.00 99.78
3849 Manufacture of transport equipment NEC 94.08 95.81 94.22 100.00
3851 Controlling equipment NEC 34.87 43.34 36.34 55.93
3852 Manufacture of photographic and optical goods 62.06 76.78 81.98 84.30
3853 Manufacture of watches and clocks 100.00 100.00 100.00 98.73
3854 Other 79.65 81.46 65.87 65.64
3901 Manufacture of jewelery and related articles 48.80 46.02 47.12 53.39
3902 Manufacture of musical instruments 100.00 100.00 — —
3903 Manufacture of sporting and athletic goods 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
3909 Manufacturing industries NEC 31.38 32.74 39.74 45.58
— Not available.
Note: For abbreviations, see table 3.13.
Source: Turkish State Institute of Statistics.
ISIC
Rev 2 Commodity 1997 1998 1999 2000
various sectors of the economy, and impose hard
budget constraints on all public and private enter-
prises. Further integration with the EU will then
remove the distortions in the price system, which,
in turn, will boost the allocative efficiency in the
economy.
Conclusion
Although customs duties and equivalent charges, as
well as quantitative restrictions on industrial prod-
ucts, were eliminated with the formation of the
customs union in 1996 between Turkey and the EU,
the free movement of industrial products between
the parties could not be established until 2003. The
two remaining issues are contingent protectionism
and technical barriers to trade. Article 44 of the
Customs Union Decision allows the EU to impose
antidumping measures until Turkey implements
effectively the competition rules and the rules on
the intellectual, industrial, and commercial prop-
erty rights of the customs union. Similar considera-
tions apply for Turkey. Since 1996, both parties
have been active users of these measures.
On another front, under Decision 2/97 of the
Association Council, Turkey had to incorporate
into its internal legal order, before the end of 2000,
324 instruments corresponding to various Euro-
pean Economic Community and European Com-
munity regulations and directives on technical leg-
islation. But the work has still not been completed.
In addition, Turkey has to align its national quality
infrastructure to the European one. Products man-
ufactured in Turkey must satisfy the same require-
ments as those prevailing in the EU, and the
demonstration of conformity to these require-
ments must be done in the same “harmonized” way
and according to the same principles as in the EU.
Recently, Turkey has taken major steps to align its
legislation with the acquis. But it still has to estab-
lish the operators and operation of standardization,
testing, certification, inspection, accreditation, and
metrology according to the same principles and
obeying the same rules as in the EU. Once these
problems are solved, competition will increase in
the economy, leading to decreases in markups and
concentration ratios, provided it is complemented
with privatization and adoption of appropriate
competition policies. Thus, to benefit from free
trade between the parties, Turkey has to adopt and
implement the whole body of EU legislation—that
is, the acquis communautaire, and in particular the
rules on competition, intellectual, industrial, and
commercial property rights, and the whole body of
technical legislation on a sectoral as well as a hori-
zontal level.
Notes
1. The authors wish to thank their discussant, Bernard
Hoekman, and anonymous referees for helpful comments.
I˙brahim Yılmaz and Harun Çelik provided excellent research
support.
2. For a discussion of the trade regime during the 1980s, see
Togan (1994).
3. All dollar amounts are U.S. dollars unless otherwise
indicated.
4. EU15 refers to the 15 members of the EU prior to the 2004
enlargement in which 10 more countries joined the EU. The
15 countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
5. The mass housing fund tax is a specific tariff imposed
mainly on agricultural commodities.
6. The average rates of nominal protection were derived by
weighting nominal rates estimated as applied rates for the sec-
tors by sectoral outputs valued at world prices. The average rates
of effective protection were obtained by weighting effective rates
estimated for the sectors by sectoral value addeds evaluated at
world market prices.
7. These are the sectors with negative EPRs and with values
greater than −100.
8. The classification of the sectors into four trade groups fol-
lows the same rule adopted by Balassa and others (1982). The
export category includes sectors whose exports amount to more
than 10 percent of domestic production and whose imports
account for less than 10 percent of domestic consumption. For
sectors classified as export and import competing, both of these
shares exceed 10 percent. The import-competing and non-
import-competing categories include sectors whose exports
amount to less than 10 percent of domestic production. In sec-
tors in the import-competing category, imports exceed 10 per-
cent of domestic consumption. In sectors in the non-import-
competing category, imports are less than 10 percent of
domestic consumption.
9. The authors are grateful to Ela Yazıcı Inan for her contri-
butions to this section. On technical barriers to trade, see Sykes
(1995).
10. Directive 83/189/EEC, amended by Directive 98/34/EC,
established the requirements that member states notify draft
regulations and that national standards bodies notify work on
new standards.
11. Consider the machinery directive that applies to all
machinery and to safety components. The directive defines a
machine as “an assembly of linked parts or components, at least
one of which moves.” Annex I of the directive gives a compre-
hensive list of the hazards that may arise from the design and
operation of machinery, and gives general instructions on what
hazards must be avoided. The directive requires the machine
manufacturer to produce a “technical file” of documentary evi-
dence that the machinery complies with the directive, the form
and content of which is dictated in the directive. Machinery
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meeting the requirements of the directive is required to have the
CE symbol clearly affixed to indicate compliance. An item of
equipment may only display the CE mark when the equipment
satisfies all relevant directives—for example, machines with
electrical controls must also comply with the requirements of
the low voltage and electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) direc-
tives. For most items of machinery, the manufacturer (or its
authorized representative) can self-certify—that is, it designs its
products to meet the requirements of the directive and signs a
Declaration of Conformity. This declaration of conformity must
be backed up with the technical file. The file must be retained for
a period of 10 years after the manufacture of the machine (or the
last machine of a production run). For certain especially danger-
ous items of machinery (known as Annex IV machines), justifi-
cation of use of the CE mark must be independently verified by
a recognized authority (called an “approved body” or “notified
body”). Manufacturers of Annex IV machines are required to
compile a technical file that shows how the machinery has been
constructed to meet the requirements of the directive. The file is
then audited by the notified body to confirm that the directive’s
requirements have indeed been met, and a sample of the
machinery is examined to confirm that it is constructed as
described in the file. If a harmonized standard for a particular
type of Annex IV machine exists, the manufacturer can avoid
the expense of type examination by manufacturing the machine
fully in accordance with the standard. All that is then required is
that the file be lodged with a notified body, but the notified body
does not have to give an opinion on the machine—it simply acts
as an independent repository for the file. This procedure can
only be applied to machines that are manufactured fully in
accordance with the harmonized standard. If there are any devi-
ations from the standard (e.g., a light guard is fitted where the
standard says a physical guard is required), the full type approval
route must be followed.
12. This section reports the state of affairs on technical barri-
ers to trade in Turkey as of 2003.
13. Law 4703 is based on Council Directive 92/59/EEC on
general product safety, Council Regulation 85/C 136/01 on the
new approach to technical harmonization and standards, and the
Council resolution of December 1989 on the global approach to
conformity assessment.
14. The legislation on market surveillance was prepared using
Council Directive 92/59/EEC on general products safety, the
Council resolution of December 1989 on the global approach to
conformity assessment, Council Directive 88/378/EEC on the
approximation of the laws of the member states on the safety of
toys, and on a European Commission implementation guide
(2000). The legislation on working principles and procedures for
the conformity assessment bodies and notified bodies was pre-
pared using the material in chapter 6 of the European Commis-
sion guide (2000). The legislation on the use and affixing of the
CE conformity mark is based on Council Decision 93/465/EEC
on the modules for the various phases of the conformity assess-
ment procedures and the rules for affixing and the use of the CE
conformity marking. Finally, the legislation on notification pro-
cedures between Turkey and the EU for technical legislation and
standards is based on Council Directive 98/34/EC, laying down a
procedure for the provision of information in the field of techni-
cal standards and regulations and the relevant section of Decision
2/97 of the EC-Turkey Association Council.
15. Under a law published on October 27, 1999, TURKAK is
the national accreditation body in all fields. But the regulations
that gave the Turkish Standards Institute (TSE) and Turkish
Scientific and Technical Research Council (TUBITAK) the
power to accredit are still in force.
16. The TSE was established in 1954 to draw up standards for
all kinds of products and services.
17. For automotive products, the “e” sign confirms
conformity.
18. UME is organized as part of TUBITAK. UME has cali-
bration laboratories in mechanics, physics, electricity, ionizing
radiation, and chemicals. The laboratories under construction
include EMC, acoustics, and liquid flow.
19. We use four-digit SITC trade data and correspondences
between the NACE, International Standard Industrial Classifica-
tion, and Standard Identification Trade Classification classifica-
tions provided by the Eurostat’s Classification Server (http://
europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat/ramon/).
20. Manufactures are defined as consisting of sectors under
SITC sections 5, 6, 7, and 8 minus division 68 and group 891.
21. Although Turkey realizes that the major pillars of a com-
petition policy must comprise privatization, liberalization of
entry and exit, imposition of hard budget constraints on all pub-
lic and private enterprises, and a very liberal trade regime, it
faces difficulties in implementing these principles.
22. For concentration ratios in Slovakia and Belgium, see
Djankov and Hoekman (1998).
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tions of EU regulation for the sector. The first sec-
tion discusses the context of membership, espe-
cially the Customs Union between the EU and
Turkey, but also the other protocols agreed to and
under negotiation between the EU and Turkey.
That section is followed by a brief quantitative dis-
cussion of the likely impact of full membership on
trade and on the transport sector itself. Because the
customs union covers many of the steps needed for
membership, the incremental impact of the last
necessary steps for the transport sector is relatively
minimal. Other possible effects are then identified
through a detailed assessment of the regulatory
regime in Turkey for transport as compared with
the one in effect for the rest of the EU. Here, too,
the major steps have already been taken, implying
that EU membership will have little direct impact,
institutionally or economically, on the domestic
transport sector. Effects may be related to EU struc-
tural funds (which was the case in Spain and Portu-
gal), but in view of the size of the looming enlarge-
ment, such funds are likely to be limited.
The Customs Union
The primary difference between the current list of
new EU members and membership for Turkey is the
depth and long history of trade integration in place
between the EU and Turkey. The EU-Turkey cus-
toms union has been a long time in the making. In
The European Union (EU) has been at the center of
a recent explosion in regional trading schemes. A
combination of economic and political factors—
including greater peace and stability in the EU hin-
terland, support for democratic reforms in devel-
oping countries, greater trade and investment
liberalization in developing countries, and access to
new markets for EU exports—have been advanced
as motives for the EU to conclude such agreements.
For developing countries, the attraction has been
preferential access to the large EU market and the
prospect of increased EU aid. The reality is that
everybody, except the North American and high-
income Asian economies, now seems to have pref-
erential access to the EU.1
For those countries that are immediate neigh-
bors of the EU, the big prize has been the promise
of accession to the EU (see Baldwin and Francois
1997). Turkey is no exception. Although Turkey was
not included in the list of new members for the
next round of accession, an ongoing process (with a
very long history) is supposed to lead eventually to
EU membership.
This chapter explores the implications of even-
tual Turkish accession to the EU. The potential
impacts of regulatory reform under such a process
are examined by focusing on the transport sector,
broadly defined to include air, land, rail, and other.
Two issues studied are the linkage between trade
effects and the transport sector, and the implica-
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1963 the Treaty of Ankara envisaged Turkey becom-
ing a full member of the EU, with preparation
occurring over a series of stages. In 1970 a protocol
to this Ankara agreement outlined a framework of
the customs union between the EU and Turkey.
Even though Turkey’s 1987 application for full
membership in the EU was rejected, it continued to
pursue unilateral trade liberalization with the EU.
As a result, when the customs union was finally
established for industrial products on January 1,
1996, after a transition period of 22 years, much of
the required tariff changes for industrial products
had already been implemented.
The existence of the customs union, along with
the protocols that go with it, has important impli-
cations for the discussion that follows of the likely
effects of full EU membership. The average reduc-
tion in tariffs required by the CU for Turkey has
been estimated to be only 7 percent (Harrison,
Rutherford, and Tarr 1997). The combination of
adopting the Common Customs Tariff (CCT)
structure and Uruguay Round commitments
should have produced a trade-weighted average
tariff on industrial goods of 3.5 percent by 2001
(WTO 1998). In theory, the objective of the
customs union agreement is to prepare Turkey
for full membership in the EU, and the agree-
ment is, therefore, not only deeper than the EU’s
free trade agreements, but also goes well beyond
the basic requirements of a customs union agree-
ment. In particular, it requires Turkey to introduce
a wide range of legislation covering all aspects
of trade; competition law; industrial, commer-
cial, and intellectual property rights; and to adopt
EU technical standards.2 In this sense, the
customs union agreement carries with it many of
the consequences that would follow from full EU
membership.
Table 4.1 compares the current EU arrangement
with Turkey with recent and ongoing agreements
(in the form of free trade agreements, FTAs) with
selected developing countries and regions. Behind
all of these agreements is a mix of politics and eco-
nomics. A basic dilemma facing EU negotiators of
these free trade agreements is that, according to
their negotiating mandate, they must not under-
mine the finely tuned border protection of the
EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the
Common Fisheries Policy. At the same time, they
must ensure that agreements are compatible with
Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) of 1994, particularly Section 8
requiring coverage of “substantially all trade” and
the Understanding on Article XXIV (especially the
preamble, which states that “no major sector is
excluded”). The EU seeks to resolve this dilemma
by interpreting World Trade Organization (WTO)
rules as requiring free trade to be established on
90 percent of total bilateral trade flows.
Because EU tariffs on most industrial products
are zero or very low (exceptions are, for example,
clothing and motor vehicles), the EU has little diffi-
culty in liberalizing imports of all, or practically all,
industrial products. Moreover, because imports of
agricultural and fisheries products are limited by
(sometimes prohibitive) border protection, they
account for only a small proportion of existing
total imports from the partner country. As a result,
the EU is able to make a sufficient contribution to
the fulfillment of the 90 percent criterion by liber-
alizing only around 60 percent of its imports of
agricultural products. Similar calculations, it is
argued by the EU, also enable the partner country
to protect sensitive industrial and agricultural
sectors of its economy while remaining within
the EU’s interpretation of the requirements of
Article XXIV.
Given these constraints, the pattern of tariff
reductions in the developing country usually takes
the form of abolishment of the duties on capital
and intermediate goods before duties on final con-
sumer goods, which are also subject to significantly
higher initial duties and which are liberalized only
toward the end of the transitional period. It is in
the area of trade in agricultural and fisheries prod-
ucts that the agreements fall significantly short of
free trade. The EU routinely excludes products such
as beef, sugar, a range of dairy products, some cere-
als and cereal products, rice, some fresh fruits and
vegetables, some cut flowers, and fisheries prod-
ucts. The partner developing country also excludes
a range of agricultural products, not least to protect
its agriculture from imports of subsidized agricul-
tural goods from the EU, such as beef, sugar, dairy
products, and cereals. As a result, in the agreement
with Mexico only 62 percent of bilateral trade in
agricultural products is fully liberalized. In the
agreement with South Africa, 62 percent of EU
imports are liberalized, while South Africa fully lib-
eralizes 82 percent of its imports from the EU. No
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TABLE 4.1 Structure of EU Free Trade Agreements with Selected Developing Countries
Rationale:
EU Security Reinforce
democracy;
regional hub
Access to NAFTA;
regional hub
Customs union
agreement in
industrial
products;
objective of
membership 
in EU
Egypt South Africa Mexico Turkey
Partner Maintain
preferences;
lock in reforms;
attract FDI
Improve access to
EU market;
attract FDI; lock
in reforms
Reduce
dominance of
United States;
improve access
to EU market;
attract FDI
Transitional period: 
EU
Partner
Immediate
12–15 years
10 years
12 years
10 years
10 years
Turkey’s customs
legislation now
almost same as
that of EU
Industry coverage:
EU All Almost all, most
by 2006
All by 2003 All
Partner All, less than half
by year four,
end-weighted
on most
protected
87% and 
end-weighted
All by 2007, most
by 2003
All
Agricultural
coverage:
EU Approx. 60%+ of imports, entry prices, plus preferences 
with tariff quotas
Separate preferen-
tial agreement
covering range
of products,
some with tariff
quotas
Partner Very limited;
some duty
reductions
within tariff
quotas
Substantial; some
wines subject to
tariff quotas
Some, such as
dairy, tobacco,
processed foods
Rules of origin:
EU EU rules; bilateral cumulation with EU; derogations 
can be requested.
EU rules
Partner Part MEDA
cumulation an
objective
Full SACU
cumulation;
partial SADC
cumulation with
one country
Relaxation in some
sectors due to
lack of raw
materials and
components
Safeguards Standard EU clause for both parties plus transitional 
arrangements for partner
EU rules
Antidumping Standard WTO rules
Intellectual
property rights
Protected under TRIPS plus list of 
international agreements
Special committee
to solve 
difficulties
TRIPS plus list of
international
agreements
126 Turkey: Economic Reform and Accession to the European Union
TABLE 4.1 (Continued)
Competition rules Outlaws collusion/
abuse of
dominant
position of
enterprises,
which distorts
competition in
trade (except
for ECSC
products)
Each retain own
rules; outlaws
collusion/abuse
of market
power, etc.;
cooperation
plus EU
assistance
Own laws;
detailed
statement on
cooperation;
technical
assistance
EU policy
Egypt South Africa Mexico Turkey
State aids
Public procurement Consultation 
with aim of
liberalization
“Fair, equitable and
transparent”
National
treatment and
nondiscrimina-
tion phased in
over 10 years,
except some
public utilities
and transport
Agreement to be
reached in
future
Rights of 
establishment
and services
Trade in most
services
liberalized plus
most modes of
supply by 2004;
transitional
period of
10 years;
national
treatment
National
treatment;
services
agreement
under
negotiation as
part of customs
union
Capital movements Program of 
liberalization
relating to
investment 
plus protection
of investment
Export of large
sums from
Turkey unclear
Standards Cooperation;
Special
Committee on
SPS Measures
Working toward
implementation
of EU rules
Custom
cooperation
EU commercial
policy and rules
Aid, economic
development
cooperation
MEDA programs
(grants) to
support all
Euro-Med
agreements;
three-year
rolling national
indicative
programs
Multiannual
indicative
programs of
grants and
loans
n.a. MEDA plus EIB
preaccession
loan facility
Institutions Association Council;
CU Joint
Committee; Joint
Consultative
Committee
Must not distort competition in trade between EU and partner, but are 
permissible for public or policy objectives (EU Article 92)
GATS plus possibility of further 
liberalization
Free movement of capital relating
to direct investment plus interest
profits and dividends 
Aim of reducing differences (especially
SPS) and mutual recognition
For example, exchange of information, introduction of single
administration document, simplification of controls and
procedures for clearance, cooperation on rules of origin
Joint EU/Partner Association/Cooperation Council at
ministerial level supported by committees (high official) 
and technical working groups
comparable figures are published for trade in agri-
cultural products with Egypt or Turkey.
Agricultural products are not included in the
customs union agreement with Turkey, but because
the objective is full membership in the EU, both
parties have agreed to progressively improve their
preferential regime in the agricultural sector with
the aim of allowing Turkey to adapt its agricultural
policy to the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy.
However, no time frame has been applied to this
process, and the system of preferences does not
“restrict in any way the pursuance of the respective
agricultural policies of the Community or Turkey.”3
In addition, both countries have a safeguard clause
that can be activated if “either quantities or the
prices of imported products from the other Party in
respect of which a preferential regime has been cre-
ated, causes or threatens to cause a disturbance of
the Community or Turkish market.” The European
Commission estimates that 93 percent of Turkey’s
agricultural exports to the EU and 33 percent of EU
agricultural exports to Turkey are covered by the
1998 scheme of preferences.
The customs union agreement is part of the
more general program of preparation for EU mem-
bership, signaled in particular by the Helsinki
agreement to include Turkey as a candidate coun-
try for accession to the EU and by Turkey’s adop-
tion on March 19, 2001, of the “National Pro-
gramme for the Adoption of the Acquis” (the
acquis communautaire is the entire body of legisla-
tion of the European Communities and Union).
This program includes the economic aspects of the
acquis, in particular the “four freedoms” (related to
goods, persons, services, and capital) that form the
basis for the operation of the internal market. As
discussed in other chapters in this volume, these
economic aspects have immediate implications for
services trade.
A Quantitative Assessment
As noted earlier, the customs union between the
EU and Turkey already covers most, if not substan-
tially all, trade. To analyze the impact of Turkey’s
accession to the EU, this section describes the
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Dispute settlement Association
Council by
“decision” or 
by arbitration
binding on
both parties; 
no time limit or
enforcement
procedures
Cooperation
Council or
arbitration;
stages time
limited; no
enforcement
procedures
Joint Committee
or arbitration;
rules for
procedures,
time-limited,
stages, 
compensation
Association
Council or
arbitration
General
Other Money
laundering;
drug trafficking;
migrant workers
and illegal
immigration;
regional
integration
Wine and spirits
agreement;
fisheries (not
concluded);
regional
cooperation
Turkey to adopt 
all of EU’s 
preferential
trade
agreements
Egypt South Africa Mexico Turkey
n.a. Not applicable.
Note: NAFTA  North American Free Trade Agreement; FDI  foreign direct investment; MEDA is the
financial instrument of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership; SACU  South African Development
Community; SADC  South African Development Community; WTO  World Trade Organization;
TRIPS  Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights; ECSC  European Coal and
Steel Community; GATS  General Agreement on Trade in Services; SPS  sanitary and phytosanitary;
EIB  European Investment Bank; CU  Customs Union.
Source: Francois, McQueen, and Wignaraja 2003.
Political dialogue; social and cultural cooperation; democratic principles and respect
for human rights; scientific, technical, and technological cooperation
application of a global general equilibrium model
(the model, which is described in annex 2, is based
on Francois, McQueen, and Wignaraja 2003). The
policy experiments involve a summary of the esti-
mated economic effects of the customs union and
of its extension, under membership, to cover all
trade.
The EU-Turkey customs union agreement is
really designed for industrial products; the final
stage was completed in 2000. As such, there is unre-
stricted trade in all industrial products between
the two countries, and Turkey applies the CCT to
imports of industrial products from third countries.
Agriculture is largely excluded from the agreement,
although there is a preferential trade regime for a
limited range of agricultural products (see table 4.2
for a summary).
EU imports of products not listed in table 4.2
are exempt from ad valorem duties, but they are
still subject to specific duties and quotas. Even
where preferences are given for some food products
(fruits and vegetables), they are only available
between certain dates. Turkey has liberalized even
less in the area of food and agriculture. Most-
favored-nation (MFN) duties have been abolished
for live bovine (pure breeding animals) and meat
or fish unfit for human consumption. For a fairly
short list of other products, duties are abolished
within small tariff quotas, including products listed
in table 4.2.
Turkey has undertaken “far-reaching structural
and legislative reforms within the framework of
the customs union agreement” (WTO 1998). The
adoption of the CCT has meant that Turkey’s level
of border protection on industrial products and
the industrial component of processed foods has
declined significantly. As a result, even though
there may be some concerns about the possibility
of relative trade diversion, the absolute level
of imports from third countries should have
increased, not only because border measures of
protection have declined significantly, but also
because the adoption of EU customs regulations
has provided exporters with greater certainty of
treatment. Turkey illustrates as well some of the
substantial difficulties that developing countries
experience in implementing far-reaching structural
reforms even when, like Turkey, they have both the
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TABLE 4.2 Processed Food Concessions 
under the EU-Turkey Customs Union
EU Concessions Turkey Concessions
Tomato paste Live bovine animals
Poultry meat Frozen meats
Sheep and goat meat Butter
Olive oil Cheese
Cheese Vegetable and flower seeds
Some fresh fruit and vegetables Flower bulbs
Hazelnuts Apples and pears
Fruit juices Potatoes
Marmalade and jams Cereals
Refined/raw vegetable oil
Sugar
Tomato paste
Some alcoholic beverages
Some animal foods
Note: Products not listed by the EU are exempted from ad valorem
duties, but they are still subject to quotas and specific duties. Examples
are beef and sugar. Turkey has liberalized some agricultural tariffs within
very narrow tariff-rate quotas.
Source: Francois, McQueen, and Wignaraja 2003.
incentive of full membership in the EU and the
backing of substantial financial and technical
resources.
Because the customs union reflects political sen-
sitivities in the EU and Turkey, areas of significant
potential (agricultural) trade have been excluded
by both parties to the agreement. Reflecting the
customs union as just described, the scenario for
application of the computable general equilibrium
(CGE) model is summarized in table 4.3.4
Of immediate interest here is the sectoral impact
of the actual customs union and of a full free trade
scenario. The omission of the agricultural sector
from the customs union agreement almost cer-
tainly means that the agreement does not conform
with Article XXIV of the GATT. Interestingly, this
issue was raised in the WTO review of the report
of the Trade Policy Review Board (TPRB) on
Turkey (no response by Turkey was recorded), but
no WTO member state has so far challenged the
agreement, presumably because those states feel
that adoption of the CAP by Turkey would increase
the current level of discrimination against their
exports.
Agriculture is, however, an important sector of
the Turkish economy, accounting for about 11.4
percent of its gross domestic product and 34 per-
cent of employment. The omission of this sector
from the customs union agreement must produce
significant distortions in the allocation of resources
in the economy and in the economic effects of the
agreement.
The macroeconomic effects of the customs
union are summarized in table 4.4. Consider first
national welfare (measured as current welfare
derived from economy-wide consumption pat-
terns). The customs union, as currently constructed,
yields a boost in Turkish welfare (measured as a per-
centage of base national income) of over 1.3 percent
relative to the baseline with MFN industrial tariffs.
Based on 1997 values, this gain is comparable to a
boost in real GDP of US$2.2 billion.5 The static
effect is slight, adding less than 0.1 percent to
welfare through induced capital accumulation.
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TABLE 4.3 Customs Union Scenario
Full Partial No
Liberalization Liberalization Liberalization
Grains Turkey EU
Other agriculture EU, Turkey
Mining EU, Turkey
Other primary production EU, Turkey
Sugar Turkey EU
Dairy Turkey EU
Meats EU, Turkey
Processed foods EU, Turkey
Textiles EU, Turkey
Clothing EU, Turkey
Leather EU, Turkey
Wood and paper EU, Turkey
Chemicals EU, Turkey
Refineries EU, Turkey
Steel EU, Turkey
Nonferrous metals EU, Turkey
Motor vehicles EU, Turkey
Electronics EU, Turkey
Other machinery EU, Turkey
Manufactures, NEC EU, Turkey
Note: Partial liberalization is modeled as 50 percent. NEC  not elsewhere classified.
Source: Author’s definition of model aggregation.
A comparable improvement appears in Turkey’s
terms of trade through static effects—the gap
between export and import prices widens by over
2.5 percent. However, there is an interaction
between long-run capital accumulation and the
terms of trade that erodes terms-of-trade gains over
the medium run. The agreement, as modeled,
yields a considerable boost in the capital stock
(1.24 percent).Normally, a large boost in real income
would follow. In fact, the quantity index for GDP
does expand. But because of the erosion in the
terms of trade in the medium to long run, the value
of GDP (in dollar terms) falls somewhat. Even so,
the initial terms-of-trade gains are strong enough
to outweigh these effects.
Consider next the impact on wages. Both skilled
and unskilled workers gain from the agreement,
with a 2.2 percent and 1.7 percent boost, respec-
tively, to real incomes (net of changes in the con-
sumer price index, CPI) over the long run. Such
wage changes are considerable, given that they
are realized in the context of a trade agreement.
The positive wage effects imply that, overall, the
customs union will not make labor market condi-
tions worse.
The next set of indicators reported in table 4.4
relate to real exchange rates and GDP. GDP is not
an appropriate measure of economic welfare—it
misses substitution effects in production and con-
sumption—but it is a common metric for govern-
ment monitoring of economic climate. The
changes in both the value and quantity of GDP
(based on a fixed 1997 basket of goods and serv-
ices) fail to track welfare gains in any meaningful
way.
How does the actual customs union compare
with a full customs union? A comparison of the
last two columns of table 4.4 reveals the differ-
ences. The EU-Turkey customs union does not
cover all potential EU-Turkey trade, but Turkey is
at a stage of development where critical market
access revolves around manufactured goods rather
than agriculture. As a result, the actual customs
union does cover enough trade to generate gains
that are broadly similar to those of a full cus-
toms union. The differences between the two
columns are within the margin of error for this
kind of modeling exercise. Broadly speaking, the
table does not reveal a significant difference, in
terms of welfare, between a full customs union and
the EU-Turkey customs union. But there is some
expansion of trade (primarily in food) under full
membership.
Although the overall macro effects of the actual
customs union are comparable with those of a full
customs union, some slight differences emerge at
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TABLE 4.4 Summary of Macroeconomic Effects of Customs Union for Turkey
A B C  A  B D
Long-Run
Effects of Long-Run
Actual Effects of
Static Dynamic Customs Full EU 
Effects Effects Union Membership
Welfare (% of national income) 0.91 0.4 1.31 1.36
Welfare (millions of US$) 1,558.92 678.31 2,237.23 2,335.73
Terms of trade (%) 2.64 0.91 1.73 1.95
Value of exports (%) 10.6 3.46 14.06 15.21
Unskilled worker wages (%) 2.02 0.22 2.24 2.62
Skilled worker wages (%) 1.28 0.43 1.71 1.72
Capital stock (%) 0.00 1.24 1.24 1.24
Value of GDP in dollars (%) 3.17 0.36 2.81 3.01
Real exchange rate (%)a 3.05 1.1 1.95 2.16
GDP quantity index (%) 0.11 0.74 0.85 0.84
a. Real exchange rate is the dollar price of the base period GDP basket.
Source: Author’s calculations.
the sectoral level (see table 4.5). Under a full
customs union, EU grain production squeezes
Turkey’s production, with a projected drop in out-
put of 1.18 percent. However, under the actual
agreement this sector is largely sheltered, with pro-
duction projected to drop only 0.09 percent from
baseline levels. A similar story holds for meat pro-
duction, which is largely insulated under the current
agreement.
Outside of food production, the largest effects
are in textiles, clothing, and motor vehicle produc-
tion. Textiles and clothing have benefited tremen-
dously from improved EU access. Production is
25 percent and 50 percent higher, respectively, than
without preferred access. At the same time, the
motor vehicle sector in the EU applied strong pres-
sure on the motor vehicle and parts sector in Turkey,
which shrank by 15 percent. Another sector that
benefits is (consumer) electronics, which enjoyed a
12 percent increase in production.
The sector-level results also point to no real
great adjustment pressures within Turkey, except
in heavy manufacturing. The motor vehicle,
machinery, and equipment sectors are squeezed.
This situation is consistent with expectations about
Turkey’s comparative advantage, with an advantage
in lighter manufactures and a relative disadvantage
in some heavy manufacturing sectors.
The trade results largely mirror the results for
production. One outlier is motor vehicles. Although
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TABLE 4.5 Change in Output by Sector in Turkey
(percent)
A B C  A  B D
Long-Run Long-Run
Effect of Effect of
Static Dynamic Actual Full EU 
Sector Effects Effects FTA Membership
Grains 0.76 0.67 0.09 1.18
Other agriculture 0.89 0.78 0.11 2.3
Mining 4.14 0.65 3.49 4.67
Other primary production 0.28 0.34 0.62 0.4
Sugar 0.4 0.61 0.21 4.6
Dairy 0.09 0.39 0.48 0.09
Meats 0.77 1.03 0.26 2.96
Processed foods 0.84 1.06 1.9 1.61
Textiles 21.81 4.43 26.24 25.46
Clothing 49.16 6.46 55.62 54.86
Leather 0.81 3.92 4.73 4.88
Wood and paper 0.76 0.05 0.71 0.87
Chemicals 2.31 1.21 1.1 1.14
Refineries 0.85 0.97 0.12 0.1
Steel 3.93 0.74 3.19 3.67
Nonferrous metals 7.09 2.23 4.86 5.5
Motor vehicles 17.12 2.05 15.07 15.73
Electronics 11.6 1.46 13.06 12.7
Other machinery 6.35 1.81 4.54 5.08
Manufactures, NEC 1.0 0.39 0.61 0.81
Transport 0.43 0.87 0.44 0.35
Construction 3.47 2.77 0.7 0.64
Business services 3.71 1.83 1.88 2.13
Other services 1.07 0.78 0.29 0.41
Note: NEC  not elsewhere classified.
Source: Author’s calculations.
production is squeezed and imports go up substan-
tially, exports also go up substantially. Mexico’s
experience with the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) was similar. The motor vehicle
sector is forced to restructure, and in the process it
becomes more deeply integrated with the European
industry. As a result, significant growth is projected
in both imports and exports in the sector relative to a
baseline with continued MFN protection for the sec-
tor.The result for sugar under the full customs union
reflects the subsidies to EU production and a large
increase in a small export base for Turkey (small
changes in small flows can lead to large percentage
changes). In the actual customs union agreement,
these effects are sterilized.
What happens to the transport sector under the
customs union? The static effect is contraction, as
resources are pulled out of the sector and into manu-
facturing. However, because the customs union is
estimated to have positive investment effects (i.e., the
capital stock expands), there is a projected expansion
of the sector in the medium term of roughly 0.44 per-
cent. Because the agreement is already in place, the
interpretation is that the transport sector is almost a
half percent larger than it would be otherwise.
What happens to the transport sector under
actual EU membership (the focus here is on the
trade-related effects)? Again, the impact is positive
relative to no preferential trade at all. However,
because full membership would extend access to the
EU food markets (food production is a large share of
Turkey’s economy), resources would be pulled out
of the service sectors and into agriculture.
Finally, what happens to direct trade in trans-
port services? The Global Trade Analysis Project
(GTAP) database reveals that Turkey’s trade in
transport services is relatively small, with imports
of roughly $1.207 billion in 1997. Based on gravity
estimates of services trade barriers, the import tar-
iff equivalent for cross-border transport service
imports into Turkey is roughly 8.9 percent (see
annex 1). Assuming an import demand elasticity of
–3.9 (equal to the import substitution elasticity in
demand in the GTAP model for this sector) and
deadweight trade costs, a back-of-the-envelope cal-
culation yields gains of roughly $126 million per year
from full trade liberalization in the sector. The EU
accounts for roughly 25 percent of this total, or only
about $30 million per year in welfare gains in the sec-
tor from direct trade related to liberalization vis-à-vis
the EU. This would follow from roughly $100 million
in additional services imports from the EU.
A Factor Analysis of Regulatory
Structures
Membership in the EU involves not only market
access, but also community rules and regulations.
In this section, the regulation database of the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) is used to examine the struc-
ture of competition and regulation in the transport
sector across OECD countries. The goal is to com-
pare the regulatory status of Turkey’s transport sec-
tor with those of EU members. In the end, it turns
out that the Turkish regulatory regime is not at all
inconsistent, by these measures, with the broad pat-
tern observed within the EU. This finding may
reflect the long, ongoing process of Turkish integra-
tion. In any event, it suggests that the sector may
require little overall realignment of regulation in
view of what is currently allowed within the EU.
The 2000 OECD International Regulation Data-
base includes more than 1,100 variables for each
OECD member on both economy-wide product
market regulation and regulation at the sector level.
For the purposes of this study, it includes data
on regulation in road transport, national and inter-
national air transport, and rail transport (see
Nicoletti, Scarpetta, and Boylaud, 1999, for a
detailed description of the data). In general, the
data of interest here are centered around 1998.
The OECD database may contain over 1,100 vari-
ables, but only a limited number apply to transport.
In addition, many remain unanswered by a large
number of members, and many others simply defy
quantification. For this reason, the full set of trans-
port questions has been reduced to the set covered in
table 4.6. The 18 variables listed for air transport are
classified into domestic competition, international
competition, and government ownership and regu-
lation. The 15 variables for road transport and the
six for rail are roughly classified into domestic com-
petition and government ownership and regulation.
Within each set of variables, the assigned values
range from 0 to 6 (so that for dummies, yes is gener-
ally 6 and no is 0), and the assigned weights are based
on the number of variables in a sector:category set.
In this factor analysis of the variables, the result of
this scaling is a set of regulatory indexes ranging
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TABLE 4.6 Variables Used from OECD International Regulation Database
Data Set
OECD Survey Variable
Question No. Question Name
17 Does national, state, or provincial government hold equity stakes in ATOR1
business company? 7,131 air transport carriers
52 Do national, state, or provincial laws or other regulations restrict in at ATOR2
least some markets the number of competitors allowed to operate a 
business? 7,131 air transport carriers
547 Air travel/national market structures: domestic market share of the largest ATDC1
airline (incl. subsidiaries) (more than 500,000 passengers a year)
548 Air travel: market structure: domestic routes (all routes): share of traffic ATDC2
(passengers/km) of the incumbent carrier
558 Air travel: market structure: international routes (all routes): share of ATIC1
traffic (passengers/km) of the largest carrier in the international traffic of 
national carriers
566 Air travel: Is the largest operator in international routes also the largest ATIC2
operator in domestic routes? (all routes)
567 Air travel/national market structures: share of 100 international routes ATIC3
with more than three carriers
572 Air travel/national regulations and government ownership: government ATOR3
ownership in largest airline (%)
573 Air travel/national regulations and government ownership: government ATOR4
golden share in a major airline 
579 Air travel/national regulations and government ownership: government ATOR5
loss makeups in major airlines in the past five years
580 Air travel/national regulations and government ownership: the largest ATOR6
airline has public service obligations 
611 Air travel/national regulations and government ownership: domestic ATOR7
market deregulated
612 Air travel/national regulations and government ownership: Open Sky ATIC4
agreement with United States 
613 Air travel/national regulations and government ownership: Open Sky ATIC5
agreement older than six years
618 Air travel/national market structures: international market share of the ATIC6
largest airline (incl. subsidiaries) (more than 500,000 passengers a year )
619 Air travel/national market structures: Herfindahl concentration index in ATDC3
domestic market 
620 Air travel/national market structures: Herfindahl concentration index in ATIC7
international market (%) 
1120 Air travel: ceiling on foreign ownership allowed in national air transport ATOR8
carriers
13 Does national, state, or provincial government hold equity stakes in RTOR1
business company? 7,114 road freight
48 Do national, state, or provincial laws or other regulations restrict in at RTDC1
least some markets the number of competitors allowed to operate a 
business? 7,114 road freight
492 Road freight: Is there a firm in the road freight sector that is publicly RTOR2
controlled (i.e., national, state, or provincial governments hold the 
largest single share)?
493 Road freight: Is registration in any transport register required in order to RTOR3
establish a new business in the road freight sector?
494 Road freight: In order to operate a national road freight business (other RTOR4
than for transporting dangerous goods or goods for which sanitary 
assurances are required) do you need to be granted a state concession 
or franchise by any level of government?
from 0 (generally open, competitive regimes with
minimal regulation) to 6 (generally more regulated,
with less or no competition).
Multivariate factor analysis is a standard tech-
nique for summarizing patterns in regulatory data
(see Nicoletti, Scarpetta, and Boylaud 1999 and
Boylaud 2000). Factor analysis yields factors that are
linear combinations of the variables observed and
that, in theory, identify latent variables or indicators
that lurk behind the observed data. In the present
context, this approach allows the construction of
indexes of regulatory frameworks in the sample.
Factor analysis is applied first to the regulatory
variables grouped by sector and type of regulation,
thereby yielding a set of indicators for road trans-
port, air, and rail, which are listed in tables 4.7, 4.8,
and 4.9. The critical point to pick up from these
indexes is that in all three transport sectors Turkey’s
regulatory regime is fully consistent with the
regimes of current EU members. For example,
the road transport regime in Turkey has fewer limits
on competition (including pricing guidelines) than
Germany, Greece, Finland, and the Netherlands.
Overall, the road transport sector compares favorably
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Data Set
OECD Survey Variable
Question No. Question Name
495 Road freight: In order to operate a national road freight business do you RTOR5
need to obtain a license (other than a driving license) or permit from the 
government or a regulatory agency?
496 Road freight: In order to operate a national road freight business do you RTOR6
need to notify any level of government or a regulatory agency and wait 
for approval before you can start operation?
505 Road freight: Does the regulator, through licenses or otherwise, have any RTDC2
power to limit industry capacity?
513 Road freight: Are there any regulations setting conditions for driving RTOR7
periods and rests?
515 Road freight: Do regulations prevent or constrain: backhauling? RTDC3
516 Road freight: Do regulations prevent or constrain: private carriage? RTDC4
517 Road freight: Do regulations prevent or constrain: contract carriage? RTDC5
520 Road freight: Within the last five years, have laws or regulations removed RTOR8
restrictions on: commercial, for-hire shipments?
521 Road freight: Are retail prices of road freight services in any way regulated RTOR9
by the government?
522 Road freight: Does the government provide pricing guidelines to road  RTDC6
freight companies?
10 Does national, state, or provincial government hold equity stakes in  RROR1
business company? 7,111 railways
45 Do national, state or provincial laws or other regulations restrict in at least RRDC1
some markets the number of competitors allowed to operate a business? 
7,111 railways
528 Railways: freight transport: total number of operators RRDC2
538 Railways: Please indicate if the government has any liability for losses made RROR2
by a railway company (excluding subsidies related to service obligations).
539 Railways: Did the government in the past five years make up for any losses RROR3
made by railway companies?
540 Railways: Are companies operating the infrastructure or providing railway RROR4
services subject to universal service requirements (e.g., obligation to 
serve specified customers or areas)?
Note: Questions have generally been rescaled from 0 to 6, with 0 being a positive indicator (more
competition, less regulation, less participation by government through ownership, golden shares, price
setting, and so forth). Questions have also been assigned inverse weights (i.e., if there are four domestic
competition questions for air, each gets a 1/4 weighting for the domestic competition for air transport
factoring and scoring exercise).
Source: OECD International Regulation Database, 2001.
TABLE 4.6 (Continued)
1
3
5
TABLE 4.7 Regulation Indexes, Air Transport
Public
International Service
Public Service Reservation Obligation,
Government Regulation Obligations for Dominant Competition Regulation of Regulated Government
Ownership or Government and Limits on and Custom Domestic International Domestic and Price Industry Customer Ownership
Overall Management Bailouts Restructuring Guarantees Competition Competition Carrier(s) Air Road Rail Regulation Structure Access and Bailouts
United States 2.1 2.5 2.7 1.7 0.8 1.1 2.4 3.7 2.1 1.4 2.6 0.827486135 0.639225018 0.373642805 0.451764654
Japan 3.6 2.5 2.6 1.3 0.9 2.2 4.7 3.8 3.6 1.2 1.7 1.608383946 0.398000994 0.440217734 0.397295435
Germany 4.6 2.7 2.5 2.7 1.5 3.4 5.9 4.0 4.6 1.6 1.2 2.001897264 0.760787878 0.464155476 0.478902558
France 3.8 4.7 3.5 2.1 1.3 2.5 5.7 3.4 3.8 1.0 1.9 1.648319644 0.690636245 0.58446881 0.551299765
Italy 4.1 4.6 3.5 2.1 2.2 3.1 5.8 3.5 4.1 2.1 2.0 1.802392871 0.653592598 0.710903353 0.539211452
United Kingdom 3.7 2.7 1.7 2.3 2.8 1.9 4.7 4.4 3.7 1.9 0.9 1.41077272 0.838287495 0.998012427 0.190062094
Canada 3.4 2.5 1.9 0.7 1.2 2.3 4.7 3.2 3.4 1.4 1.8 1.634645345 0.316644254 0.4247025 0.304681501
Finland 4.0 4.4 1.4 2.4 1.2 3.4 6.0 2.8 4.0 2.1 1.9 1.854702305 0.722343477 0.560720801 0.32557426
Greece 4.2 4.7 3.4 1.5 2.2 3.8 5.9 3.0 4.2 2.4 2.1 1.95420938 0.461873888 0.714813349 0.543616231
Mexico 2.1 4.2 3.5 1.7 1.1 2.0 3.4 1.8 2.1 1.0 1.3 1.353502801 0.694882568 0.570964691 0.522586274
Netherlands 4.0 4.0 2.2 3.7 0.2 3.6 5.4 3.2 4.0 1.8 1.6 1.768005014 1.039911684 0.309726703 0.337963967
New Zealand 4.5 2.7 2.7 3.5 1.2 3.7 6.0 3.0 4.5 2.8 0.7 2.010288982 0.905292063 0.478973959 0.385442689
Norway 3.3 4.3 1.4 2.4 1.1 2.2 5.6 1.9 3.3 2.8 1.9 1.550070023 0.703961664 0.571637512 0.309285763
Portugal 4.2 4.7 3.4 1.5 2.2 3.9 5.9 3.1 4.2 1.4 1.9 1.927716035 0.537816601 0.712804139 0.52197316
Spain 3.7 4.7 3.6 2.9 1.0 2.5 5.6 3.1 3.7 1.2 1.9 1.682086662 0.927405698 0.473408351 0.55497655
Sweden 4.0 4.2 2.1 2.8 0.7 3.1 6.0 2.9 4.0 1.7 1.9 1.836297304 0.773933652 0.427582084 0.399262966
Switzerland 4.2 3.7 1.4 1.6 0.5 3.5 6.0 3.0 4.2 2.2 1.9 1.90027128 0.545283018 0.315114694 0.280302128
Turkey 4.1 4.8 1.3 1.6 2.2 3.7 5.8 3.3 4.1 2.3 1.9 1.740053875 0.631766305 0.758792739 0.343861905
Czech Rep. 3.8 4.7 1.3 1.7 1.3 3.8 5.9 1.9 3.8 1.5 1.4 1.976677595 0.599534062 0.47354244 0.250246189
Hungary 2.8 4.4 1.3 1.8 1.1 2.6 4.9 1.0 2.8 2.1 1.9 1.512782968 0.653479446 0.495375794 0.162857349
Korea, Rep. of 3.9 2.6 2.5 2.1 1.5 3.2 4.8 3.6 3.9 0.6 0.3 1.830529419 0.767582267 0.66823034 0.245312432
Poland 3.7 4.9 1.3 1.6 1.3 3.7 5.7 2.1 3.7 1.4 1.7 1.875180579 0.60420922 0.557323214 0.26365386
Note: Indexes, which range from 0 to 6, are based on rotated factor loadings. The overall index is based on the first factor for the summary indexes, with 90 percent of the variance explained.
Source: Author’s calculations.
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TABLE 4.8 Regulation Indexes, Road Transport
Limits on
State Backhauling, Limits on
Concession Regulatory Private Competition
State Requirements Approval Carriage, and (Including
Government Ownership/ and Price Required for Other Contract Price
Overall Licensing Concessions Regulation Establishment Regulations Carriage Guidelines)
United States 1.4 4.7 1.9 1.3 1.8 1.2 0.8 1.7
Japan 1.2 4.7 1.4 2.3 0.6 1.4 0.5 1.7
Germany 1.6 4.6 2.3 1.2 2.1 1.3 1.2 2.4
France 1.0 4.9 3.5 1.1 0.3 1.3 0.5 1.7
Italy 2.1 4.4 1.6 3.9 1.8 2.0 0.7 1.5
United Kingdom 1.9 4.6 1.8 1.4 1.7 2.1 0.9 1.7
Canada 1.4 4.7 1.9 1.3 1.8 1.2 0.8 1.7
Finland 2.1 4.4 2.2 1.3 1.2 2.2 1.2 3.9
Greece 2.4 4.4 1.6 3.9 1.8 2.0 0.7 4.1
Mexico 1.0 4.8 1.7 1.2 1.8 0.2 0.7 3.4
Netherlands 1.8 4.5 1.8 1.4 1.0 2.1 0.8 2.9
New Zealand 2.8 3.0 1.8 1.4 2.7 2.1 0.0 1.7
Norway 2.8 3.2 3.9 1.1 2.2 2.3 0.2 2.1
Portugal 1.4 4.7 1.9 1.3 1.8 1.2 0.8 1.7
Spain 1.2 4.6 1.9 1.3 1.1 1.2 0.8 1.8
Sweden 1.7 4.5 1.8 1.4 1.0 2.1 0.8 1.7
Switzerland 2.2 1.8 1.8 1.6 0.6 1.4 0.9 3.4
Turkey 2.3 1.8 2.3 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.7
Czech Rep. 1.5 4.6 4.2 2.6 1.9 1.1 1.1 1.7
Hungary 2.1 4.6 1.8 1.4 1.7 2.1 0.9 3.2
Korea, Rep. of 0.6 4.7 1.7 1.2 1.1 0.2 0.6 1.7
Poland 1.4 4.5 4.2 2.6 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.7
Note: Indexes, which range from 0 to 6, are based on rotated factor loadings. The overall index is based on the first factor for the summary indexes, with 90 percent
of the variance explained.
Source: Author’s calculations.
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TABLE 4.9 Regulation Indexes, Rail Transport
Government
Financial/
Operational Government Domestic
Overall Interventions Ownership Competition
United States 2.6 1.9 1.7 0.2
Japan 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.3
Germany 1.2 1.7 1.8 1.9
France 1.9 3.4 1.8 1.3
Italy 2.0 3.4 1.8 1.2
United Kingdom 0.9 2.2 0.3 1.3
Canada 1.8 1.9 1.7 1.2
Finland 1.9 1.3 2.2 1.3
Greece 2.1 3.0 2.2 1.3
Mexico 1.3 1.7 1.8 1.8
Netherlands 1.6 2.3 1.4 1.3
New Zealand 0.7 1.3 1.1 1.9
Norway 1.9 1.3 2.2 1.3
Portugal 1.9 3.4 1.8 1.3
Spain 1.9 3.4 1.8 1.3
Sweden 1.9 1.3 2.2 1.3
Switzerland 1.9 3.4 1.8 1.3
Turkey 1.9 3.4 1.8 1.3
Czech Rep. 1.4 3.4 1.8 1.9
Hungary 1.9 3.4 1.8 1.3
Korea, Rep. of 0.3 2.2 0.3 1.9
Poland 1.7 1.9 1.7 1.3
Note: Indexes, which range from 0 to 6, are based on rotated factor loadings. The overall index is based
on the first factor for the summary indexes, with 90 percent of the variance explained.
Source: Author’s calculations.
with that of the EU, as does air and rail (see figure 4.1,
which compares Turkey with 21 other OECD
members on the overall sector indexes).
Another set of indicators, for the transport sec-
tor broadly defined, is presented in table 4.10. Like
those in tables 4.7, 4.8, and 4.9, these indicators are
based on a factor analysis of the regulatory vari-
ables. In table 4.10, however, the full set of sector
indicators in the previous three tables are combined
to yield a set of four factors used to construct the
composite index—that is, a set of overall regulatory
indicators for competition, regulation of industry
structure, public service obligations, and financial
involvement of government—as well as an overall
index, based on these four factors and aggregated
using rotated factor loadings. These four factors
explain roughly 90 percent of the regulatory vari-
able variance, because they are constructed from
sector indicators. For the overall index, the most
important summary indictor is competition and
price regulation (37.4 percent), followed by regula-
tion of industry structure (23.2 percent), public
service obligations and regulation of customer
access (22.5 percent), and indicators of government
ownership and bailouts (16.9 percent).
The indexes in table 4.10 are summarized in fig-
ure 4.2. The figure presents a breakdown (based on
the weights in table 4.10) of the contribution of
each factor to the total index. Note the level of
Turkey in relation to the average level for the EU. It
reveals for all of transport, as it was for the individ-
ual subsector indicators, a rough congruence
between the Turkish regulatory regime and the
range of regimes tolerated by the European Union.
What do these indicators say? Overall, the regime
in Turkey appears to be consistent with regimes
existing within the EU, including, for example,
Greece, Spain, Italy, Germany, and Portugal. Thus,
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TABLE 4.10 Regulation Indexes, All Transport
Public Service
Obligation,
Competition Regulation of Regulated Government
and Price Industry Customer Ownership and
Overall Regulation Structure Access Bailouts
United States 2.3 2.2 2.8 1.7 2.7
Japan 2.8 4.3 1.7 2.0 2.4
Germany 3.7 5.3 3.3 2.1 2.8
France 3.5 4.4 3.0 2.6 3.3
Italy 3.7 4.8 2.8 3.2 3.2
United Kingdom 3.4 3.8 3.6 4.4 1.1
Canada 2.7 4.4 1.4 1.9 1.8
Finland 3.5 5.0 3.1 2.5 1.9
Greece 3.7 5.2 2.0 3.2 3.2
Mexico 3.1 3.6 3.0 2.5 3.1
Netherlands 3.5 4.7 4.5 1.4 2.0
New Zealand 3.8 5.4 3.9 2.1 2.3
Norway 3.1 4.1 3.0 2.5 1.8
Portugal 3.7 5.2 2.3 3.2 3.1
Spain 3.6 4.5 4.0 2.1 3.3
Sweden 3.4 4.9 3.3 1.9 2.4
Switzerland 3.0 5.1 2.3 1.4 1.7
Turkey 3.5 4.6 2.7 3.4 2.0
Czech Rep. 3.3 5.3 2.6 2.1 1.5
Hungary 2.8 4.0 2.8 2.2 1.0
Korea, Rep. of 3.5 4.9 3.3 3.0 1.5
Poland 3.3 5.0 2.6 2.5 1.6
Weight 0.374 0.232 0.225 0.169
Note: Indexes, which range from 0 to 6, are based on rotated factor loadings. The overall index is based
on the first factor for the summary indexes, with 90 percent of the variance explained.
Source: Author’s calculations.
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FIGURE 4.1 Comparison of Regulatory Regimes
Source: The author.
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FIGURE 4.2 Decomposition of Overall Transport Regulation Index
Source: The author.
given what is tolerated within the EU, there is no
clear indication that Turkey will need to realign its
regulatory stance upon accession to the EU. This
situation probably reflects, in part, the country’s
already long history of regulatory alignment.
Summary and Conclusions
This chapter has explored the possible implications
of Turkish accession to the EU, particularly regula-
tory issues in the transport sector in Turkey. The
transport sector is important to the general condi-
tions for economic performance and growth.
Because it serves as an important intermediate
input, both nationally and internationally, changes
in the trade and regulatory regime of the sector can
have important economic effects. The chapter has
addressed two sets of issues. The first is the quanti-
tative impact, through direct trade and economy-
wide effects, of full membership. These effects have
been examined through reference to computable
general equilibrium analysis and partial equi-
librium analysis. Because of the existence of the
EU-Turkey customs union, deeper integration
along this front does not appear to carry significant
threats of pressure for restructuring, surges in
imports, or, as a consequence, significant income
gains from the sector. The second set of issues
involves regulatory convergence. Here, factor analy-
sis of a database of regulatory variables indicates
that, overall, the two regimes (Turkey and the EU)
are broadly consistent in their regulatory stance
(e.g., degree of competition, price regulation, gov-
ernment financial intervention). This consistency
most likely reflects the long process of negotiation
and regulation that has accompanied evolution of
the customs union. It means as well that pressure to
restructure for broad regulatory reasons may be
minimal.
Annex 1: Tariff Equivalents 
for Transport Services
This annex describes a basic methodology for the
estimation of sector-specific gravity equations in
relation to global trade levels. The results are
reported in table 4.11. Basically, services trade data
are fitted to a simple gravity model of total imports
by country. These equations have been estimated at
the level of transport services.
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The gravity equations are estimated using ordi-
nary least squares with the variables
(4.1) Xi  a1  ln(POPi)  a2  ln(PCGDP)i
 a3  ln(PCGDP)
2
i  εi
where Xi represents imports from the world, POP
represents population, and PCGDP per capita
income in the importing country.
In the regressions, Hong Kong (China) is broken
out as a free trade“benchmark.”Deviations from pre-
dicted imports, relative to this free trade benchmark,
are taken as an indication of barriers to trade. These
tariff equivalent rates are then backed out from a con-
stant elasticity import demand function as follows:
(4.2)
T1
T0
=
[
M1
M0
]1/e
Here, T1 is the power of the tariff equivalent (1 
t1 ) such that in free trade T0  1, and [M1/M0] is the
ratio of actual to predicted imports (normalized rel-
ative to the free trade benchmark ratio for Hong
Kong). In this reduced form, actual prices and con-
stant terms drop out because ratios are formed. The
term e is the demand elasticity (taken to be 3.9).
This approach yields an estimated tariff equiva-
lent for Turkey’s imports of transport services of
8.9 percent, and the EU data reveal no barriers to
cross-border trade in the sector at the EU15 level—
that is, including all 15 member states. Barriers may
emerge, however, at the level of individual member
states (see Francois, van Meij, and van Tongeren
forthcoming).
Annex 2: The Model
This annex describes the basic structure of the stan-
dard multiregion computable general equilibrium
model used in this study. The model is imple-
mented in GEMPACK, a software package designed
for solving large applied general equilibrium mod-
els.6 It is solved as an explicit nonlinear system of
equations, using techniques described by Harrison,
Horridge, and Pearson (2000).7 The national
accounts data were organized into 24 sectors and
29 regions. The sectors and regions for this 24  29
aggregation of the data are detailed in table 4.12.
The data were taken from various sources. Data
on production and trade are based on national
accounting data linked through trade flows and
drawn directly from the GTAP Version 5 dataset
(GTAP 2001; also see Reinert and Roland-Holst,
1997, for a discussion of the organization of such
data for CGE models). The GTAP Version 5 dataset is
benchmarked to 1997 and includes detailed national
TABLE 4.11 Regression Results for Gravity Equation on 
Cross-Border Trade
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.967335
R-square 0.935736
Adjusted R-square 0.926556
Standard error 0.179688
Observations 25
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 3 9.872914 3.290971 101.9261 1.12E-12
Residual 21 0.678044 0.032288
Total 24 10.55096
Coefficients Standard Error t Statistic
Intercept 2.48491 1.213893 2.04706
log(POP) 0.901064 0.064715 13.92348
LOG (PCGDP) 1.43188 0.693996 2.063239
log(PCGDP)sq 0.0585 0.098696 0.59275
Source: Author’s calculations.
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input-output, trade, and final demand structures.
Significant modifications were made to the basic
GTAP database. The basic social accounting and
trade data were supplemented with trade policy
data, including additional data on tariffs and nontar-
iff barriers. The dataset was also updated to better
reflect actual import protection for goods and serv-
ices (for example, the basic GTAP database includes
no information at all on trade barriers for services).
General Structure
The general conceptual structure of a regional
economy in the model is represented in figure 4.3.
Within each region,firms produce output,employing
land, labor, and capital and combining these with
intermediate inputs. Firm output is purchased by
consumers, government, the investment sector,
and other firms. Firm output also can be sold for
export. Land is employed only in the agricul-
tural sectors, while capital and labor (both skilled
and unskilled) are mobile between all production
sectors. Moreover, capital is fully mobile within
regions. However, capital movements between
regions are not modeled, but rather are held fixed in
all simulations. Labor mobility is discussed below.
All demand sources combine imports with
domestic goods to produce a composite good, as
indicated in figure 4.3. These are Armington
composites.
TABLE 4.12 Sectoring Scheme of Model
Model Regions Model Sectors
Australia and New Zealand Grains
China Other agriculture
Hong Kong (China) Mining
Japan Other primary production
Korea Sugar
Taiwan Dairy
Other ASEAN Meats
Vietnam Processed foods
Bangladesh Textiles
India Clothing
South Asia Leather
Canada Wood and paper
Mexico Chemicals
United States Refineries
Caribbean Basin Initiative countries Steel
Andean Trade Pact Nonferrous metals
MERCOSUR Motor vehicles
Chile Electronics
Other Latin America Other machinery
European Union (EU15) Manufactures, NEC
Central European Associates Trade, transport, communications
Turkey Construction
SACU Business services
Botswana Other services
Malawi
Mozambique
Rest of Southern Africa
North Africa and Middle East
Rest of world
Note: ASEAN  Association of South East Asian Nations; MERCOSUR 
Southern Cone Common Market (Mercado Común del Sur); SACU 
Southern African Customs Union; NEC  not elsewhere classified.
Source: Author’s definition of model aggregation.
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Dynamics
An important feature of the model is a dynamic
link, whereby the static or direct income effects of
trade liberalization induce shifts in the regional
pattern of savings and investment. These effects
have been explored extensively in the trade litera-
ture, including Baldwin and Francois (1999), Smith
(1976, 1977), and Srinivasan and Bhagwati (1980).
Several studies of the Uruguay Round have also
incorporated variations on this mechanism. Such
effects compound initial output welfare effects over
the medium run and can magnify income gains or
losses. How much these “accumulation effects” will
supplement static effects depends on various fac-
tors, including the marginal product of capital and
underlying savings behavior. This application
employs a classical savings-investment mechanism
(Francois, McDonald, and Nordstrom 1997), which
means modeling medium- to long-run linkages
between changes in income, savings, and invest-
ment. The results reported here therefore include
changes in the capital stock and the medium- to
long-run implications of such changes.
Taxes and Policy Variables
Taxes are included in the theory of the model at sev-
eral levels. Production taxes are placed on interme-
diate or primary inputs, or on output. Some trade
taxes are modeled at the border. Additional internal
taxes can be placed on domestic or imported inter-
mediate inputs and may be applied at differential
rates that discriminate against imports. Where
relevant, taxes are also placed on exports and on pri-
mary factor income. Finally, where relevant (as indi-
cated by social accounting data), taxes are placed on
final consumption and can be applied differentially
to consumption of domestic and imported goods.
Trade policy instruments are represented as
import or export taxes/subsidies. This includes
applied most-favored-nation tariffs, antidumping
duties, countervailing duties, price undertakings,
export quotas, and other trade restrictions. The one
exception is services sector trading costs, which are
discussed in the next section.
The basic data on current tariff rates are taken
from the UN Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment (UNCTAD) and WTO data on applied and
bound tariff rates, and they are integrated into the
core GTAP database. These data are supplemented
with those from the U.S. Trade Representative
(USTR) and U.S. International Trade Commission
(USITC) on regional preference schemes in the
Western Hemisphere. For agriculture, protection is
based on OECD and U.S. Department of Agriculture
(USDA) estimates of agricultural protection, as
integrated into the GTAP core database. Tariff and
nontariff barrier estimates are further adjusted to
reflect the remaining Uruguay Round commit-
ments, including the phasing out of the remaining
textile and clothing quotas under the Agreement on
Textiles and Clothing (ATC). Data on post–Uruguay
Round tariffs are taken from recent estimates
reported by Francois and Strutt (1999), which are
taken, in turn, primarily from the WTO’s integrated
database, with supplemental information from the
World Bank’s recent assessment of detailed pre– and
post–Uruguay Round tariff schedules. All of this
tariff information was concorded to the model sec-
tors. The services trade barriers are based on the
estimates described in Annex 1.
Trade and Transport Costs
International trade is modeled as a process that
explicitly involves trading costs, which include both
trade and transportation services. These trading
costs reflect the transaction costs of interna-
tional trade, as well as the physical activity of trans-
portation itself. Those trading costs related to the
CES
M1 M2 MR
CES
Domestic
goods
Composite
imports
Armington
composite
FIGURE 4.3 Armington Aggregation Nest
Note: CES  constant elasticity of substitution.
Source: The author.
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international movement of goods and related logis-
tic services are met by composite services purchased
from a global trade services sector in which the
composite “international trade services” activity is
produced as a Cobb-Douglas composite of regional
exports of trade and transport services. Trade cost
margins are based on reconciled free on board
(FOB) and cost, insurance, and freight (CIF) trade
data, as reported in Version 5 of the GTAP dataset.
A second form of trade costs, known in the liter-
ature as frictional trading costs, is implemented in
the services sector. These costs represent the real
resource costs associated with producing a service
for sale in an export market instead of the domestic
market. Conceptually, a linear transformation tech-
nology was implemented between domestic and
export services. This technology is represented in
figure 4.4. The straight line AB indicates, given the
resources needed to produce a unit of services for
the domestic market, the feasible amount that can
instead be produced for export using those same
resources. If there are no frictional barriers to trade
in services, this line has a slope of 1. This free trade
case is represented by the line AC. As trading costs
fall, the linear transformation line converges on the
free trade line, as indicated in the figure.
Production Structure
The basic structure of production is depicted in fig-
ure 4.5. Intermediate inputs are combined, and this
composite intermediate is in turn combined in
fixed proportions with value added. This yields sec-
tor output Z.
Composite Household and Final Demand
Final demand is determined by an upper-tier
Cobb-Douglas preference function that allocates
income in fixed shares to current consumption,
investment, and government services. This process
SDomestic 
SExport B C
A
FIGURE 4.4 Trading Costs in the Services 
Sector
Source: The author.
Specification of production in
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Value
added
Intermediate
inputs 
Composite goods
Output
CapitalLaborLand
Production and trade flows 
Primary
factors
Composite
goods
Imports 
Exports Domestic
production Final
demand
LeontiefCES
FIGURE 4.5 Basic Features of the Simulation Model
Note: CES  constant elasticity of substitution.
Source: The author.
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yields a fixed savings rate. Government services are
produced by a Leontief technology, with house-
hold/government transfers being endogenous. The
lower-tier nest for current consumption is also
specified as a CDE (constant difference of elastici-
ties) demand function. The regional capital mar-
kets adjust so that changes in savings match
changes in regional investment expenditures. (Note
that the Cobb-Douglas demand function is a spe-
cial case of the CDE demand function, as is the CES
or constant elasticity of demand specification. The
Cobb-Douglas version of the CDE is implemented
through GEMPACK parameter files.)
Labor Markets
The default closure involves modeling labor markets
as clearing with flexible wages. This fits with the
“long-run” approach in which labor markets tend to
be more flexible. A situation is specified in which the
basic structural rigidities of labor markets (and the
aggregate employment levels implied) are unaf-
fected by the simulations in the long run. However,
in implementation the mobility of labor between
sectors is slightly “sluggish” in the sense that there is
not a perfectly linear transform technology for the
movement of labor between sectors. The implemen-
tation of sluggish factor mobility represents the
assumption that, for institutional reasons (and
because some skills are sector-specific), labor is not
fully flexible in its application across sectors. This
representation of labor markets seems reasonable.
To the extent that wage rigidities are important, the
direction of aggregate employment effects may be
inferred from wage effects. (Hertel, 1996, refers to
this as “sluggish” factor movements). A theoretical
discussion of factor mobility, along the lines devel-
oped in Hertel and employed here, can be found in
Casas (1984). In practice, the transformation elastic-
ities are set very high (25.0), but not infinitely so.
This effectively allows for almost full mobility.
Notes
1. One might say that, in the eyes of the EU, when it comes to
trading partners, “Everybody is special and unique, just like
everybody else.”
2. The procedures for implementing the final phase of the
customs union in industrial products are set out in the Official
Journal of the European Communities 13.02.95 L 035, and in a
bilateral steel agreement.
3. Decision No. 1/98 of the EC–Turkey Association Council,
February 25, 1998, on the trade regime for agricultural produc-
tions (98/223/EC).
4. See Francois, McQueen, and Wignaraja (2003; technical
annex) for a detailed discussion of the model. Also see the
related background report cited therein.
5. All dollar amounts are U.S. dollars unless otherwise indi-
cated.
6. See Hertel (1996: chap. 2) for a detailed discussion of the
basic algebraic model structure represented by the GEMPACK
code. The capital accumulation mechanisms are described in
Francois, McDonald, and Nordstrom (1996).
7. More information can be obtained at http://www.
monash.edu.au/policy/gempack.htm. Social accounting data are
based on Version 5 of the GTAP dataset (GTAP 2001), with an
update to reflect post–Uruguay Round protection.
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The second and third aspects of the telecom-
munications industry—its rapid technological
progress and its role in providing the infrastructure
for the information society and knowledge econ-
omy—are central to investments and economic
development. Private investments are becoming the
main source of technology development and capac-
ity building in the telecommunications industry.
Licensing and privatization are the two main chan-
nels to attracting initial private capital and paving
the way for further investments. Human capital for-
mation and innovation are facilitated by means of
sharing knowledge at almost no cost. The easy inter-
action between universities and research institu-
tions also encourages research and innovation.
Moreover, easy access to networks promotes social
cohesion and inclusiveness. Finally, government-
citizen and government-business relations are sim-
plified through e-government projects. In this area,
Turkey has signed the eEurope+ 2003 Action Plan
along with other EU candidate countries. Some
progress has been made in areas of liberalization
and licensing, but very little progress has been made
in privatization.
The fourth aspect of the telecommunications
industry—its direct utility to the end users of
telecommunications services—can be measured
roughly by the share of telecommunications
The telecommunications industry has many inter-
esting aspects.1 First, it is a network industry, with
high fixed costs and low marginal costs. Second, it
is subject to rapid technological progress. Third, it
serves as the infrastructure for the information
society and knowledge economy. Finally, it provides
direct utility to the end users of telecommunica-
tions services.
The first aspect—the telecommunications in-
dustry as a network industry—has been a challenge
to both economic theorists and policymakers in
general. How to maintain an efficient outcome by
an appropriate mix of competition and regulation
policies is still an active research area (e.g., Baumol
and Sidak 1994; Laffont and Tirole 1996, 2000;
Armstrong 1997, 1998; Shy 2001). The legal and
regulatory arrangements have been evolving quite
fast in the last decade as well (e.g., World Bank
2000; OECD 2003; 1997 and 2002 acquis commu-
nautaire of the European Union on telecommuni-
cations services). Turkey has already adopted the
1998 acquis of the European Union (EU) in tele-
communications, and it has shown some progress
in regulatory capacity building and liberalization of
mobile phone (GSM) services. A crucial milestone
was reached in May 2004, when the first licenses for
the provision of voice telephony services by alter-
native operators were issued.
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spending of households as a fraction of gross domes-
tic product (GDP). Other indicators are per capita
number of fixed plus mobile lines (teledensity) and
Internet use and the urban-rural teledensity ratio. In
some of these measures, Turkey has shown substan-
tial progress; in others, it is still lagging behind.
The focus in recent years, however, has shifted
from building infrastructure to regulatory and
market structure issues. For example, using data
from 23 Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) countries over the
1991–97 period, Boylaud and Nicoletti (2000) find
significant price, quality, and productivity effects
for both prospective and effective competition. They
measure prospective competition by the number of
years remaining until liberalization and measure
effective competition by the share of new entrants
or by the number of competitors. Legal competi-
tion in fixed lines became effective in Turkey as of
January 2004.
Likewise, a recent paper by Fink, Mattoo, and
Rathindran (2002) based on data from 86 develop-
ing countries finds that both the privatization and
liberalization of fixed lines significantly increase
mainline penetration and productivity. They also
show that competition without privatization is not
significant on these two performance measures.
The sequencing also matters. According to Fink and
his colleagues, simultaneous privatization and com-
petition have a greater impact on mainline penetra-
tion than the privatization-before-competition
scenario. The estimated quantitative impact of
complete reform is 8 percent higher mainline pene-
tration and 21 percent higher productivity com-
pared with the case of no reform.
This chapter is organized as follows. The first
section gives a quantitative comparison of recent
indicators for price, quantity, and quality of various
services for Turkey, EU member countries, and EU
accession countries. The second section summarizes
developments in the liberalization and regulation of
the sector, and the third discusses the brief history
of the privatization process for Türk Telekom.
A comparison of the legal infrastructure and insti-
tutional aspects of Turkey’s telecom sector with
those of the EU follows in the fourth section. The
concluding section provides an overview of needs
assessment in market structure, legislative, regula-
tory, and taxation issues in light of EU accession and
the eEurope+ Action Plan.
A Quantitative Comparison
Broadly speaking, the Turkish telecommunications
sector is comparable with those of the accession
countries2 that have with a similar level of GDP.
Turkey scores better in terms of total teledensity
and the urban-rural teledensity ratio, but lags
behind in Internet usage.
The total expenditure on telecommunications
services constitutes a significant portion of GDP in
both EU members and candidate countries. Fig-
ure 5.1 shows this statistic to be about 3 percent for
both Turkey and candidate countries and slightly
lower for EU members.
Figure 5.2 shows that in terms of fixed-line tele-
phones per household, Turkey scores better than
both the candidate countries and the EU. However,
in terms of the fixed-line penetration rate (i.e., the
number of fixed lines per 100 inhabitants) Turkey
seems to lag behind (figure 5.3). The striking differ-
ence between figures 5.2 and 5.3 can be attributed
to the large families in Turkey. Therefore, the rela-
tively low penetration rate in fixed lines need not be
seen as a deficiency.
The urban-rural teledensity ratio (Istanbul ver-
sus the rest of the country) is shown in figure 5.4.
This figure reflects the fact that most of the invest-
ments of Türk Telekom were carried out with the
implicit understanding that it would provide uni-
versal service throughout the country. The figure
also is indicative of the significant investments
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made by Türk Telekom during the 1980s. In 1980
the ratio of Türk Telekom investments to the gross
national product (GNP) was about 0.3 percent.
This ratio steadily increased to 1 percent of GNP in
1987. Afterward, it sharply declined and fell back
on average to about 0.3 percent during the second
half of the 1990s (Yılmaz 2000). The significant
slowdown in investments by TT brought stagnation
in improvements in the fixed-line teledensity.
Figure 5.5 also supports the investment slow-
down reported by Yılmaz (2000). The slowdown
can be attributed largely to the financial squeeze in
the government’s budget and the use of TT profits
to contribute to the primary budget surplus of the
general government under the International Mone-
tary Fund (IMF) program.
The mobile penetration rate is also significant.
According to figure 5.6, Turkey has a mobile
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Source: eEurope+ 2003.
penetration rate comparable with that of the candi-
date countries. Given Turkey’s population, this rate
translates into a large mobile market in Europe.
In line with the 2002 acquis and the eEurope+
2003 Action Plan, Internet use and related data
services are also important. Figures 5.7 and 5.8
indicate that both the Internet availability per
household and Internet use per individual are low
in Turkey compared with the rates even in the can-
didate countries. There are two possible explana-
tions for this observation. One is related to the
price of Internet services, and the second is related
to the availability of Internet facilities—that is, data
lines and personal computers (PCs).
Figure 5.9 shows that the cost of connecting to
the Internet is significantly lower in Turkey than in
the other countries. Connection prices are less than
half of the EU average and less than a quarter of the
candidate countries’ average. Thus the only possible
obstacle to use of the Internet in Turkey would
be the availability of PCs. Although significant
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progress has been achieved in recent years, mobile
Internet technologies serve a niche market and do
not seem to contribute to Internet penetration.
Likewise, figures 5.10 and 5.11 show Turkey as
an outlier to the negatively sloped demand curve
on cost versus use of the Internet.
In Turkey, the PC penetration is low—only
about 4 PCs per 100 persons, compared with about
13 PCs for candidate countries and 33 PCs for the
EU member states (figure 5.12). Therefore, low
Internet use can be linked to low PC penetration
rates in Turkey. The 2002 “Progress Report” of
eEurope+ 2003 (2003) elaborates on the low PC use
in primary, secondary, and higher education in
Turkey. The same document also points out that
Turkey does not have any public Internet access
points (PIAPs or telecenters).3
As for the prices of fixed-line telephone services,
both Turkey and other candidate countries have rel-
atively high call rates and relatively low fixed
monthly fees (see figure 5.13 for a comparison of
the fixed monthly access fees). Turkey, with an aver-
age monthly fee of about €4, is below the averages of
both the EU and candidate countries. The country-
specific fixed access fees are reported in tables 5.1
and 5.2 in the chapter annex.
Figure 5.14 compares local call rates. Turkey’s
price is slightly above the average for the candidate
countries and significantly above the EU average.
Turkey’s position can be attributed to Türk
Telekom’s monopoly in fixed-line services. The
country-specific local charges are given in tables 5.1
and 5.2 in the chapter annex as well.
One measure of quality of service is faults per
100 main lines per year. In this area, Turkey scores
worse than both the candidate and EU countries
(see figure 5.15).
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Source: ITU 2001.
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Source: World Bank 2002.
In the final measure—international calling—
Turkey, possibly because of its high international
tariffs, ranks far behind both the candidate and EU
countries.
Competition Policy and Regulation
As of January 2004, Turkey’s telecommunications
sector was fully open to competition, making
Turkey the last of the OECD countries to fully
liberalize its sector. To this end, in 1998 the Turkish
government had committed itself, in accordance
with World Trade Organization (WTO) guidelines,
to liberalize its fixed-line telephone network and
services no later than the end of 2004. However, the
telecommunications law (No. 4502) enacted in
January 2000 shifted the liberalization timetable to
the end of 2003.
After taking the important step of opening
up fixed lines for competition, the government
Turkey
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FIGURE 5.13 Residential Monthly Access
Fee (Including Value Added
Tax) for Fixed-Line Telephone
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Source: World Bank 2002.
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addressed the institutional capacity of the inde-
pendent Telecommunications Authority (TA),
Telekomünikasyon Kurumu. The TA was established
by the 2000 telecommunications law. Some criticism
was directed at the authority’s initial composition
and the excessive amount of power that it was given
to apply sanctions if national security or public
order were imperiled (OECD 2002; Goldstein 2003).
Nevertheless, the secondary legislation was broadly
completed by the TA before January 2004.
In fact, limited competition had been under way
in mobile phone services since 1994, when two pri-
vate firms, Turkcell and Telsim, were given the
rights to offer GSM services through revenue-
sharing agreements with Türk Telekom. In 1998 the
government sold the two operators licenses, by
means of a concession agreement, to operate their
GSM 900 networks for 25 years in return for
US$500 million apiece.4
In April 2000, the Ministry of Transportation ten-
dered two new GSM 1800 licenses by means of con-
cession agreements. A third license was reserved for
Türk Telekom at the price of the first auction.
Because of the auction design, only one of the
licenses was sold, but the revenue generated was
higher than expected. I
.
s¸bank-Telecom Italia Mobile
(TIM) consortium (Aria) won the first auction with
a bid of $2.5 billion. This number was then the min-
imum price for the second auction, and thus the auc-
tion attracted no bidders.5 Türk Telekom decided to
launch its own GSM 1800 operator, Aycell. As of the
end of 2003, the four GSM operators—Turkcell,
Telsim, Aria, and Aycell—had market shares of
68 percent, 18 percent, 7 percent, and 7 percent,
respectively. The two small operators, Aria and
Aycell, merged in 2004 under TT-I
.
s¸bank-TIM with
the brand name Avea.
Privatization of Türk Telekom 
The already delayed privatization of Türk Telekom
bears urgency, because competition between the
company and potential private entrants will not be
easy. Some of the difficulties facing Türk Telekom
in its competition with others are as follows:
• Turkey’s Treasury does not permit the state-
owned corporation to borrow funds for invest-
ments.
• Only a small fraction of net profits can be used
for investments.6
• As a state-owned corporation, Türk Telekom
would find it difficult to undertake risky and
ambitious projects and restructuring plans.
Since 1994, when the postal and telecommuni-
cations services of the General Directorate of Post,
Telegraph, and Telephone (PTT) were separated,
various attempts have been made to privatize Türk
Telekom. Earlier attempts were turned down by the
Supreme Court. After addressing the legal issues
more carefully, the government offered a tender in
2000 that left 51 percent of the shares with the Trea-
sury, but it was not successful in part because of
poor market conditions in the telecommunications
sector worldwide. Law No. 4673 of May 2001 left a
golden share of Türk Telekom to the Treasury,
which means, in fact, to one strong member of the
board of directors. Türk Telekom employees are
entitled to 5 percent of the shares, and the remain-
ing are available for block sale or for initial public
offerings (IPOs). The restriction on foreign owner-
ship was removed by the foreign direct investment
law of 2004.
In December 2003, the Council of Ministers
adopted a new privatization plan for Türk Telekom.
The plan called for a block sale of 51 percent of
shares in 2004. Since then, the valuation committee
and the tender committee have been preparing for
that sale. Law No. 5189 of July 2004 provided
further amendments to foster the privatization
process.
Legal and Institutional 
Comparisons with the EU
The most recent legal development in the EU is the
acceptance of the 2002 acquis in telecommunica-
tions. The European Parliament and the European
Council approved and published a set of new direc-
tives in 2002. The directives considered here are the
framework directive, authorization directive, access
directive, and universal service directive. This sec-
tion, in light of the EU directives, describes the
recent progress of Turkey in each area. It also com-
pares price regulation practices in EU and Turkey.
Framework
The purpose of the 2002 EU legislation is to pro-
vide a common regulatory framework and compe-
tition principles and practices for the electronic
communications sector, comprising telecommuni-
cations, media, and information technology serv-
ices (the framework does not regulate content).
The purpose of introducing the new directives is
to address the technological convergence observed
in these three sectors. Under the framework
directive,
• Member states are to guarantee the independ-
ence of the national regulatory authority (NRA).
• Telecommunication service providers have the
right of appeal against NRA decisions.
• NRAs are responsible for the gathering and dis-
semination of sector-related information.
• All potential service providers have the right to
install facilities in a timely, nondiscriminatory,
and transparent manner.
• Facility sharing among service providers is nor-
mally voluntary, but the NRAs can also make it
compulsory under exceptional circumstances.
• NRAs are responsible for identifying service
providers that have a “significant market power”
in the relevant market.
• In cases in which significant market power is
identified, the NRAs are supposed to impose
regulations ex ante on the company with signifi-
cant market power.
• If access and interconnection negotiations
between companies fail, the NRA resolves the
dispute within four months.
In Turkey, an important reform process began in
2000 in the telecommunications sector. The previ-
ous legislation, which dates back to 1924, was
amended. The new legislation is broadly compati-
ble with the EU perspective. In June 2001, Turkey,
along with the other EU candidate countries, was a
signatory to the eEurope+ Action Plan by which it
committed itself to achieving certain measurable
goals in the electronic communications sector.
Authorization
The most recent EU document on licensing and
related issues is the authorization directive
(2002/20/EC). The objective of the directive is 
to create a legal framework to ensure the freedom
to provide electronic communication networks
and services, subject only to the conditions laid
down in this Directive and to any restrictions in
conformity with Article 46(1) of the Treaty, in
particular, measures regarding public policy,
public security and public health. (Emphasis
added.) 
A general authorization is available for every serv-
ice provider. Yet the member states may at most
require a notification from the service provider.
Other than the notification, no permissions or
other administrative barriers to entry will be
imposed (Article 3.2). In cases in which there is a
technical need to limit the number of rights of use
granted, such as the allocation of radio frequencies,
the selection criteria must be objective, transparent,
nondiscriminatory, and proportionate. Time limits
are imposed on the administration to finalize the
applications (Articles 5.2, 7.4).
Although obtaining a general authorization is as
simple as it can be, an undertaking that does not
comply with the general conditions laid down
by the NRAs may be subject to financial penalties
and even be prevented from providing service
(Article 10).
In Turkey, the government monopoly on fixed-
line services dates back to 1924 and the telegram
and telephone law (No. 406). This monopoly
ended, however, at the beginning of 2004 under the
telecommunications law (No. 4502). Licensing was
mentioned in legal arrangements for the first time
in 1995, when a value added telecommunications
services regulation was enacted. In 2000 the telecom-
munications law brought with it a new approach to
licensing. Based on this approach, the Ministry of
Transportation issued a new telecommunications
services regulation.
In May 2001, by means of Law No. 4673, the right
to issue licenses was transferred to the Telecom-
munications Authority. Accordingly, the TA pub-
lished a Licensing Communiqué in 2002. The
communiqué states the conditions to be met by
applicants, the time limits, and the other procedural
details for issuing licenses. The minimum license fees
are determined by the Council of Ministers. These
fees are broadly consistent with the average adminis-
trative fees set in the EU.
In 2002, new licenses were issued by the TA.
These were general authorizations and telecommu-
nications licenses for some existing Internet serv-
ice provider, very small aperture terminal, and
satellite platform operators. The licenses for long-
distance telephony operators have been issued since
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May 2004. Although some applications for telecom-
munications services, such as fixed wireless access,
are outstanding, the TA is expected to issue licenses
in the fourth quarter of 2004.
The 2000 telecommunications law contains
clauses on licensing with four types of authoriza-
tion: (1) authorization agreement, (2) concession
agreement, (3) telecommunications license, and
(4) general authorization. The approach in the EU
is general authorization and allocation rules for
individual licenses for radio frequencies based on
competitive principles. In Turkey, the four different
arrangements for licensing are confusing and diffi-
cult to implement.
The latest telecommunications services reg-
ulation should be updated to reflect changes in
legislation (mainly Law No. 4502 and No. 4673).
Authorization agreements and concession agree-
ments could be converted to individual licenses,
and telecommunications licenses could be con-
verted to general authorizations or permits. Rev-
enue share agreements also could be converted to
licenses. There is no genuine license concept in cur-
rent arrangements because the TA can change
license conditions unilaterally.
Access
The most recent EU documents regulating access to
the network of other firms are the access directive
(2002/19/EC) and the regulation on unbundled
access to the local loop (No. 2887/2000). The access
directive defines access as “the making available of
facilities and/or services, to another undertaking,
under defined conditions, on either an exclusive or
non-exclusive basis, for the purpose of providing
electronic communication services” and intercon-
nection as 
the physical and logical linking of public com-
munications networks used by the same or a dif-
ferent undertaking in order to allow the users of
one undertaking to communicate with users of
the same or another undertaking, or to access
services provided by another undertaking. . . .
Interconnection is a specific type of access imple-
mented between public network operators.
Local loop unbundling is based on the definition in
the local loop regulation in which the “‘local loop’
is the physical twisted metallic pair circuit in the
fixed public telephone network connecting the
network termination point at the subscriber’s
premises to the main distribution frame or equiva-
lent facility.”
The access directive establishes the rights and
obligations of operators regarding interconnec-
tions and access. It also defines the NRA objectives
and procedures regarding access. The main points
are as follows:
• Private negotiations between undertakings for
interconnections cannot be restricted by mem-
ber states.
• Operators cannot be obliged to discriminate
between different undertakings for equivalent
service.
• Operators are obliged to negotiate interconnec-
tion when others ask for it.
• The NRAs can impose, when necessary, obliga-
tions on an operator to facilitate interconnections.
• The obligations may be imposed only on an objec-
tive, transparent, proportionate, and nondis-
criminatory basis.
• With the permission of the European Commis-
sion, the NRAs can impose additional measures
related to access on operators with significant
market power.
Likewise, the local loop unbundling regulation
aims to facilitate access to the “least competitive
segments of the liberalized telecommunications
market.” It is recognized that the new entries will be
difficult, given the high costs of fixed-line infra-
structure, and that the existing infrastructure has
been financed by monopoly rents. Yet the eEurope+
Action Plan, in order to substantially reduce the
costs of using the Internet, identifies unbundled
access to the local loop as a short-term priority.
According to the local loop unbundling regula-
tion, the NRA has the following responsibilities:
• To identify notified operators (NOs) as those that
have significant market power in fixed public
telephone networks
• To ask NOs to publish a reference offer for unbun-
dled access to their local loops and related facilities
• To supervise NOs in their cost-based pricing and
in providing other operators with transparent,
fair, and nondiscriminatory unbundled access to
the local loop.
The clauses in Turkey’s Law No. 4502 on inter-
connection and roaming are in harmony with the
EU acquis. The law also includes a dispute resolu-
tion mechanism for interconnection via the TA.
However, no direct legal basis exists for local loop
unbundling. The secondary legislation for national
roaming, interconnection, and local loop
unbundling were put in place in 2002, 2003, and
2004, respectively.
Universal Service 
Universal service is defined in the 2002 acquis as
“the provision of a defined minimum set of serv-
ices to all end-users at an affordable price.” The EU
views universal service as an obligation of its mem-
ber states (see Article 3.1 of the universal service
directive). However, care is taken not to distort the
market mechanism while safeguarding the public
interest (Article 3.2).
The minimum service requirements in the uni-
versal service directive can be summarized as the
provision of
• Access to a fixed telephone at every reasonable
fixed location
• Directory inquiry services and directories
• Public pay phones
• Special measures for disabled users 
• Affordable tariffs
• Adequate quality of service
• Number portability.
How much of the obligation of universal service
that should be allocated on the service providers
has been greatly debated (see, e.g., Choné, Flochel,
and Perrot 2002 for a theoretical investigation). The
universal service directive of the 2002 acquis
imposes certain obligations on all undertakings,
including the competitive ones, but it imposes extra
obligations on firms with significant market power
(Articles 16–19). Nevertheless, the financing of an
important part of the universal service obligations
is left to the member states (Articles 12–14).
In Turkey, universal service is covered by various
laws, but no explicit mechanism is in place. The
Ministry of Transportation is responsible for uni-
versal service policy, and the burden is carried
mostly by Türk Telekom. As for the rights of users,
the legislation contains no solid regulation, except
for the general consumer rights protection law.
Thus the main and secondary legislation for uni-
versal service needs to be put in place, and new pro-
grams should be developed for a low-user scheme
and special needs. As for financing the burden of
the universal service organization, a fund or a
budgetary mechanism must be established.
Price Regulation
According to the EU acquis, only firms with signifi-
cant market power can be regulated. The same
principle carries over to the telecommunications
services. National regulatory authorities are sup-
posed to define the relevant markets and then, in
each relevant market, determine the presence of
firms with SMP. Where SMP exists, the NRA would
implement price regulation.
The economics literature discusses two possible
ways of price regulation: price cap regulation and rate
of return (or cost plus) regulation. For price cap reg-
ulation,the regulator determines a“reasonable price”
for the base year and then for the following years
applies a consumer price index (CPI) inflation − X
percent adjustment on the base year’s price. Price cap
regulation is desirable because it provides an incen-
tive for a firm to find ways to cut its production cost.
The disadvantages are a greater need to regulate the
quality of services and the difficulty encountered in
setting the base price and the X factor—that is, the
expected growth in productivity (see Weisman 2002
for an interesting discussion). Rate of return regula-
tion also has negative aspects. First, the NRA must
be cautious about the costs reported by the firm.
Second, the incentives to improve productivity and
thus cut costs are not there.
The trend in Europe, as well as in Australia, the
United States, and South America, over the past
15 years has been toward implementing price cap
regulation (Weisman 2002: 350). In Turkey, the
price cap method is also used. Turkish telecom law
has several clauses on price regulation. The 2001
Pricing (Tariff) Regulation and 2001 Price Cap
Communiqué for SMP operators are in force. GSM
tariffs are subject to price regulation based on the
operators’ concession agreements. But their X
factor is fixed at 3 percent (CPI – 3 percent [CPI]),
which is much lower than that of Türk Telekom.
Türk Telekom is subject to price regulation as
well. For the years 2002–03, the voice telephony
services of TT were subject to an X factor of 7.5 per-
cent, which was changed to 4 percent in 2004. By
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contrast, the leased-line tariffs price cap method
was used for 2002. The TA approved cost-based
tariffs for leased lines in 2004, which were in force
by June 2004.
Another important issue lagging behind sched-
ule for the TA and Türk Telekom is the rebalancing
of the local, long-distance, and international prices
of TT. Rebalancing is central to price regulation.
The new structure, which is based on a monthly
rental fee and a reduction in the tariffs of national
and international calls in order to eliminate cross
subsidy, came into effect in August 2004. A whole-
sale tariff is needed for resale and new entrants.
For GSM operators, the inconsistency between
their concession agreements and tariff regulation
should be removed. For operators with significant
market power, a flexible price regulation similar to
the one in the EU should be followed.
Conclusion and Recommendations
The liberalization of telecommunications services
in the EU has had a substantial impact. During
1998–2002, the prices of telecommunications serv-
ices fell substantially, ranging from 14 percent in
residential national calls to 70 percent in interna-
tional business calls (see figures 5.17 and 5.18 in the
chapter annex). Turkey is also expected to benefit
from a reduction in prices and increase in quality
by adopting the EU regulatory framework and by
liberalizing the market for fixed lines.
This chapter has shown that Turkey scores rea-
sonably well when compared with the EU candi-
date countries in terms of the significance of
telecommunications services in GDP, the mainline
and mobile penetration rates, the urban to rural
penetration rates (i.e., universal service), and Inter-
net service prices. However, performance needs to
be improved in some areas. Examples are invest-
ments in fixed lines such as fiber cables, Internet
usage, tariff rebalancing by means of higher fixed
access fees and lower marginal fees, and the quality
of services offered by Türk Telekom.
Therefore, a clear need exists for a new, single
telecommunications act that would update the
century-old telegraph and telephone law (Law
No. 406), eliminate conflicting clauses in the amend-
ing laws, and harmonize with EU regulations. The
main problems facing Turkey are related to the
implementation of the new legislation and, by impli-
cation, the quantitative targets. It is also important
that the TA be strengthened in its technical, legal,
and economics capabilities. Finally, after full liberal-
ization of the sector, the successful privatization of
Türk Telekom would benefit not only the sector but
also significantly benefit the Turkish economy.
Annex: Price Comparisons 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
90
80
70
1998 1999 2000 20022001
Euros per month
Business, excluding value added tax
Residential, including value added tax
FIGURE 5.17 Basket of National
Calls
Note: Figure shows estimates of the average monthly
spending by a typical “European business/residential
user” for fixed national calls.
Source: European Commission 2002.
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.8
1.6
1.4
1998 1999 2000 20022001
Euros
Business, excluding value added tax
Residential, including value added tax
FIGURE 5.18 Basket of International Calls
Note: Figure shows the average price of a single call
from the originating country to all other OECD desti-
nations. A full description of the methodology can be
found in OECD 1990.
Source: European Commission 2002.
158 Turkey: Economic Reform and Accession to the European Union
TABLE 5.1 Monthly Residential Access Fee and Local Call Tariffs: 15 EU Member
States and Washington, DC, July 1, 2002
Monthly Residential Cost of Three-Minute Local
Access Fee, Including Value Economy Call, Including
Country Added Tax (euros) Value Added Tax (euros)
Austria 17.44 0.09
Belgium 16.20 0.12
Denmark 15.74 0.08
Finland 13.79 0.16
France 12.55 0.13
Germany 12.69 0.05
Greece 11.77 0.09
Ireland 19.60 0.04
Italy 14.88 0.07
Luxembourg 18.40 0.05
Netherlands 16.42 0.07
Portugal 14.10 0.17
Spain 13.54 0.08
Sweden 13.25 0.08
United Kingdom 15.51 0.05
EU average 14.46 0.05
Washington, DC 10.67 0.05
(Verizon), low-user, flat
fee per call (excluding
tax of $2.69 and other
charges and levies of
$6.00)
Source: World Bank 2002.
TABLE 5.2 Monthly Residential Access Fee and Local Call Charges: 13 EU
Preaccession Countries (PAC), March 31, 2002
Monthly Residential Cost of Three-Minute Local
Access Fee, Including Value Economy Call, Including
Country Added Tax (euros) Value Added Tax (euros)
Bulgaria 3.00 0.022
Cyprus 9.50 0.076
Czech Republic 9.70 0.136
Estonia 5.90 0.096
Hungary 12.30 0.111
Latvia 6.30 0.143
Lithuania 5.50 0.130
Malta 5.30 0.132
Poland 11.80 0.970
Romania 3.50 0.940
Slovakia 5.90 0.141
Slovenia 9.90 0.084
Turkey 4.30 0.129
PAC average 7.15 0.107
Source: PWC Consulting 2002. 
Annex:
Notes
1. The authors would like to thank I˙zak Atiyas, Andrea
Goldstein, Sübidey Togan, Kamil Yılmaz, Tolga Kılıç, and S¸ahin
Ardıyok for their comments and encouragement. The usual dis-
claimer applies.
2. In this chapter, the term accession or candidate countries
refers to the 10 countries that joined the EU in May 2004,
together with Bulgaria and Romania.
3. PIAPs are government-initiated centers within the context
of universal service policies.
4. All dollar amounts are U.S. dollars unless otherwise
indicated.
5. The auction design for mobile phone service licenses is
heavily discussed in the literature, especially after the so-called
UMTS auction tragedy in Europe (UMTS is a third-generation
mobile system). See Klemperer (2002) and van Damme (2002)
for possible reasons why the UMTS auctions in Europe during
2000 and 2001 produced incredibly different outcomes.
6. See the paper by Li, Qiang, and Xu (2001) for cross-
country evidence that supports the “cash cow” hypothesis,
among other reasons, for delayed privatization of the telecom-
munications sector.
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initial fiscal costs of the resolution of the Turkish
banking crisis were about €50 billion (about
34 percent of the gross domestic product, GDP),
which, with servicing costs, implies an annual cost
of €5 billion. These restructuring costs must be
taken into account in an assessment of the potential
costs to the Turkish banking sector of EU accession.
In effect, much of the adjustment costs have already
been borne because of the major bank restructur-
ing that took place during 2001–03.
In implementing structural reforms, Turkey has
met nearly all of the conditions set for the banking
sector so that it complies with EU norms. Indeed, the
sector has made the necessary amendments as dic-
tated by the Turkish “National Program,” which puts
forth the criteria for accession to the EU. Setting cap-
ital adequacy standards, redefining “own funds” and
subsidiaries, setting related lending limits, regulating
accounting practices, and ensuring transparency of
financial reporting are among the issues addressed
in the recent regulations that have been adopted and
that are in full compliance with EU principles.
Despite the relatively small asset size and low
degree of intermediation of the Turkish financial
system, Turkey’s potential and its regional situation
make it an attractive market. The entry of foreign
banks into Turkey’s financial markets is expected to
enhance competition in the financial sector and
improve the quality of banking services and finan-
cial products. Furthermore, the Turkish banking
Turkey’s prospects of accession to the European
Union (EU) are highly dependent on the progress
made with political and economic reforms.1 Of
these reforms, financial sector–related issues are an
important component of the criteria associated
with full membership. Most of the issues are con-
centrated in the banking sector, because banks
account for more than 90 percent of the total assets
of the Turkish financial system.
Turkey adopted a comprehensive disinflation
program, supported by the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), at the beginning of 2000. Before
adoption of this program, macroeconomic instabil-
ity, crowding out by the public sector, systemic dis-
tortions created by state banks, inadequate risk
assessment and management systems, and a lack of
independent and effective supervision were all fac-
tors contributing to the major structural weak-
nesses of the Turkish banking system. In September
2000, the Banking Regulation and Supervision
Agency (BRSA), an independent institution with
responsibility for regulating and supervising the
banking sector, began operations. Soon after its for-
mation, the BRSA had to manage a major banking
crisis brought on by the escalating political uncer-
tainties, the loss of credibility by the exchange rate
regime, and, finally, the abolition of the pegged
exchange rate system in February 2001.
As in many other countries, the restructuring of
Turkey’s banking sector has been very costly. The
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system, with its high-technology systems and
regulatory compliance, is a strong candidate for
becoming a member of the EU financial system.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as
follows. The next section provides an overview of
the major reforms undertaken in restructuring the
Turkish banking sector during 2001–03 and the
associated costs.2 That overview is followed by a
comparison of the Turkish banking sector with
those of the EU member states and other EU acces-
sion countries in order to evaluate the impact of the
greater competition that may result from joining
the EU. The chapter then summarizes the current
situation in relation to compliance with EU bank-
ing legislation. The final section is devoted to an
assessment of the general findings.
The Restructuring of the Turkish
Banking Sector and Related 
Fiscal Costs
In the early 1980s, the Turkish economy underwent a
significant policy shift from financial repression
toward liberalization. Compared with its stance
before the 1980s, Turkey became an outward-
oriented economy and experienced significant
changes in foreign trade and external capital move-
ments. During the same period, Turkey also experi-
enced high inflation,coupled with high public sector
deficit financing. High real interest rates and greater
macroeconomic instability became the defining
features of the Turkish economy after the 1980s.
Turkey’s banks therefore found themselves oper-
ating in an environment of macroeconomic insta-
bility, characterized by high and volatile inflation
rates and fragile external capital flows. Because of
the high interest rates resulting from the high
public sector deficits, banks invested in risk-free
government securities. The systemic distortions
created by the state banks and the inadequate risk
management and internal control procedures of
the sector exacerbated the vulnerability of the
banks to financial crises. In the aftermath of the
1994 financial crisis, the strength of the Turkish
banking sector was severely tested. The recovery
that began in 1995 was negatively affected by the
East Asian and Russian crises of 1997–98. The dev-
astating earthquakes of 1999 also had negative
effects on the Turkish economy in general and the
banking sector in particular.
The exchange rate–based disinflation program
introduced in January 2000 had a major impact on
banks’ balance sheets. Deposit and lending rates fell
sharply during the initial stages of the program’s
implementation phase. Funding in foreign currency
became cheaper because of the preannounced
exchange rate and the real appreciation of the
Turkish lira. As a result, banks borrowed short term,
leading in turn to a maturity mismatch because
outstanding loans had longer durations. Moreover,
open foreign currency positions increased sharply.
The financial crises of November 2000 and February
2001 led to the abolition of the pegged exchange
rate system and triggered another severe hit on the
Turkish banking sector.
The Bank Restructuring Strategy
The Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency,
established in 2000, is a financially and administra-
tively independent institution funded by the pre-
miums collected from Turkish banks. Before the
formation of the BRSA, the Undersecretariat of
Treasury was responsible for preparing and issuing
prudential banking regulations and conducting
bank examinations under the Banks Act, and the
Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey conducted
off-site monitoring of banks under the Central
Bank Act.
In May 2001, in the aftermath of the crises, the
BRSA announced the Banking Sector Restructuring
Program (see BRSA 2001). The main objective of
the program was to eliminate distortions in the
financial sector and adopt regulations to promote
an efficient, globally competitive, sound Turkish
banking sector (see figure 6.1). The restructuring
program was based on four main pillars: (1) restruc-
turing the state banks, (2) seeking prompt resolu-
tion of the intervened banks, (3) strengthening the
private banks, and (4) strengthening the regulatory
and supervisory framework. Despite various chal-
lenges, much progress has been achieved in all of
these areas.
As in many other countries, the costs of re-
structuring the banking sector have been high (see
table 6.1). During the restructuring of the state
banks (the first pillar), the Treasury issued govern-
ment bonds worth about €18 billion in 2001 to
securitize the state banks’ losses arising from subsi-
dized lending (so-called duty losses). At the same
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time, legislation was introduced to prevent the
future accumulation of duty losses. Meanwhile, the
banking license of the third largest state bank
(Emlak) was revoked, and the management of the
remaining two state banks, Ziraat and Halk, was
strengthened through the establishment of a joint
board of management. The total resources trans-
ferred to the state banks to eliminate duty losses
and to provide capital support amounted to about
€22.5 billion as of the end of 2001.
Operational restructuring was a very important
component of the overall restructuring of the state
banks. The number of branches was reduced from
2,494 as of December 2000 to 1,685 as of December
2002, and the number of personnel was reduced
to 30,399 from 61,601. State banks became more
efficient in organization, technology, human
resources, financial control, planning, and risk
management, so that they can operate in line with
the requirements of modern banking and interna-
tional competition.
The second pillar of the restructuring strategy
was the resolution of the banks taken over by the
Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF). The SDIF,
run by the Central Bank of Turkey since 1983 with
the mandate to insure saving deposits, was also
charged with resolving insolvent banks in 1994. It
was transferred to the BRSA on August 31, 2000.
Twenty banks were transferred to the SDIF during
1997–2002. An Asset Management Unit was created
and charged with recovering the value of the assets
of the banks taken over by the SDIF. As of the date
of transfer, the total liabilities of the banks taken
over were €33 billion, and the total losses of these
banks amounted to about €18 billion.
The funds needed for the resolution of the banks
in which the SDIF intervened were met by govern-
ment bonds issued by the Treasury (€18.5 billion)
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FIGURE 6.1 Turkish Bank Restructuring Strategy
Source: The author.
TABLE 6.1 Initial Fiscal Costs of Turkish
Banking Crisis, 2000–01
Cost in
2001 Ratio of Cost 
(billion to 2001 
euros) GDP (%)
State banks’ duty 18.5 12.8
losses
Capital support to 2.9 2.0
state banks
Resolution of SDIF 27.1 18.7
banks
Public resources 24.6 17.0
Private resources 2.5 1.7
Total costs 48.5 33.5
Source: Banking Regulation and Supervision
Agency of Turkey.
and the SDIF’s own resources (€5 billion). The
main source of the SDIF revenues were premiums
collected from the banking sector, as well as pro-
ceeds from the sale and collection of the assets of
the intervened banks. Thus the private sector also
shared the burden of the costs of restructuring.
To avoid even greater losses and to accelerate the
resolution process, the SDIF has subjected the trou-
bled banks to an intensive financial and operational
restructuring. The speed of the resolution has been
very rapid compared with the international experi-
ence. As of May 2003, only two banks remained
under management of the SDIF. One was a bridge
bank used for asset management purposes; the
other bank was put up for sale.
The third pillar of the restructuring strategy was
the establishment of a sound private banking sec-
tor. The financial structure and profitability of the
private banks deteriorated sharply in the aftermath
of the crises. During the first stage of the restruc-
turing program, measures were put in place to
recapitalize the private banks, limit foreign cur-
rency open positions, and encourage mergers and
acquisitions. In line with the program, important
steps were taken toward strengthening the capital
base of the private banks with their own resources.
The deeper-than-expected recession in 2001
and the general global economic conditions high-
lighted the need to further bolster the private banks
by strengthening their capital through public sup-
port if necessary, by resolving the nonperforming
loans of the banking sector through the Istanbul
Approach,3 and by establishing asset management
companies.
The recapitalization program consisted of three
phases.4 During the assessment phase, the financial
status of all private commercial banks using inter-
national accounting standards was obtained by
means of a three-phase audit procedure carried out
on a fair and impartial basis. An independent audit
company appointed by the bank undertook the first
audit. A second audit was conducted by another
independent audit company to ensure that the first
audit was carried out according to the agreed-on
principles. The BRSA conducted the final audit.
This multiphase auditing procedure was utilized to
increase transparency and credibility. The audits
were based on the financial statements of the
banks, as well as on the supplementary reporting
schedules completed, based on the detailed instruc-
tions of the BRSA. The supplementary reporting
schedules and statements focused on four areas:
(1) capital adequacy, (2) credit portfolio and coun-
terpart risk, (3) risk groups to which the bank
belongs, and (4) structured transactions and other
income recognition issues.
In preparation of the financial statements the fol-
lowing central issues were taken into consideration:
• Inflation accounting
• Consolidated reporting
• Inclusion of material changes to financial state-
ments after December 2001 
• Special issues related to the assessment
• Loan portfolio assessment and provisioning
• Evaluation of derivative instruments
• Evaluation of swap bonds
• Valuation of foreign currency accounts.
The bank recapitalization phase began with the
BRSA’s notification to the banks. During this phase,
ordinary general assemblies were convened, and the
financial situation of the banks, as determined dur-
ing the assessment phase, was presented to the
shareholders. The shareholders made the required
resolutions for the recapitalization of the banks
whose capital adequacy ratio fell below the 8 per-
cent minimum required.
The public recapitalization phase was designed to
provide public capital support for solvent banks
that did not satisfy the minimum capital adequacy
ratio (8 percent) on a pari passu basis with the
majority shareholders. The public support took the
form of a capital injection or subordinated debt
with the appropriate contingencies and safeguards.
Banking Sectors in the EU 
and Turkey: A Comparison 
of Structural Indicators
This section presents an overview of the structural
characteristics of the Turkish banking sector and
compares these characteristics with those of the
banking sectors of the EU member countries as
well as the countries included in the EU enlarge-
ment process.5
Concentration Ratio, Entry to the Sector, Public
Share, and Capital Adequacy
The five largest Turkish banks have a market share
of 60 percent of total assets, which is similar to the
average for the EU’s five largest banks (see figure 6.2
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and annex 1).6 This ratio is a little higher for the EU
candidate countries, reflecting the entry of large
foreign banks in the financial markets of these
countries. The concentration of the large Turkish
banks is significantly higher than in the late 1990s
because of the significant merger and acquisition
activities, as well as the state’s intervention into the
failed banks. The launching of negotiations with
the EU and thus the expected “convergence play”
are likely to generate more consolidation in the
banking industry and increased interest by both
domestic and foreign participants.
The €11 million in capital required to license a
bank in Turkey is in line with the EU average of
€12 million (see annex 1, table 6.3). Licensing
requirements have become much more onerous in
Turkey since the bank failures of 2000–01.
Although the withdrawal of the state from the
banking sector in many EU member countries is
significant, state banks still play a dominant role in
Turkey, accounting for one-third of total assets as
of June 2004 (see figure 6.3). However, a key pillar
of the bank restructuring strategy (as discussed in
the earlier section) is the restructuring and privati-
zation of state banks.
The average capital adequacy ratio of the Turkish
banking system is high compared with the EU aver-
age and that of the candidate countries (see fig-
ure 6.4). A minimum capital adequacy ratio—the
ratio that measures a bank’s capital as a percentage
of its risk-weighted assets—is a regulatory require-
ment intended to ensure that banks maintain ade-
quate capital to support their risk exposures. The
capital adequacy ratio of a bank is a good indication
of its vulnerability to potential shocks and thus the
health of that bank. The capital adequacy regula-
tions in Turkey are in line with those of the EU.
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Deposit Insurance
An explicit full deposit guarantee for the banks in
which the state intervened was extended to avoid
the deposit runs that occurred during the 2001
financial crisis in Turkey. However, because of the
distortions and the moral hazard such a blanket
guarantee creates, the BRSA subsequently imple-
mented a partial deposit guarantee system in line
with EU regulations. This system was put into place
in 2004 with a one-year notice period.
Compared with the GDP and per capita national
income of the EU countries, it can be argued that the
level of protection of deposits in Turkey—€27,000
per account holder—is very high.7 Although the
level of deposit protection (guarantee or insurance)
varies between €20,000 and €60,000 in the EU
countries, the average amount of insured deposits is
about €29,000 (figure 6.5). The average deposit
guarantee amounts to nearly €13,000 in the candi-
date countries.8
Number of Banks, Average Size,
and the Staff Employed 
Compared with EU averages, the Turkish banking
system has fewer banks that have a high-density net-
works and a high level of employment. Although
there is wide variance among EU member countries,
as of the end of 2003 an EU member country had
on average 500 banks with 11,500 branches and
140,000 employees (see annex 1, table 6.3). As of
end of June 2004, Turkey had 49 banks with 6,000
branches and 126,000 employees.
An average EU bank is almost twice as large as
an average Turkish bank. The average asset size per
bank (calculated as total assets divided by number
of banks) in EU countries is about €5.3 billion,
compared with about €3.1 billion in Turkey. The
average asset size of banks in the candidate coun-
tries is about €1 billion (see figure 6.6).
An average bank in Turkey has 125 branches,
much higher than the comparable number for EU
member and EU candidate countries. In the EU
member countries, the average number of branches
per bank is 36, and the average number of employ-
ees per branch is 27 (see figures 6.7 and 6.8). Simi-
lar figures apply to the EU candidate countries. The
average number of personnel per branch in Turkey
is 21, which is comparable to that of EU member
and candidate countries.
Asset, Deposit, and Loan Indicators 
The total asset size of the banking system of Turkey
is about €152 billion, compared with the EU aver-
age of €1.7 trillion. One of the large banks in
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Europe, Deutsche Bank, had total assets of about
€803 billion as of December 2003, which is five and
a half times larger than that of the whole Turkish
banking sector.
In terms of the ratio of loans to GDP, Turkey fares
poorly, reflecting the crowding out of the real sector
by the government. The loans-to-assets ratio was
20 percent in Turkey in June 2004, compared with
147 percent in the EU member countries and 55 per-
cent in candidate countries. Similar observations can
be made about deposit mobilization (figure 6.9).
Profitability
The return on equity of Turkish banks has been
very volatile, reflecting the macroeconomic devel-
opments. For example, the ratio of the term profit9
of the Turkish banking sector to total equity (return
on equity) was −80 percent as of December 2001,10
reflecting the financial crises of 2000–01 and the
adoption of inflation accounting (figure 6.10).
During 1995–2000, this ratio averaged about
22 percent. However, these figures are estimated to
be close to the 8–10 percent levels under inflation
accounting. The average return on equity of the EU
member countries’ banks was about 10 percent
(after deduction of tax and extraordinary items) in
2003 (see figure 6.11 and annex 1).11 However, the
return on equity of the large-scale banks is much
higher than that of the other bank segments.
Income, Expenditure, and Cost Structure 
In banks in the EU countries, net interest income
accounts for almost 60 percent of total income, but
it accounts for only 14 percent of the total income
of Turkish banks. The share of other operating
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income (net) is the largest item in the total income
of Turkish banks.
The staff expenses of EU banks constitute about
61 percent of total expenditures (figures 6.12 and
6.13), whereas such expenses account for only
13 percent of the total expenditures of Turkish banks.
Asset Quality
The ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans in
Turkish banks (6.3 percent) is more than double that
for the average EU bank (figures 6.14 and 6.15).With
the onset of the severe financial crises in Turkey in
2000–01, the quality of the assets of Turkish banks
deteriorated sharply, with the ratio of nonperform-
ing loans reaching about 22 percent in 2001. The
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situation improved during 2002–03 because of the
acceleration of out-of-court settlements and volun-
tary debt restructuring arrangements.
Share of Government Debt Securities
Government debt securities held by Turkish banks
amounted to 40 percent of total assets as of June
2004, compared with less than 2 percent for EU
banks at the end of 2003. This ratio increases to 22.6
percent for the EU banks when nongovernment
securities are included, indicating the dominance
of the real sector in the securities portfolio (fig-
ure 6.16). The nongovernment securities holdings
of Turkish banks are about 1.5 percent of total assets.
Financial Strength Ratings
Turkish banks have much lower financial strength
ratings than banks in the EU member countries. In
a study conducted by Moody’s Investors Service in
March 2003, all countries were rated by their finan-
cial strength by assigning weights to their assets
(figure 6.17). E was the lowest rating and A was the
highest. The average rating mark of the EU mem-
ber states was B–; the average rating mark of the
candidate countries was D; and Turkey’s rating
mark was D– (figure 6.17).
Foreign Bank Entry 
The low share of foreign banks in Turkey (less than
10 percent) offers a striking contrast with the shares
of foreign banks in newly liberalized or liberalizing
Central and Eastern European countries (close to
70 percent). Persistent macroeconomic instability
appears to be the main reason for the very small
share of foreign banks in Turkey. A positive correla-
tion exists between the volume of foreign direct
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investment and foreign bank expansion in the host
country originating from the same parent country.
In 2003 the net foreign direct investment in Turkey
was about $1 billion. In addition to macroeco-
nomic instability, the delays in implementing
financial sector reforms in Turkey have prevented
foreign investors from entering the Turkish market.
Host country regulations also determine foreign
bank entry. Foreign banks prefer countries with
fewer regulatory restrictions for investment.
Since completion of the Turkish bank restruc-
turing program, the banking sector has become
more resilient to economic shocks, regulations have
been streamlined with international standards, and
overall bank soundness has improved. As a result,
the interest of foreign investors in Turkish banks
has begun to increase. Ongoing efforts to decrease
high intermediation costs and implement limited
deposit insurance are expected to accelerate foreign
entry.
Compliance with EU Banking
Legislation 
Because of the European Commission’s work in par-
allel with the Basel Committee on Banking Supervi-
sion, Turkey’s efforts to prepare changes in the
banking system regulations serve both bodies’ pro-
posals (and thus directives). Specifically, Turkey’s
compliance with EU banking legislation is mainly in
the area of EU directives. Several initiatives have
been taken in the context of the ongoing regulatory
efforts of the EU.
After establishing the BRSA,12 Turkey increased
its effort to harmonize Turkish legislation with the
related EU directives. The new Banks Act and the
regulations issued by the BRSA are in line with
international standards, and the Turkish banking
legislation in force is almost fully in compliance
with the EU in many areas.
The remaining pieces of legislation that need to
be introduced or amended in order for Turkey to
achieve full alignment with the EU legislation are
on the agenda, and they are expected to be realized
within the framework of the National Program that
is currently being revised by the Secretariat General
for the EU in cooperation with the related Turkish
authorities, including the BRSA. The comprehen-
sive table in annex 2 of this chapter describes both
the legislation in force in banking in the EU and the
corresponding Turkish legislation to give a picture
of the current state of play in legislative compliance.
Adoption of the Capital Adequacy Directive
Parallel with the consultative process of the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision for the final-
ization of the New Basel Accord (Basel II), the
European Union released an advance draft of a new
directive on the EU capital framework known
as Capital Adequacy Directive 3 (CAD 3), which
translates Basel II into EU legislation and applies
Basel-type provisions to investment firms and
domestic credit institutions as well as to interna-
tional banks. Unlike Basel II, which addresses inter-
nationally active banks, CAD 3 will be applied to all
credit institutions in the EU (including building
societies). It also will be applied to nonbank invest-
ment firms authorized under the Investment Ser-
vices Directive (ISD). The directive will take effect
in 2007.
In parallel with CAD 2 principles, the commu-
niqué on capital adequacy was amended in February
2001 to cover market risks, and further amendments
were made in January 2002 to include options and to
address some other specific issues, such as the inclu-
sion of Tier 3 capital and structural positions. The
regulation requires banks to incorporate their mar-
ket risks into their regulatory capital calculation,
and it stipulates that banks must separate their
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books into a banking book and a trading book. The
calculation of market risk covers the interest rate
risk and equity risk of the trading book, and the for-
eign exchange risk covers both the trading book and
the banking book. Banks are permitted to use either
the standard approach or the model approach to
calculate their market risks. Banks implementing
the internal model approach will calculate their
market risk–based capital requirements on the basis
of their their value-at-risk (VaR) figure. Banks are
also required to conduct a regular stress testing pro-
gram. Whether a bank can use the model approach
is determined by compliance with the qualitative
and quantitative criteria defined in the regulation.
Currently, all banks are using the standard approach
to report their market risk capital charges on both a
solo basis (since January 2002) and on a consoli-
dated basis (since July 2002).
The BRSA has prepared a draft “Circular
Regarding the Evaluation of Risk Measurement
Models of Banks by the Agency,” which sets out the
principles and procedures for assessment of the risk
measurement models to be used for regulatory
reporting purposes by banks. Whether a bank can
use the model is determined on the basis of a care-
ful and comprehensive set of checks to grant per-
mission for its use.
To gauge the impact of Basel II (and CAD 3), six
of the top 10 Turkish banks (ranked by asset size)
participated in the third Quantitative Impact Study
(QIS 3) under the guidance of the BRSA (Basel
Committee 2003). The study focused on the pro-
posed minimum capital requirements under pillar
one of Basel II. The results of the study, in which
participant Turkish banks have applied simpler
approaches for credit and operational risks,13 have
been shared with the QIS Working Group of the
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.
The results of the QIS 3, in which 365 banks
from 43 countries participated, convey significant
information about the potential impact of Basel II
on Turkey as well as other on participant countries.
The results are generally in line with the Basel
Committee’s objectives: the minimum capital
requirements would be broadly unchanged for
large, internationally active banks under the inter-
nal ratings–based (IRB) approach, and the propos-
als would offer an incentive for internationally
active banks to adopt more sophisticated
approaches. The summary of worldwide results,
which reflects the impact of the last consultative
paper of Basel II (Consultative Paper 3), is pre-
sented in table 6.2.
The results show that under three different
approaches for credit risk (standardized approach,
foundation IRB approach, and advanced IRB
approach), both the G-10 countries and the EU
countries have lower capital requirements.14 How-
ever, other countries incur a small increase in credit
risk capital requirements under the standardized
approach. For operational risk capital charges, all
banks incur on average nearly an 8–10 percent
increase in risk-weighted assets.
The table also reveals that there is considerable
variation in the extent to which capital requirements
will rise or fall under Basel II for different banks.
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TABLE 6.2 Results, Quantitative Impact Study, 2003
(percent)
Foundation IRB Advanced IRB
Standardized Approach Approach Approach
Average Max Min Average Max Min Average Max Min
G-10 Group 1 11 84 15 3 55 32 2 46 36
Group 2 3 81 23 19 41 58
EU Group 1 6 31 7 4 55 32 6 26 31
Group 2 1 81 67 20 41 58
Other Groups 1 12 103 17 4 75 33
and 2
Note: IRB  internal ratings–based approach; for definition of G-10 countries, see note 14.
Sources: Quantitative Impact Study Results, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2003.
This variation reflects the differences between bank
portfolios. The variation in results for the standard-
ized approach also largely stems from the relative
importance of retail portfolios for different banks.
Moreover, the level of specialization in different
lines of activities will imply different capital charges
for operational risk between banks.
The results of the third quantitative impact
study (QIS 3) imply that the implementation of
new capital adequacy regulations will mean that
Turkish banks must incur significant costs to meet
their credit and operational risk capital require-
ments and the cost of funding. Even though the
said effects have been verified by the QIS 3, the
potential effects of CAD 3 are not expected to be
significantly different from the effects of Basel II.
This expectation is based on the assumption that
there is a negligible difference between CAD 3 and
Basel II, in view of the fact that CAD 3 has so far
suggested Basel-type provisions. Because the new
directive requires additional inputs and new
methodologies for capital adequacy, the inherent
costs appear in three main areas: input gathering,
system design, and additional charges for capital
requirements and cost of funding.
Contrary to the relatively low data intensiveness
of CAD 2, which basically requires the location of
the counterparty (whether it is an Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development country
or not) and the type of collateral, CAD 3 requires a
comprehensive amount of technical data, such as
external ratings, probability of default or of a loss-
given event for credit risk, and a new type of data
for operational risk (such as event data or gross
income by business lines). Providing this data will
obviously be a difficult task for Turkish banks and
banks elsewhere and will require modifications in
the accounting and reporting framework and
information technology restructuring. New data
requirements can be met only by means of an effi-
cient infrastructure such as the existence of a well-
functioning rating system and liquid markets for
collaterals.
The BRSA aims to implement CAD 3 by 2007.
This target also includes working on the potential
effects of Basel II and CAD 3, as well as clarification
of the provisions of CAD 3 by taking the country-
specific issues into consideration. To serve this pur-
pose, a steering committee, pioneered by the BRSA
and consisting of representatives of the member
banks of the Banks Association of Turkey, was
formed in February 2003 to prepare a road map for
the adoption and implementation of Basel II and
CAD 3 principles by the Turkish banking sector.
Conclusion
Turkey has fulfilled most of the conditions required
for the banking sector to comply with the integra-
tion process for the EU. Within the National Pro-
gram, the necessary legislation on various issues
has been amended or enacted in line with EU direc-
tives. Examples are indirect loans; definitions of
capital and subsidiary; related lending limits; prin-
ciples on the establishment and operations of
banks and special finance houses; regulation on
accounting practices; steps to ensure transparency
on financial reporting; principles on bank mergers
and acquisitions; the issues surrounding decreasing
the public share within the financial sector; steps to
ensure the efficiency of supervision and surveil-
lance in cross-border banking; capital adequacy,
including market risk; and risk management and
internal control systems.15
The BRSA has revised the regulations on deposit
insurance in line with international standards; the
introduction of the new scheme was announced in
2004 (with a one-year transition period). Areas that
need further improvements in regulations are the
business of electronic money institutions and sup-
plementary supervision of financial conglomerates.
Various directives such as the one for cross-border
payments in euros will become effective with full
EU membership. Thus the preparation at this stage
is restricted to the technical evaluations.
Despite the adverse macroeconomic conditions,
the core Turkish banking sector proved to be
resilient. Many of these banks are comparable to
their European counterparts in terms of selected
indicators, such as high quality of human resources,
technological infrastructure, a nationwide branch
network, and high-quality service provided in a
variety of financial products. However, it will be dif-
ficult for Turkish banks to compete with the larger
European banks with their large assets and capital
strength. Thus the initiation of negotiations with the
EU and the expected “convergence play” are likely to
generate more consolidation in the banking indus-
try and increased interest of both domestic and for-
eign participants.
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Because of the crowding out by the government,
the share of consumer and corporate loans of total
assets or deposits is very low. However, under a
convergence scenario it is clear that the Turkish
financial sector has important future growth
potential. The convergence to the EU implies not
only convergence of the capital structure, prof-
itability, and management techniques, but also of
accounting standards, transparency guidelines, and
corporate structure.16
There is no doubt but that the Turkish banking
sector will be exposed to certain costs during
integration with the EU. EU banks tend to keep
their profitability high through restructuring their
activities and improving their risk management
techniques. Competitive pressure on the Turkish
banking sector may arise from EU banks that are
well known for their strong capital base and their
capability for managing risks. It appears that, to
be competitive in the EU banking sector, or at
least to form partnerships based on solid ground
with EU banks, Turkish banks must further
strengthen their equity structures during the tran-
sition period.
The Turkish banking system has become more
resilient and sound since the extensive restructur-
ing program and implementation of international
standards. This development inevitably implied a
large fiscal cost in which the initial fiscal burden of
the bank restructuring reached levels close to one-
third of GDP. Thus a large portion of the cost that
will emerge from full membership and full conver-
gence to the EU banking sector has already been
borne. Furthermore, the confidence that will result
from the convergence to the EU is expected to have
significant positive externalities on the banking sec-
tor that should at least partially offset the impact of
competition from strong EU banks.17
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TABLE 6.3 Statistics on Banking Sectors of EU15 and Turkey, 2003
Percentage Percentage
of Banking of Banking
System’s System’s
Concen- Assets Assets Deposit Scale
tration Minimum Risk- in Banks in Banks Insurance Moody's Corres-
Ratio of Capital Entry Number Number Number Adjusted 50% or More 50% or More per Total Total Total Rating ponding to
Five Largest Requirement of of of CAR Capital Government- Foreign- Account Assets Deposits Credit GDP (March Moody's
Banks (%) (€ millions) Banks Branches Staff (%) Ratio (%) Owned Owned (€) (€ billions) (€ billions) (€ billions) (€ millions) 2003) Rating
Austria — 5 896 4,401 62,674 8 — 0.0 — 20,000 605 370 288 199,603 C+ 8
Belgium 88.0 62.5 109 4,935 72,210 8 12.7 0.0 — 20,000 891 420 397 269,546 B 10
Denmark 90.0 5 198 2,014 38,740 8 9.7 0.0 0.0 47,728 312 125 126 187,951 B 10
Finland 99.5 5 343 1,527 23,372 8 10.5 0.0 6.2 25,000 177 64 81 142,518 B− 9
France 60.0 7 925 25,789 — 8 — 0.0 — 70,000 3,779 978 1,196 1,557,245 B− 9
Germany 20.0 5 2,465 36,599 712,000 8–12.5 10.6 42.2 4.3 20,000 6,471 2,448 3,025 2,128,200 C 6
Greece 73.9 18 59 3,095 61,074 8 13.6 22.8 10.8 20,000 200 116 101 153,045 D+ 5
Ireland — 6.3 91 856 42,126 8 — — — 20,000 575 160 249 134,786 B− 9
Italy 51.2 6.3 788 30,502 337 8 13.4 10.0 5.7 — 2,170 596 1,039 1,300,926 C+ 8
Luxembourg 27.9 8.7 169 200 22,529 8 12.7 5.1 94.6 20,000 656 218 118 23,956 B− 9
Netherlands 88.1 5 147 4,000 144,000 8 11.5 3.9 2.2 — 1,911 1,263 1,096 454,276 B+ 11
Portugal 79.8 17.5 52 5,431 54,089 8 9.5 22.8 17.7 — 318 139 181 129,908 C+ 8
Spain 53.2 18 265 39,506 240,210 8 13.0 0.0 8.5 — 1,430 807 813 744,754 B 10
Sweden 62.0 5 126 1,900 38,200 8 19.9 0.0 — 27,000 287 123 123 267,251 B 10
U.K. 23.0 5 356 11,624 455,500 8 — 0.0 46.0 — 6,786 3,493 3,283 1,591,412 B+ 11
EU average 62.8 12 466 11,492 140,504 8 12.5 7.6 20 28,973 1,771 755 808 619,025 B− 9
Turkey 60.0 11.1 49 6,126 126,274 8 25.4 32.7 3.2 27,691 152.5 95 48 237,723 D− 3
— Not available, not applicable, or negligible.
Note: In June 2004, 1 euro = TL 1,805.605; in December 2003, 1 euro = TL 1,757.480.
Sources: Data on concentration, minimum capital, capital adequacy ratio (CAR), public share, foreign share, deposit insurance: “2003 World Bank Banking Survey,” http://www.worldbank.org; other
banking indicators: European Banks Federation (FBE), http://www.fbe.org; GDP figures: Eurostat, http://www.europa.eu.int.
Unless otherwise stated, data on Turkey are from national sources. Concentration, number of banks, number of branches, realized capital ratio data are as of June 2004, http://www.bddk.org.tr.
Turkish data can be found in BRSA 2004.
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TABLE 6.4 Statistics on Banking Sectors of EU15 and Turkey, 2001
Personnel per Number of Branches Total Assets/ Total Deposits/ Total Credit/ Deposits/Credit Credit/Assets Assets/Number of
Branch per Bank GDP (%) GDP (%) GDP (%) (%) (%) Banks (€ millions)
Austria 14 5 303 185 144 128 48 675
Belgium 15 45 331 156 147 106 45 8,173
Denmark 19 10 166 67 67 100 40 1,577
Finland 15 4 124 45 57 80 46 517
France — 28 243 63 77 82 32 4,085
Germany 19 15 304 115 142 81 47 2,625
Greece 20 52 130 76 66 114 51 3,384
Ireland 49 9 427 119 185 64 43 6,321
Italy 0 39 167 46 80 57 48 2,754
Luxembourg 113 1 2,737 912 491 185 18 3,880
Netherlands 36 27 421 278 241 115 57 13,002
Portugal 10 104 245 107 139 77 57 6,110
Spain 6 149 192 108 109 99 57 5,395
Sweden 20 15 107 46 46 100 43 2,278
U.K. 39 33 426 220 206 106 48 19,061
EU average 27 36 422 169 147 100 45 5,323
Turkey 21 125 64 40 20 196 32 3,113
— Not available, not applicable, or negligible.
Note: In June 2004, 1 euro = TL 1,805.605; in December 2003, 1 euro = TL 1,757.480.
Sources: Banking indicators: European Banks Federation (FBE), http://www.fbe.org; GDP figures: Eurostat, http://www.europa.eu.int.
Unless otherwise stated, data on Turkey are from national sources. Concentration, number of banks, number of branches, realized capital ratio data are as of June 2004,
http://www.bddk.org.tr. Turkish data can be found in BRSA 2004.
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TABLE 6.5 Statistics on Banking Sectors of Enlargement (Candidate) Countries and Turkey, 2003
Percentage Percentage
of Banking of Banking
System’s System’s
Assets Assets Deposit 
Concentration Minimum Risk- in Banks in Banks Insurance Moody's Scale
Ratio of Capital Entry Number Number Number Adjusted 50% or More 50% or More per Total Total Total Rating Corresponding
Five Largest Requirement of of of CAR Capital Government- Foreign- Account Assets Deposits Credit GDP (March to Moody's
Banks (%) (millions) Banks Branches Staff (%) Ratio (%) Owned Owned (euros) (€ billions) (€ billions) (€ billions) (€ millions) 2003) Rating
Bulgaria 56.52 Lev 10 35 727 21,434 12 31.1 17.6 74.6 6,843 9 6 5 15,793 D− 3
(approx.
US$5.40)
Cyprus 89.2 £C 3 13 940 10,300 10 14.0 4.2 12.7 — 36 28 20 11,645 D+ 5
Czech Rep. 69 CZK 500 35 1,647 39,004 8 15.4 3.8 90.0 No limit 78 52 31 80,097 D 4
Estonia 98.9 EEK 75 7 206 4,018 8 15 0.0 98.9 20,000 7 3 5 125,832 C− 6
Hungary 62.5 Ft 2,000 38 1,126 27,200 8 15.6 9.0 88.8 No limit 51 31 32 73,213 C− 6
Latvia 66.2 €5 23 206 8,895 12 14.2 3.2 65.2 — 9 6 4 9,868 D 4
Lithuania 87.9 €5 13 485 7,027 10 15.7 12.2 78.2 10,000 6 4 4 16,271 —
Malta 84.13 Lm 2 15 106 3,407 8 18.4 0.0 60.0 16,488 18 8 8 4,333 D+ 5
Poland 57.4 €5 660 4,394 151,257 8 15.1 23.5 68.7 — 104 61 44 185,227 D 4
Romania 42.8 Rol 370 000 38 2,921 46,535 11 20.3 41.8 47.3 No limit 14.7 10.23 7.27 47,936 D− 3
Slovak Rep. 66.5 Sk 500 21 553 19,797 8 13.4 4.4 85.5 11,129 24 17 9 28,822 E+ 2
Slovenia 69 SIT 1,100 20 636 11,397 8 11.9 12.2 20.6 No limit 21 14 11 24,576 D+ 5
(approx.
US$5.10)
Candidate
countries
average 70.8 — 77 1,162 29,189 9 16.67 11 66 12,892 31 20 15 51,968 D 4
Turkey 60 11.1 49 6,126 126,274 8 25.42 32.7 3 27,691 152.5 95 48 237,723 D− 3
— Not available, not applicable, or negligible.
Note: In June 2004, 1 euro = TL 1,805.605; in December 2003, 1 euro = TL 1,757.480.
Sources: Concentration, minimum capital, capital adequacy ratio (CAR), public share, foreign share, deposit insurance: “2003 World Bank Banking Survey,” 
http://www.worldbank.org; other banking indicators: European Banks Federation (FBE), http://www.fbe.org; GDP figures: Eurostat, http://www.europa.eu.int. 
Unless otherwise stated, data on Turkey are from national sources. Concentration, number of banks, number of branches, realized capital ratio data are as of June 2004, http://www.bddk.org.tr. 
Turkish data can be found in BRSA 2004.
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TABLE 6.6 Statistics on Banking Sectors of Enlargement (Candidate) Countries and Turkey, 2001
Personnel per Number of Branches Total Assets/ Total Deposits/ Total Credit/ Deposits/ Credit/ Assets/Number of
Branch per Bank GDP (%) GDP (%) GDP (%) Credit (%) Assets (%) Banks (€ millions)
Bulgaria 29 21 56 39 29 134 52 253
Cyprus 11 72 307 238 171 139 56 2,750
Czech Rep. 24 47 97 64 38 167 40 2,229
Estonia 20 29 5 3 4 76 69 931
Hungary 24 30 70 43 43 99 62 1,350
Latvia 43 9 87 57 46 124 53 372
Lithuania 14 37 37 24 22 112 58 462
Malta 32 7 412 189 195 97 47 1,191
Poland 34 7 56 33 24 140 42 157
Romania 16 77 31 21 15 141 49 387
Slovak Rep. 36 26 83 59 31 193 37 1,140
Slovenia 18 32 87 57 44 130 50 1,069
Candidate 25 33 111 69 55 129 51 1,024
countries average
Turkey 21 125 64 40 20 196 32 3,113
Note: In June 2004, 1 euro = TL 1,805.605; in December 2003, 1 euro = TL 1,757.480.
Sources: Banking indicators: European Banks Federation (FBE), http://www.fbe.org; GDP figures: Eurostat, http://www.europa.eu.int.
Unless otherwise stated, data on Turkey are from national sources. Concentration, number of banks, number of branches, realized capital ratio data are as of June 2004,
http://www.bddk.org.tr. Turkish data can be found in BRSA 2004.
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TABLE 6.7 Income, Costs, and Profits of EU Banks in Different Size Groups, 2003
All
Change
2002–03 2003 Large Medium Small
(% of total assets)
Income
Net interest income −0.02 1.38 1.22 1.64 2.54
Fees and commissions (net) −0.02 0.64 0.65 0.57 0.84
Trading and foreign exchange results 0.04 0.20 0.25 0.06 0.09
Other operating income (net) 0.00 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.31
Total income 0.00 2.38 2.28 2.44 3.78
Expenses
Staff costs −0.03 0.88 0.86 0.84 1.47
Other −0.01 0.11 0.09 0.13 0.28
Total expenses −0.07 1.44 1.37 1.43 2.62
Profitability
Profits I (operating profits) 0.08 0.94 0.91 1.00 1.16
Specific provisions −0.02 0.36 0.32 0.44 0.47
Funds for general banking risks (net) 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02
Profits II (before tax and extraordinary items) 0.10 0.59 0.59 0.56 0.67
Extraordinary items (net) −0.02 0.01 −0.01 0.05 0.08
Tax charges 0.03 0.18 0.18 0.20 0.27
Profits III (after tax and extraordinary items) 0.05 0.41 0.40 0.42 0.48
(% of Tier 1 capital)
Return on equity
Profits III (after tax and extraordinary items) 1.08 9.87 10.89 8.73 6.20
(% of total income)
Income structure
Net interest income −0.71 58.05 53.48 67.29 67.15
Fees and commissions (net) −1.02 26.80 28.55 23.42 22.22
Trading and foreign exchange results 1.42 7.33 9.64 2.34 2.28
Other operating income (net) 0.11 6.94 6.88 6.79 8.22
(% of total expenses)
Expenditure structure
Staff costs 0.94 61.43 63.02 58.84 56.28
Administrative costs −0.68 31.10 30.42 32.19 33.33
Other −0.26 7.47 6.56 8.97 10.51
Cost-to-income ratio −3.18 60.39 60.15 58.89 69.31
Source: European Central Bank 2004.
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TABLE 6.8 Indicators of 50 Major EU Banks, 2002 and 2003
(percent)
2002 2003
Profitability
Cost-to-income ratio 67.9 64.5
Return on assets (after tax and extraordinary items) 0.4 0.4
Return on equity A9 (after tax and extraordinary items) 8.0 8.7
Net interest income/total assets 1.4 1.3
Net noninterest income/total assets 1.2 1.2
Noninterest income/total operating income 48.9 47.5
Solvency
Tier 1 ratio 6.7 6.7
Total capital ratio 9.6 9.9
Note: The sample of large banks in table 6.8 differs from that in table 6.7. Table 6.8 covers
the weighted average figures for 50 major banks of EU15 countries.
Source: European Central Bank 2004.
TABLE 6.9 Nonperforming Assets and Provisioning of EU Banks, 2003
(percent)
All
Change 
from 2002 2003 Large Medium Small
Nonperforming and doubtful loans (gross; −0.1 3.1 2.7 3.6 6.5
% of loans and advances)
Nonperforming and doubtful loans (gross; −1.9 51.1 46.6 55.7 61.6
% of own funds)
Nonperforming and doubtful loans (net; −1.9 16.7 12.1 22.7 28.3
% of own funds)
Provisioning (stock; % of nonperforming 2.3 67.4 74.1 59.1 54.0
and doubtful assets)
Source: European Central Bank 2004.
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TABLE 6.10 Regulatory Capital Ratios and Risk-Adjusted Items of
EU15 Banks, 2003
Change 
All Banks from 2002
Tier 1 ratio 8.8 0.3
Overall solvency ratio 12.4 0.4
Overall solvency ratio below 9%
Number of banks 98 −74
Asset share (% of total banking sector assets) 0.7 −1.26
Risk-adjusted items (% of total risk adjusted assets)
Risk-weighted assets 82.3 −0.16
Risk-weighted off-balance-sheet items 11.1 0.0
Risk-adjusted trading book 6.6 0.1
Source: European Central Bank 2004.
TABLE 6.11 EU Balance Sheet Structure of EU Banks, 2003
All Banks Change from
(% of total assets) 2002 (%)
Assets
Cash and balances with central bank 1.24 0.1
Treasury bills 1.0 0.0
Loans to credit institutions 15.8 −0.2
Debt securities (public bodies) 7.8 0.8
Debt securities (other borrowers) 10.5 0.1
Loans to customers 50.6 −0.4
Shares and participating interests 3.3 0.0
Tangible assets and intangibles 1.6 0.0
Other assets 8.0 −0.2
Liabilities
Amounts owed to credit institutions 30.4 0.1
Amounts owed to customers 41.9 −0.2
Debt certificates 20.7 0.1
Accruals and other liabilities 8.8 0.0
Fund for general banking risks 0.14 0.0
Provisions for liabilities and charges 1.2 0.0
Subordinated liabilities 1.8 0.0
Equity capital 4.2 0.0
Other liabilities 0.5 0.0
Profit/loss for financial year 0.4 0.1
Selected off-balance-sheet items
Credit lines 14.2 0.7
Guarantees and other commitments 6.5 0.7
Source: European Central Bank 2004.
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EU Banking Turkish 
Directives in Force The Directive . . . Equivalent
Directive No. 2002/87/
EC of European
Parliament and
European Council,
December 16, 2002, on
the supplementary
supervision of credit
institutions, insurance
undertakings, and
investment firms in a
financial conglomerate 
No corresponding
regulation. The intro-
duction of compliant
legislation may bring
about some costs
because of reorganiza-
tion and related
changes at the institu-
tional level, but it is
expected that the
ultimate overall
outcome is likely to
produce efficiency
gains for the banking
sector and the whole
economy.
• Lays down rules for supplementary supervision
of “regulated entities” that are part of a
financial conglomerate.
• Defines the term regulated entity as a credit
institution, an insurance undertaking, or an
investment firm.
• Defines the term financial holding company as a
financial institution, the subsidiary undertak-
ings of which are either exclusively or mainly
credit institutions or financial institutions.
• Makes it compulsory for all financial
conglomerates that are subject to
supplementary supervision to have a
coordinator appointed from among the
competent authorities involved. The
coordinator does not affect the tasks and
responsibilities of the competent authorities as
provided for by the sectoral rules, but works in
cooperation and exchanges information with
these authorities.
• Specifies that the activities of a group occur
mainly in the financial sector if the ratio of the
balance sheet total of the regulated and non-
regulated financial sector entities in the group
to the balance sheet total of the group exceeds
40 percent. Sets out the thresholds for
identifying a financial conglomerate, taking
into account the regulated entities and the
other undertakings and their significance
among the whole.
• Sets out that regulated entities shall be subject
to supplementary supervision. 
• Requires regulated entities to have in place
adequate capital adequacy policies and lays
down the rules for the supplementary
supervision of the capital adequacy of the
regulated entities.
• Requires regulated entities to report on a
regular basis and at least annually to the
competent authority any significant risk
concentration at the level of financial
conglomerate.
• Requires regulated entities to report on a
regular basis and at least annually to the
coordinator all significant intragroup
transactions and requires the supervisory
overview of these transactions to be carried
out by the coordinator.
• Requires regulated entities to have adequate
risk management process and internal control
mechanisms.
• Requires the member states to decide or give
their competent authorities the power to
decide according to which sectoral rules asset
management companies shall be included in
the consolidated or supplementary supervision. 
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EU Banking Turkish 
Directives in Force The Directive . . . Equivalent
Regulation (EC)
No. 2560/2001 of
European Parliament
and European Council,
December 2001, on
cross-border payments
in euros
Directive No. 2001/24/
EC of European
Parliament and
European Council, April
4, 2001, on the reor-
ganization and winding
up of credit institutions
No need for any
national implementing
legislation, because the
EU regulation becomes
binding and directly
applicable upon full
membership. Its imple-
mentation is not
expected to incur a
major cost for the
banking sector.
Banks Act as amended
by Act No. 4743.
• Amends Directives No. 93/6/EC and
No. 2000/12/EC.
• Lays down rules on cross-border payments in
euros to ensure that charges for these
payments are the same as those for payments
in euros within a member state.
• Applies to cross-border payments in euros up
to €50,000 within the European Community.
• Specifies that cross-border payments made
between institutions for their own account are
not covered.
• Specifies that the charges levied for 
cross-border payments and for payments
effected within the member state shall be
transparent.
• Requires that prior to exchanging currencies
into and from euros, customers be informed
about the exchange charges the institutions
propose to apply and about the various
charges that have been applied.
• Applies to credit institutions and their branches
set up in member states other than those in
which they have their head offices.
• Stipulates that the administrative or judicial
authorities of the home member state shall be
the sole authority to decide on the implemen-
tation of reorganization measures.
• States that the home member state shall
without delay inform the competent
authorities of the host member state of
decisions on reorganization.
• Calls for the home member state to publish an
extract from the decision to adapt a reorgani-
zation measure in the Official Journal of the
European Communities to facilitate the exercise
of right of appeal.
• Mandates that the administrative or judicial
authorities of the host member state of a
branch of a credit institution having its head
office outside the community shall without
delay inform the other authorities of their
decision to adopt any reorganization measure.
• Specifies that the home member state shall be
the sole authority to decide on the opening of
winding-up proceedings.
• Calls for the home member state to, without
delay, inform the competent authorities of the
host member state of its decision to open
winding-up proceedings.
• Sets out that where the opening of winding-up
proceedings is decided after the failure of
reorganization measures, the authorization of
the institution shall be withdrawn.
Annex 2: (Continued)
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Directive No.
2000/46/EC of
European Parliament
and European Council,
September 18, 2000,
on the taking up,
pursuit, and prudential
supervision of the
business of electronic
money institutions
Directive No. 2000/12/
EC of European
Parliament and
European Council,
March 20, 2000, on the
taking up and pursuit of
the business of credit
institutions
No corresponding
Turkish legislation. The
introduction of such
legislation would enrich
the scope of financial
services.
• Banks Act as
amended by Act
No. 4743.
• Regulation on the
Establishment and
Operations of Banks.
• Regulation on
Measurement and
Assessment of Capital
Adequacy of Banks.
• Defines an electronic money institution as an
undertaking or any other legal person, other
than a credit institution, that issues means of
payment in the form of electronic money.
• Restricts the business activities of electronic
money institutions, other than the issuing of
electronic money, to the provision of closely
related financial and nonfinancial services and
to the storing of data in electronic devices
on behalf of other undertakings or public
institutions.
• Sets out the redeemability of the bearer
of electronic money during the period of
validity and depending on the contract
between issuer and bearer.
• Sets out that electronic money institutions
should have initial capital of not less than
€1 million.
• Specifies that the maximum storage amount of
the electronic storage device shall not exceed
€150.
• Defines the term credit institution as an
undertaking whose business is to receive
deposits or other repayable funds from the
public and to grant credits for its own account.
• Prohibits undertakings other than credit institu-
tions from carrying on the business of taking
deposits or other repayable funds from the
public and makes it compulsory for credit insti-
tutions to obtain authorization from member
states before commencing their activities.
• Stipulates that credit institutions should possess
their separate own funds and that the initial
capital for access to the taking up of credit
institutions should be equal to or greater than
€5 million.
• States that the competent authorities shall not
grant authorization (1) unless at least two
persons are effectively directing the business of
the credit institution and (2) before they have
been informed of the identities of the share-
holders or members.
• Calls for any natural or legal person who
proposes to hold, directly or indirectly, a
qualifying holding in a credit institution to first
inform the competent authorities. 
• Permits the competent authorities of the host
member state to, in emergencies, take any
precautionary measures necessary to protect
the interests of depositors, investors, and
others to whom services are provided.
• Specifies that the state is responsible for the
prudential supervision of a credit institution.
• States that the competent authorities of the
member states concerned shall collaborate
closely in order to supervise the activities of the
credit institutions operating.
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Annex 2: (Continued)
Directive No. 94/19/EC
of European Parliament
and European Council,
May 30, 1994, on
deposit guarantee
schemes
Decree No. 2000/682
on Savings Deposit
Insurance and
Premiums Collected by
the Saving Deposit
Insurance Fund.
• Specifies that the solvency ratio expresses own
funds as a proportion of risk-adjusted total
assets and off-balance sheet items, and requires
the competent authorities to ensure that the
ratios are calculated not less than twice each
year, either individually or consolidated, where
required.
• Requires credit institutions to permanently
maintain the solvency ratio at a level of at least
8 percent, but the competent authorities may
prescribe any higher minimum ratios they
consider appropriate. 
• Limits a credit institution’s large exposure to a
client or group of connected clients to 25
percent of its own funds and limits the large
exposures in total to 800 percent of the credit
institution’s own funds.
• States that no credit institution shall have a
qualifying holding, the amount of which
exceeds 15 percent of its own funds, in an
undertaking that is neither a credit institution
nor a financial institution.
• Limits the total amount of a credit institution’s
qualifying holdings in undertakings other than
credit institutions and financial institutions to
no more than 60 percent of its own funds.
• Subjects every credit institution that has a
credit institution or a financial institution as a
subsidiary or that holds a participation in such
institutions to supervision on the basis of its
consolidated financial situation.
• Sets up a Banking Advisory Committee
alongside the European Commission in order
to ensure the proper implementation of this
regulation and to assist the Commission in the
preparation of new proposals to the European
Council.
• Defines deposit as any credit balance that
results from funds left in an account or
from temporary situations deriving from
normal banking transactions, which a credit
institution must repay under the legal and
contractual conditions applicable, and any
debt evidenced by a certificate issued by a
credit institution.
• Specifies that the scheme does not cover
deposits made by other credit institutions on
their own behalf, all instruments that fall within
the definition of own funds, and deposits
arising out of transactions in connection with
which there has been a criminal conviction for
money laundering.
• Permits credit institutions authorized in a
member state to take deposits only if they are
members of such a scheme.
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• States that the aggregate deposits of each
depositor shall be covered up to 20,000
European currency units (ECUs).
• States that this regulation shall not preclude
the retention or adoption of provisions that
offer a higher or more comprehensive cover for
deposits.
• Allows deposit guarantee schemes to, on social
considerations, cover certain kinds of deposits
in full.
• Calls for depositors to be informed of the
provisions of the deposit guarantee.
Notes
1. This chapter was written while the author was vice presi-
dent of the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency of
Turkey. She is grateful to Münür Yayla and Serdar Özdemir for
their contributions to this chapter. The views expressed in it are
hers and do not necessarily represent those of the Banking Reg-
ulation and Supervision Agency of Turkey.
2. Details of the restructuring program can be found in
“Banking Sector Restructuring Program—Progress Reports of
BRSA” at http://www.bddk.org.tr.
3. The Istanbul Approach is a voluntary corporate debt
restructuring scheme based on the London Approach. It was
introduced by amendments to the Banks Act. A Financial
Restructuring Framework Agreement was prepared and submit-
ted to the banks by the Banks Association of Turkey on May 24,
2002. The agreement was signed by 25 banks and 17 financial
institutions and approved by the BRSA on July 4, 2002.
4. Detailed explanations about and the results of the audit
and assessment phases of the program have been released to
the public through the “Introductory Report” and “Progress
Report.” These reports are available on the BRSA Web site,
http://www.bddk.org.tr.
5. The description of the EU banking sector in this study is
based on the report EU Banking Sector Stability (European
Central Bank 2003a).
6. Data for the figures that follow are reported in annex 1
and were drawn from World Bank (http://www.worldbank.org),
European Central Bank (2003a, 2003b; see http://www.ecb.int),
and European Banking Federation (http://www.fbe.be) sources.
These data are based on Banking Supervision Committee (BSC)
sources. The banks of current member countries are classified
by asset size as large, medium, and small. The data on banks
cover 99 percent of the credit institutions in EU countries.
Large, medium, and small banks account for 66 percent, 30 per-
cent, and 4 percent of total assets, respectively. The data for 2003
cover 57 large banks, 968 medium banks, and 3,600 small banks.
7. The euro–Turkish lira exchange rate for June 2004 was
used in these calculations.
8. These figures should be considered with caution, because
data were not available for five of the candidate countries.
9. Based on the historical cost and for the whole banking sec-
tor, including the intervened banks.
10. For the same period, this ratio is −33 percent for state
banks, −132 percent for privately owned banks, −12 percent for
development and investment banks, −242 percent for SDIF
banks, and 1.6 percent for foreign banks.
11. Because consistent data for candidate countries are not
available, comparisons are made only between the EU countries
and Turkey in the rest of this chapter.
12. The BRSA was established by the Banks Act (Law No.
4389), issued on June 23, 1999.
13. They applied the standardized approach for credit risk
and the basic indicator and standardized approaches for opera-
tional risk.
14. The Group of Ten is made up of 11 industrial countries—
Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands,
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United
States—that consult and cooperate on economic, monetary, and
financial matters. The ministers of finance and the central bank
governors of the Group of Ten usually meet once a year in con-
nection with the fall meetings of the Interim Committee of the
International Monetary Fund. The governors of the Group of
Ten normally meet bimonthly at the Bank for International
Settlements.
15. For recent information on actions taken to satisy acces-
sion requirements, see “Monitoring the Implementation of the
National Program,” http://www.abgs.gov.tr.
16. It is believed that an assessment of new organizational
models, such as a financial holding company, within the same
scope will be useful.
17. In fact, the economic criteria that are a precondition for
EU membership will independently be an important develop-
ment for ensuring confidence and stability in the markets. Mem-
bership might further strengthen this confidence.
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Characteristics and Evolution 
of the Industry
The electricity industry is made up of three main
interrelated segments. Electricity is generated in
plants by harnessing the flow of water or the power
of the wind, sun, or earth (geothermal); burning
fossil fuels (thermal); or capturing nuclear fission.
Distribution refers to supplying residences or busi-
nesses with electricity through lower-voltage wires
and transformers. The transmission of electricity
refers to the actual transportation of higher-voltage
electricity between generation plants and distribu-
tion facilities, the interconnection of geographically
dispersed generation plants, their scheduling, and
orderly dispatch. The operation and commercial
principles of related wholesale and retail supply
activities are quite similar; both involve metering,
computing, and billing. An important distinction
is that the wholesale trade business is carried
out mostly at the transmission level on a larger
scale, and the retail trade business is carried out
through the distribution system at the end user
level with both smaller business and household
customers.
Several characteristics of the electricity industry
distinguish it from other industries. For one thing,
there is no economical way to store electricity. This
situation implies that the demand for and supply of
electricity must be balanced almost continuously
Turkey has begun a major overhaul of the legal and
regulatory framework surrounding its electricity
industry.1 The reform program entails liberalization
as well as a radical restructuring of the industry—
that is, its generation, transmission, and distribu-
tion segments, including its wholesale and retail
activities. The purpose of this chapter is to review
and assess the new regulatory regime, identify the
main competition-related challenges the industry is
likely to face, and discuss future prospects. The
chapter will attempt to evaluate the reform process
in light of the regulatory framework established at
the level of the European Union (EU) and the cur-
rent debate on the proposals about its amendment.
The chapter is organized as follows. The first
section reviews the physical peculiarities of the
electricity industry and discusses how they have
shaped the evolution of its industrial organization.
The second section presents an overview of regula-
tory reform in the EU, the electricity directive
issued by the European Parliament in 1996, and the
recent proposals for amendment advanced by the
European Commission. The pre-and postreform
structure of the electricity industry in Turkey and
the main features of the new regulatory regime are
featured in the third section. The fourth section
identifies the main challenges that the industry is
likely to face in the process of developing effective
competition. A final section discusses possible
competition-enhancing solutions.
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in real time. In addition, the demand for electricity
varies hourly and daily, as well as across months
and seasons. Consumers can obtain electricity as
long as they are connected to the network, because
there is no cost-effective way to establish physical
contact between specific consumers and genera-
tors. Rather, electricity from generating plants
flows to a common pool and is retrieved by con-
sumers from that pool. In the short run, the price
elasticity of demand is very low. Because generat-
ing plants have rigid, nonflexible capacity con-
straints, supply is relatively inelastic, especially at
peak demand times. In addition, several physical
constraints, such as voltage, have to be met. The
most binding constraint affecting system opera-
tions is the limitation on the power-carrying
capacities of lines and transformers. Congestion
resulting from this constraint can, in principle, so
severely limit system operation that it could
impede the transfer of production from a least-cost
plant to a load, even though both parties would
like to make the requisite sales agreement. Thus,
balancing supply and demand requires coordinat-
ing and scheduling the production of different
plants, taking the existing capacity of lines and
transformers into account. The use of generators
will allow the system to respond to changes in
demand or supply. The generators must hold a
minimum level of reserve capacity to keep the
probability of system failure below an acceptable
threshold. Failure at one point in the network (e.g.,
failure of a generation plant) can have serious
repercussions for the whole network if not man-
aged properly. Thus there are strong externalities in
terms of network security.
The need to coordinate generation and supply
on an almost minute-by-minute basis is an incen-
tive to integrate these two activities vertically.
Indeed, in most countries electricity services his-
torically have been supplied through vertically inte-
grated enterprises encompassing generation, trans-
mission, and distribution activities. In Europe, such
enterprises have been organized as monopolies
under public ownership. In the United States, the
predominant form of industrial organization has
been privately owned but regulated franchises with
monopoly rights to serve specific geographic
regions.
Because the transmission and distribution of
electricity involve large sunk capital costs with
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strong economies of scale (in the sense that
duplication of lines would be economically waste-
ful), there is little scope for competition in these seg-
ments of the industry. By contrast, the generation of
electricity is now regarded as potentially competi-
tive, especially with the advent of the smaller-scale
combined-cycle gas turbine (CCGT) technology.
Generation is generally believed to exhibit increas-
ing returns of scale at low levels of production and
constant returns to scale otherwise (Armstrong,
Cowan, and Vickers 1994: 282). Armstrong and
others report Joskow and Schmalensee’s estimate of
minimum efficient scale for fossil-based plants at
400-megawatt capacity.
In the last 10–15 years, the predominant view
has evolved to favor the introduction of competi-
tion into generation and retail supply activities.
Some countries, such as Chile and the United
Kingdom, were pioneers, but the wave of liberaliza-
tion has been widespread, covering developing and
developed economies alike.
Regulatory Reform in the EU
The European Commission’s effort to liberalize
electricity markets in the EU was driven primarily
by the quest for a single market, but it was met with
resistance by many national governments.2 In 1991
the Commission proposed allowing third-party
access within the electricity markets of all member
states, but the Council of Ministers rejected the
proposal. By 1993 the concept of negotiated (as
opposed to full or regulated) third party access
was being presented as one of the options under
discussion. In 1994 France introduced the single
buyer model as an alternative to negotiated third
party access. Eventually, in 1996, an agreement
was reached on a timetable for liberalization, and
each member state was given a choice between
the three alternatives for access. The agreement cul-
minated in the European Parliament’s electricity
directive.3
Liberalization of the electricity sector was
strongly supported by the Competition Directorate
General of the European Commission (the former
DG IV) through its threats that no liberalization
would call for tougher action on the basis of Arti-
cles 81 and 82 of the Treaty Creating the European
Community (Pollitt 1999: 50).
The Electricity Directive of 1996
The basic idea behind the electricity directive is
to introduce competition to the potentially com-
petitive segments of the electricity industry—
generation and retail supply—and to regulate trans-
mission and distribution, which retain natural
monopoly characteristics. This section examines
four aspects of the directive: market opening,
unbundling, third party access, and public service
obligations and regulation
Market Opening On the demand side, the direc-
tive envisaged market opening targets on the basis
of consumers being designated to have freedom to
contract their consumption of electricity (so-called
eligible customers). Thus, according to the direc-
tive, each member state would “open” a given and
increasing percentage of its market over the next six
years. That percentage was to be calculated as the
share, in overall European Community consump-
tion, of final customers consuming more than
40 gigawatt-hours per year. The threshold was to
be reduced to 20 gigawatt-hours in the second
stage (within three years) and 9 gigawatt-hours in
the third step (within six years). Those thresholds
have been estimated to correspond to market share
openings equal to 27 percent, 28 percent, and
33 percent, respectively, in 1999, 2000, and 2003.4
Each member state was to designate its own set of
eligible customers, but consumers with more than
100 gigawatt-hours of consumption were to be
definitely included in that designation. To address
problems that might arise if the degree of market
opening differed across states, the directive included
provisions for reciprocity: a member state has the
right to refuse access for companies from states that
have not liberalized to an equal extent.
On the supply side, the directive provided for
two mechanisms for the development of new
capacity in generation, both aimed at introducing
competition:
• Authorization. Companies offer to build new
power plants under an open and impartial pro-
cedure that decides whether they should go
ahead.
• Tendering. An authority decides what new
capacity is required. It solicits tenders, which
are then assessed through an impartial
procedure.
Unbundling To prevent discrimination, cross
subsidization, and distortion of competition, the
directive obliged integrated operators to separate
the management of the generation, transmission,
distribution, and nonelectricity activities and to
keep separate accounts for each. To ensure nondis-
crimination, it envisaged creation of an independ-
ent authority for dispute settlement.
Each member state was required to specify a
transmission system operator (TSO), whose task
was to ensure dispatch of a generation plant under
fair and transparent rules that did not favor plants
owned by the same company as the TSO. The
unbundling of the TSO was deemed crucial (man-
agement, legal, or ownership unbundling).
As for distribution, the system was to operate on
the same nondiscriminatory basis as transmission.
Third Party Access One of the main objectives of
the directive was to enable independent generators
to have access to the transmission and distribution
networks in order to supply final customers. The
directive prescribed three types of access arrange-
ments (but member countries could also choose
hybrid arrangements):
• Negotiated third party access (nTPA). Consumers
and producers contract directly with each other
and then negotiate with the transmission and
distribution companies for access to the net-
work.
• Regulated third party access (rTPA). Access prices
are not negotiated, but rather are published by
the regulator.
• Single buyer model (SBM). There is a single
wholesale buyer of electricity. Competition in
generation is allowed, but retail competition is
limited. Eligible consumers not tied to a specific
distributor or retailer can still contract with pro-
ducers. The single buyer pays the producer its
regulated sales price minus network charges.
The producer can then compensate the con-
sumer so that the consumption prices become
equal to the contract price.
Public Service Obligations (PSOs) The directive
also recognized that some objectives deemed desir-
able from a social point of view may not be achieved
through unfettered competition. To achieve these
objectives, the directive provided that member
states may impose such obligations on electricity
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undertakings.The objectives mentioned in the direc-
tive were security (including security of supply),
regularity, quality, price, and environmental pro-
tection. The obligations would be defined by the
member states.
Progress with Implementation and 
Proposed Amendments
In March 2001, the European Commission issued a
communication that assessed the progress in devel-
opment of the internal market for electricity and
the effects of implementation of the 1996 directive
(European Commission 2001a) and proposed a
series of amendments (European Commission
2001b). The communication underlined the impor-
tance of fully opening energy markets to improving
Europe’s competitiveness. According to the Com-
mission, the effects of market opening were posi-
tive. However, it also stated that to complete the
internal market, further measures were necessary.
The key points of the communication are described
in this section.
By 2000 the average market openness in the
European Community had reached 66 percent—a
figure higher than the thresholds established in the
directive. However, progress was very uneven across
countries. Some countries had full market opening;
in others, market opening was limited to 30 per-
cent. It also was observed that the reciprocity provi-
sions of the directive had proved unable to address
problems of unevenness in the competitive envi-
ronments between member states. There was con-
cern that if this unevenness persisted over a longer
period, a level playing field would not develop
within the internal market.
For access, 14 member states had chosen rTPA;
only Germany had selected the nTPA regime. Italy
and Portugal had chosen SBM for captive (i.e.,
noneligible) customers and rTPA for eligible cus-
tomers. Most member states had chosen authoriza-
tion as the procedure to elicit additions to genera-
tion capacity. However, the ultimate goal of
nondiscriminatory access to the network was not
fully achieved. The absence of standard and pub-
lished third party access tariffs was thought to be a
significant barrier to entry. Another barrier was
the absence of effective unbundling in member
states. Germany and France chose management
unbundling,seven countries chose legal unbundling,
and five countries chose ownership unbundling.
Thus effective access required further strengthening
of unbundling.
The communication underlined the benefits of
progress in competition. Prices for industrial users
had come down in all member states, but larger
price decreases occurred in countries where liberal-
ization was 100 percent. Household prices fell,
though to a lesser extent overall than prices for
industrial users. Overall, larger reductions occurred
in countries in which customers were free to
change suppliers and in which changing suppliers
was actually easy to do.
The communication also raised concerns about
the pace of cross-border trade: “The objective of
the Electricity and Gas Directives is the creation of
one truly integrated single market, not fifteen more
or less liberalized but largely national markets.” It
pointed out that even though the number of cus-
tomers who switched suppliers rose overall, most
customers tended to opt for national suppliers. In
general, cross-border trade was limited. Its expan-
sion would require developing appropriate rules on
the pricing of this trade, developing rules for the
allocation and management of scarce interconnec-
tion capacity, and, where necessary, increasing such
capacity.
In short, the Commission indicated that there
were “several weaknesses in the current legal frame-
work which needed to be remedied if a fully opera-
tional internal market for gas and electricity is to be
achieved” (European Commission 2001a: 6). On
the basis of these findings, the Commission devel-
oped proposals to amend the directive (European
Commission 2001b). The most important pro-
posed amendments were as follows:
• Market opening. Allow all electricity customers
freedom to choose suppliers (end domestic cus-
tomer franchise monopoly) by January 1, 2005.
This was called the quantitative proposal.
• Unbundling. Strengthen unbundling to legal and
functional separation of transmission from gen-
eration (thus management separation alone was
no longer sufficient, and ownership separation
is now appropriately promoted as a form of
unbundling stronger than legal separation).
• Access. Strengthen access by requiring rTPA with
published tariffs. Do not permit the single buyer
model.
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• Public service obligations. Make explicit mention
of the obligation that member states should
ensure universal service, defined as “supply of
high quality of electricity to all customers in
their territory,” as well as protection of vulnera-
ble customers and final consumers’ rights.
• Regulation. Establish an independent regulatory
authority to approve tariffs and conditions for
access to transmission and distribution net-
works ex ante and to monitor and report to the
Commission on the state of the electricity mar-
kets (especially supply-demand balances).
The proposals did not prescribe a specific model
for organization of wholesale activities. Some of the
proposals initially met with opposition. In particu-
lar, Germany opposed the requirement for an
independent regulator and ex ante regulation of
access prices and conditions (Newbery 2002a). The
principles of nondiscriminatory access to the net-
work, based on transparent and published tariffs,
and the establishment of independent regulators
were adopted by the Barcelona European Council in
March 2002 (European Commission 2002b). The
Barcelona council also pointed out the need to take
measures on PSO, in particular for remote areas and
vulnerable groups. During their November 2002
meeting, EU energy ministers agreed that full market
opening would be achieved in 2004 for nonhouse-
hold customers and in 2007 for household cus-
tomers (European Commission 2002a). Unbundling
was to be achieved by July 2004 for transmission and
2007 for distribution. The proposed amendments
were finally adopted in June 2003.5
The Current Structure of Turkey’s
Electricity Industry
As in many European countries until recently, the
Turkish electricity industry was dominated by a
state-owned vertically integrated company, TEK.6
In 1993, in an attempt to prepare TEK for priva-
tization, the government separated TEK into the
Turkish Electricity and Transmission Company
(TEAS) and the Turkish Electricity Distribution
Company (TEDAS).
Background
Beginning in the 1980s, the government sought to
attract private participation in the industry. Its
motivation was both the general disposition toward
the private sector that emerged in the 1980s and fis-
cal constraints, purportedly to ease the investment
load on the general budget. This effort was con-
strained, however, by the constitutional regime that
interpreted the provision of electricity as a public
service—that is, something that had to be supplied
by the government. Instead of responding directly
by seeking to remove this constitutional challenge,
the governments of the 1980s and 1990s chose to
create shortcuts7 through various private sector
participation models short of privatization. The
first law setting up a framework for private partici-
pation in electricity was enacted in 1984 (Law
No. 3096).8 This law forms the legal basis for pri-
vate participation through build-operate-transfer
(BOT) contracts for new generation facilities,
transfer of operating rights (TOOR) contracts for
existing generation and distribution assets, and the
autoproducer system for companies wishing to
produce their own electricity. Under a BOT conces-
sion, a private company would build and operate a
plant for up to 99 years (later reduced to 49 years)
and then transfer it to the state at no cost.9 Under a
TOOR contract, the private enterprise would oper-
ate (and rehabilitate, where necessary) an existing
government-owned facility through a lease-type
arrangement.
In 1994 Law No. 3996 and Implementing Decree
5907 were enacted to enhance the attractiveness of
BOT projects. The laws authorized the Undersecre-
tariat of the Treasury to grant guarantees and pro-
vided tax exemptions (as well as extended the
purview of the model to other public services such
as water and wastewater, transport, and communi-
cations).10 An additional law was enacted in 1997
for private sector participation in the construc-
tion and operation of new thermal power plants
through a licensing system rather than concession
award. The build-operate-own (BOO) law (Law
No. 4283) again provided guarantees by the Trea-
sury. Under the BOO model, investors retain
ownership of the facility at the end of the contract
period.
A typical BOT, BOO, or TOOR generation con-
tract, signed between the private party and TEAS or
TEDAS, includes exclusive “take-or-pay” obligations
with fixed quantities and prices (or price formulas)
over 15–30 years. Thus it does not provide a frame-
work for competition in the market, but only
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potentially for competition for the market if the
contracts are granted through a competitive
process in which the lowest-cost proposals are
accepted. The main benefits, in principle, of such
private sector participation contracts arise from
(1) transferring those risks to the private sector
that is best able to manage them (including most
commercial risk during the operating phase),
(2) accessing strong and effective private sector
commercial and managerial skills for reduced
operational costs and improved service quality, and
(3) spurring adoption of innovation at both the
design and implementation phases of projects. Such
efficiency-related benefits are only likely to arise,
however, from competitively tendered projects.
Unfortunately, no rigorous framework was in place
to ensure implementation of competitive tendering.
On the contrary, under the Turkish BOT model there
was no requirement for prequalification, nor for a
competitive open tender, nor even for a closed tender
(the“method of sealed bid from selected companies”
merely requires that at least three interested compa-
nies submit their offers). Unsolicited bids could be
brought forward and negotiated solely on the basis of
an investor-completed feasibility study (through
“the method of negotiation”).
Compounding these problems, under the
Turkish BOT, BOO, and TOOR generation models
the government has retained most of the commer-
cial risks while providing the private sector with
substantial rewards. Under these contracts, the
Treasury has provided guarantees to cover critical
commercial take-or-pay payment obligations, such
as minimum electricity generation levels and mini-
mum quantities of gas in power station gas pur-
chase contracts, at associated predetermined prices
in U.S. dollars over the life of the contracts.11
Although the fixed-price nature of the contracts
creates incentives for cost efficiencies, the contracts
preclude any possibility of making consumers share
in any efficiency gains: all cost savings are appropri-
ated by the generator. In addition to the relatively
high electricity cost of many of these projects, the
BOT and TOOR contracts are heavily front-end
loaded with higher capacity charges in the first
years of operation to allow for early recovery of
investment costs (OECD 2002). As discussed below,
the current structure of these contracts acts as a
major barrier to the development of competition in
the generation sector.12
A large number of BOT proposals or projects
have not been completed.13 Initially, the main
constraint was the prevailing interpretation of
Turkey’s constitution—that is, that even though
Law No. 3996 stated that BOT contracts would be
subject to private law, the Constitutional Court
decided that electricity was a public service and
that therefore the BOTs were to be considered as
concessions under public administrative law. This
ruling meant that the development and eventual
completion of a BOT contract required interven-
tion and approval from a multitude of government
agencies, including the Ministry of Energy and
Natural Resources (MENR), the High Planning
Council (referred to by its Turkish initials, YPK),
the State Planning Organization (SPO), and the
Treasury. In addition, the public law character of
the contract meant that investors did not have
recourse to international arbitration and that con-
tracts had to be reviewed by Danıs¸tay, the Council
of State, which was a lengthy process.
In August 1999, a constitutional amendment
opened the way for privatization in the electricity
sector, for the application of private law to con-
tracts, and for limits to the scope and duration of
the Danıs¸tay review.14 Although the constitutional
amendment (and the subsequent Law No. 4501 of
January 2000, which implemented these changes)
simplified the legal framework for private partici-
pation, the new obstacle to the development of
BOT contracts was the unwillingness of the Trea-
sury to provide new guarantees in light of the
implied contingent liabilities.
By the end of the 1990s, it had become clear that
quasi-privatization with Treasury guarantees was
not going to be feasible because of the rapidly dete-
riorating fiscal stance. In addition, there was wider
appreciation that these types of contracts, which
locked generation companies into long-term exclu-
sive sale agreements with predetermined, fixed
prices, did not serve the overall objective of develop-
ing competition in electricity markets. Several gov-
ernment agencies (e.g., MENR, SPO, the Treasury)
were already working on the design of a competitive
electricity sector regulated through an independent
agency. In 2001 Law No. 4628 (the electricity market
law, or EML) provided a new and radically different
legal framework for the design of electricity markets
and established a new, independent Energy Market
Regulatory Authority (EMRA).
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The Current Model
The main drivers for liberalization in Turkey were
very different from those that preoccupied the EU
or the leaders of electricity liberalization such as the
United Kingdom. The EU was primarily concerned
with creating an internal market. Countries such as
the United Kingdom were motivated by the ineffi-
ciency of public enterprises (the ownership dimen-
sion) and the opportunities generated by techno-
logical changes that made competition possible in
generation (the market structure dimension).15 In
Turkey, the main driver of and the public justifica-
tion for private participation under the pre-2001
regime, and liberalization under the new regulatory
regime, were rapid growth in demand, combined
with the inability of the government to meet that
demand through public investments or Treasury-
guaranteed private investments because of the
deteriorating fiscal situation.
Still, the degree of competition envisaged in the
new framework is more advanced than the EU
directive of 1996. In most respects, it is compatible
with (if not more competitive than) the proposed
amendments to the directive currently under dis-
cussion. As described in the next section, the main
challenge for Turkey is that, the competitive frame-
work notwithstanding, the actual development of
competition is likely to take some time because of
the legacy of Turkey’s recent past: the current struc-
ture of ownership (dominance of state-owned
assets in generation) and even more problemati-
cally the uncompetitive, tied nature of the contracts
governing the privately operated assets.
The new regime contained in primary legislation
and implementing regulations emphasizes competi-
tion in ordering the market. The main principles of
the EML, and their status in relation to the 1996
directive, are as follows.
Market Opening On the demand side, customers
that consume more than 9 gigawatt-hours per year
are designated as eligible consumers who are free to
choose their suppliers—a measure that meets the
targets of the directive. The main operational diffi-
culty in market opening is estimating the number
of expected eligible customers, because higher
numbers mean more measuring, telemetering, and
computing hardware and software, which means
larger investments by wholesale and retail
companies. These costs must be reflected in con-
sumer tariffs. As of May 2003, the estimated eligible
customers above 9 gigawatt-hours per year were
103 at the transmission level and 507 at the distri-
bution level, accounting for 13.5 percent of overall
consumption (Sevaiog˘lu n.d.).16 This number is
likely to increase, however, because additional
industrial users are expected to enroll as eligible
customers through demand aggregation, with users
having similar demand characteristics.
On the supply side, the authorization-type
licensing framework established in the new regime
also appears to be fully compatible with the direc-
tive. It provides entry opportunities into the gener-
ation (independent power producers, or IPPs, and
autoproducers who can sell up to a maximum of
20 percent of their annual production to consumers
other than their shareholders), wholesale trade,
distribution, retail trade, import, and export of
electricity. Distribution companies may also oper-
ate as retail sales companies in their regions by
obtaining a retail sales license and may import elec-
tricity if allowed in their license. Distribution com-
panies may establish joint ventures with generation
companies or set up generation units (not exceed-
ing a market share of 20 percent). Transmission
remains a state monopoly, but private generators
can establish private direct transmission lines. The
only limitation is that the EMRA’s granting of gen-
eration licenses is conditional on no congestion in
the transmission-distribution link connecting the
new plant to the grid or directly to customers.
According to EMRA, congestion in the transmis-
sion network is most likely to be resolved through
some type of auctions among the companies that
would benefit from the transmission investments
(Sevaiog˘lu n.d.).
Unbundling TEAS has been further unbundled
into the Turkish Electricity Generation Company
(EUAS), Turkish Electricity Wholesale Company
(TETAS), and Turkish Electricity Transmission
Company (TEIAS), each organized as a separate
legal entity. Thus, the degree of unbundling between
generation, transmission, and distribution envis-
aged and carried out under the EML goes beyond
the minimum directive requirements of manage-
ment separation and unbundling of accounts. The
secondary legislation regulating these activities is
being prepared by EMRA.
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Under the new structure, EUAS will take over,
operate, or close down the state’s existing power
plants that are not transferred to the private sector.
TETAS is created to carry out wholesale operations.
It will take over all existing energy sale and purchase
agreements from TEAS and TEDAS (distribution).
TEIAS is responsible for transmission assets, for sys-
tem operation and maintenance, for planning of
new transmission investments and building of new
transmission facilities, and, critically, for the balanc-
ing and settlement procedure that will balance the
power transactions among parties, both physically
and financially. Thus, in the words of the directive,
TEIAS is the transmission system operator. It is
envisaged that all transmission facilities owned and
operated by other companies will be transferred to
TEIAS under the EML. In line with this require-
ment, the transmission facilities that had been
awarded to private investors through concessions to
the two companies Kepez Elektrik (Antalya region)
and Cukorova Elektrik, or CEAS (Adana, Mersin,
Hatay, and Osmaniye regions), were seized by the
Ministry of Energy17 and handed over to TEIAS in
June 2003, because the companies had failed to
hand them over by February 2003 as required.18
Third Party Access EML requires the rTPA
regime for access to transmission and distribution.
An independent regulatory authority was created
that, among other things (see later discussion), will
settle disputes between parties.
Market Design As highlighted in figure 7.1, at the
heart of the new regime is a bilateral contracts
market in which generation companies contract
with wholesale trade companies (TETAS and any
eventual new entrants), distribution companies,
any new independent retail companies, and eligible
customers (EMRA 2003). On the generation side,
EUAS is likely to be split into a hydro generator
(holding all state-owned hydro plants transferred
from DSI, the Directorate General of State Water
Works) and a small number of affiliate portfolio
generation companies (holding the state-owned
thermal plants and mobile plant contracts). EUAS
also will hold the physical assets associated with any
TOOR (generation) contracts. For any excess
capacity, existing and new autoproducers (genera-
tion by industrial facilities for own use) will
compete with other generators for contracts with
distribution companies and independent retailers,
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FIGURE 7.1 Structure of the Electricity Market, Turkey
Source: Modified from Draft Electricity Market Implementation Manual (see EMRA 2003).
and directly with eligible consumers. As illustrated
in figure 7.1, the dominant state-owned wholesaler
TETAS also holds all previous BOO, BOT, and
TOOR (generation) contracts and will assume
other stranded costs such as the debts and employ-
ment liabilities of EUAS and TEIAS.19 In fact, deal-
ing with stranded costs is one of the main reasons
for the creation of TETAS.
As for end users, eligible customers may buy
electricity from their regional distributor/retailer
or TOOR distributor, but they also may buy
directly from a wholesaler, from a new independent
retailer, or from an independent generator. Captive
customers, by contrast, must buy their electricity
from a distributor/retailer in their region, but they
have the right to buy from any retailer carrying out
the same commercial activity in the region—that is,
either their existing regional distributor or retailer
or TOOR distributor or any other new retailer in
the region.
The current market design does not envisage a
centralized pool or power exchange. Therefore,
dispatch is separated from the operation of the
wholesale market. The actual real-time equality of
demand and supply, given the bilateral contracts,
will be carried out by the system operator through
purchases and sales in a balancing market. For this
purpose, a market System Balancing and Settle-
ment Center20 is to be established within TEIAS.
In principle, it is expected that the balancing
market will make up a small percentage of total
demand and will be used for adjustments at the
margin.
Privatization The new regime envisages eventual
direct privatization in generation and distribution.
Transmission assets are to remain under govern-
ment ownership. Foreign investors cannot assume a
controlling interest in the generation, transmission,
and distribution sectors.
The details of licensing procedures, market
operation, tariffs, vesting contracts, privatization,
and stranded cost mechanisms have been left to
secondary legislation and decisions.
Vesting Contracts Vesting contracts are an initial
set of bilateral contracts put in place by the govern-
ment between companies it owns (or between
state-owned companies and private companies
such as independent retailers when the government
decides the contract structure and when the retailer
decides whether to buy it) to provide a smooth
transition to competitive markets and to improve
the predictability of revenues during this transi-
tion. The contracts remain with the companies
when they are privatized—the private buyer pays
for the company and its package of contracts. Vest-
ing contracts are intended to cover a large portion
of sales (90–100 percent) of each supplier initially.
This share is reduced gradually in later years and
replaced by freely negotiated bilateral contracts as
the vesting contracts expire.
Vesting contracts are expected to include pur-
chases by TETAS from all EUAS hydro plants, sales
from TETAS to all distribution companies and dis-
tribution TOORs to cover franchise captive con-
sumer demand (with part of hydro capacity avail-
able for the balancing market), and sales from
affiliate portfolio generation companies to all dis-
tribution companies.
The main objectives of vesting contracts are as
follows (OECD 2002, EMRA 2003):
• Avoid large physical imbalances or large finan-
cial risks to participants.
• Avoid chaotic prices.
• Ensure that distribution companies are not
overexposed in the balancing market.
• Allow a period of time for learning how the
bilateral market works before distribution com-
panies undertake their own contracting.
• Allow companies to be privatized with a set of
matching purchase and sale contracts so that
potential buyers can value them.
• Allow government to influence the portfolio
mix of generation purchased by each distributor
to ensure reasonable regional balance.
• Allow determination of a reasonable flow of
funds between companies (e.g., minimum sales
levels for generation companies).
Public Service Obligations The EML under the
consumer support section of Article 13 and the tar-
iff regulation under Article 20 allow for an explicit
cash subsidy: direct cash refunds to consumers
without affecting the price structure and the prices
“in cases where consumers in certain regions
and/or in line with certain objectives need to be
supported.” The mechanism for allocation of these
direct cash refunds (“amount, procedure and
principles”) has not been defined in the primary
legislation; it will be established by the Council of
Ministers upon proposal by the MENR.
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The Independent Regulatory Authority The
new regime establishes the independent Energy
Market Regulatory Authority, which is governed by
its own board.21 The main functions of the author-
ity include:
• Applying and overseeing the new licensing
framework
• Preparing and publishing secondary legislation
on electricity and natural gas markets22
• Enforcing regulated third party access
• Applying a new transmission and distribution
code
• Determining eligible customers over time
• Regulating tariffs for transmission and distribu-
tion activities (connection and use of system), as
well as provision of retail services to noneligible
customers, and the wholesale tariff of TETAS
• Performing tenders for city gas distribution
networks
• Following the performance of all actors in the
market
• Following and protecting customer rights
• Applying sanctions to parties violating the
established rules.
Main Challenges
The actual development of competition in the
Turkish electricity market is likely to take time
because of various challenges and difficulties, espe-
cially those related to the exit from the old system.
Primary among these challenges is the fact that
most generation capacity is currently either under
government ownership or tied up in take-or-pay
contracts that leave no room for competition.
Additional challenges lie in the financial difficulties
that may persist in distribution. Finally, liberaliza-
tion will entail significant tariff rebalancing, which
may pose serious political challenges.
Stranded Costs and Competition 
in the Generation Market
As of 2002, private generators in Turkey accounted
for a total of about 37 percent of capacity, including
12 percent for autoproducers (table 7.1). Under cur-
rently committed BOO, BOT, and TOOR contracts
(see table)—assuming no privatization in genera-
tion, a significant increase in autoproduction capac-
ity, but little additional new entry for the foreseeable
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TABLE 7.1 Turkey’s Electricity Generating Capacity: 2002, 2005, 2010
2002 2005 2010
Megawatts Percent Megawatts Percent Megawatts Percent
Non-EUAS plant
Build-own-operate (BOO) 3,830 11.3 5,810 14.4 5,810 13.5
Build-own-transfer (BOT) thermal 1,450 4.3 1,450 3.6 1,450 3.4
BOT hydro and wind 899 2.7 899 2.2 899 2.1
Transfer of operating rights 650 1.9 650 1.6 650 1.5
(TOOR) transferred 
Mobile 623 1.8 823 2.0 823 1.9
Kepez and CEAS 1,120 3.3 1,120 2.8 1,120 2.6
Autoproduction 3,944 11.7 5,344 13.2 6,844 15.9
Subtotal 12,516 37.0 16,096 39.8 17,956 41.7
EUAS plant
Natural gas 3,983 11.8 3,983 9.8 3,983 9.3
Hydro 10,326 30.6 11,685 28.9 12,762 29.7
Coal/lignite and fuel oil 6,972 20.6 8,692 21.5 8,692 20.2
Subtotal 21,281 63.0 24,360 60.2 25,437 59.1
Total capacity 33,796 100.0 40,455 100.0 43,032 100.0
Note: The forecasts in the table exclude additional hydro plants with signed intergovernmental protocols
scheduled for 2007 and after.
Source: ECA 2002.
future—the public sector’s share of capacity will
remain at about 60 percent in 2010. Publicly owned
hydro assets alone account for about a third of total
generation capacity.
Because a significant share of privately operated
assets are tied to contracts entailing fixed amounts
and prices, those assets will not be deployed under
competitive forces. As highlighted in table 7.1, as of
2002 the three BOO plants in operation accounted
for the largest share. Total energy sold by the BOO
plants in 2002 was 36.4 gigawatt-hours, or 34.3 per-
cent of the total energy purchased by TETAS in 2002.
Four natural gas plants, 17 hydroelectric plants,
and two wind BOT plants are already in operation.
These BOT projects sold 12.7 gigawatt-hours of
energy in 2002, which accounted for an additional
11.9 percent of total TETAS consumption. There-
fore, 46.2 percent of all purchases made by TETAS is
based on existing tied BOO and BOT contracts.
Procedures are not complete for an additional
30 BOT projects with a capacity of 2,771 mega-
watts, and their legal status is still not clear. The
anticompetitive nature of these contracts and their
apparent high cost have roused public reaction
against them. As for TOORs, two generators (one
lignite and one hydro) are operating. TOOR con-
tracts accounting for an additional 3,926 mega-
watts have not been transferred; their legal status is
not clear (and their transfer would have little effect
on available capacity, because they represent exist-
ing production).
Stranded costs—that is, the costs incurred
within the previous market structure that cannot
be economically recovered within a competitive
market structure—include the high operating costs
of old and inefficient generators, long-term power
purchase agreements with high prices, removal of
production subsidies, and high staffing costs (pay-
ments of redundancies resulting from the transfer
of operations to the private sector, including pen-
sion liabilities for workers able to retire). Stranded
costs create uncertainty for new investors and risk
stifling competition.
Stranded costs have two main sources. The first
is the substantial surplus generating capacity.
Reserve margins were over 60 percent in 2002 and
may remain substantially above the minimum
25 percent or so required for system security for the
next few years, depending on the evolution of
demand. This substantial level of excess capacity cre-
ates a situation in which facilities have low capacity
factors and thus lower revenues than required to
recover full costs. Surplus generating capacity may
have been driven at least in part by overly opti-
mistic demand forecasts, a natural occurrence in a
system in which the costs of substantial publicly
promoted overbuilding are not apparent, and the
costs of underbuilding are immediately obvious
and extremely high. The two earthquakes and the
economic crises that Turkey suffered in recent years
also play a significant role in explaining the devia-
tion between initial demand forecasts and actual
demand. The second main source of stranded costs
is the long-term power purchase contracts between
the state and private producers with especially high
front-end costs. The high cost of electricity from
many of these contracts makes it difficult to generate
the required revenues to service these contracts with-
out increasing average wholesale and retail prices.
The long-term, Treasury-guaranteed generation
contracts and associated stranded costs have two
important implications. The first relates to compe-
tition. The prospects for competition among gener-
ators are poor for the immediate future unless there
is new entry by IPPs or autoproducers. However,
new entry may exacerbate the problem of stranded
costs, because generation capacity is already
expected to be in substantial surplus. Furthermore,
the existing finalized BOT, BOO, and TOOR
(generation) contracts adversely affect the possibil-
ities of market liberalization by preserving an
uneven playing field (in which favored generators
benefit from state guarantees, privileged trading
relationships, and noncompetitive pricing, and
thereby face substantially fewer market risks), by
preventing pressures on prices from new entry, and
by preventing flexible price and quantity adjust-
ments to unanticipated market shocks (such as the
recent macro crisis).
The second implication has to do with the con-
tingent liabilities created for the government. If rev-
enues to the electricity sector do not cover payments
to the Treasury-guaranteed generators, then the
guarantees would be activated and payments from
the government’s constrained budgetary resources
would be needed to subsidize electricity (whether it
is actually used or not). The substantial state-owned
hydro resources that have been developed to date go
some way toward minimizing these potential liabil-
ities, because the low cost of hydro can be consid-
ered a “stranded benefit” that can be used to help
offset the sizeable transition-related stranded costs.
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Indeed, the idea behind initially contracting all state-
owned hydro assets to TETAS is to enable it to cover
a substantial part of the stranded costs through the
profits on sales at market levels of this low-cost
power. However, under some low demand scenarios,
even with hydro fetching the very low price of
US$0.002 per kilowatt-hour,23 TETAS may be faced
with a substantial revenue deficit. Under the worst-
case but not necessarily zero-probability scenarios,
Economic Consulting Associates calculates these
deficits to be between $100 million and $800 million
annually (adding to a total of $4.1 billion) between
2003 and 2010 (ECA 2002: table 29).24
Revenue Deficits, Technical Losses, and Private 
Participation in Distribution
The main challenge in distribution when trying to
create competition is to ensure the creation of cred-
itworthy entities that can act as counterparts to
incumbents and potential entrants on the genera-
tion side.
Turkey presently has 33 distribution areas. In a
few regions (including those served by Kepez and
CEAS, concessions that had permitted operation of
the networks by private investors have been
cancelled. Additional tenders for TOORs were held
for other regions in 1996. Bidding occurred
through offers of distribution tariffs over the con-
cession period, with the lowest bidder winning.
Thus, as for the fixed-price BOT, BOO, and TOOR
generation contracts, any efficiency gains over the
franchise period will not be passed on to con-
sumers. In addition, winners had to commit to
reducing technical electricity losses; gains or losses
generated by changes in electricity losses would be
appropriated fully by the company. An additional
problem with distribution TOOR contracts is that
they may prevent the subsequent imposition of a
harsh efficiency-enhancing, incentive-based tariff
formula, because these companies would then lose
profits relative to the initially promised fixed-
cost-plus tariffs, and they would therefore seek
(and have grounds for) compensation. Finally, to
the extent that the desirable distribution regions
were cherry-picked through the TOOR process,
sufficiently marketable and competitive groupings
could not be formed from the remaining regions,
and the most desirable subregions could not be
matched with least desirable subregions, thereby
jeopardizing distribution privatization and possibly
resulting in nonsalable assets. In 2003 most of those
contracts were canceled by the Council of State.
The distribution sector suffers from growing
operating revenue deficits, which are driven by elec-
tricity theft and nonpayment (about 14 percent of
total energy purchased by TEDAS with large regional
variation), technical losses (about 7 percent), and a
free or unbilled electricity supply (4 percent, espe-
cially street lighting). In member countries of the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), the average of electricity
losses (which are driven mainly by technical losses) is
about 8 percent (figure 7.2). Theft and nonpayment
are fundamentally a political economy and distri-
bution problem that has implications for rebalanc-
ing tariffs.
Tariff Rebalancing, Social Protection,
and Industrial Competitiveness
Industrial prices are almost as high as household
prices, unlike in more liberalized markets where
industrial prices are often less than half those of
households (lower industrial prices reflect the
lower unit cost of delivery of large amounts of
electricity to industrial customers). According to
data on end-user prices, Turkish industry faces
one of the highest costs in Europe. However,
equally noteworthy is that Turkish household
prices are not particularly high, in the lower end of
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the range for Europe. Out of 32 countries listed in
the International Energy Agency (IEA) report Key
World Energy Statistics 2002, Turkey is the only
country (apart from India) in which consumer
prices are so close to industrial prices (IEA 2002).
Consumer prices are more than double industrial
prices in 8 of the 12 EU countries in table 7.2 and
in Denmark they are three times higher. The num-
bers in table 7.2 suggest that, although large indus-
trial users are likely to see substantial price
decreases from increased competition, households
and smaller industrial users are likely to see sub-
stantial price increases.
This large cross subsidy to households will not
survive with liberalization, because eligible con-
sumers are entitled to switch to lower-cost sources
under bilateral agreements, and because less effi-
cient or higher-cost regional distribution systems
reflect these costs in user tariffs. This issue of tariff
rebalancing toward cost-reflective tariffs, if not
properly handled, could jeopardize the entire
reform effort by creating political pressures for
backtracking. Rebalancing will have effects on
poverty and relocation incentives—poorer house-
holds in the east are likely to see their prices rise
most in the short term, while already overpopu-
lated cities in the west with more efficient distribu-
tion systems will face somewhat less steep tariff
increases. And it will have effects on employment
and industrial competitiveness—business users
with annual consumption below the threshold,
including all small and medium-size enterprises
(SMEs), will also likely see substantial price rises.
The recent difficulties over the creation of distri-
bution regions reflected the income distribution
dilemma faced by the authorities. The agreement
reached ultimately among EMRA, MENR, TEDAS,
and the Treasury after months of work was rejected
by the government because of intense pressures
from localities that did not want to be included in
regions designated as high-cost areas. EMRA
responded by proposing instead province-based,
cost-reflective retail tariffs. The highest proposed
tariff was for Hakkari, which is both one of the
poorest provinces and the one with the highest
incidence of theft (Radikal, March 3, 2003).
Wholesale Market Concentration and 
the Dominant Role of TETAS
In the design of the new market model, the role of
TETAS is critical as an instrument to help resolve
transitional stranded costs through market mecha-
nisms, and thereby help protect captive consumers
from sudden and large increases in wholesale
prices. It is with this purpose in mind that TETAS
was designated to hold all legacy state-owned
contracts and liabilities—including BOT, BOO,
and TOOR contracts as well existing import and
export contracts—and play a key role as a whole-
saler trader of electricity. The EML requires TETAS
to be financially viable and authorizes TETAS to
charge a wholesale price sufficient to cover its
stranded cost obligations (based on the weighted
average costs of the generation plants selling to it,
including BOT, BOO, and TOOR plants). However,
there is no requirement for profitability on a year-
by-year basis. Rather, surpluses and deficits must
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TABLE 7.2 Retail Prices for Electricity
(US¢ per kilowatt-hour)
Electricity Electricity
for for
Industry Households 
EU12
Austria 9.21 12.14
Belgium 4.77 13.23
Denmark 5.97 19.53
Finland 3.94 7.89
France 3.58 10.17
Germany 7.90 16.66
Greece 4.31 7.75
Ireland 4.62 9.57
Italy 9.30 13.42
Portugal 6.59 11.77
Spain 5.58 14.33
United Kingdom 4.96 10.10
Central and Eastern 
Europe
Czech Republic 4.68 6.11
Hungary 5.21 6.98
Poland 4.76 8.34
Slovak Republic 4.35 6.28
North America
Canada 3.86 6.01
United States 4.27 8.50
Turkey 8.05 8.49
Source: IEA 2002.
balance over a reasonable period. The initial con-
tracting to TETAS of all state-owned hydro plants
is intended to help it meet this financial viability
criterion.
As the holder of the majority of generation con-
tracts, TETAS will be the dominant seller in the
market for the foreseeable future. Through its
rights to hydro capacity, TETAS also will be the
dominant participant in the balancing market.
Given its dominant position, it will be critical that
TETAS be effectively regulated. In the absence of
effective regulation, TETAS has no incentive to
keep its costs as low as possible, because it passes its
costs fully to captive customers.
In practice, the ability of TETAS to raise the
wholesale price to cover its stranded cost obliga-
tions is constrained by the prices that could be
offered by new entrants (such as the cost of elec-
tricity from a new gas-fired CCGT power plant), to
the extent that new developers are willing to take
the risk of building new power plants over the next
few years. If the TETAS wholesale price is above the
price offered by IPPs, then distribution companies
and eligible consumers will choose to buy from
IPPs, causing TETAS’s sales to fall. However,
because TETAS’s costs have a large take-or-pay
component from BOT, BOO, and TOOR plants,
those costs will remain high as TETAS’s market
share falls, forcing the company to recover its fixed
costs over a lower level of sales. To avoid such a
vicious cycle of falling sales and required higher
wholesale prices, TETAS cannot afford to charge a
wholesale price significantly above that offered by a
new gas-fired plant.
Interinstitutional Coordination and a National
Electricity Policy
Turkey’s electricity policy lacks the strong, central-
ized leadership needed to take an overall perspec-
tive of the electricity reform program—including
tariffs, market structure, promotion of competi-
tion, and privatization issues—and to ensure coor-
dination of the eight or more entities with separate
management teams: MENR, EMRA, PA (Privatiza-
tion Authority), EUAS, TETAS, TEIAS, TEDAS, and
the Treasury. It would be highly desirable to achieve
consensus among all main national stakeholders
around a national electricity policy that presents a
coherent strategy for market structure, that out-
lines what is meant by competition in Turkey’s
electricity market for the foreseeable future and
how more room could be made for additional com-
petition, and that articulates a well-defined end
state for the industry and a strategy for achieving it.
Possible Competition-Enhancing
Solutions
Evidence of the benefits of electricity reform is
rather recent, and most of the detailed studies con-
centrate on well-known cases such as the United
States, United Kingdom, and Scandinavian coun-
tries. Some studies do not provide strong conclu-
sions. For example, a recent study by the OECD
(Steiner 2002) fails to find that regulatory variables
such as third party access and unbundling have a
significant effect on industrial prices. Such vari-
ables are found to have an impact on the ratio of
industrial to residential prices, but this finding may
be capturing the impact of rebalancing rather than
the impact of the other components of reform.
Privatization is found to increase industrial prices.
Yet the same regulatory variables are found to have
a positive impact on a proxy for efficiency.
Nevertheless, there is a general consensus
among analysts that the key to welfare-enhancing
electricity reform is adequate competition in gener-
ation. Efficiency gains, especially those stemming
from cost reduction, are easiest to obtain in this
segment of the industry. However, enhanced
competition is necessary for those efficiency gains
to be passed on to consumers. The rest of this sec-
tion discusses some options that can accelerate
the development of competition in the Turkish
context.
Transitional Regimes for Tackling Stranded Costs
In minimizing and addressing stranded costs, the
government will have to consider several options.
Lowering and more rapidly resolving stranded
costs will have benefits—in particular, allowing the
more rapid introduction of competition. Such a
step also would allow a more rapid release of hydro
plants for privatization, which would have the
added benefits of enabling generators and retailers
to offer more valuable contract shapes and of
providing flexible energy to the balancing market.
Possible options include
• A final resolution of all outstanding nonfinalized
BOT and TOOR generation contracts that does
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not increase stranded costs. In view of the poten-
tial costs to the economy and the electricity sec-
tor in both additional fiscal costs and foregone
competition benefits, it appears to be in the
public interest not to provide Treasury guaran-
tees for most of the nonfinalized BOT and
TOOR projects, while remaining open to nego-
tiated win-win solutions subject to this con-
straint. The basic strategy of EMRA has been to
encourage project sponsors to apply for generat-
ing licenses and to act according to the dictates
of the new market model. Because of the poten-
tial reputational costs to Turkey as a destination
for foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows from
such a unilateral government decision, the gov-
ernment should remain open to negotiating
with project sponsors on a case-by-case basis to
seek acceptable solutions that do not burden
Turkey with additional expensive and unneeded
power. The broader international impact should
not be too negative, as long as the underlying
public policy reasons are clearly explained and
the initially agreed-upon contractual terms are
met, including the appropriate compensation
being offered after arbitration if a negotiated
solution is not possible.
• Voluntary win-win renegotiation of tariffs. The
existing BOT contracts are heavily front-loaded
with higher capacity charges in the first
5–10 years of operation. By exploring the scope
for nonunilateral improvements to the contracts
in the spirit of the basic principles of the EU’s
1996 directive, the government could lower the
level of stranded costs. Possible win-win modifi-
cations include lowering the average tariff level
over time and flattening the tariff slope in
exchange for removing the “T” (transfer require-
ment) in BOT or using alternate approaches to
providing an equity return over a longer period.
To facilitate negotiations, the following potential
win-win modifications that would transform the
existing BOT contracts into IPPs should be
unbundled and discussed separately (Sevaiog˘lu
n.d.): (1) tariff smoothing, flattening the pay-
ment curve by retarding the higher payments of
the first years; (2) ownership transfer, transform-
ing the BOT to a BOO model by subtracting the
value of the assets from the tariff profile;
(3) price risk transfer, removing the take-or-
pay condition by compensating the difference
between the agreed-on and estimated stabilized
market price; and (4) volume risk transfer, com-
pensating the estimated revenue loss when the
company fails to find customers paying the same
price as agreed to in the initial take-or-pay
clause. The potential for outsiders to challenge
any such negotiated solution should be minimal,
so long as project sponsors are no better off than
they were prior to the renegotiation. Stranded
costs also could be reduced by agreeing to lower
the gas prices charged in individual contracts by
BOTAS¸, the state-owned national gas company.
• Postponing or canceling of nonfinalized intergov-
ernmental protocols on hydro. Intergovernmental
protocols refer to commitments between two or
more sovereign governments for specific invest-
ments. To help lower the extent of excess genera-
tion capacity on the system, authorities should
consider altering the existing pipeline of country-
to-country protocols. Because such protocols are
political undertakings rather than established
private contractual rights, modifications in line
with unexpected public policy imperatives may
be easier to achieve.
• Low pricing of TETAS-contracted, state-owned
hydro generation assets. By pricing hydro at its
operations and maintenance cost, TETAS could
reduce the revenues required to pay the stranded
costs. However, depending on the demand
scenario, low pricing of hydro may not be ade-
quate on its own.
• Stranded cost levy. A levy or additional surcharge
could be applied in various ways to obtain
revenue to cover any deficit, but the simplest
way would be to apply it to final electricity
consumption. Imposing the levy on final con-
sumption ensures that eligible consumers and
distribution companies cannot avoid the levy
when they buy power from sources other than
TETAS. A stranded cost levy may be the easiest
and best solution from an economic point of
view. However, the levy would result in an
increase in prices to end consumers: the
approach suffers from the obvious drawback
that the tariff would raise.
• Sale of hydropower plants. Selling (or leasing)
hydropower plants to the private sector and
using these sales revenues to cover the stranded
cost deficits is an option that also should be
considered. This would have an impact similar to
that produced by diluting the high BOT, BOO,
and TOOR generation costs with low-cost hydro,
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but the advantages would be twofold. First, rev-
enues would be realized immediately, at a time
when Treasury resources are particularly con-
strained. Second, such an approach would allow
market liberalization to go ahead more rapidly.
However, an important consideration for the
government is whether adequate revenues would
be realized from the sale of what are potentially
extremely valuable assets in the balancing mar-
ket in the immediate term, or whether higher
revenues could be realized once the market
begins functioning, once experience accumu-
lates on how the new market would value hydro
plants and hydro electricity, and once investor
confidence increases with additional regulatory
oversight experience. Yet the benefit of more
rapid liberalization or at least a staged privatiza-
tion approach with annual auctions for some
hydro (either for capacity in, say, 1-megawatt
tranches of all hydro or for all of a specific plant
for one-year leases) may well outweigh the fore-
gone higher revenue proceeds of a later sale, in
particular if the earlier prospect of privatization
helps to spur better regulatory oversight and
other market-friendly policy decisions during
the shorter preprivatization period (driven by
the pressures of an incipient privatization).
Tariffs and Universal Service
Under the electricity reforms, industrial tariffs are
expected to fall, and household tariffs are expected
to increase from tariff rebalancing. However, in any
assessment of the impact of overall tariff changes
on consumer welfare, it is important to take into
account the decrease in the prices of all goods in the
household consumer basket that will result from
the lower cost of this key intermediate input.
More generally, efficiency gains from cost-reflective
prices are expected throughout the economy.
To mitigate the effect of rising household tariffs,
the first priority should be to reduce costs by elimi-
nating theft and nonpayment rather than by
adjusting household tariffs upward by the full
margin required to cover costs (inclusive of theft
and nonpayment). In addition, a means-tested sys-
tem is needed to provide support to those who can-
not afford the higher retail prices and are eligible
for such social protection (in part replacing the
current reliance on theft and nonpayment of bills
as a social safety net). Such support has fiscal impli-
cations for forthcoming budgets. It also requires
the implementation of workable eligibility and
delivery mechanisms.
As part of a possible policy solution, the EML
and the tariff regulation allow an explicit cash sub-
sidy under a mechanism to be established by the
Council of Ministers. Provisional Article 12 of the
licensing regulation allows vesting contracts, which
could be bundled in order to offer lower-cost
contracts to higher-cost distribution regions and
thereby ease cross-regional adjustment. One addi-
tional mechanism that might help to ease the cost
burden on residents in the eastern part of Turkey is
the use of meters with a three-term tariff structure.
By using such meters, the electricity sector could
offer extremely low prices during off-peak periods
and thereby help to reduce illicit utilization.
Cross-Border Trade and the Benefits 
of EU Accession
EU countries have reported benefits from adopting
the electricity directive, but problem areas remain
(European Commission 2002c):
• Differential rates of market liberalization. By
2002, five countries had implemented 100 per-
cent market liberalization, but the rest had
opened up less than 60 percent of their markets.
Indeed, Denmark, France, and Greece had
opened up only 35 percent of their markets.
• Disparities in access tariffs between network oper-
ators. Because of a lack of transparency caused
by insufficient unbundling (e.g., management
or accounting but not legal or ownership sepa-
ration) and inefficient regulation, these dispari-
ties may form a barrier to competition.
• The high level of market power among existing
generating companies associated with a lack of liq-
uidity in wholesale and balancing markets. Such
high market power impedes new entrants. For
example, only in three member states do the top
three companies have less than 50 percent mar-
ket share; in nine member states the top three
companies have more than 75 percent market
share. Large divergences in prices continue to
exist across member states.
A central implication of the full internal market
is that an important source of competition in
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countries where the generation market is con-
centrated would be cross-border transactions.
However, the ratio of import capacity to installed
capacity is more than 25 percent in only four out
of the 15 EU countries to date. A heavier reliance
on cross-border transactions requires better cross-
border arrangements. The problem is insufficient
interconnection infrastructure between member
states and, where congestion exists, unsatisfactory
methods for allocating scarce capacity. But it is
encouraging that participants in the sixth Florence
forum in September 2001 agreed on common
guidelines on congestion management. There has
been more progress on cross-border tariffication.
Since the adoption of a temporary mechanism for
cross-border electricity exchanges in March 2002,
EU market players involved in cross-border
exchanges no longer have to pay a series of uncoor-
dinated charges to transmission networks (“pan-
caking”) because all transit and import charges
have been removed. Under the new regime, only a
single export charge is allowed (€1 per megawatt-
hour). Nevertheless, the European Commission
remains worried about the pace of development of
cross-border trade. By the end of 2000, four years
after adoption of the electricity directive, the physi-
cal cross-border trade in electricity did not exceed
8 percent of total consumption, which left “the
EU far from a real, competitive internal market”
(European Commission 2002c: 22)
As for Turkey, obstacles to increased cross-
border trade include:
• Operating standards and interconnector capacity.
Currently, Turkey does not comply with the
main continental European UCPTE (Union for
the Coordination of Production and Transmis-
sion of Electricity) operating standards, and
therefore it cannot connect its network synchro-
nously. In 2006 Turkey is expected to be part of
the UCPTE network. A 400-kilowatt overhead
line to Greece is expected to be commissioned
by 2006 (with a subsea cable connecting Greece
with Italy and the Western Europe network). A
connection exists with Bulgaria when a portion
of the Turkish network in Thrace is discon-
nected (according to the OECD, imports from
Bulgaria account for 3 percent of domestic
consumption).
• Cross-border transmission pricing and settlement
coordination. The tariff framework for cross-
border transactions is not yet very well devel-
oped, so it is still organizationally and economi-
cally difficult for individual electricity customers
to choose suppliers situated in another EU
member state, although proposals for more
refined systems of cross-border pricing are being
developed.
• Technological transmission losses over distance.
Absent a DC (direct current) direct transmission
link (like the one between Greece and Italy), the
cost of running electricity through intermediary
transmission networks makes shipping elec-
tricity from Turkey to France or the United
Kingdom prohibitive. Therefore, trade in the
medium term will remain fairly localized, possi-
bly including Greece, Italy, and Bulgaria-
Romania. Because Turkey has lower-cost
endowments than neighboring countries, it is
likely that the eventual flow will be from Turkey
to neighboring countries, implying a gradual
increase in Turkish prices as low-cost assets are
fully utilized.
Without a doubt, one of the most significant
benefits of EU accession for Turkey in the electric-
ity sector would be the stability provided by
anchoring Turkish regulations and practices to EU
norms and practices. Because of the degree of polit-
ical instability in Turkey (especially, until recently,
the predominance of coalition governments and the
short tenure of governments), and because in the
past the discretionary authority of the state has not
always been used in the clear interest of the public
(the existing stranded contracts in electricity are an
example), the European anchor will provide a
strong signal of discrete and irreversible regime
change from past practices that may have caused
concern among both foreign and domestic players
in the electricity industry. The confidence-boosting
effect on potential investors, who otherwise may
continue to be reluctant to enter the Turkish elec-
tricity market, is likely to be significant.
Privatization and Entry Promotion Strategies 
for Generation and Distribution Assets
It has been asserted that one of the worst fea-
tures of EU electricity reforms until the recent
proposals was the continued presence of vertical
integration—in Europe, common ownership of
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generation and distribution is increasing. Vertical
ownership separation or unbundling of distri-
bution from generation at the time of privatiza-
tion seems to have become the consensus approach
in the rest of the world; it has been adopted
successfully in England/Wales, Latin America
(Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Peru as the most-cited examples),
several transition economies, and Australia and
New Zealand. Malaysia and many EU countries are
exceptions to this pattern.
The recent crisis in California, however, raised
doubts, including in Europe, about the stability
and viability of unbundled electricity markets
(Newbery 2001, 2002a). It has been argued that gen-
erating companies in California had the incentives
and ability to behave strategically, withhold capac-
ity, and thereby manipulate and increase wholesale
prices (although other factors were at work as well,
including flawed market design—see box 7.1). By
contrast, it is argued that integration of generation
with distribution eliminates these incentives and
creates a more stable market structure.
An assessment of which way to go must include
weighing the benefits of mitigating the wholesale
price risk that vertical integration can provide
against the costs of foregone competition and fore-
gone effective regulation. The arguments point to
vertical separation as the preferred initial configu-
ration, allowing markets to reconfigure assets at a
later stage if desirable (subject to oversight by
the competition authorities). Whether Turkey’s 
state-owned thermal generation plants should be
privatized as a small number of bundled portfolio
companies or sold as separate units depends at least
in part on how geographically apart from each
other they are.
Mitigating Wholesale Price Risk The recent rush
toward vertical mergers in England/Wales has been
driven at least in part by their move from a compul-
sory, single-price power pool to a bilateral contracts
framework in which there would no longer be a
single price for the delivery of electricity at any
particular time but rather directly negotiated prices
between buyers and sellers (and substantial penal-
ties for generators and customers who deviate
from their contracted levels). The wholesale price
risk that arises in a bilateral contracting environ-
ment translates directly into profit risk in an
unbundled structure: a high price shifts profits to
generators and away from the retailing business,
and a low price benefits retailing at the expense of
generators. This risk can be reduced by vertical
integration in which generators are assured of a
captive market. Vertical integration also reduces the
transaction costs of contracting, as well as the risk
of failing to find a buyer and thus being forced into
a distress sale in the short-term balancing market.
Yet the larger the share of the market covered by
vertically integrated companies, the harder new
entry will be and the more disadvantaged will be
those companies that remain nonintegrated.
Developing Competition Where Possible If a
key objective of reform is to stimulate the stable
provision of low-cost, low-priced electrical energy,
international evidence suggests that sufficient com-
petition is the best means to achieve it. A negative
aspect of vertical integration is that the monopolist
distributor will, in many circumstances, be able to
increase its profits (together with delayed innova-
tion) at the expense of society by favoring its own
integrated generating companies over more efficient
(existing and potential that may not enter) genera-
tors. Ownership separation removes the incentive
for market foreclosure. Although there remain
economies of scope between generation and trans-
mission/distribution that may suggest benefits from
full vertical integration, there is also substantial evi-
dence that the benefits of unbundled competition
may be substantial. A telling example is the early
experience of Scotland, where the two producers
were privatized as vertically integrated companies,
and England/Wales, where there was strict vertical
separation at the time of privatization. Prior to the
reforms in 1990, prices in Scotland were about
8 percent lower than those in England/Wales. In
2000, Scottish prices were 5 percent higher, a swing
of 13 percent (OECD 2001).
Facilitating Effective Regulation If the regula-
tors of the distribution monopolies are unable to
detect or prevent discriminatory treatment toward
favored generators, many of the benefits of compe-
tition would be lost, casting doubt on the benefits
of the overall liberalization project. Vertical owner-
ship separation facilitates the job of the regulator
by removing incentives for nontransparent transfer
pricing, differential quality of access to the wires, or
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BOX 7.1 California’s Electricity Crisis
In 1996 the California electricity industry under-
went a fundamental restructuring. Before
reforms, three vertically integrated utilities
owned and operated generation, transmission,
and distribution assets. Retail prices were regu-
lated by the state, and wholesale prices were
regulated at the federal level by the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). Prices
were higher than U.S. averages, a situation that
was blamed on the vertically integrated structure
and long-term contracts with independent power
producers (IPPs). Thus, the public demanded
reform.
The most important features of the Restruc-
turing Law of 1996 were as follows:
• Customers could choose a competitive
electricity service provider (ESP) or buy
default service from the local utility distri-
bution company (UDC).
• Incumbents were required to provide com-
peting generators, wholesale marketers,
and ESPs with open access to their trans-
mission and distribution networks at regu-
lated prices.
• The UDC default service price was set equal
to the wholesale spot market prices deter-
mined in the day-ahead real-time markets.
• A retail rate freeze of a maximum of four
years was set to recover the stranded costs
of generating assets (the assumption was
that wholesale prices would be lower than
frozen retail levels).
• The California Independent System Opera-
tor (ISO) and California Power Exchange
were created.
• The two largest investor-owned utilities
(IOUs) were ordered to divest at least half
of their fossil fuel generating capacity.
• The IOUs were required to meet default
service obligations by purchasing from the
spot market (i.e., they had to sell power
from their remaining assets and then buy it
back to meet their default service
demand). They were “short” for the differ-
ence between what they could sell and
what they had to meet in terms of default
demand; and they were not allowed to
hedge by forward contracts with genera-
tors, because it was feared that such con-
tracts could be anticompetitive.
Market design represented a series of inco-
herent and fragmented compromises between
interest groups (bits and pieces from different
designs) rather than a well-thought-out strategy.
It also was very complicated. The design relied
more on individual generator owners to make
commitment and dispatch decisions and to
manage congestion based on their self-interests
(in that sense, it was closer to the “New Trading
Arrangements” in the United Kingdom than the
previous pool system). Meanwhile, serious
episodes of horizontal market power problems
began to emerge: because of the rigid capacity
constraints, small amounts of withheld capacity
resulted in large price increases. But the
buildup of new capacity turned out to be very
slow, and California found itself also experienc-
ing a rapid increase in demand. In response,
the IOUs became increasingly reliant on the
spot market. Customer switching to ESPs was
slower than expected, which meant large
default service obligations for the IOUs. The
ban on hedging contracts made their situation
even more difficult. As a result, a large portion
of demand was served through the volatile
wholesale market.
The meltdown of the system was triggered
by dramatic increases in the wholesale prices
that utilities had to pay. The main reasons for the
increase were rising natural gas (input) prices, a
large increase in demand (due to abnormally
hot weather, high economic growth), reduced
imports, and rising prices for nitrogen oxide
emissions credits. In addition, there were serious
market power problems. It has been estimated
that about a third of price increases were attrib-
utable to market power and strategic behavior by
players. High prices also further distorted incen-
tives. For example, ESPs lost incentives to sell in
the retail market because they could increase
profit by selling in the wholesale market.
Because retail prices were frozen, the utilities
began to experience financial problems and
creditworthiness declined. Their requests to
increase retail prices were turned down by the
state regulator. Finally, they went bankrupt. The
state government practically took over supply.
Bad luck played an important role in the
Californian crisis in the sense that a large num-
ber of adverse events jointly triggered wholesale
prices. However, flawed design and existence of
market power made the system vulnerable to
adverse shocks.
Sources: Joskow 2001; Cabral 2002.
other discriminatory treatment between distribu-
tors and generators, and thereby making it easier
for regulators to get information about the true
underlying costs and to secure fair access to the net-
works. The much more difficult task of effectively
regulating vertically integrated companies, if that is
to be an outcome preferred by the markets at a sub-
sequent stage, should only be attempted by more
seasoned regulators after a significant period of
learning-by-doing in an unbundled environment.
As for sequencing, it is appropriate first to priva-
tize distribution companies and ensure commercial
management of those assets. This approach will
allow the creation of financially viable companies
that, in turn, allow private generators to structure
bankable projects without government guarantees.
According to Newbery (2002a, 2002b), four con-
ditions must be met for unbundled electricity mar-
kets to create socially beneficial outcomes. The first
is that potential suppliers must have access to the
transmission system. Access is best achieved by
unbundling transmission from generation and
securing third party access, both of which are satis-
fied in the Turkish design.
The second condition is the existence of ade-
quate and secure supplies of electricity, which
implies the existence of adequate transmission and
generation capacity. This condition also seems to
be satisfied in the Turkish case, at least in the short
to medium term, because of the substantial
amounts of excess capacity available at present.
The third condition is the presence of a suffi-
cient number of untied generation companies, so
that generation is truly competitive. This situation
is perhaps the most problematic in the current
Turkish context because of the sizable amount of
generation capacity that is either state-owned or
has tied quantities and prices through long-term
contracts. Thermal generation assets under public
ownership can, in principle, be regrouped prior to
privatization to create a number of viable compa-
nies. These affiliate portfolio generation companies
can be granted managerial and financial independ-
ence so that they can perform their activities in
accordance with more competitive conditions even
prior to privatization. This situation would be
desirable in any case in order to put at least a mini-
mum amount of structurally based competitive
pressure on existing state-owned thermal plants for
increased productive efficiency and lower costs.
However, the weight of tied generation assets that
have been contracted to private parties through
BOT, BOO, and TOOR contracts may continue to
prevent sufficient competition from emerging for
some time, particularly to the extent that hydro
assets also remain contracted to TETAS over the
medium term to ensure its financial viability. In
this area, bold policy measures that reduce stranded
costs and allow earlier hydro release to the market
could yield substantial benefits.
An alternate but complementary way in which
to increase competition and reduce market power
in generation markets is through policies that work
on the demand rather than the supply side by
increasing the elasticity of demand—that is, by
promoting stronger customer response to price
changes. Traditionally, all customers pay fixed
prices (for industrial customers, these are based on
annually negotiated fixed-price contracts) that may
vary in a mutually agreed-upon manner on a daily
or weekly basis, but independent of fluctuations in
wholesale prices. As a result, the drop in demand in
response to a rise in market price is negligible,
greatly facilitating the exercise of market power.
The key here is to induce customers to reduce con-
sumption when prices rise. Two options are possi-
ble. For the first, interruptible contracts, which give
the electricity supplier the right to curtail supply or
to ripple off specific appliances for short periods
of time when price exceeds some level, could be
promoted—if necessary through subsidies because
of their positive externality—for customers who
can switch to other fuels or self-generation. But
the preferred option, again promoted through
subsidies if necessary because of their positive
spillover, is to subject customers, especially the
largest, to real-time (time-of-use) metering and
billing. Once end users receive the technology not
only to observe but also to respond to real-time
prices, they are empowered to modify their pur-
chasing habits accordingly.
A powerful additional mechanism for enhanc-
ing customer response to price changes is the pro-
motion of competition in retail activities. As dis-
cussed earlier, the EML allows for several retail
companies to undertake activities in a distribution
region along with the retailer that belongs to the
distribution company.
Newbery’s fourth and final condition is that the
liberalized markets should be adequately regulated.
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This condition means, among other things, that reg-
ulation should not be limited to naturally monopo-
listic segments, but also should include wholesale
markets. The argument here is that relying solely on
ex post competition policy remedies to discipline
strategic behavior in wholesale markets may be
insufficient for preventing large welfare losses.
Instead, regulators may need competition powers to
ensure that pricing in wholesale markets does not
deviate too much for too long from costs.25 This area
seems to have been overlooked in the proposed
amendments to the electricity directive in Europe.
In the Turkish market design, the wholesale tar-
iff applicable to electricity sales by TETAS will be
regulated to reflect TETAS’s average purchase
prices as well as its financial obligations (see Provi-
sional Article 1 of the electricity market tariff regu-
lation). In addition, the vested contracts discussed
earlier should prevent high volatility as the non-
TETAS segment of the market develops. Because of
the initial monopolistic structure of the wholesale
market in Turkey, it is appropriate that the behavior
of TETAS be closely regulated. However, as noted
earlier, it may be desirable that the regulator be
granted additional oversight powers over the
wholesale market even as the dominant power of
TETAS dissipates over time.
Conclusion
It will take some time before electricity reform in
Turkey starts showing benefits that are appreciated
by consumers. In fact, in the short run some
consumers may be adversely affected as measures
are undertaken to correct for past mistakes. Yet the
slow pace of market development may be turned
into a blessing. Electricity reform of the Turkish
type is radical and entails huge uncertainties. The
slow pace of liberalization stemming from inherited
stranded costs should allow market players and reg-
ulators alike to experiment and adjust the rules
wherever necessary.
Notes
1. The authors are grateful for extremely helpful written
comments on an earlier draft provided by Osman Sevaiog˘lu,
board member of Turkey’s Energy Market Regulatory Authority,
and for additional feedback from conference participants.
2. This section builds on Pollitt (1999) and Newberry
(2002b, 2002c).
3. Directive 96/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 19 December 1996 Concerning Common Rules for
the Internal Market in Electricity. The text of the directive, as
well as the accompanying explanatory memorandum and
proposed amendments (discussed later in this chapter), can
be found at http://europa.eu.int/comm/energy/en/elec_single_
market/index_en.html.
4. See the guide to the electricity directive at http://
europa.eu.int/comm/energy/en/elec_single_market/memor.htm.
5. See “Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 26 June 2003 Concerning Common Rules for
the Internal Market in Electricity and Repealing Directive
96/92/EC.” The new directive is available at http://europa.eu.int/
comm/energy/electricity/legislation/index_en.htm.
6. For background on the Turkish electricity sector, see
Kulalı (1997), Zenginobuz and Og˘ur (2000), and OECD (2002).
7. OECD (2002) calls this “policy work-arounds.”
8. The law is titled Law Concerning the Authorization of
Enterprises Other than Turkish Electricity Authority for the Pro-
duction, Transmission, Distribution and Trade of Electricity.
9. In practice, most BOT contracts have been for 20 years.
10. Law No. 3996 is titled Law for Certain Investments and
Services to be Carried Out under the Build-Operate-Transfer
Model. The scope of the BOT model under this new law (Article 2)
appears to limit its application to greenfield projects and to
require TOOR projects for existing assets to be governed by the
privatization law (Law No. 4046, also dated 1994). The electric-
ity sector was removed from the domain of Law No. 3996 in
1994 (through Law No. 4047), but was reinstated in 1999
(through Law No. 4493).
11. The take-or-pay element of the contracted gas varies
from contract to contract, but on average it is 80 percent, imply-
ing, for example, that in 2005 some 33 billion cubic meters of gas
must be purchased whether needed or not (ECA 2002).
12. Although there now is general agreement that these con-
tracts are not in the best public interest, it is still not clear why
they were awarded in the first place. One explanation, men-
tioned earlier in this chapter, is that the government saw an
urgent need to attract private investors (both to deal with fiscal
constraints and to reduce state dominance), and that it had to
pay high risk premiums because of macroeconomic uncertainty
and, in general, weak protection of property rights. Others argue
that that view is naïve, and they point to lobbying and capture by
investor groups and weaknesses in checks and balances.
13. The evolution of BOT and TOOR projects in generation
and distribution is further discussed later in this chapter.
14. Law No. 4446 Regarding Amendments on Certain Arti-
cles of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, published in
the Official Gazette on August 14, 1999.
15. Many authors also point to the Conservative Party’s
overall—ideological—dislike of government intervention in the
economy (see, e.g., Newbery 2001).
16. Data provided by Osman Sevaiog˘lu, board member,
EMRA, May 11, 2003.
17. EML Article 2.b states that TEIAS is to take over all “pub-
licly owned” transmission facilities. A communiqué issued by
EMRA in November 2002 envisaged the transfer of all transmis-
sion assets to TEIAS by December 31, 2002. This deadline was
moved a month by the decision of the board of EMRA (Com-
muniqué on the Amendments of Contracts of Undertakings
Active in More than One Market and on Transfer of Transmis-
sion Activities and Activities Which Are to Be Withdrawn
From). Apparently, CEAS and the government disagree about
the ownership of transmission facilities that were operated by
CEAS.
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18. All production, distribution and commercial facilities of
these two companies were also seized in June 2003, on grounds
that the companies persistently violated provisions of the TOOR
concession agreements that they had signed with the govern-
ment to run the power stations and distribute electricity.
19. Stranded costs are those incurred within the previous
market structure that cannot be economically recovered within
a competitive market structure.
20. In the English translation available on EMRA’s Web site,
it is called the Market Financial Reconciliation Center.
21. The EML provided for an authority responsible for regu-
lating the electricity sector. This provision was changed, how-
ever, through Law No. 4646 (the natural gas market law), which
designated a single authority for both the electricity and gas
sectors.
22. For the electricity market, EMRA has issued, among
other things, regulations on licensing, tariffs, exports and
imports, and eligible consumers, as well as a grid code and a dis-
tribution code. These are available at http://www.epdk.gov.tr/
english/regulations/electricity.htm.
23. All dollar amounts are U.S. dollars unless otherwise
indicated.
24. The worst-case scenario entails demand growth at levels
projected by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), which are lower than those projected by
MENR and with all pending BOT and TOOR projects going
ahead. In addition to assumptions on demand, results also are
sensitive to the assumed level of wholesale prices that might
emerge with new entry (lower wholesale prices will create larger
operating deficits for the relevant generation plants selling to
TETAS) and to the assumed minimum unavoidable costs of the
state-owned plants that must be covered (sustainable operating
cost levels, rather than those required just to cover operations
and maintenance, fuel, and debt service costs, could lead to rev-
enue deficits even with the higher MENR demand levels).
25. For example, in the United States FERC has a statutory
responsibility to ensure that prices are “just and reasonable,”
which gives it the authority it needs to replace market-
determined prices with regulated prices. See the discussion in
Newbery (2002b).
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The Present Situation in the 
Turkish Gas Market
The Turkish natural gas market is still an emerging
one. Turkey has limited gas resources, and it began
production and distribution only in 1976. A con-
siderable part of the country is still not served by
natural gas.
The use of natural gas by industry is also rela-
tively new. It began in 1989—after the initiation of
gas imports from the Russian Federation and is
rapidly growing. Demand in the power generation
sector is expected to grow even more rapidly, dou-
bling between 2001 and 2010. In 2001 total gas
demand was 15.5 billion cubic meters. Of this, the
power industry accounted for about 10.6 billion
cubic meters, followed by residential demand at
about 2.7 billion cubic meters and industry demand
at 2.0 billion cubic meters.2
Between 1990 and 1998, the average annual
primary gas demand increased by 15.3 percent,
with peak growth of 18.4 percent in 1999. Past
government forecasts had predicted that demand
would grow by almost 26 percent per year between
1999 and 2005; for the next 15 years it was expected to
grow at a rate of between 3.5 percent and 4 percent.
Figures published recently by Turkey’s state-owned
This chapter focuses on Turkey’s natural gas mar-
ket and the regulatory reforms recently adopted to
liberalize the sector and comply with European
Union (EU) requirements for accession.1 To this
end, the first section of the chapter analyzes the
present situation of the gas market from the point
of view of its structural parameters—that is, the
structure of its demand and supply and the present
status of its import and export interconnections
and national networks, as well as its future develop-
ment. The section then goes on to analyze the
issues related to the long-term take-or-pay con-
tracts by the national transportation company and
their impact on liberalization. The second section
of this chapter addresses questions related to the
present ownership and industry structure, and it
compares the Turkish case with that of some EU
countries. In doing so, the section discusses simi-
larities with other emerging gas markets as well as
differences with more mature markets. The third
section is devoted to regulatory reforms. It analyzes
the new Turkish gas law and compares it with the
solutions adopted in selected EU countries, with
particular reference to the gas release program and
measures that might be taken to limit the market
power of the incumbent. A concluding section
follows.
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gas company, BOTAS¸, indicate that the company
expects the Turkish gas market to double in size over
the next years, with 55 cities receiving natural gas for
the first time. Many independent observers have
expressed doubts about these figures, however. They
believe BOTAS¸’s demand forecasts were overly opti-
mistic and point to the fact that subsidies and
below-cost pricing would have to be phased out dur-
ing the process of liberalization of the energy sector.
Import and Export Infrastructure 
and Future Developments
The state-owned company, BOTAS¸, has enjoyed
monopoly rights for oil and gas pipeline trans-
portation, as well as for import, export, and whole-
sale trading, since 1987. BOTAS¸ owns seven natural
gas pipelines and related facilities: Russian
Federation–Turkey Natural Gas Main Transmission
Line, Marmara Ereg˘lisi Liquefied Natural Gas
(LNG) Import Terminal, I˙zmit-Karadeniz Ereg˘li
Natural Gas Transmission Line, Bursa-Çan Natural
Gas Transmission Line, Çan-Çanakkale Natural Gas
Transmission Line, Eastern Anatolia Natural Gas
Main Transmission Line, and Karacabey-I˙zmir Nat-
ural Gas Transmission Line.
In view of the expected rapid increase in natural
gas consumption, in 1984 the government of
Turkey signed an intergovernmental agreement
with the former Soviet Union. Consequently, in
1986 BOTAS¸ and SOYUZGAZEXPORT signed a
natural gas sale and purchase agreement for a 
25-year period. Natural gas began flowing to
Turkey in 1987, and the volume transported gradu-
ally increased, reaching 6 billion cubic meters per
year in the plateau period in 1993.
The 842-kilometer Russian Federation–Turkey
Natural Gas Main Transmission Line enters Turkey
at Malkoçlar at the Bulgarian border and then fol-
lows the Hamitabat, Ambarlı, I˙stanbul, I˙zmit,
Bursa, Eskis¸ehir route to reach Ankara. The main
dispatching center is located in Yapracık-Ankara.
Construction of the pipeline began on October 26,
1986, and the line reached Hamitabat on June 23,
1987. Since then, imported natural gas has been
used together with domestic gas for power genera-
tion at the Trakya Combined Cycle Power Plant in
Hamitabat. The pipeline reached Ankara in August
1988. The I˙stanbul Fertilizer Industry Company
(IGSAS¸) began to receive natural gas in July 1988,
the Ambarlı Power Plant in August 1988, and
Ankara for residential and commercial purposes in
October 1988. In 1996, the transmission pipeline
was extended to the western Black Sea region via
the I˙zmit-Karadeniz Ereg˘li line (209 kilometers);
the main customers are the Ereg˘li Iron and Steel
Works plants. In the same year, the main transmis-
sion line also was extended to Çan.
The Bursa-Çan Natural Gas Transmission Line
was completed in 1996 for the purpose of supply-
ing natural gas to the Çanakkale Ceramic Factory,
together with other industrial establishments along
the route. In 2000, the Çan-Çanakkale Natural Gas
Transmission Line was completed.
In 1998, BOTAS¸signed an agreement with Russia
to import 8 billion cubic meters per year of natural
gas from the West through TURUSGAZ—a
BOTAS¸, GAZPROM (Russia), and GAMA (Turkey,
civil contractor) joint venture. Another agreement
was signed with the Russian Federation on Decem-
ber 15, 1997, to import 16 billion cubic meters of
gas per year through a pipeline beneath the Black
Sea. A joint venture was also established by
GAZPROM and ENI (Italy) to lay the “Blue
Stream” pipeline, and on December 29, 2002, the
first Blue Stream pipeline gas from Russia entered
Turkey, crossing the Black Sea at a depth of down to
2,150 meters. Deliveries were expected to amount
to 16 billion cubic meters by 2007 in accordance
with the natural gas sale and purchase agreement.
In August 1996, Turkey and the Islamic Republic
of Iran signed a 25-year natural gas sale and pur-
chase agreement that called for the delivery of nat-
ural gas to start at a volume of 3 billion cubic
meters per year, to reach 10 billion cubic meters per
year in the plateau period in 2007.The agreement was
then amended in August 2000. A dedicated pipeline,
the Eastern Anatolia Natural Gas Main Transmission
Line, running between Dogubayazit on the Turkish-
Iranian border and Ankara/Seydisehir (Konya) was
completed at the end of 2001 after some delay. On
December 2001, the delivery of natural gas began
through the Eastern Anatolia line. In April 2002 the
construction works of the Karacabey-I˙zmir Natural
Gas Transmission Line were completed, and the line
became operational.
In 1999, BOTAS¸ signed an agreement with Turk-
menistan for the purchase of 16 billion cubic
meters of natural gas per year. The Turkmen gas
would be transported to Turkey for a period of
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30 years. On February 19, 1999, the Turkmen
government commissioned project studies to a
consortium comprising PSG–General Electric
Capital and Bechtel. Shell joined this consortium
on August 6, 1999. This project involves construc-
tion of a pipeline from Turkmenistan to Turkey,
running parallel to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan crude
oil pipeline until it joins the Eastern Anatolia Nat-
ural Gas Main Transmission Line near Erzurum.
Gas imports were expected to begin between 2002
and 2004; however, no progress has been made on
this gas pipeline. Meanwhile, the Turkish Petro-
leum Corporation (TPAO) has conducted the rele-
vant studies needed to join the international con-
sortium that will develop and produce gas from six
dedicated gas fields (including the Körpece, Zeagli,
Darvaza, Garacaovlak, and Malay fields) to feed the
Trans-Caspian gas pipeline.
In April 2002, after two years of planning,
Turkey and Greece signed a memorandum of
understanding for a gas pipeline linking the two
countries. The Ankara–Dedeagac link, which forms
part of the EU’s INOGATE (Interstate Oil Gas
Transport to Europe) program, will feed Iranian
gas through western Turkey to the Greek frontier.
INOGATE is a technical assistance program of the
EU (covering central and eastern Europe, including
the newly independent states) that seeks to inte-
grate the hydrocarbon transport networks between
the Caucasus, central Asia, and central and eastern
Europe. Start-up is planned for 2005, with an initial
capacity of 0.5 billion cubic meters per year, rising
to a plateau of 3.6 billion cubic meters per year. The
link is capable of carrying 13 billion cubic meters of
gas per year, with Turkey’s share set to plateau at
10 billion cubic meters per year in 2007. The
pipeline will connect Karacabey in western Turkey
to Komotini city in northeast Greece, enabling
Turkey to sell Greece some of the gas surplus. The
cost of this project is estimated at €250 million, and
it should be completed in 2005. An economic feasi-
bility study for the project, conducted by Société
Générale, was funded equally by DEPA (the
Greek national gas company) and the European
Commission. Countries that could be interested
in selling gas to the European market via this
pipeline include Azerbaijan, the Islamic Republic of
Iran, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
In particular, Iran hopes to export the extra 3 bil-
lion cubic meters per year to the European market.
The natural gas could reach Italy by means of an
offshore connection, where it could eventually
compete with Algerian and Libyan natural gas.
Another possibility is to export gas to Bosnia and
Herzegovina. A further possibility could be the
construction of a pipeline to Austria through
Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary.
In fact, in November 2002 five companies signed
an agreement to carry out a joint feasibility study
on the construction of a natural gas pipeline from
Turkey to Austria via Bulgaria, Romania, and
Hungary. Participants in the project are BOTAS¸,
(Turkey),Bulgargaz (Bulgaria),Transgaz (Romania),
MOL (Hungary), and OMV Erdgas (Austria). The
study received approval from the EU in July 2003.
At the beginning of 2004, the Nabucco Company
began its financial and market studies, and the final
report of the feasibility study is due by the begin-
ning of 2005. The construction phase is scheduled
to start in mid-2006, and operations are expected
to begin at the end of 2009. Once contracted, the
pipeline will stretch about 3,400 kilometers, with
total capacity from Turkey of 25 billion to 30 billion
cubic meters per year. The expected offtake in tran-
sit countries would be 8 billion to 10 billion cubic
meters per year, and the total capacity to Austria’s
Baumgarten region would be 17 billion to 20 bil-
lion cubic meters per year. Total costs are projected
to be about €4.4 billion. The idea behind the proj-
ect is that Turkey would act as an “energy corridor”
for the export of Caspian oil and gas. Turkey finds
the idea attractive, because it would allow the coun-
try to reduce the gas surplus it seems to be facing in
the near future. In view of its geographic position,
Turkey could, in fact, play a pivotal role in enhanc-
ing the security of supply and competition in the
EU, connecting the Caspian gas reserves with the
Mediterranean region and Europe.
Long-Term Purchase Contracts
BOTAS¸ has signed eight long-term sales and pur-
chase contracts with six different supply sources.
Six contracts are presently in effect. Of these, three
are with Russia for plateau volumes of 6 billion
cubic meters per year, 16 billion cubic meters per
year, and 8 billion cubic meters per year, respec-
tively, through the Blue Stream pipeline across the
Black Sea; one is with Iran for 10 billion cubic
meters per year; and two are liquefied natural gas
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(LNG) contracts—one with Algeria for 4 billion
cubic meters per year and the other with Nigeria for
1.2 billion cubic meters per year. These agreements
are summarized in table 8.1.
Of the two contracts that are not yet in effect,
one was signed with Turkmenistan for 16 billion
cubic meters per year, and the Shah Deniz contract
with Azerbaijan is for 6.6 billion cubic meters per
year, starting in 2005 (see table 8.1). It is likely,
however, that these two contracts will prove mutu-
ally incompatible. Although progress has been
reported on imports from Azerbaijan, the pipeline
project from Turkmenistan appears to be stalled.
On December 26, 1996, a framework agreement
was signed between Iraq and Turkey to pipe 10 bil-
lion cubic meters of Iraqi gas per year to Turkey
after development of the gas fields in Iraq. On the
Turkish side, BOTAS¸, TPAO, and TEKFEN have
been involved in this project. ENI was designated as
coordinator of the upstream activities.
Finally, a natural gas sale and purchase agree-
ment was initialed on March 31, 2001, by BOTAS¸
and EMG (Eastern Mediterranean Gas Company)
of Egypt to supply Turkey with 4 billion cubic
meters per year of natural gas.
To diversify natural gas supply sources, BOTAS¸
entered into a 20-year LNG sale and purchase
agreement with SONATRACH (Algeria) in 1988. In
order to receive the imported LNG, BOTAS¸ began
construction of the Marmara Ereg˘lisi LNG Import
Terminal in September 1989. The terminal, which
began operations in 1994, is used both as a LNG
regasification plant and as a storage facility for
imported LNG.
In addition to long-term contracts, BOTAS¸ has
also purchased natural gas on the spot market. The
first spot LNG was from Australia within the scope
of an agreement signed with North West Shelf LNG
in 1995. Spot LNG was also purchased from Qatar
and Algeria under two different agreements signed
with Qatar Gas and SONATRACH in 1998.
In 2001 BOTAS¸ purchased a total of 16,368 mil-
lion cubic meters of natural gas.The Russian Federa-
tion was the main natural gas supplier with 10,931
million cubic meters, followed by Algeria (3,985 mil-
lion cubic meters) and Nigeria (1,337 million cubic
meters). Iran provided 115 million cubic meters
(BOTAS¸ 2001).
BOTAS¸ justified signing these long-term pur-
chase contracts by pointing to the expected rapid
growth in the Turkish gas market; it predicted that
gas demand would reach 55 billion cubic meters in
2010 and 83 billion cubic meters in 2020. As noted
earlier, however, most observers believed the ambi-
tious BOTAS¸ demand forecasts were overly opti-
mistic, and they cautioned as well about the coun-
try’s economic crisis. Some analysts foresee that in
2010 Turkey will have surplus gas of 10 billion to
25 billion cubic meters, increasing to 50 billion
cubic meters in 2020 (Hafner 2002).
Oversupply also seems to be the basis of the dis-
pute that arose between Turkey and Iran in 2001 in
connection with a natural gas purchase agreement
for 10 billion cubic meters per year signed in 1996.
Under the contract, Iran was to export to Turkey a
total of 192 billion cubic meters of Iranian gas over
22 years, with deliveries starting in January 2000.
However, when deliveries were scheduled to start,
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TABLE 8.1 Existing Gas Agreements, Turkey
Amount (billion
cubic meters
per year) Signature Date Duration (years)
Russian Federation (West) 6 February 1986 25
Algeria (LNG) 4 April 1988 20
Nigeria (LNG) 1.2 November 1995 22
Islamic Republic of Iran 10 August 1996 25
Russian Federation (Black Sea) 16 December 1997 25
Russian Federation (West) 8 February 1998 23
Turkmenistan 16 May 1999 30
Azerbaijan 6.6 March 2001 15
Source: BOTAS¸, http://www.botas.gov.tr/.
BOTAS¸ had not completed the necessary import
infrastructure, and an amendment to the original
deal was negotiated under which first gas was
delayed to July 2001, and the duration of the con-
tract was extended to 25 years. The total contractual
volume was also increased to 228 billion cubic
meters, with annual volumes scheduled to reach
their plateau level of 10 billion cubic meters per year
in 2007. But again, when the July 2001 date arrived,
BOTAS¸ claimed that Iran had not constructed the
necessary border metering facilities, and gas did not
actually start flowing until December 2001.
In June 2002, BOTAS¸ announced that gas
imports from Iran had been halted because of an
alleged quality problem. Iran accused Turkey of
using the quality issue as a pretext, and said that the
real reason for the halt was that Turkey was not in a
position to consume the gas. The dispute was
resolved after a reduction in the contract price (in
line with the reduction that BOTAS¸ agreed to with
the Blue Stream consortium—about 9 percent) and
in the take-or-pay level (down from the original
87 percent of annual contract quantity to 70 per-
cent, which means that BOTAS¸ will need to take
only 7 billion cubic meters per year at the plateau).
National Networks and Future Development
Residential users in Ankara began receiving natural
gas in 1988. In 1992 Istanbul and Bursa also began
to receive supplies of natural gas; I˙zmit and
Eskis¸ehir received supplies in 1996. The distribu-
tion of natural gas is undertaken by local distribu-
tion companies; EGO in Ankara, I˙GDAS¸ in I˙stanbul,
I˙ZGAZ in I˙zmit, and BOTAS¸ in Bursa and Eskis¸ehir.
The distributors are owned or co-owned by the
municipalities they serve, except in Bursa and
Eskis¸ehir. The gas supply continues to be restricted
to limited areas of western Turkey, but there are
plans to extend the system.
The city distribution networks have been
enlarged over the years, parallel with demand. In
2001 the number of consumers increased to
197,303 in Bursa and 76,484 in Eskis¸ehir because of
the work under way to enlarge the city distribution
networks in these cities. In view of the growth sce-
nario described earlier, BOTAS¸ has planned to con-
nect local distribution networks in 55 new cities.
The connection dates for all of these projects are
in 2002–04.
In order to become “a Bridge to Europe” and
boost its internal demand, Turkey will have to
improve its national transmission and distribution
network. Five projects are already under study and
slated to become operational in 2005: the Southern
Natural gas transmission line project; the Konya-
I·zmir natural gas transmission line project; the
eastern Black Sea gas transmission line project; the
western Black Sea natural gas transmission line proj-
ect; and the Georgian border–Erzurum (Horasan)
natural gas transmission line project.
The Southern Natural gas transmission line
project is aimed at meeting natural gas demand in
the southern and southeastern regions of Turkey by
transmitting natural gas through a branch line to
be extended from the Eastern Anatolia Natural Gas
Main Transmission Line near Sivas. The total
length of this 40-inch pipeline from Sivas to
Mersin via Malatya, Kahramanmaras¸, Gaziantep,
Osmaniye, and Adana will be 565 kilometers.
By means of the Konya-I·zmir natural gas trans-
mission line project, the Eastern Anatolia Natural
Gas Main Transmission Line will be extended from
Konya to I˙zmir, and will supply natural gas to cities
such as Burdur, Isparta, Denizli, and Nazilli. The
618-kilometer 40-inch line will have branches to
the cities in the vicinity of Afyon and Antalya.
The eastern Black Sea gas transmission line proj-
ect will supply Hopa, Artvin, Rize, Trabzon, Giresun,
Ordu, and Samsun via Bayburt and Gümüs¸hane by
extending a branch from the Eastern Anatolia
Natural Gas Main Transmission Line at Erzincan.
The plan is to supply natural gas to Gümüs¸hane,
Bayburt, Trabzon, and Rize as the first stage of the
project. Through the western Black Sea gas trans-
mission line project, natural gas will be supplied to
Bartın, together with the industrial and residential
sectors along the route via Zonguldak, Devrek, and
Çaycuma, by extending a branch from Karadeniz
Ereg˘li. It is foreseen that the 141-kilometer line will
consist of a 78-kilometer line of 16-inch pipe and a
63-kilometer line of 12-inch pipe. In addition, a 
65-kilometer loop line of 16-inch pipe will be con-
structed on the I˙zmit-Karadeniz Ereg˘li Natural Gas
Transmission Line.
To transport Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan natu-
ral gas within Turkish territories, an approximately
225-kilometer pipeline will be constructed from the
Georgian border of Turkey to Erzurum (Horasan).
This line will be connected to the Eastern Anatolia
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Natural Gas Main Transmission Line at Horasan.
The project includes a commercial metering station
and a compressor station.
Ownership and Industry Structure 
This section addresses questions related to the pres-
ent ownership and industry structure of Turkey’s
natural gas sector, with the goal of comparing the
Turkish case with that of some EU countries. In
doing so, the section discusses similarities with
other emerging gas markets as well as differences
with more mature markets.
Turkey
Turkey’s natural gas sector is dominated by
BOTAS¸. BOTAS¸ Petroleum Pipeline Corporation
was established as an affiliated company of the
Turkish Petroleum Corporation on August 15,
1974, to transport Iraqi crude oil to the Gulf of
Iskenderun. In 1995 the company was restruc-
tured as a state economic enterprise (SEE) by
Decree of the Council of Ministers No. 95/6526,
thereby obtaining the status of an independent
company. Since 1987, BOTAS¸ has expanded its
original mission of transporting crude oil through
pipelines to cover the natural gas transportation
and trading activities. In 1995 all kinds of
petroleum-related activities such as exploration,
drilling, production, transportation, storage, and
refining for the purpose of providing crude oil
and natural gas from sources abroad was added to
BOTAS¸’s activities.
BOTAS¸ is made up of a series of sectoral and
provincial organizations: Petroleum Operations
Management, Natural Gas Operations Manage-
ment, LNG Operation Management, Dörtyol
Operation Management, Kayseri Operation Man-
agement, I˙stanbul Operation Management, Bursa
Operation Management, and Eskis¸ehir Operation
Management.
By Decision of the High Planning Council
No. 2002/T-15 of June 6, 2002, the Bursa and
Eskis¸ehir Operation Managements were restruc-
tured and transformed into affiliate companies of
BOTAS¸ that took the form of joint stock compa-
nies. The new companies were the Bursa City
Natural Gas Distribution, Trade and Contracting
Corporation (BURSAGAZ) and the Eskis¸ehir City
Natural Gas Distribution, Trade and Contracting
Corporation (ESGAZ).
BOTAS¸’s monopoly rights to natural gas import,
distribution, sales, and pricing, granted by Decree
No. 397 of February 9, 1990, were abolished by the
natural gas market law (No. 4646) enacted on May 2,
2001, to establish a stable and transparent natural
gas market based on competitive rules. The new law
covers the import, transmission, distribution, stor-
age, wholesale trading, and export of natural gas,
and the transmission and distribution of com-
pressed natural gas (CNG), as well as the rights and
obligations of all real and legal persons related to
these activities. Under the law, BOTAS¸ will compet-
itively tender and release the import contracts to
new private entrants until its import share falls
below 20 percent by the year 2009. The company
must auction at least 10 percent of its gas purchase
rights a year, starting from the enactment date of
the law. BOTAS¸ will also undergo further restruc-
turing, and separate companies will be established
for trade, transmission, and storage after the year
2009.
The 2001 natural gas market law also set the
minimum annual consumption limit for qualifica-
tion as an eligible consumer to 1 million cubic
meters, which corresponds to a market opening of
approximately 80 percent (European Commission
2003).
EU Emerging Gas Markets 
Within the European Union, Greece and Portugal
are considered to be emerging gas markets. As a
result, both countries obtained derogation to the lib-
eralization schedule foreseen in Directive 98/30/EC
of the European Parliament and of the Council of
June 22, 1998, on common rules for the internal
market in natural gas.
Greece Greece is not directly linked to the inter-
connected system of any other member state, and
it has only one main external supplier of imported
gas, Russia, which has a market share of more than
75 percent. So far, Greece has only a vertically
integrated gas company, DEPA (Public Gas Corpo-
ration). Plans are under way to separate DEPA’s
activities into transmission and supply. At present,
there is no unbundling of gas supply and high-
pressure transmission.
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Low-pressure gas distribution is performed (for
individuals and small industrial consumers) by
three independent private companies, each cover-
ing a specific geographic area. An energy regulatory
authority was established by Law No. 2773/99.
Greece has an LNG terminal, which may serve as
storage. No underground gas storage is yet in oper-
ation. The opening of the Greek gas market is
scheduled for 2006.
Portugal The Portuguese gas market is very
small. Transgas, the main operator for the high-
pressure network, was set up in 1993, and its major
shareholder is Gas de Portugal, which previously
was in charge of supply and transmission. Indus-
trial and commercial consumers with a gas con-
sumption profile of over 10,000 thousand cubic
meters are served directly by Transgas, along with
the four distribution companies in Portugal (Gas
de Lisboa for the capital city, Portgas for the north-
ern region, Lusitania Gas for the central region, and
Set Gas for the southern region). These four com-
panies sell, in turn, to smaller distribution compa-
nies (less than 2,000 cubic meters purchased annu-
ally). To promote investment in the enlargement of
the three provincial distribution networks, the
Portuguese government conducted in the 1990s an
international tender to select strategic investors for
each network. Italgas, a subsidiary of ENI, was
selected as the strategic investor for two out of three
(Lusitania Gas and Set Gas).
In 2000 the government merged the state-
owned oil and gas operators with the intention of
privatizing them. A holding was then set up (Galp-
SGPS) in which Eletricidade de Portugal is the
major shareholder. ENI took 33 percent of the cap-
ital. As an emerging market, Portugal has applied
for derogation; therefore, the EU natural gas direc-
tive will not be implemented before 2007.
EU Mature Gas Markets: The Italian Case
Italy produces only about one-fifth of its internal
gas consumption, and production is falling, in
absolute and relative terms, in relation to needs. In
the production sector, ENI is the dominant opera-
tor (in 2001 it accounted for 88 percent of total
production), followed by Edison T&S SpA (12 per-
cent of total production). Proven overall reserves
amount to about 215 billion cubic meters, the
equivalent of 13 years of production at current lev-
els. Imports fulfill most of the country’s require-
ment (just under 80 percent), and their share is
expected to cover 88 percent of the total require-
ment by 2005 and 90 percent by 2010. As for
imports, the ENI Group is again the dominant
operator, accounting for about 85 percent of the
total in 2001. The second importer after ENI is Enel
SpA (the former electricity monopoly), with about
11 percent of imports in 2001.
In 2004, Italy started importing gas from Libya,
and in 2007 the operator Edison will begin import-
ing liquefied natural gas from Qatar upon the con-
struction of a regasification terminal in the upper
Adriatic. The import contracts that are signed will
satisfy expected requirements until 2010.
The contracts for the vast majority of imports
are long term; in 2001 they accounted for
about 98 percent of the imported volume. Nearly
93 percent of imported gas is transported by
pipeline to entry points in Italy. The transporta-
tion rights paid by importers on foreign pipelines
serving the national gas system go mainly to com-
panies of the ENI Group, which was responsible
for constructing and funding the infrastructure.
Snam Rete Gas SpA3 owns 96 percent of the trans-
portation capacity in Italy in terms of invested
capital. The network of the second operator,
Edison, is geographically complementary to that of
Snam Rete Gas, especially in the central part of the
country. The section of pipeline passing under
the territorial waters of the Channel of Sicily is
also part of the national system. It is owned by
Transmediterranean Pipeline Company Limited
(TMPC, an Italian-Algerian company in which
SONATRACH and ENI hold equal stakes).
Access to Italy’s transportation networks is regu-
lated in accordance with Legislative Decree
164/2000 implementing the EU directive on the
internal market for natural gas. Tariffs, access crite-
ria, and the obligations to be met by the transporta-
tion companies are set by the Electricity and Gas
Regulatory Authority.
Legislative Decree 164/2000 also defined the
national network of gas pipelines, which is made up
of import pipelines, connections to storage facilities
and the principal interregional pipelines. For this
network, as defined and updated by ministerial
decree, access has been regulated since October 2001
along entry-exit lines.
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The Italian storage system consists of depleted
fields. The storage sites currently in operation are
managed by Stoccaggi Gas Italia SpA (Stogit), a
company set up in 2001 by the ENI Group, after
hiving off its storage branch, and Edison. Stogit
manages eight storage facilities, and Edison has two
storage facilities. The energy authority sets the tar-
iffs, criteria, access priorities, and obligations that
storage companies are required to respect. The only
regasification terminal in Italy at present is the one
at Panigaglia, which is run by Snam Rete Gas. Its
capacity is presently entirely taken up. Six new ter-
minals are planned.
The Italian market has been fully open since Jan-
uary 1, 2003. Article 1 of Legislative Decree 164/00
implementing European Commission Directive
98/30/EC on common rules for the internal natural
gas market provides that the importation, exporta-
tion, transportation, dispatch, distribution, and
sale of natural gas are free.
Imports from non-EU countries are subject to
authorization by the Ministry of Industry on the
basis of objective, nondiscriminatory published
criteria on technical and financial capabilities;
assurances about the origin of the gas; the availabil-
ity of strategic storage capacity in Italy in propor-
tion to the quantity of gas imported annually; and
the ability to contribute to the development and
safety of the system or to the diversification of
supply. LNG imports are facilitated through the
reduction of strategic storage obligations. Two
transitional annual constraints have been intro-
duced to facilitate the entry of new operators: a
ceiling on the national consumption level that can
be served by a single company from 2003 to 2010
(50 percent) and a ceiling on the deliveries to the
national network by any single company from 2002
to 2010 (initially 75 percent of national consump-
tion, with a reduction of 2 percentage points per
year, to 61 percent).
Transportation and dispatch are public service
activities, with connection and network access obli-
gations according to the criteria and tariffs laid
down by the energy authority. Storage is conducted
on a licensing basis lasting no more than 20 years,
and is subject to access obligations under the
criteria, priorities, and tariffs laid down by the
authority. Storage and exploitation activities must
be separated.
Distribution is a public service activity. The
service is entrusted to a concessionaire through an
open tendering process for a period not exceeding
12 years. The local authorities that grant the con-
cession are entrusted with the orientation, supervi-
sion, and control powers, and their relation with
the distributors are regulated on the basis of a stan-
dard contract prepared by the regulatory authority
and approved by the Ministry of Productive
Activities.
The legislative decree implementing the EU
directive completely transformed the structure of
the gas sector in Italy and provided a new impetus
to the reorganization of the sector. The major
energy companies acquired many distribution
companies so that they could increase their market
share and create new consortia. Companies that use
gas have also set up consortia with a similar goal of
purchasing gas on competitive terms.
The Italian case represents a median case of lib-
eralization in the EU context. The U.K. market is
considerably more competitive than the Italian
one, because the country has, until recently, been
self-sufficient in natural gas. In almost all other EU
countries, the market is less competitive: in
Germany, a regulatory authority has not yet been
introduced, although it was recently decided to
introduce one; in France, the incumbent controls
the market almost completely; in Spain, competi-
tion is facilitated by the presence of multiple regasi-
fication terminals, and a model gas release program
was implemented to reduce the share of the incum-
bent, Gas Natural.
Regulatory Reform in Turkey
On May 15, 2001, the executive board of the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF) approved a new
three-year standby arrangement for Turkey
amounting to US$19 billion. As part of the package
of economic measures, which were a condition of
IMF support, Turkey passed new electricity and
gas laws.
The new natural gas market law (Law No. 4646)
was adopted on May 2,2001.The law came into force
immediately,but its implementation was subject to a
12-month transition period, extendable to a maxi-
mum of 18 months. The transitional period was in
fact extended until November 2002. Implementing
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legislation on gas market licensing was issued in
September 2002.
The law is intended to establish a competitive gas
market and to ensure independent regulation of the
sector. The law also seeks to harmonize Turkish leg-
islation with EU law in view of Turkey’s future acces-
sion. The main features of the law are the following:
• All legal entities can carry out import, export,
wholesale trade, transportation, distribution,
storage, and CNG transmission and distribution
activities under license from the energy market
regulator.
• The natural gas activities of BOTAS¸ are to be
unbundled. BOTAS¸ is to be split into three state
economic enterprises after the year 2009,
responsible for trading, storage, and transmis-
sion, respectively. The two local distributors
owned by BOTAS¸ in Bursa and Eskis¸ehir will
later be corporatized and privatized.
• No importer will be allowed to import more
than 20 percent of Turkey’s gas consumption
during any one year. BOTAS¸ will be required to
sell part of its gas import contracts to comply
with this provision. This sale will be accom-
plished through a series of annual competitive
tenders to sell existing import contracts to new
importers for no less than 10 percent of total
imports each year. No new natural gas purchase
agreement can be executed by any import com-
pany with countries that have existing contracts
with BOTAS¸. This limitation shall apply for the
entire duration of the agreement.
• No legal entity is allowed to sell more than
20 percent of annual gas consumption. Only
national gas producers may sell more than
20 percent of annual gas consumption in the
domestic market, provided that the amount sold
directly to eligible consumers does not exceed
20 percent. The remaining gas could be sold
through importers, distributors, or wholesalers.
• Gas companies will not be allowed to establish
another company in the same field of activity,
but will be allowed to own participations in a
company operating in another field. They may
not, however, directly or indirectly hold the
majority of the capital or commercial assets of
the company, nor do they have the right to use
the majority of voting rights of the company.
The rights of BOTAS¸ on existing participations
are preserved.
• To ensure security of supply, gas importers and
wholesalers must inform the Energy Market
Regulatory Authority (EMRA) about the source
and security of their gas imports, and they must
store 10 percent of the gas they import in five
years. Importers also must prove that they can
contribute to the improvement and security of
the national transmission system.
• Transportation companies that own transporta-
tion networks and the owners and operators of
LNG and storage facilities are to offer services at
nondiscriminatory conditions.
• Third parties also will be allowed to build
pipelines. BOTAS¸ and other potential grid oper-
ators are to undertake investment, which is sub-
ject to EMRA’s approval. The regulatory agency
is to control this investment, along with service
quality. Existing and planned national transmis-
sion networks as well as transmission networks
under construction remain under the ownership
of BOTAS¸.
• Eligible consumers will be free to select the sup-
plier of their choice. Eligibility will be deter-
mined by the regulator. Consumers purchasing
more than 1 million cubic meters of natural gas
a year and users unions (consortia), power gen-
erators, and cogenerators are considered eligible.
• Distribution rights for cities and municipalities
must be awarded under a tender. Once a distrib-
utor has won a tender, it applies the unit service
and the amortization price as specified in the
tender announcement. After this period, its
prices and conditions will be reviewed every
year by the regulator. Distributors must con-
struct, operate, and extend distribution equip-
ment as specified in the license. Once the license
for a distribution area has been awarded, the
selected operator has to allow the local govern-
ment to participate up to 20 percent in the com-
pany capital. The size of public participation, to
be remunerated at the nominal share price, is to
be determined by the regulator. Distribution
companies may hold a license for no more than
two cities within the country.
• EMRA has to develop five different categories of
gas prices: for connection, transmission, storage,
wholesale sales, and retail sales. Prices for
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connection will be determined between the
regulator and distribution companies. Network
tariffs will be based mainly on distance and vol-
ume. Storage tariffs will be freely determined
between storage companies and users. Trans-
mission and storage companies will have an
obligation to prove to the regulator that their
services are economical and safe. Wholesale
prices will be negotiated by the trading parties,
but the regulator will maintain some oversight
of wholesale prices. The distribution companies
must prove that they provide gas from the
cheapest source, and they must operate effi-
ciently and safely during their license period.
Distributors’ retail sales prices for captive con-
sumers are subject to rate-of-return regulation.
The Energy Market Regulatory Authority, which
opened its doors in November 2001, was estab-
lished to meet a condition of the IMF’s support for
Turkey. EMRA is an independent, administratively
and financially autonomous public administration
related to the Ministry of Energy and Natural
Resources. According to Article 4, paragraph 3, of
the electricity market law (No. 4628), “The head-
quarters of the Authority shall be located in Ankara
and the ministry to which it is related shall be the
Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources. The
Authority may establish representative offices in
distribution regions in order to carry out customer
relations.” Most of the technical specialists have so
far been recruited through temporary assignments
from various public administrations, including the
Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, BOTAS¸,
the former Turkish Electricity and Transmission
Company (TEAS), the Treasury, and public banks.
By March 2003, its overall personnel, including
support staff, totaled 270. Its budget is €4.3 million.
EMRA has begun to develop some of the sec-
ondary regulation for the liberalization of the
energy sector. In September 2002, EMRA issued a
regulation on principles and procedures pertaining
to connection, transmission and dispatch, storage,
and wholesale and retail sale tariffs. In January
2003, the new transmission tariff was announced.
The tariff—the maximum that system operator
BOTAS¸ can charge to shippers—is a flat rate postal
tariff equivalent to $0.4 per million Btus. This tariff
is lower than many expected, indicating that EMRA
seriously intends to create a competitive market
and that the prices for industrial consumers will
probably go down as a result of liberalization.
Secondary legislation on licensing procedures and
on network operation rules to be determined by
transmission companies was also adopted.
Comparative Analysis of Turkey’s Gas Legislation
Even though Turkey is an emerging market, its indus-
try structure does not differ considerably from that
of other countries of the EU, including more mature
markets. Furthermore, its new legislation goes even
further than the laws in force in many EU countries.
Although liberalization was postponed in Greece and
Portugal until 2006 and 2007, respectively, in Turkey
the threshold of 1 million cubic meters per year for
eligibility represents a market opening of approxi-
mately 80 percent. This figure may, however, be a
result of the structure of the demand, mainly consist-
ing of large consumers. The average market opening
within the EU is about 78 percent.
As for unbundling, the obligation imposed on
BOTAS¸ to divest all distribution activities, in addi-
tion to separating trading and transmission activi-
ties, is more stringent that that found in other EU
countries. In Italy, for example, ENI has substantial
interest in distribution (100 percent of Italgas
through Snam Rete Gas) and was not requested to
divest its distribution arm, which owns 35 percent
of the distributors. In Spain, Gas Natural is strongly
linked to Enagas and Repsol. In Germany, Ruhrgas
has a minority interest in regional companies
and distributors at least sufficient to influence
them. RWE Gas and E. ON cover the whole chain,
including small production interests. In France,
over 90 percent of distribution is undertaken by
EdF-GdF. In Austria, the regional gas companies
may be connected with their distributors.
The limit on BOTAS¸’s share of imports is much
more stringent than what is imposed in Italy and in
Spain. No limit was imposed in France or Germany.
Likewise, the limit on BOTAS¸’s domestic market share
is more stringent than what was imposed on Snam
Rete Gas in Italy. The 10 percent storage obligation is
similar to that existing in Italy. However, Turkey’s sit-
uation is different because it is a transit country that
eventually will have access to much more gas than it
consumes domestically, but it has little opportunity
to create underground storage sites (which instead
are available“downstream,” in the Balkans).
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The most interesting feature of the new gas law,
however, is the gas release program. If managed
wisely, the program has the potential to create real
competition within the country. The natural gas
law states (temporary article 2) that every year until
the aggregate of the annual import amount falls to
20 percent of the annual consumption amount,
BOTAS¸ shall release part of its contracts to com-
petitors by means of a tender. However, it is not yet
clear how such a system will work in practice.
BOTAS¸ has a final say on the winner of the tender
procedure. If BOTAS¸ is left free to choose the oper-
ator to whom it will cede its purchase agreements,
the program may turn out to be not too effective.
Also, in view of the Italian experience, it would be
preferable that the gas be released by means of a
tendering procedure based on objective criteria.
Italian legislation implementing the EU direc-
tive introduced two constraints on the incumbent,
ENI, to facilitate the entry of new operators. The
first is a ceiling on the national consumption level
that can be served by a single company from 2003
to 2010 (50 percent). This measure, however,
excludes gas for self-consumption.4 The second is a
ceiling on the deliveries to the national network by
any single company from 2002 to 2010 (initially
75 percent of national consumption, with a reduc-
tion of 2 percentage points a year, to 61 percent).
ENI was left free to decide how to resell part of
the gas for which it had already contracted through
long-term take-or-pay contracts. The result was
that only Italian companies (Plurigas SpA, Dalmine
Energia, and Energia SpA) benefited from the
measure; major international gas companies, espe-
cially producers, were not offered an opportunity
to enter the market.
The solution adopted in Italy thus, in the end,
reinforces the position of some weak competitors
that represent no real threat to the incumbent, but it
does not seem very effective as a means of reducing
prices and building competition. The three compa-
nies that benefited from the measure are too small to
effectively compete with ENI. On the contrary, it is
more likely in practice that smaller firms will adjust
their prices to be in line with that of the incumbent.
In the United Kingdom, competition effectively
started only in the early 1990s, when a gas release
program was introduced. Each year, the release gas
was allocated on a pro rata basis to successful appli-
cants (32 in the first year and an additional 70 in
the second year—albeit including some multiple
bids), who paid BG (British Gas) a price equal
to BG’s weighted average cost of gas. Previous
attempts by the British government to introduce
supply side competition through voluntary com-
mitments by BG (including the 90/10 rule under
which BG would contract no more than 90 percent
from new fields, leaving 10 percent to other compa-
nies) were less effective than hoped, because most
of the 10 percent gas contracts were bought for new
power generation rather than competing in the
industrial market.
One example of a competition-enhancing
release program was undertaken in Spain. By Royal
Decree Law 6/2000 of June 23, 2000, and by an
order of June 29, 2001, the Spanish government
conducted a gas release program for 25 percent of
the gas supplies that Spain received from Algeria
through the Maghreb pipeline from October 2001
to January 1, 2004—that is, for about 26 months.
This program, like the gas release program in the
United Kingdom, was based on the principle of
keeping the incumbent neutral.
The release was designed to give competitors to
Gas Natural access to gas, so that customers in the
large industrial market would receive offers from
alternative suppliers. Trading companies with a
market share of more than 50 percent of the market
were excluded from the bidding. Fourteen bids
were made by different company groups (the total
bid was for two and a half times the amount of gas
being offered). Bids could be made for only up to
25 percent of the total volume offered. The average
price paid by bidders was equivalent to Gas
Natural’s purchasing cost (oil-related gas price)
plus a fixed management fee.
The final awards were made on October 22, 2001.
Among the winning applicants were three Spanish
companies—Iberdrola Gas (25 percent), Unión
Fenosa Gas Comercializadora (20 percent), and
Endesa Energía (18 percent)—and two interna-
tional companies—BP Gas (25 percent) and Shell
(2 percent)—through their Spanish subsidiaries.
Spanish imports from Algeria by pipeline
totaled 6.54 billion cubic meters in 2001; total
imports were almost 17.5 billion cubic meters.
Spain’s gas release program was therefore equal to
about 16 percent of Spanish consumption, whereas
the planned gas release for Turkey will be for
80 percent of total imports.
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Conclusion
Turkey plays a central role as a transit country for
oil and gas from the Caspian Sea, Black Sea, and
Central Asia regions to the EU. Because of its strate-
gic position, Turkey can help to improve natural
gas supply diversification and security in Europe as
well as to enhance competition. It is expected that
the EU will have a gas supply deficit of about
13 percent in 2010 and about 28 percent in 2020
(European Commission 2002).
To perform this role effectively, Turkey will have
to develop its national infrastructure and stimulate
internal gas demand. The development of distribu-
tion networks is important to maintain market
growth, which itself will be vital if the gas that
BOTAS¸ has contracted is to be absorbed and if the
country is to attract international investors. In that
respect, clear regulations on access rules, tariffs, and
new investments are vital. Experience in other
countries reveals that uncertainty over the applica-
ble regime may seriously prevent investments.
To develop the internal market, regulators
should also enact the appropriate secondary legisla-
tion that will allow prices to domestic consumers to
go down while maintaining good quality standards.
Time limits must be imposed on the licensing sys-
tem for distribution.
Finally, the release program must be imple-
mented soon to increase the number of market
participants.
Notes
1. The authors wish to thank the participants in the confer-
ence “Turkey: Towards EU Accession” for their comments, and
especially Ahmet Aydin, who sent them detailed comments and
additional information that allowed them to substantially
improve the first draft of this chapter.
2. These numbers were provided by the state-owned gas
company, BOTAS¸.
3. In 2001 both Snam Rete Gas and Edison were separated
from their respective vertically integrated groups (ENI and
Edison) in compliance with the provisions of Legislative
Decree 164/2000 on the unbundling of activities in the gas
sector. At the end of 2001, 40.24 percent of the shares of Snam
Rete Gas were floated, with ENI continuing to own the remain-
ing stake.
4. The fact that gas for self-consumption has been excluded
from the ceiling means that Snam can minimize the amount of
gas it releases by entering the electricity market through the
construction of gas-fired power generators, thus reducing
the effect of the program.
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Part III
Economic
Challenges

medium term, removal of all forms of discrimina-
tion, adoption of EU legislation in the field of labor
law, effective implementation and enforcement of
the social policy and employment acquis, and
preparation of a national employment strategy
with a view toward later participation in the Euro-
pean Employment Strategy (EES). These institu-
tional changes are expected to enhance Turkey’s
capacity to develop and implement, together with
the European Community, strategies for “employ-
ment and particularly for promoting a skilled,
trained and adaptable workforce and labour mar-
kets responsive to economic change” (Treaty Estab-
lishing the European Community, Article 125; also
see the EU’s Official Journal, C 325, December 24,
2002).
Adoption of the EU acquis on employment and
social affairs is likely to put a burden on the firms
and workers that need to adapt themselves to the
new competitive environment. The adverse effects
of this process of transformation would be mini-
mized if the government, the private sector, and
labor understand what needs to be changed and
then adopt effective policies and strategies. The
main aim of this study is to provide, for use by
these agents, information on the employment and
labor market issues that are important during the
EU accession process. A study of labor markets in
the process of EU membership is crucial for Turkey,
because, as in all other European countries, the
The process of European Union (EU) accession has
provided a strong stimulus for various institutional
changes in Turkey. The recognition of Turkey as a
candidate state for accession by the European
Council at Helsinki on December 10–11, 1999, was
an important turning point in this process.1 The
Accession Partnership (AP), which followed the
Helsinki summit, identified the short-term and
medium-term priorities, intermediate objectives,
and conditions on which accession preparations
must concentrate in light of the political and eco-
nomic criteria. One of the most important issues
for Turkey in adopting and implementing the EU
acquis communautaire (the entire body of legisla-
tion of the European Communities and Union) is
labor market regulations and employment policies.
Adoption of the EU acquis will certainly bring radi-
cal changes to the functioning of the labor market
in Turkey, with vital consequences for firms,
workers, and the long-term performance of the
economy.
As noted, the Accession Partnership identified
short-term and medium-term priorities and objec-
tives in employment and social affairs. In the short
term, Turkey was expected to strengthen efforts to
tackle the problem of child labor, to ensure that
the conditions are in place for an active and
autonomous social dialogue, and to support the
social partners’ capacity-building efforts to develop
and implement the acquis. The AP envisaged, in the
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labor market is the single largest market whose effi-
cient operation has significant repercussions for the
performance of the whole economy. Moreover,
being a social institution, the labor market, and the
rules and regulations defining how it should oper-
ate, have a direct impact on the lives of almost all
citizens.
Because the topic is rather broad, this study con-
centrates on the possible effects of the adoption of
the employment acquis regulating work and
employment conditions, and it ignores some issues
such as child labor, discrimination, and social pro-
tection. The chapter thus focuses on employment
protection and labor market flexibility issues. It
begins by briefly summarizing the literature on
labor market policies, institutions, and economic
performance. It then presents basic employment
indicators for Turkey, the EU, and some accession
countries to set the background for the study. The
next section compares EU and Turkish labor law
and discusses the main characteristics of the ration-
ale and implementation of the European Employ-
ment Strategy. The sections that follow analyze the
measurement of labor market flexibility and the
flexibility of the Turkish labor market and describe
the impact of the accession process and the adop-
tion of the acquis. The final section summarizes the
basic findings and policy proposals.
Labor Market Policies, Institutions,
and Economic Performance
Although the link between labor market institu-
tions and economic performance has received con-
siderable attention in the literature beginning with
the classical economists, since the mid-1970s it has
become a major contentious issue among econo-
mists and policymakers. The member countries of
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) experienced a rapid increase
in inflation and unemployment rates in the second
half of the 1970s. Almost all the OECD countries
(with a major exception, Turkey) were successful in
curbing the inflation, but high unemployment rates
have persisted in European countries.
The difference in the labor market performances
of the United States and European countries
has instigated an intensified debate on the link
between labor market institutions and economic
performance. Many economists and international
organizations such as the OECD have pointed to
inefficient and inflexible labor markets as a reason
for the high and, in many cases increasing, unem-
ployment in European countries. The concept of
“labor market flexibility” has played a key role in
these discussions.2
The concept of labor market flexibility refers to
the functioning of labor markets (“external flexibil-
ity”), and it focuses mainly on wage and numerical
flexibility. Wage flexibility refers to the speed of
adjustment in wages in the labor market. What is
usually meant by wage flexibility is the downward
flexibility of real or nominal wages. Specific wage-
setting institutions (centralized collective bargain-
ing, wage indexation, and minimum wage legisla-
tion) and tax and social spending policies (such as
high unemployment benefits, high nonwage labor
costs, and high marginal tax rates) are blamed for
reducing wage flexibility. Numerical flexibility refers
to how fast and at what cost a firm can adjust the
composition and the number of workers it employs
by hirings, layoffs, and firings. Employment protec-
tion legislation (EPL) is one of the main institutions
that determines numerical flexibility. Because
numerical and wage flexibility are closely related (as
will be discussed later—rigidities in EPL may lead to
higher wages), in this chapter we use only the term
labor market flexibility to cover both aspects of
external flexibility.
In the 1990s, some researchers emphasized
the importance of functional (or “internal”)
flexibility—that is, flexibility in job description and
job design for multiskilled workers. Although
external and internal flexibility could be substitutes,
or options, for alternative corporate strategies, we
do not study the issue of internal f lexibility.
As noted earlier, Article 125 of the Treaty Estab-
lishing the European Community calls for a coordi-
nated strategy for promoting a “skilled, trained and
adaptable workforce and labour markets responsive
to economic change.” The concept of adaptability
is certainly broader than the concept of flexibility.
For example, it is suggested in a report financed
by the European Commission that adaptability
refers to “the broad process by which labour mar-
kets adjust to exogenous developments over a
period of time.” whereas flexibility is now used
to refer to the “short-term response of wages and
labour costs, in particular, to variations in the
demand for labour relative to supply, or to the
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ability of employers to adjust their work force to
changes in economic activity.” Therefore, “[w]hile
flexibility defined in these terms may be an impor-
tant part of the wider concept of adaptability, it is
far from being the only aspect of labour market
behavior which is of significance. Indeed, a high
degree of flexibility so defined may not only con-
flict with the achievement of wider objectives than
simply the maintenance of a high level of employ-
ment but might also make it more difficult to secure
longer-term growth objectives” (Algoé Consultans
2002: 2). Keeping in mind these differences, this
study focuses on labor market flexibility, especially
on changes needed in the EPL during the accession
process in Turkey.
Researchers disagree about the effects of labor
market flexibility on economic performance. One
group claims that labor market flexibility is
required for the good functioning of competitive
markets and thus for the efficient allocation of
resources. Because employment protection and
rigidities in wage setting are costs incurred by
firms, they have profound effects on firms’ deci-
sions (OECD 1994a, 1994b, 1999; Salvanes 1997;
Blanchard 2000; Scarpetta and Tressel 2002;
Heckman and Pagés 2004). These researchers
suggest, first, that stricter labor market regulations
may lead to higher unemployment (and lower
output) and change the composition of unemploy-
ment, because they affect the flows to and from
employment—that is, hiring and layoffs. EPL costs
affect layoffs directly, because these costs are added
to the cost of layoffs, and the cost of hiring indi-
rectly, because firms will take into consideration the
(potential) costs of layoffs (including EPL costs) in
their hiring decisions. If the second effect domi-
nates the first one, then the unemployment rate will
be higher. EPL will also increase unemployment
duration because of the decrease in the exit rate
from unemployment.
Second, strict EPL is likely to strengthen the bar-
gaining power of workers and, depending on the
structure of product and labor markets, may lead to
wages higher than the market-clearing wages and
higher unemployment. Moreover, EPL provides
protection for insiders, those workers who have
regular jobs in the formal sector. Thus, strict EPL
may cause a widening gap between insiders and
outsiders and may encourage firms to operate in
the informal sector.
Although there is almost a consensus on the
effects of EPL on the composition and rate of
unemployment among neoclassical economists,
another group of researchers suggests that excessive
labor market flexibility may hinder investment in
training and innovative activities, diminish the
accumulation of human and knowledge capital,
and thus have a negative impact on growth and
employment in the long run. According to Michie
and Sheehan (2003), “The sort of ‘low road’ labor
flexibility practices encouraged by labor market
deregulation—short term and temporary con-
tracts, a lack of employer commitment to job secu-
rity, low levels of training, and so on—are nega-
tively correlated with innovation.” Firms that rely
on labor market flexibility to be more competitive
will have weak incentives for conducting innovative
activities. Moreover, reduced innovative activities
will, in turn, have a negative impact on employ-
ment and company profits because “(1) lower wage
increases will lead to a slower replacement of the
capital stock, (2) lower wages prevent the Schum-
peterian process of creative destruction, and
(3) lower wages will lead to a lack of effective
demand” (Kleinknecht 1998).3 Patterns of sectoral
specialization also may be influenced by labor mar-
ket flexibility. For example, Bassanini and Ernst
(2002) show in an empirical study that “countries
with coordinated industrial relations systems and
strict employment protection tend to specialize in
industries with a cumulative knowledge base
because coordinated industrial relations and employ-
ment protection encourage firm-sponsored train-
ing as well as the accumulation of firm-specific
competencies.”
Rigidities and frictions in the labor market may
reduce labor flows and lead to wage compression
(lower wage differentials). These factors, however,
may induce firms to provide more training for their
employees and contribute to the accumulation of
human capital, both at the firm level and at the
economy level (see, e.g., Acemoglu and Pischke
1998, 1999; Agell 1999; Ballot and Taymaz 2001).
The stability of the employment relationship, com-
plementarities between training and innovation
activities, and wage compression all make training
activities more profitable. Thus, firms will achieve
higher productivity and a higher rate of growth in
productivity as a result of employing more skilled
and well-educated employees.
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Although the issue of the effects of labor market
institutions on economic performance has yet to be
resolved, some remarkable contributions in recent
years have improved understanding of how labor
market institutions function. For example, Belot,
Boonez, and van Ours (2002) have developed a
model that proves that there is an optimal degree of
employment protection. In other words, both
excessive and limited labor market flexibility could
be detrimental to economic growth. More impor-
tant, it has been shown that the impact of labor
market regulations and institutions depends on
other market and technology conditions (Scarpetta
and Tressel 2002). Blanchard has developed models
in which he studies the interactions between labor
and product markets (e.g., Blanchard 2000). He
shows that institutions play a more important role
in the process of wage setting if product markets
are monopolistic or oligopolistic, because only in
those markets would workers be able to bargain
over rents. Therefore, (de)regulation of labor and
product markets must be implemented together.
Finally, Belot (2002) develops the idea that labor
market flexibility itself could be an endogenously
determined variable, and he shows in a model that
countries with low migration costs and high eco-
nomic heterogeneity (such as the United States)
may prefer no employment protection.
Numerous empirical studies have attempted to
test the effects of labor market flexibility on eco-
nomic performance. Most of these studies show that
the effect on the composition of unemployment is
unambiguous: employment protection increases
the duration of unemployment by slowing down the
flows through the labor markets (more long-term
unemployment and less short-term unemploy-
ment), but the effect on the rate of unemployment
and output is ambiguous. Labor market flexibility
has an adverse impact on specific groups of workers
such as youth and marginal groups (for extensive
surveys, see Nickell and Layard 1999; Addison and
Teixeira 2001; Baker and others 2002; Heckman and
Pagés 2004). As for growth and productivity, Nickell
and Layard (1999) suggest that“there seems to be no
evidence that either stricter labor standards or
employment protection lowers productivity growth
rates. If anything, employment protection can lead
to higher productivity growth if it is associated with
other measures taken by firms to enhance the sub-
stantive participation of the workforce.”
Labor Market Indicators for Turkey
Turkey, with its population of 64 million, is the
largest of the 13 accession and candidate coun-
tries.4 Its eventual membership in the EU will have
a profound impact on both Turkey and the EU
countries, and the impact of membership will be
determined, to a large extent, by the peculiarities of
the structure of the population and labor markets
in Turkey.
One of the most important characteristics of the
population of Turkey is its age composition. The
share of young people is relatively high because of
the country’s high birthrate. The birthrate is declin-
ing, but it is predicted to remain higher than the
European average in the coming decades (the pop-
ulation growth rate was about 1.8 percent in the
1990s). The high proportion of young people could
be an advantage for Turkey because it includes a
high share of active population, but it imposes a
heavy burden on the educational system and makes
employment generation one of the main social
issues.
The employment rate as a percentage of
working-age population (aged 15–64) is lower in
Turkey than in the EU and other candidate countries.
In 2000 the employment rate was only 48.2 percent
in Turkey, whereas it was 63.2 percent in the EU and
well above 50 percent in all candidate countries (see
table 9.1 for data on Turkey, the EU, and candidate
countries with more than 5 million population).
One of the main reasons for the low employment
rate in Turkey is the fact that the participation rate is
also low, especially for urban women. Turkey is
expected to experience an increase in its participa-
tion rate in the future, which may intensify pressures
for employment generation.
Self-employment rates and part-time and fixed-
term employment rates5 seem to be quite high in
Turkey (24.5 percent, 20.7 percent, and 10.0 per-
cent, respectively). However, the majority of the
self-employed and part-time employed are working
in agriculture, and the fixed-term employment is
dominant in the construction sector. Therefore,
these rates basically reflect sectoral specificities and
the importance of these sectors (agriculture and
construction) in total employment.
In Turkey, the share of agriculture in total
employment is extremely high (34.5 percent);
among all candidate countries, it is second to that
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of Romania (45.2 percent). Because the share of
agriculture is expected to decline in the future, this
transformation may tend to lower the participation
rate (the participation rate for urban women is
much lower than that for rural women) and add
another source of demand for urban male jobs,
mainly in the services sector. The share of services
in total employment in Turkey is much lower than
that in the EU and candidate countries, but again
with the exception of Romania where the agricul-
tural sector is predominant.
The unemployment data reveal that there could
be substantial differences between the labor markets
in Turkey and the EU. The unemployment rate in
Turkey is relatively lower. Moreover, the youth
unemployment rate is significantly lower, especially
compared to major candidate countries, in spite of a
huge influx of the young people into the labor force.
Most interesting, the long-term unemployment
rate6 (as a percentage of labor force) is very low, only
1.3 percent, although it is 3.7 percent in the EU, 9.5
percent in Bulgaria, 3.1 percent in Hungary, 7.3 per-
cent in Poland, and 3.4 percent in Romania. The
proportion of long-term unemployed in total
unemployed in Turkey is also very low, only 20 per-
cent in 2000. Among all large candidate countries,
the lowest rate after Turkey is observed in Poland
(45 percent), and the EU average is about 47 per-
cent. These data seem to suggest that Turkey has
maintained a high rate of labor market flows so that,
in spite of a huge youth population and the growing
demand for new jobs, the rate of long-term unem-
ployment remains relatively low. In other words,
Turkey has quite a dynamic labor market.
The labor market indicators summarized in
table 9.1 also reveal that employment generation is a
major issue in Turkey. The demand for labor must
increase at a high rate to keep the rate of unemploy-
ment at the existing level. One of the main determi-
nants of labor demand is, of course, the cost of
labor. Table 9.2a presents the data on labor costs,
income tax, and employees’ and employers’ social
security contributions (SSCs) for a single individual
without children in OECD countries in 2002.
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TABLE 9.1 Employment Indicators: EU and Selected Group of Candidate
Countries, 2000a
Turkey EU Bulgaria Hungary Poland Romania
Total population (thousands) 64,059 370,914 6,832 9,927 30,535 22,338
Population aged 15–64 (thousands) 41,147 247,708 5,502 6,760 25,652 15,213
Total employment (thousands) 20,579 165,537 2,872 3,807 14,518 10,898
Employment rate (% population aged 15–64) 48.2 63.2 51.5 55.9 55.1 64.2
FTE employment rate (% population 49.3 57.9 50.3b 56.0 53.0b 63.8
aged 15–64)c
Self-employed (% total employment) 24.5 15.0 14.7 14.5 22.5 25.4
Part-time employment (% total employment)c 20.7 17.8 3.4b 3.6 10.6 16.4
Fixed-term contracts (% total employment)c 10.0 13.6 5.7b 5.8 4.2 1.6
Employment in services (% total employment) 47.3 69.0 54.0 59.8 50.3 29.0
Employment in industry (% total employment) 18.2 26.7 32.8 33.8 31.1 25.8
Employment in agriculture 34.5 4.3 13.2 6.5 18.7 45.2
(% total employment)
Unemployment rate (% labor force) 6.6 7.9 16.2 6.6 16.3 7.0
Youth unemployment rate (% labor force 13.2 15.5 33.3 12.3 35.7 17.8
aged 15–24)
Long-term unemployment rate 1.3 3.7 9.5 3.1 7.3 3.4
(% labor force)
Note: FTE  full-time equivalent.
a. Candidate countries with more than 5 million population in 2000.
b. Data for 2001.
c. Calculated from Turkish State Institute of Statistics; Household Labour Force Statistics (SIS 2000b).
Sources: Turkey: SIS 2000b; all other countries: European Commission DG for Employment and Social
Affairs 2002.
Table 9.2b presents the same data for various family
types and wage levels.
Three striking observations about Turkey emerge
from the data presented in tables 9.2a and 9.2b. First,
the average labor cost for employers is substantially
lower in Turkey than in the developed OECD coun-
tries, but it is relatively higher than in some major
candidate countries (Hungary, Poland, and the
Slovak Republic). The tax wedge (the proportion of
income tax and employers’ and employees’ SSCs in
labor cost) for a single individual without children is
close to the EU average and lower than the one
observed in most of the candidate countries.
Second, the tax wedge does not differ much in
Turkey across family types and wage levels. For
example, the lowest tax wedge exists for an individ-
ual without any children earning 67 percent of the
average wage rate (41.3 percent) and the highest for
an individual without any children earning 167 per-
cent of the average wage rate (44.3 percent); the
difference is only 3 percentage points. In all EU
countries (with the exception of Greece), the tax
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TABLE 9.2a Income Tax Plus Employees’ and Employers’ Social Security
Contributions, 2002a
(percent of labor costs)
Social Security Contributions Labor
Income Tax Employee Employer Total Costs (US$)b
Australia 24 0 0 24 33,964
Austria 8 14 23 45 34,030
Belgium 21 11 24 55 43,906
Canada 18 6 7 31 34,793
Czech Rep. 8 9 26 43 18,631
Denmark 32 11 1 43 36,690
Finland 20 5 20 45 35,513
France 9 9 29 48 32,856
Germany 17 17 17 51 42,197
Greece 0 12 22 35 20,570
Hungary 13 9 24 46 11,934
Iceland 21 0 5 26 25,379
Ireland 10 4 10 24 27,775
Italy 14 7 25 46 35,709
Japan 6 9 10 24 32,287
Korea, Rep. of 2 6 8 16 32,116
Luxembourg 7 12 12 32 37,573
Mexico 2 1 13 16 10,295
Netherlands 6 19 10 36 36,019
New Zealand 20 0 0 20 26,629
Norway 19 7 11 37 36,262
Poland 5 21 17 43 16,268
Portugal 4 9 19 32 15,376
Slovak Rep. 5 9 28 42 13,249
Spain 10 5 23 38 27,156
Sweden 18 5 25 48 33,345
Switzerland 9 10 10 30 37,710
Turkey 12 12 18 42 17,367
United Kingdom 14 7 8 30 32,557
United States 15 7 7 30 34,650
a. Single individual without children at the income level of the average production worker. Note that such
workers do not receive family benefits.
b. Annual labor cost per worker, U.S. dollars with equal purchasing power.
Source: OECD 2002.
wedge differences between various categories of
workers are much wider. These figures show that
income tax and social security structures in Turkey
do not have a social policy component that favors
disadvantaged groups.
Third, significant differences appear across
countries in terms of the shares of income taxes
and SSCs. For example, the tax wedge is almost the
same for Denmark and Austria, but the share of
income tax is 32 percent in Denmark and only
8 percent in Austria. In other words, there are sub-
stantial intercountry differences in the composition
of cuts on labor costs.
These observations indicate that anyone making
intercountry comparisons should be extremely
careful. There are significant differences in the
institutional setups: different institutions may have
similar functions, and there may be complementar-
ities or substitutions between various institutions
and functions. Therefore, issues such as labor
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TABLE 9.2b Income Tax Plus Employees’ and Employers’ Contributions Less Cash
Benefits, by Family Type and Wage Level, 2002
(percent of labor costs)
Single, Single, Single, Single, Married, Married, Married, Married,
Family Type No Child No Child No Child 2 Children 2 Children 2 Children 2 Children No Child
Wage Levela 67 100 167 67 100–0 100–33b 100–67b 100–33b
Australia 19.7 23.6 32.0 10.5 14.7 16.8 19.2 20.3
Austria 39.9 44.8 50.0 16.3 29.6 31.9 34.4 42.5
Belgium 48.9 55.3 61.1 32.9 40.1 42.5 48.5 49.8
Canada 26.8 30.8 31.8 4.6 20.9 24.5 27.4 27.9
Czech Rep. 41.8 43.5 45.8 18.0 28.7 35.4 39.3 42.3
Denmark 40.4 43.4 51.2 15.8 30.9 35.7 38.4 40.5
Finland 40.4 45.4 51.2 26.7 38.5 37.4 39.3 42.5
France 37.8 47.9 50.5 30.1 39.2 37.8 39.9 43.0
Germany 45.9 51.3 55.8 29.1 32.5 38.7 43.0 45.9
Greece 34.3 34.7 40.2 34.3 35.1 34.9 34.8 35.3
Hungary 42.0 46.3 54.8 17.7 30.2 32.1 34.9 44.2
Iceland 19.4 25.8 31.0 6.4 1.9 12.3 19.0 19.4
Ireland 16.6 24.5 34.4 13.3 9.0 13.5 16.9 19.1
Italy 42.7 46.0 49.9 25.4 34.0 39.3 41.8 42.9
Japan 23.2 24.2 27.1 20.4 20.3 21.8 22.6 23.3
Korea, Rep. of 14.8 16.0 20.3 14.4 15.4 15.0 15.3 15.3
Luxembourg 27.3 31.5 39.0 1.3 9.0 12.8 15.4 25.9
Mexico 11.4 16.1 22.4 11.4 16.1 13.4 14.2 13.4
Netherlands 37.2 35.6 40.4 18.2 25.2 29.1 32.6 33.6
New Zealand 18.8 20.0 25.7 1.6 18.2 19.2 19.5 19.2
Norway 33.8 36.9 43.5 14.0 27.2 29.2 31.4 34.5
Poland 41.4 42.7 43.8 36.5 37.7 41.4 42.2 41.4
Portugal 29.5 32.5 38.0 18.9 23.4 24.6 27.1 30.2
Slovak Rep. 40.3 41.4 44.7 23.8 29.6 34.1 35.9 40.5
Spain 33.9 38.2 41.9 28.3 31.4 34.5 34.7 35.7
Sweden 45.9 47.6 52.0 35.3 40.5 41.3 42.7 46.6
Switzerland 27.0 29.6 33.8 12.6 18.1 20.5 23.6 27.3
Turkey 41.3 42.4 44.3 41.3 42.4 41.7 41.9 41.7
United Kingdom 24.7 29.7 32.9 10.8 18.2 18.0 22.4 24.7
United States 27.3 29.6 35.2 5.0 17.6 22.7 25.0 27.8
a. Percentage of the wage rate for an average production worker.
b. Two-earner family.
Source: OECD 2002.
market flexibility must be studied within a larger
framework that encompasses all institutions inter-
acting with each other.
Turkey and EU Labor 
Market Policies
Turkey must fulfill the accession criteria and adopt
the regulatory framework required for EU member-
ship. This process will lead to a rather dramatic
transformation in the Turkish labor market through
two channels. First, the membership process implies
economic integration with the EU, and competition
in all markets will be intensified. Indeed, Turkey
should ensure “the existence of a functioning mar-
ket economy as well as the capacity to cope with
competitive pressure and market forces within the
Union” to satisfy the economic criteria for member-
ship—that is, the so-called Copenhagen criteria.
Second,Turkey is required to apply fully the acquis of
the EU in force,7 including all rules and regulations
in the field of employment and social policy that
form Chapter 13 in accession negotiations.
Turkey has had a customs union with the EU
since 1996. Therefore, the impact of the process of
membership on the labor market through changes
in product markets could be expected to be limited.
The adoption of the acquis would have a direct
impact on the labor market, because it requires a
new institutional setup and a new way of forming
policy. In this section, we compare the labor law in
Turkey with the EU directives and assess the effects
of adopting the acquis. We focus on the labor law
and issues related to labor market flexibility.8 We
also briefly analyze how employment policies are
formed in the EU (the European Employment
Strategy) and how the candidate countries are
expected to adjust employment policies and coor-
dinate them with the EU during the membership
process.9
The EU Law
The EU law is composed of three different types of
legislation: primary legislation, secondary legisla-
tion, and case law. These types of legislation com-
pose the acquis communautaire.10
Primary Legislation Primary legislation includes
the treaties establishing the European Union and
other agreements having similar status. The treaties
have been revised several times (for all treaties,
see the EU Web site, http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/
lex/en/treaties/index.htm). The Treaty of Amster-
dam, which was signed by the heads of state or gov-
ernment of the member states on October 2, 1997,
and entered into force on May 1, 1999, promoted a
series of social policy priorities at European Com-
munity level, especially in the area of employment.
The change in emphasis on employment is
reflected in the fact that the employment articles
are included in the treaty as a title (like the mone-
tary and economic articles), not as a mere chapter.
The employment title (Title VIII of the treaty) lays
down the principles and procedures for developing
a coordinated strategy for employment. Article 125
sets the basic objectives as follows:
Article 125: Member States and the Community
shall, in accordance with this title, work towards
developing a coordinated strategy for employ-
ment and particularly for promoting a skilled,
trained and adaptable workforce and labour
markets responsive to economic change with a
view to achieving the objectives defined in Arti-
cle 2 of the Treaty on European Union and in
Article 2 of this Treaty.
The treaty maintains the commitment to
achieving a high level of employment as one of the
key objectives of the EU, and it calls attention to
promoting “a skilled, trained and adaptable work-
force and labour markets responsive to economic
change.” This objective is an issue of “common con-
cern” for all member states.
The Treaty of Amsterdam, like earlier treaties,
leaves the implementation of employment policy to
the member states, but it obliges member states and
the Community to work toward developing a
“coordinated strategy for employment,” because
the labor market policies of a member state will
have a direct impact on other member states as
well. Article 128 sets out the specific steps leading
to the formulation of such a strategy, including, on
an annual basis, guidelines for employment, possi-
ble recommendations to the member states, and a
joint report by the Council of the European Union
and the Commission to the European Council
that describes the employment situation in the
European Community and the implementation of
the guidelines. Each member state is to provide the
Council of the European Union and the Commis-
sion with an annual report on the principal meas-
ures taken to implement its employment policy in
light of the guidelines for employment.
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Finally, the treaty provides a legal base for the
analysis, research, exchange of best practices, and
promotion of incentive measures for employment
(Article 129), and it establishes permanent, consti-
tutionally based institutional structures (Article
130, Employment Committee) that will help to
develop employment policies.
Secondary Legislation The EU secondary legisla-
tion is based on the treaties and takes the following
forms:
• Regulations, which are directly applicable and
binding in all member states without the need
for any national implementing legislation.
• Directives, which bind member states as to the
objectives to be achieved within a certain time
limit while leaving to the national authorities the
choice of form and means to be used. Directives
have to be implemented in national legislation
in accordance with the procedures of the indi-
vidual member states.
• Decisions, which are binding in all their aspects
for those to whom they are addressed. Thus,
decisions do not require national implementing
legislation. A decision may be addressed to any
or all member states, to enterprises, or to
individuals.
• Recommendations and opinions, which have no
binding force. The Commission can make a rec-
ommendation for a party to behave in a particu-
lar way without any legal obligation, or it can
deliver an opinion to assess a given situation or
development in the Community or individual
member states.
The EU secondary legislation on employment is
mainly regulated through European Council direc-
tives, which bind member states to the objectives to
be achieved within a certain time limit but leave
them the choice of form and means to be used. In
other words, the directives are implemented in
national legislation in accordance with the proce-
dures of the individual member states. Most of
the employment directives can be implemented
through collective agreements, provided such
agreements apply to all workers that the directive
intends to cover or to protect.
The secondary legislation, like the treaty itself,
directly confers certain individual rights on the cit-
izens of member states under the protection of the
judicial system. Moreover,
[u]nder article 226 EC (ex article 169 EC) the
European Commission or a Member State may
bring a complaint, alleging the failure by a
Member State to fulfil an obligation under the
Treaty, before the European Court of Justice
(ECJ or the Court). Grounds for a complaint
may be, for example, the lack of transposition of
a binding Directive, or the non repeal of a
national rule that is not consistent with the
Treaty or a Directive. If the Court finds that the
obligation has not been fulfilled, the Member
State concerned must comply without delay. If,
after new proceedings are initiated by the Com-
mission, the Court finds that the Member State
concerned has not complied with its judgment,
it may impose a fixed or a periodic penalty.
(Bronstein 2003)11
Case Law Case law includes judgments of the
European Court of Justice and of the European
Court of First Instance, for example, in response to
referrals from the Commission, national courts of
the member states, or individuals. In this study,
we do not cover the case law on employment
regulations.
Council Directives on Employment and 
the Turkish Labor Law
Turkey has begun to change its laws and regulations
in accordance with the acquis. In this section, we
compare the European Council directives on
employment with the Turkish labor laws, both the
new Labor Law No. 4857 enacted by the Turkish
Parliament on May 22, 2003, and the former Labor
Law No. 1475 that regulated the labor market for
decades. We compare both the former and new
labor laws because the new law has been in force for
a few months and the agents in the labor market are
in the process of adapting to the new circum-
stances. This comparison will also make it possible
to show how far the new law goes in adopting the
acquis. As mentioned earlier, we focus only on
employment directives and not on directives on
other labor-related issues such as discrimination,
free mobility of workers, and health and safety reg-
ulations (for a comprehensive study of all directives
as of 2001, see Hermans 2001). Table 9.3 compares
the EU directives,12 the existing labor law, and the
former labor law.13 It summarizes the main issues
and regulations addressed in each directive.
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TABLE 9.3 EU Directives and Turkish Labor Law
Directive Date of Issue Former Labor Law No. 1475 New Labor Law No. 4857
(Entry into Force) Issues/Regulations (Relevant Articles) (Relevant Articles)
93/104 Organization of • Normal weekly work •  •  (45 hours)
working time • Maximum week time •  • 
November 23, 1993 • Minimum period of daily rest •  • 
(November 23, 1996) • Minimum period of weekly rest •  • 
• Minimum period of annual leave •  • 
• Shift work •  • 
• Night work (information/health) •  (excl. men) • 
• Patterns of work •  • 
(Articles 41, 43, 49, 61–65, 73) (Articles 41, 46, 53–70)
99/70 Framework agreement • Definition of fixed-term work No specific clause on • 
on fixed-term work • Definition of “comparable fixed-term work • ?
(UNICE/CEEP/ETUC) permanent worker”
June 28, 1999 • Abuse arising from the use of • ? (no limit)
(July 10, 1999) successive fixed-term contracts
• Rights of fixed-term workers • 
• Information/training • ? / −
(Article 8 defines only temporary (Articles 11–12)
and permanent work)
97/81 Framework agreement • Definition of fixed-time work No specific clause on • 
on part-time work • Definition of “comparable part-time work • ?
(UNICE/CEEP/ETUC) full-time worker”
December 15, 1997 • No shift from full-time to part-time • 
(January 20, 2000) work without consent
• Rights of part-time workers • 
• Information/training • ? / −
(Article 8 defines only temporary (Article 13)
and permanent work)
98/59 Collective redundancies • Definition of collective redundancy • / (changed by Law No. 4773) • 
July 20, 1998 • Information and consultation • / (changed by Law No. 4773) •  (excl. A 2.3.b.v and vi)
(September 1, 1998) • Procedure • / (changed by Law No. 4773) • 
(Article 24) (Article 29)
2
3
3
2001/23 Employees’ rights in • Employees’ rights •  • 
the event of transfers • Employers’ liabilities •  • 
March 12, 2001 • Information and consultation (Articles 14, 53; • 
(April 12, 2001) Law No. 2822, Article 8) (Article 6)
80/987 Protection of employees • Claims No specific clause (Law No. 2004 • 
in the event of insolvency • Guarantees (guarantee on bankruptcy, Article 206; • 
(Amended by 2002/74) institution) workers’ claims have priority in
Oct. 20, 1980/Sept. 23, 2002 • Coverage the event of insolvency) • 
(Oct. 28, 1983/Oct. 8, 2002) (Article 33)
94/33 Protection of young • Definition of “young” •  • 
people at work • Employers’ obligations •  • 
June 22, 1994 • Restrictions •  • (to be regulated by
(June 22, 1996) (Article 67; also regulated by the MESS) 
law on apprenticeship and (Articles 71–73, 85, 87)
vocational training, No. 3308)
91/533 Information for • Information content • ? • ?
employees • Time limits •  • 
October 14, 1991 • Enforcement •  • 
(June 30, 1993) (Articles 9 and 11) (Article 8)
2002/14 Consultation and • Information content •  • 
employee representation • Coverage •  • 
March 11, 2002 • Procedures/enforcement •  • 
(March 23, 2005/2007)
Note: A positive mark (+) for a labor law indicates that it is in conformity with the directive. A negative sign (−) indicates either that the law does not satisfy the
requirements set by the directive or that the issue is not addressed in the law. A question mark (?) indicates that the issue is not addressed in a well-defined way or
that there are some differences between the law and the directive. The third and fourth columns refer to relevant articles of the new labor law. UNICE = Union of 
Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of Europe; CEEP = European Centre of Enterprises with Public Participation; ETUC = European Trade Union Confederation;
MESS = Ministry of Employment and Social Security.
Source: The authors.
Turkey, like the member states, can comply with
the directives either by adopting the laws, regula-
tions, and administrative provisions, or by introduc-
ing the required provisions through an agreement
between the employers’ and workers’ representa-
tives. For example, some directives have been intro-
duced in some member states through collective
agreements. However, Turkish lawmakers seem to
prefer to cover almost all provisions of the directives
in the new labor law. Therefore, the lack of regula-
tions in the labor law may require further legislative
work.14
Council Directive 93/104 on certain aspects of
the organization of working time is one of the main
directives regulating working conditions. The
directive lays down minimum safety and health
requirements for the organization of working time;
it applies to minimum periods of daily rest, weekly
rest, and annual leave; to breaks and maximum
weekly working time; and to certain aspects of
night work, shift work, and patterns of work. The
directive brings flexibility to working time by set-
ting the minimum requirements for the “average
working time” for a reference period not exceeding
four months. Labor Law No. 1475 does not comply
with the directive for the maximum average work
week (48 hours). Although the proposal for the new
law prepared by the Scientific Committee intro-
duced the maximum limit to the average work
week, Parliament failed to adopt the provisions and
did not set any explicit limit for the weekly working
time. This is surprising because the new law was
promoted by its proponents as introducing flexible
working arrangements, including part-time work.
The new law also failed to meet the requirement of
the directive on annual leave. Although the direc-
tive states that “every worker is entitled to paid
annual leave of at least four weeks,” the new law sets
shorter periods on the basis of a worker’s tenure (if
a worker is employed 1–5 years, annual leave is only
14 days; 6–14 years, 20 days; and more than 14
years, 26 days). The former labor law had a similar
scheme, but two days shorter leave for all cate-
gories. Both the new and former labor laws also fail
to take the measures necessary “to ensure that an
employer who intends to organize work according
to a certain pattern takes account of the general
principle of adapting work to worker, with a view,
in particular, to alleviating monotonous work and
work at a predetermined work-rate, depending on
the type of activity, and of safety and health
requirements, especially as regards breaks during
working time” (Article 13 of Directive 93/104).
Directive 97/81 on part-time work and Directive
99/70 on fixed-term work have adopted the frame-
work agreements on part-time and fixed-term
work, respectively, between the general cross-
country organizations UNICE (Union of Industrial
and Employers’ Confederations of Europe), CEEP
(European Centre of Enterprises with Public Par-
ticipation), and ETUC (European Trade Union
Confederation). The social partners (UNICE,
CEEP, and ETUC) recognize that “contracts of an
indefinite duration are, and will continue to be, the
general form of employment relationship between
employers and workers,” but follow the conclusions
of the Essen European Council on the need to
take measures with a view toward “increasing the
employment-intensiveness of growth, in particular
by a more flexible organization of work in a way
which fulfills both the wishes of employees and the
requirements of competition.” Thus, the main aim
of these directives is to facilitate the development of
part-time and fixed-term work on a voluntary basis
and to contribute to the flexible organization of
working time by providing measures for the removal
of discrimination against part-time and fixed-term
workers and by improving the quality of part-time
and fixed-term work. These directives require that,
in relation to employment conditions, part-time
and fixed-term workers not be treated in a less
favorable manner than comparable full-time and
permanent workers. The former labor law did not
specifically define part-time and fixed-term con-
tracts. Although the new law complies with the
directives to a large extent, it does not include the
reference to the “applicable collective agreement” in
the definition of “comparable worker.”15 The direc-
tive on fixed-term work explicitly calls for the pre-
vention of abuse arising from the “use of successive
fixed-term employment contracts or relationships.”
The new law, however, does not impose any restric-
tion on the cumulative duration or the number of
successive contracts, but allows successive fixed-
term contracts if there is a “sound reason” (esaslı
neden) to do so.
Directive 98/59, which deals with the approxi-
mation of the laws of the member states related to
collective redundancies, introduced the procedures
an employer should follow in contemplating
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collective redundancies. The former labor law had
not envisaged any formal procedure for collective
redundancies. However, the law on employment
protection (No. 4773), adopted by Parliament on
August 15, 2002, and effective as of March 15, 2003,
after a lengthy political struggle, replaced Article 24
in compliance with the directive. Law No. 4773 has
been repealed by the new labor law, which endorses
the same procedure for collective redundancies
(Article 29).
Directive 2001/23 (which repealed Directive
77/187) and its amending directive (98/50) are
related to the protection of workers’ rights in the
event of transfers of undertakings, businesses, or
parts of undertakings or businesses. Directive 80/987
(which was amended by Directive 2002/74) regu-
lates the protection of employees in the event of the
insolvency of their employers. The directive on
transfers stipulates that the “transferor’s rights and
obligations arising from a contract of employment
or from an employment relationship existing on
the date of transfer shall, by reason of such transfer,
be transferred to the transferee,” and the transferor
and the transferee shall be jointly and individually
liable with respect to obligations, including collec-
tive agreements, that arose before the date of trans-
fer from a contract of employment or from an
employment relationship existing on the date of
transfer (Article 3). Moreover, both the transferor
and the transferee shall be required to inform rep-
resentatives of their respective employees affected
by the transfer. The labor law and the law on collec-
tive bargaining agreements (Law No. 2822) have
provided similar safeguards to protect employees’
rights. The new labor law complies with most of the
provisions of the directive, with the exception of
those on “information and consultation” with
employees (the third chapter).
Directives 80/987 and 2002/74 set rules to protect
employees’ claims arising from contracts of
employment or employment relationships in the
event of their employer’s insolvency. The directive
states explicitly that the member states may not
exclude from its scope part-time employees, work-
ers with fixed-term contracts, and workers with a
temporary employment relationship. Member
states “shall take the necessary measures to ensure
that guarantee institutions guarantee . . . payment
of employees’ outstanding claims, resulting
from contracts of employment or employment
relationships, including, provided for by the
national law, severance pay on termination of
employment relationships” (Article 3). The former
labor law did not specifically address the issue of
employees’ rights in the case of insolvency. How-
ever, the law on bankruptcy (No. 2004) assigns pri-
ority to workers’ outstanding claims. The new law
calls for the creation of a Wage Guarantee Fund as a
part of the Unemployment Insurance Fund to pro-
tect employees’ claims, excluding severance pay.16
Directive 94/33 provides the measures necessary
to prohibit work by children (any person under
15 years of age or who is still subject to compulsory
full-time schooling under national law) and the
minimum working conditions for young people
(any person under 18 years of age). The labor law
prohibits employment of any person under 13 years
of age and restricts employment of people under
15. The law on apprenticeship and vocational train-
ing (No. 3308) also regulates the employment of
children and young people. The new law satisfies
most of the provisions set by the directive, and
refers to the Ministry of Employment and Social
Security (MESS) for regulation of the employment
conditions for young people.
Directive 91/533 states that employers have an
obligation to provide an employee with informa-
tion in the form of a written document on the
essential aspects of the contract or employment
relationship not later than two months after the
commencement of employment. The former labor
law had a similar clause but did not specify the time
limit in which the information has to be provided
to the employee. The new law, in accordance with
the directive, mentions that the document has to be
handed over to the employee within two months if
there is no employment contract signed by the
employee and employer. Although the directive
requires that any change in the conditions referred
to in the written document “must be the subject of
a written document to be given by the employer to
the employee at the earliest opportunity and not
later than one month after the date of entry into
effect of the change in question,” the new law does
not enforce this requirement.
Directive 2002/14, published in the EU’s Official
Journal on March 23, 2002, establishes a general
framework for informing and consulting employees
in the European Community. The directive requires
all undertakings employing at least 50 employees,
Labor Market Policies and EU Accession: Problems and Prospects for Turkey 235
or all establishments employing at least 20 employ-
ees in any one member state, to adopt practical
arrangements for exercising the right to informa-
tion and consultation at the appropriate level.
Information and consultation shall cover:
(a) information on the recent and probable devel-
opment of the undertaking’s or the establish-
ment’s activities and economic situation;
(b) information and consultation on the situation,
structure and probable development of
employment within the undertaking or estab-
lishment and on any anticipatory measures
envisaged, in particular where there is a threat
of employment;
(c) information and consultation on decisions
likely to lead to substantial changes in work
organization or in contractual relations.
Information shall be provided by the employer
“at such time, in such fashion and with such con-
tent as are appropriate to enable, in particular,
employees’ representatives to conduct and ade-
quately study and, where necessary, prepare for
consultation.” A related directive (Directive 94/45)
on the establishment of a European Works Council
sets the rules and procedures to improve the right to
information and to consultation of employees
specifically in Community-scale undertakings and
Community-scale groups of undertakings. The new
labor law does not provide any provisions to estab-
lish the framework for informing and consulting
employees within the context of these directives.
There are also directives on parental leave
(96/34),17 health and safety conditions (89/391 and
91/383), and working conditions in specific sectors
(93/104, 99/63, 2000/34, 2000/79, and others). The
Turkish labor law is in compliance with most of the
provisions of these directives.
European Employment Strategy
The European Council Summits The treaties
establishing the European Community have
assigned the responsibility for employment and
social protection exclusively to the member states.
The role of the European Commission was to pro-
mote cooperation between the member states at the
EU level. In the early 1990s, persistent European-
wide unemployment and structural problems in
the labor markets, together with the increased inte-
gration of national economies, led to a process of
seeking European solutions through closer cooper-
ation and convergence of structural policies,
including the employment and social protection
policies.
The issuance of the EU’s famous “Delors’ White
Book” on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment
in 1993 set the scene for the development of coor-
dinated employment policies at the EU level.
Inspired by the White Book, the European Council
in Essen in 1994 agreed on five objectives18 and for-
mulated the Essen Strategy, which was reinforced
by successive Council conclusions and resolutions.
A permanent Employment and Labour Market
Committee was created in 1996. The Essen Strategy
declared a political commitment to the issue of
employment, but the strategy itself and its imple-
mentation were based on nonbinding conclusions
of the European Councils. The Treaty of Amsterdam
(signed in 1997 and entered into force in 1999) and
the new Title on Employment provided the neces-
sary legal framework for implementing a coordi-
nated employment policy.
The European Council in Luxembourg (November
1997), which is now known as the Luxembourg Jobs
Summit, launched the European Employment
Strategy on the basis of the new provisions of
the employment title of the Treaty of Amsterdam
before it entered into force. The following European
Councils have provided additional orientations and
targets for the EES and reinforced its links with
other EU policies.
The European Council in Lisbon (March 2000)
set a new strategic goal for the EU for the next
decade (“to become the most competitive and
dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world,
capable of sustainable economic growth with more
and better jobs and greater social cohesion”) and
integrated the EES into a wider framework of pol-
icy coordination to achieve this strategic goal. The
European Council agreed on the objective of
achieving an employment rate as close as possible
to 70 percent overall, and exceeding 60 percent for
women, on average in the EU by 2010. After the
midterm review of the first three years of imple-
mentation, the Council proposed strengthening the
EES.
The European Council in Nice (December
2000) introduced the issue of quality as the guid-
ing thread of the Social Policy Agenda, and in
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particular quality in work as an important objec-
tive of the EES.
Confirming the commitment of the EU and its
member states to the goal of full employment, the
European Council in Stockholm (March 2001)
added two intermediate and one additional target:
the employment rate should be raised to 67 percent
overall by 2005, to 57 percent for women by 2005,
and to 50 percent for older workers (aged 55–64) by
2010.
The Barcelona European Council (March 2002)
underlined that the full employment goal in the
EU is at the core of the Lisbon strategy and consti-
tutes an essential goal of economic and social poli-
cies. It called for a reinforced EES to underpin the
Lisbon strategy in an enlarged EU. After the 2002
evaluation, the Barcelona Council also urged the
Council and the Commission to streamline the
various policy coordination processes at the EU
level.
The Brussels European Council (March 2003)
reiterated that the EES has the leading role in the
implementation of the employment and labor mar-
ket objectives of the Lisbon strategy, and that it and
the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPG)
should operate in a consistent way. The European
Council called for the guidelines to be limited in
number and for them to be results-oriented in
order to allow member states to design the appro-
priate mix of action.
The 2002 Evaluation of the European Employ-
ment Strategy The EES, from its inception in
1997 to its evaluation in 2002, was based on four
“pillars” (employability, entrepreneurship, adapt-
ability, and equal opportunities) together with hor-
izontal objectives. In its fifth year, an extensive eval-
uation was conducted to give an overview of the
objectives of the EES and to strengthen the policy
formulation and implementation processes. The
study (European Commission 2002d) noted:
The comprehensive approach of the EES gener-
ally strengthened national employment policy
coherence and framework. Policies under each
pillar were progressively adjusted and employ-
ment priorities were mainstreamed into other
policy areas like taxation and social security. In
addition, the Strategy has brought about a grad-
ual change in priority from managing unem-
ployment to managing employment growth,
and has become gradually embedded in national
policy formulation.
Beyond the clear convergence towards the
active labour market principles of the EES in the
earlier years of the strategy, the evaluation shows
that other policies were also significantly influ-
enced by the EES (notably gender equality and
social inclusion policies). . . . Over the years, the
EES has added momentum to longer term struc-
tural reforms in labour markets, not least
through the use of recommendations, addressed
to individual Member States, adopted by the
Council on a proposal from the Commission.
The EES also fostered political agreement on
new common paradigms, such as lifelong learn-
ing and quality in work. The need for lifelong
learning, and the complementarity between
education and training systems, has become
generally accepted, and Member States are all in
the process of re-designing their education and
training policies in a more integrated way. Qual-
ity in work appeared as a new priority in the
Employment Guidelines for 2000.
Streamlining Policy Processes After the Barcelona
Council, the Commission adopted its communica-
tion on streamlining the annual economic and
employment policy coordination cycles (European
Commission 2002a and 2003a). The main idea is to
reorganize existing EU coordination processes
around a few key points to make the coordination
cycle more transparent and intelligible and to
strengthen its visibility and impact. In line with the
overall Lisbon strategy, this process is expected to
reinforce the focus on the medium term and to
improve policy coherence.Within the new approach,
the BEPGs are expected to provide the overarching
economic policy coordination, and the leading role
on employment policy coordination will lie with the
Employment Guidelines (EGs) and Recommenda-
tions to Member States.
The main building blocks of a better and more
clearly articulated policy coordination cycle can be
briefly described as follows (European Commission
2003c and 2003d):
(i) Preparation of the Spring European Council.
The Commission would, in its Spring Report,
highlight the main areas where further
progress has to be made and the key policy ori-
entations on which general guidance is
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required from the Spring European Council.
The Spring Report would be complemented
and presented together with the Implementa-
tion Package (including the Implementation
Report on the BEPGs, the draft Joint Employ-
ment Report, and the implementation report
on the Internal Market Strategy). The Com-
mission’s various reports and scoreboards
(including inter alia the Cardiff Report; the
state aids, innovation, and enterprise policy
scoreboards) will feed into the Implementa-
tion Package and the Spring Report. This
Commission input would assist different
Council formations, as well as any other appro-
priate actor, in reviewing implementation in
their specific policy areas.
(ii) The Spring European Council. The Spring
European Council is a defining moment in the
annual policy coordination cycle. It reviews
implementation and, on that basis, gives gen-
eral political orientations on the main policy
priorities.
(iii) Commission proposals for new guidelines and
recommendations. On the basis of the Spring
European Council political orientations, the
Commission would present its proposals for
further action in the various policy areas
together in a Guidelines Package (which would
include the Commission drafts for general and
country-specific policy recommendations as
contained in the BEPGs, the EGs, and the
annual employment recommendations to
member states). This Package, the first of
which would be issued in April 2003, would, in
principle, cover a three-year period, i.e., up to
2006. The guidelines would continue to be
issued every year to take account of possible
major new developments, but should other-
wise remain stable until 2006, unless circum-
stances require otherwise. Consistent with the
recommendations of the BEPGs and the out-
come and conclusions of the Cardiff process,
the Internal Market Strategy—which will
accompany the Guidelines Package—would
deal with internal market matters at a Commu-
nity level up to 2006, and would be adjusted in
the intervening years only if necessary.
(iv) Adoption of new guidelines and recommenda-
tions. After, where appropriate, further prepa-
ration by the competent Council formations
ahead of the June European Council and fol-
lowing the latter’s consideration, the relevant
Council formations would adopt the BEPGs,
the EGs and the Employment Recommenda-
tions to member states and/or endorse action
plans (e.g., the Internal Market Strategy) in
their competence areas.
(v) Concentration of implementation review in
Quarter 4. A better streamlined review of
implementation requires:
• Systematic information provision by mem-
ber states on the implementation of policies
agreed on at European level. In this context,
there may be scope for rationalizing and
streamlining current national reporting
requirements. Fewer and more comprehen-
sive reports, allowing also for coverage of
information on newly identified issues
(thus avoiding the need to add new reports
and procedures), might help in clarifying
and ensuring the coherence of member
states’ responses to policy recommenda-
tions issued by the Community; these
reports should ideally be presented together
in October at the latest. The National
Employment Plans would be sent as a sepa-
rate document around the same time.
• An implementation assessment by the
Commission. On the basis of the available
information (through reports, through
bilateral contacts, and through the results of
various benchmarking exercises), the Com-
mission services would assess implementa-
tion in the various relevant policy areas.
The Commission will present the findings
of its review in the form of a new Implementa-
tion Package together with the Commission’s
Spring Report in mid-January, marking the
start of a new cycle.
The 10 Commandments, Targets, and Indicators
The European Council has identified and con-
firmed three objectives for the EES:
1. Full employment. Employment rate overall,
67 percent in 2005 and 70 percent in 2010 on
average; for women, 57 percent in 2005 and 60
percent in 2010; for older workers, 50 percent in
2010.
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2. Quality and productivity at work. Satisfaction
with pay and working conditions, health and
safety at the workplace, the availability of flexi-
ble work organization, working time arrange-
ments, and balance between flexibility and secu-
rity. Full attention is given to increasing
productivity, in particular through continued
investment in human capital, technology, and
work organization.
3. Cohesion and an inclusive labor market. The
reduction of unemployment and of the remain-
ing disparities in access to the labor market,
both in socioeconomic and regional terms, is a
matter of both the equity and efficiency of the
EES.
To support these three objectives, the Commis-
sion has identified 10 priorities (10 command-
ments) for action in the new guidelines:
1. Help unemployed and inactive to find a job,
prevent long-term unemployment
2. Encourage entrepreneurship and improve cli-
mate for business start-ups
3. Promote adaptability of workers and firms to
change
4. Provide more and better investment in human
capital
5. Increase labor supply and promote active aging
6. Promote gender equality in employment
and pay
7. Combat discrimination against disadvantaged
groups
8. Improve financial incentives to make work pay
9. Reduce undeclared work substantially
10. Promote occupational and geographic
mobility.
The Commission has also defined specific tar-
gets that could be used as a part of an assessment of
progress on implementing the guidelines:
• Personalized job search plan for all unemployed
before fourth month of unemployment by 2005
• Work experience or training for all unemployed
before 12th month of unemployment (before six
months for young and vulnerable) by 2005
• Thirty percent of long-term unemployed in
work experience or training by 2010
• Reduction of 15 percent in rate of accidents at
work and a reduction of 25 percent for high-risk
sectors by 2010
• Eighty percent of persons aged 25–64 to have at
least upper secondary education by 2010
• Increased rate of participation of adults in edu-
cation and training, to 15 percent on average in
the EU and to at least 10 percent in every mem-
ber state by 2010
• Increased investment by companies in training
of adults from the existing level of the equivalent
of 2.3 percent of labor costs up to 5 percent of
labor costs on average in the EU by 2010
• An increase in the effective average exit age from
the labor market from 60 to 65 years on average
in the EU by 2010
• Elimination of gender gaps in employment and
halving of gender pay gaps in each member state
by 2010
• Child care places available for 33 percent of chil-
dren aged 0–3 and 90 percent of those from 3
years to mandatory school age in each member
state by 2010
• Halving of the school dropout rate in each
member state and reduction of EU average
dropout rate to 10 percent by 2010
• Reduction by half in each member state in the
unemployment gaps for people defined as being
at a disadvantage in accordance with national
definitions by 2010
• Reduction by half in each member state in the
employment gap between non-EU and EU
nationals by 2010
• All job vacancies advertised by national employ-
ment services accessible and able to be consulted
by anyone in the EU by 2005
• National targets to be set for business training,
reduced red tape for start-ups, per capita increase
in public and private investment in human
resources, tax burden on low-paid workers, and
undeclared work.
EU Labor Market Policies and Enlargement In
1999 the European Commission initiated a cooper-
ation process on employment with the candidate
countries. The objective of this process is to
encourage those countries to define employment
policies that prepare them for membership of the
EU and progressively adjust their institutions and
policies. Moreover, the financial support for acces-
sion would be directed toward the employment
policy priorities identified in this cooperation
process (European Commission 2003b).
Labor Market Policies and EU Accession: Problems and Prospects for Turkey 239
It was agreed that as a first step the candidate
countries and the Commission would analyze the
key challenges for employment policies in Joint
Assessment Papers (JAPs). The work was started
with background studies funded by the Commis-
sion in cooperation with the European Training
Foundation. The first JAPs were signed with the
Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland, and Slovenia in
2000 and early 2001, followed by Cyprus, Hungary,
Lithuania, Malta, and Slovakia in late 2001 and
early 2002 and by Bulgaria and Romania in the
fall of 2002. The JAP with Latvia was signed in
February 2003. Cooperation with Turkey is at an
early stage; the background study for the Employ-
ment Policy Review was prepared in early 2003
under the auspices of the Turkish Employment
Organization (I˙S¸KUR)—see Tunalı and others
(2003). This study will form the basis of the JAP to
be drawn up with the European Commission.
The candidate countries and the Commission
agreed to monitor the implementation of the JAP
commitments. After signature of the JAPs, the main
commitments were discussed in a series of techni-
cal seminars between the Commission and repre-
sentatives of different institutions in the candidate
countries. The Göteborg European Council of June
2001 asked candidate countries to translate the EU
economic, social, and environmental objectives
underpinning the Lisbon strategy into their
national policies and announced that the Synthesis
Communication 2003 would include information
about the candidate countries on this subject.
Employment Protection and Labor
Market Flexibility in Turkey
The growing interest in labor market flexibility has
provided an impetus for empirical studies that aim
at measuring the degree of labor market flexibility,
mainly at the national and regional levels.
Researchers have developed two sets of measures.
The first set of measures, pioneered by the OECD’s
influential study on employment protection legisla-
tion, is based on indicators of labor market regula-
tion that summarize the information on the regula-
tory environments. The OECD has constructed a
database of internationally comparable data on
certain economy-wide and industry-specific prod-
uct market and labor market regulations (for
the methodology, the database, and summary
indicators, see Nicoletti, Scarpetta, and Boylaud
2000). Because the OECD database allows
researchers to make international comparisons and
to analyze the impact of labor market regulations
on economic performance in a cross-country set-
ting, it has led to a surge in empirical studies and
estimation of similar indicators for other countries.
For example, Riboud, Sánchez-Páramo, and Silva-
Jáuregui (2002), Cazes and Nesporova (2003), and
Heckman and Pagés (2004) have calculated EPL
indicators for Latin American, Central and Eastern
European (CEE), and transition countries, respec-
tively. In a similar fashion, Betcherman, Luinstra,
and Ogawa (2001) present a detailed analysis of
labor market regulations in 17 countries, including
Turkey. In this section, we will compare the strin-
gency of the EPL in Turkey under the former labor
law (which formed the basis of the OECD indica-
tors) and under the new labor law with that in the
OECD countries.
The second set of measures, which we define as
direct measures, are based on the estimation of var-
ious aspects of labor market flexibility using the
data on labor market variables. In this study, we
use three types of direct measures to assess the
labor market flexibility in Turkey: wage differen-
tials, job turnover, and mode-based indicators
(employment and wage flexibility).
Employment Protection Legislation
The OECD EPL index, calculated by Nicoletti,
Scarpetta, and Boylaud (2000), exploits the raw
data published in the OECD Employment Outlook
1999 (OECD 1999). The data cover two basic ele-
ments of the EPL system—restrictions on dis-
missals of workers with regular contracts, and
restrictions on the use of temporary forms of
employment contracts—and refer to the situation in
most of the OECD countries in the late 1980s as
well as in 1998.
Regulations for regular contracts (permanent
employment) cover detailed indicators on
• Procedural requirements (the process that has to
be followed from the decision to lay off a worker
to the actual termination of the contract)
• Notice and severance pay (for three tenure peri-
ods beyond any trial period)
• Prevailing standards and penalties for “unfair”
dismissals.
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The following elements were considered for reg-
ulations for temporary contracts (fixed-term con-
tracts and contracts under temporary work agen-
cies, TWAs):
• “Objective” reasons under which a fixed-term
(or a TWA) contract could be offered
• The maximum number of successive renewals
• The maximum cumulated duration of the
contract.
Nicoletti, Scarpetta, and Boylaud (2000)
assigned a score of 0–5 to each indicator, depending
on the degree of stringency of employment protec-
tion implied by that indicator, and conducted a fac-
tor analysis to aggregate the detailed indicators of
each domain (regular employment and temporary
employment) into summary indicators of the strin-
gency of regulation by domain. The overall index of
stringency of the EPL (EPL index) was obtained by
simply averaging the two summary indicators for
regular and temporary contracts. The factor analy-
sis was conducted on the 1998 regulatory indicators
for 21 OECD countries for which most informa-
tion was available.
Table 9.4 presents the summary indicators for
25 countries (ranked in descending order by the
stringency of the EPL index) for the late 1990s.
Turkey has a very high overall score (ranked sec-
ond), mainly because of its score from the tempo-
rary employment domain (index value 4.6, the
highest among all countries in the table).
Table 9.5 presents basic indicators—the EPL and
EPL index scores—for regular employment for five
countries: Germany (a leading country case from
the EU, and Turkey’s main trade partner), Spain (a
latecomer in the EU), Poland (a case for candidate
countries), the United States (the extreme case
among the OECD countries), and Turkey. The data
for Turkey are presented in two columns. The first
column refers to the situation prevailing under the
former labor law (No. 1475), and the data were
taken from Nicoletti, Scarpetta, and Boylaud
(2000). The second column refers to the current sit-
uation with the new labor law (No. 4857). The val-
ues of some indicators are based on our assessment.
Table 9.6 presents the same data for temporary
employment.
Table 9.5 reveals that the EPL index scores for
regular employment for Turkey are higher than
those for other countries mainly because of high
severance payments after 4 and 20 years of tenure, a
trial period before the eligibility arises, and unfair
dismissal compensation (20 years of tenure).
Because the new labor law changes these provi-
sions, there is a significant reduction in the EPL
index values for regular employment. The EPL
index scores for temporary employment are higher
than those of the other countries because of the
restrictions on fixed-term contracts and the lack of
legal framework for TWAs. The draft labor law had
special provisions on the TWAs, but these provi-
sions were left out of the law adopted by Parlia-
ment. The new labor law allows, with the written
consent of the worker, temporary transfer between
enterprises belonging to the same holding com-
pany, or between different companies if the worker
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TABLE 9.4 Employment Protection 
Legislation Index: OECD 
Countries, Late 1990s
EPL Index
Regular Temporary
Average Contracts Contracts
Portugal 3.7 4.3 3.2
Turkey 3.6 2.6 4.6
Greece 3.5 2.6 4.5
Italy 3.3 3.0 3.6
Spain 3.2 2.8 3.7
France 3.1 2.5 3.7
Norway 2.9 2.9 2.8
Germany 2.8 3.0 2.5
Japan 2.6 3.0 2.3
Austria 2.4 2.8 2.0
Netherlands 2.4 3.2 1.5
Sweden 2.4 3.0 1.8
Belgium 2.1 1.6 2.6
Finland 2.1 2.3 1.9
Poland 1.9 2.3 1.4
Czech Rep. 1.7 3.0 0.5
Denmark 1.5 1.7 1.2
Hungary 1.4 2.2 0.6
Switzerland 1.3 1.3 1.2
Australia 1.1 0.9 1.2
Ireland 1.0 1.7 0.3
New Zealand 1.0 1.6 0.5
Canada 0.6 0.9 0.3
United Kingdom 0.5 0.7 0.3
United States 0.2 0.1 0.3
Source: Nicoletti, Scarpetta, and Boylaud 2000.
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TABLE 9.5 Employment Protection Legislation for Regular Employment, Selected OECD Countries
United Turkey
Germany Poland Spain States L. 1475 L. 4857
Employment Protection Legislation
Regular procedural inconveniences
Procedures Scale 0–3 2.5 2.0 2.0 0.0 2.0 1.0
Delay to start of notice Days 17.0 13.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Notice and severance pay for no-fault individual 
dismissals by tenure categories
Notice period after
9 months Months 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0
4 years Months 1.0 3.0 1.0 0.0 2.0 2.0
20 years Months 7.0 3.0 1.0 0.0 2.0 2.0
Severance pay after
9 months Months 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0
4 years Months 0.0 0.0 2.6 0.0 4.0 0.0
20 years Months 0.0 0.0 12.0 0.0 20.0 0.0
Difficulty of dismissals
Definition of unfair dismissal Scale 0–3 2.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Trial period before eligibility arises Months 6.0 1.8 2.5 n.a. 2.0 2.0
Unfair dismissal compensation (20 years) Months 24.0 3.0 22.0 n.a. 26.0 6.0
Extent of reinstatement Scale 0–3 1.5 2.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0
2
4
3
Employment Protection Legislation Index Scores
Regular procedural inconveniences
Procedures 5.0 4.0 4.0 0.0 4.0 2.0
Delay to start of notice 2.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Notice and severance pay for no-fault individual 
dismissals by tenure categories
Notice period after
9 months 3.0 3.0 3.0 0.0 3.0 3.0
4 years 2.0 4.0 2.0 0.0 4.0 4.0
20 years 4.0 2.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0
Severance pay after
9 months 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
4 years 0.0 0.0 4.0 0.0 6.0 0.0
20 years 0.0 0.0 4.0 0.0 6.0 0.0
Difficulty of dismissals
Definition of unfair dismissal 4.0 0.0 4.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Trial period before eligibility arises 3.0 5.0 5.0 0.0 5.0 5.0
Unfair dismissal compensation (20 years) 4.0 0.0 4.0 0.0 5.0 1.0
Extent of reinstatement 3.0 4.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0
n.a. Not applicable.
Sources: Nicoletti, Scarpetta, and Boylaud 2000; authors’ assessment for Law No. 4857.
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TABLE 9.6 Employment Protection Legislation for Temporary Employment, Selected OECD Countries
United Turkey
Germany Poland Spain States L. 1475 L. 4857
Employment Protection Legislation
Fixed-term contracts
Valid cases other than the usual objective reasons Scale 0–3 2.5 3.0 1.0 3.0 0.0 2.0
Max. number of successive contracts Number 4.0 2.0 3.0 No limit 1.5 No limit
Max. cumulative duration Months 24.0 No limit 36.0 No limit No limit No limit
Temporary work agencies (TWAs)
Types of work for which TWA employment is legal Scale 0–4 3.0 4.0 2.0 4.0 0.0 4.0
Restrictions on number of renewals Yes/no Yes Yes Yes No limit n.a. n.a.
Max. cumulative duration of temporary work Months 12.0 No limit 36.0 No limit n.a. n.a.
contracts
Employment Protection Legislation Index Scores
Fixed-term contracts
Valid cases other than the usual objective reasons 1.0 0.0 4.0 0.0 6.0 2.0
Max. number of successive contracts 2.0 4.0 3.0 0.0 5.0 0.0
Max. cumulative duration 3.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Temporary work agencies (TWAs)
Types of work for which TWA employment is legal 1.5 0.0 3.0 0.0 6.0 4.0
Restrictions on number of renewals 4.0 4.0 4.0 2.0 n.a. n.a.
Max. cumulative duration of temporary work 4.0 0.0 6.0 0.0 n.a. n.a.
contracts
n.a. Not applicable.
Sources: Nicoletti, Scarpetta, and Boylaud 2000; authors’ assessment for Law No. 4857.
is employed in a similar position, up to 12 months
in total. For fixed-term contracts, the law does not
impose any restriction on the maximum cumula-
tive duration or renewal. Thus the new law provides
flexibility, under the OECD definition, for tempo-
rary employment.
Figure 9.1 shows the EPL index for the same
group of countries and the contribution of each
main category (factors) on the EPL index. As evi-
dent in the figure, the changes introduced by the
new labor law (No. 4857) have dramatically
reduced the EPL index for Turkey, mainly by mak-
ing temporary employment easier. The index value
would be much smaller had the new law provided
the legal basis for TWAs.
Although the EPL measures are used extensively
in empirical studies, they have four known short-
comings. First, there are significant measurement
problems. As Addison and Teixeira (2001) men-
tion, measuring the stringency of employment
protection merely from the legal texts may not be a
good indicator of the monetary costs to employers,
because the costs to employers depend on various
other factors, such as voluntary turnover and the
occupational and tenure distributions of the labor
force that define the entitlements for severance pay.
Second, the coverage of the law and regulations is
very important. The OECD EPL index almost com-
pletely ignores the coverage issue. The EPL index is
a simple average of the indexes for regular and tem-
porary employment, although temporary employ-
ment accounts for only 20 percent of wage earners
in Turkey. Moreover, the employment protection
provisions of the new law do not cover establish-
ments employing fewer than 30 workers, leaving
more than 40 percent of workers registered at the
Social Insurance Institution (Sosyal Sigortalar
Kurumu, SSK) without protection (Household
Labour Force Survey 2000 data). The law also
excludes certain sectors and activities.
Third, enforcement and implementation of the
law are a major issue in countries such as Turkey. As
Bertola, Boeri, and Cazes (1999) discuss in detail,
the EPL is enforced to different degrees, and a sim-
ple ranking of countries on the basis of legal provi-
sions may lead to misleading results.
Finally, the existing EPL measures do not reflect
the links and interactions between the EPL and
other labor market institutions, such as unemploy-
ment benefit schemes, wage-setting institutions,
early retirement, and pensions. Some of these insti-
tutions could be substitutes, some others comple-
mentary. According to Bertola, Boeri, and Cazes
(2000, p. 13),
Protection against job loss is all the more desir-
able when only scant unemployment insurance
is available, and unemployment insurance is
highly appreciated when weak job security pro-
visions increase the risk of job loss. Indeed, in
some countries job security—especially case law
favourable to employees—does appear to be
inversely correlated to the coverage and level of
unemployment insurance (suggesting a trade-
off between the strictness of EPL and the unem-
ployment benefit system, as in Denmark, Italy or
Spain, for example) or other adjustment tools
such as early retirement provisions.
Blanchard (2002) observes that there is an
inverse relation between the degree of employment
protection and the generosity of the state unem-
ployment insurance system in continental Europe.
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He explains this inverse relationship by suggesting
that these institutions are two different ways of
addressing the same failures, each one more appro-
priate to the circumstances of the country. This is
exactly the case in Turkey. Unemployment insur-
ance legislation was enacted in 1999 (Law No. 4447),
and it began to provide unemployment benefits for
those eligible in 2002. Therefore, severance pay was
considered as a kind of protection and insurance
against unemployment in the implementation of
the former labor law, and it proved to be easier to
change the provisions on severance pay in the new
labor law after introducing the unemployment
insurance system in the country.
There is almost a consensus on the impact of
the EPL on flows from and into unemployment
(Jackman, Layard, and Nickell 1996; Blanchard
2000). On the one hand, stricter EPL decreases
hiring, which, in turn, makes it difficult for the
unemployed to find a new job and thus increases
long-term unemployment. On the other hand,
stricter EPL also decreases firing and decreases
(short-term) unemployment. The net effect on
unemployment is ambiguous.
Blanchard (2000) discovers a negative correla-
tion between flow into unemployment and the
OECD EPL ranking (figure 9.2) and a positive cor-
relation between unemployment duration and the
EPL (figure 9.3), but no correlation at all between
the unemployment rate and the EPL (figure 9.4), as
predicted by the theory. The Turkish data,19 not
included in Blanchard’s study, are also plotted in
figures 9.2–9.4. Turkey is an apparent outlier in fig-
ure 9.2, and in figure 9.3 to a lesser extent. In other
words, the data on flow into unemployment sug-
gest less strict employment protection than is
implied by the OECD index. This discrepancy
could be regarded as confirmation of the caveats
about relying on the EPL as an indicator of flexibil-
ity for a country such as Turkey.
Direct Measures of Labor Market Flexibility
Rigidities in labor markets are expected to change
the behavior of economic agents and labor market
outcomes. In this study, we use three measures
that could reflect the extent of labor market
rigidities. Because of the lack of internationally
comparable data, we focus on the manufacturing
industries.20
Wage differentials tend to be lower in countries
with rigid labor markets, because various labor
market institutions, especially labor unions and
minimum wage legislation, usually aim at wage
compression across sectors and different categories
of workers.
Figure 9.5a depicts the data on the evolution of
interindustry wage differentials21 for a selected
group of countries for the period 1980–2000.
Throughout the period, Turkey had much wider
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interindustry wage differentials than the United
States (the benchmark case for flexible labor mar-
kets), Greece and Spain (two EU countries), and
Hungary and Poland (two candidate countries). As
might be expected, Poland and Hungary had rela-
tively low wage differentials in the 1980s, but they
have experienced a widening gap in interindustry
wages since the late 1980s because of their transi-
tion toward a market economy. Wage differentials
in Turkey increased in the late 1980s when real
wages increased rapidly in the post-military period,
and they declined in the period of wage depressions
in the late 1990s. The same data are presented for
developed EU countries and the United States in
figure 9.5b. Among all the developed countries
depicted in figure 9.5b, the United States has the
highest wage differentials in the manufacturing
industry and the Scandinavian countries have the
lowest. The data in figures 9.5a and 9.5b seem to
confirm the widely held belief that the Scandinavian
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countries have more equal income and wage distri-
bution as a result of their specific centralized wage-
setting institutions.
Rigidities in labor markets make the cost of fir-
ing, and the potential cost of hiring, higher. Thus
expansion and contraction of firms will be more
costly, new firm formation will be limited, and the
exit rate will be lower. All those factors will reduce
job turnover. Table 9.7 presents the data on job
turnover for selected countries. The rate of job
turnover for Turkey is calculated only for manufac-
turing establishments employing more than 10
workers. For Chile, Colombia, and the United States,
job turnover data are available only for the manufac-
turing industry. For all other countries, the data are
available for the whole economy. The U.S. data seem
to suggest that the job turnover rate is lower in the
manufacturing industry than in other sectors.
The average job turnover rate for the Turkish
manufacturing industry for the period 1980–2000
is 21 percent—that is, the proportion of jobs cre-
ated and abolished in a year is 21 percent of all jobs
available. The rate for Turkey is somewhat higher
than the one observed in the United States and
slightly lower than those in Colombia and Chile.
Although cross-country comparisons do present
some problems, it could be claimed that the job
turnover rate in Turkey is high. Table 9.8 presents
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the same data for the public sector and private sec-
tor by size categories for two subperiods, 1980–90,
and 1990–2000. The job turnover rate is much
higher in the private sector, especially among small
establishments, because of high rates of entry and
exit. Job turnover stemming from expansion and
contraction dominates entry and exit for medium-
size and large establishments. There seems to be a
slight increase in the job turnover rate in the 1990s.
Model-based indicators are extensively used in
empirical studies to assess employment and wage
flexibility (see, e.g., Nickell and Layard 1999;
Fabiani and Rodriguez-Palenzuela 2001; Plasmans
and others 2002). These indicators are based on the
coefficients of adjustment terms or elasticities in
employment or wage equations.
Employment flexibility can be defined as the
speed of adjustment of employment in a labor
demand equation. A simple dynamic conditional
labor demand equation can be written as
(9.1) Lt,i = βi + β1Lt-1,i + β2Qt,i + β3wt,i + t,i
where L, Q, and w refer to the number of employed,
real output, and real product wage, respectively. All
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TABLE 9.7 Job Turnover, Selected Countries
Period Entry Expansion Exit Contraction Turnover
Turkey (M) 1980–2000 4.8 6.7 4.1 5.5 21.0
Chile (M) 1980–1995 4.7 9.1 4.7 7.2 25.8
Colombia (M) 1978–1891 5.3 6.6 5.1 6.7 23.8
United States (M) 1984–1988 1.4 6.7 2.7 7.7 18.6
United States 1984–1991 8.4 4.6 7.3 3.1 23.4
Canada 1983–1991 3.2 11.2 3.1 8.8 26.3
France 1984–1991 6.1 6.6 5.5 6.3 24.4
Germany 1983–1990 2.5 6.5 1.9 5.6 16.5
Italy 1987–1992 3.8 7.3 3.8 6.2 21.0
United Kingdom 1985–1991 2.7 6.0 3.9 2.7 15.3
Note: M  manufacturing industries.
Sources: Bertola, Boeri, and Cazes 1999; authors’ calculations from Turkish State Institute of Statistics data.
TABLE 9.8 Job Turnover in Turkish Manufacturing Industries
(percent)
Private
Public Small Medium Large Average
1981–90
Entry 1.6 14.5 7.1 3.0 4.4
Expansion 2.8 4.7 9.7 8.5 6.8
Contraction 4.5 8.0 6.3 3.4 4.7
Exit 1.3 14.9 5.4 2.7 3.8
Turnover 10.3 42.1 28.4 17.6 19.7
1991–2000
Entry 0.4 20.2 8.5 3.1 5.2
Expansion 2.1 3.6 8.1 7.7 6.6
Contraction 6.5 10.3 6.8 5.4 6.2
Exit 2.6 17.9 5.7 2.6 4.4
Turnover 11.7 52.1 29.3 18.8 22.3
Source: Authors’ calculations from Turkish State Institute of Statistics data.
variables are in log form. The subscripts t and i
denote time and the cross-sectional unit (industry
or firm), respectively;  denotes the usual error
terms. The coefficient of the lagged employment,
β1, measures the speed of adjustment, and the coef-
ficient of the wage variable, β3, the wage elasticity of
labor demand.
The wage equation can be defined in a similar
way and can be used to estimate the effects of inde-
pendent variables on wages. In real wage equations,
the unemployment rate is usually included in the
model to estimate the degree of real wage flexibility,
because the coefficient of the unemployment
term reflects how sensitive real wages are to the
unemployment level. If the rate of unemployment
is higher than the NAIRU (nonaccelerating infla-
tion rate of unemployment), then the real wage is
expected to decline to clear the market—that is, a
statistically significant negative coefficient is
expected for the unemployment term. The absolute
value of the coefficient will indicate how fast the
labor market adjusts.
Because of the lack of data, we estimated only
the dynamic labor demand equation for a group of
OECD and candidate countries by using panel data
at the International Standard Industrial Classifica-
tion (Rev. 2) three-digit level for the period
1980–2000. The GMM (generalized method of
moments) technique is used to estimate the model
in difference form. Figure 9.6 plots the adjustment
parameter against the wage elasticity. Because a
military government ruled the country in the early
1980s, we reestimated the same equation for Turkey
for the 1990s. As is the case of almost all other
measures, the United States seems to have a flexible
labor market for the manufacturing industries. The
adjustment parameter is small, which implies fast
adjustment, and the wage elasticity is high. The rate
of adjustment is rather slow in Turkey, but it seems
to gain speed in the 1990s.
Only a few empirical studies measure wage flex-
ibility for Turkey. Onaran (2002), who estimated a
wage equation by using panel data at the industry
level, found that real wages are quite flexible in the
post-1980 period.22 The findings by I˙lkkaracan and
Selim (2002) on the basis of a cross-sectional esti-
mation of an individual-level wage equation sug-
gest that there is a statistically significant negative
correlation between wages and regional unemploy-
ment rates. Separate regressions for men and
women, however, show a wage curve to exist only in
the male labor market. Unemployment elasticity is
higher in the private sector, supporting the anec-
dotal evidence that the private sector has more flex-
ible employment practices that the public sector.
The evidence presented here suggests that the
EPL in Turkey is “rigid,” but the legislation excludes
a large part of the economy—legally, small busi-
nesses and certain sectors, and illegally, the infor-
mal sector. There are enforcement problems in the
formal sector as well. Some measures studied here
show that the labor market for the manufacturing
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industry, which is probably the most regulated and
unionized sector, is quite flexible. Moreover, the
new labor law provides a legal basis for flexible
employment practices such as part-time and fixed-
term employment.
Problems and Prospects: 
An Assessment
The labor market institutions in Turkey will con-
front four major challenges in the next decade23:
1. Dealing with the continuing decline in the share
of agriculture in total employment by creating
more jobs, especially in the services sector.
2. Increasing the employment rate—most impor-
tant, by increasing the participation rate for
urban women. This step will require a substantial
increase in employment opportunities for urban
women, especially an increase in part-time jobs.
3. Investing in the education and training of the
young people in Turkey, whose share of the
population will remain quite high compared
with the shares in the EU and candidate coun-
tries. This demographic window of opportunity
for the Turkish economy can turn into an obsta-
cle for development if the educational system
fails to raise the skills level of the young people.
4. Eliminating the informal sector that continues
to be an important source of low-quality, low-
wage jobs. The informal sector is still a source of
survival for a huge number of small and
medium-size enterprises (SMEs) that enjoy flex-
ible employment practices and are able to avoid
paying taxes, SSCs, and so forth. This sector
helps to curb the pressures on employment, but
at the same time, it hinders the generation of
better jobs by the formal sector.
The prospect of EU membership has sparked
changes in Turkey’s legal framework and labor
market institutions so that it can adopt the Com-
munity acquis. Against the background of these
four challenges, the likely effects of adopting and
implementing the acquis can be discussed at three
levels: (1) the impact of the new labor law that has
introduced various directives (the short term), (2)
the impact of adopting and implementing all
employment directives (the medium and long
term), and (3) the impact of designing and
implementing employment policies in line with the
objectives and targets of the EES.
The Impact of the New Labor Law 
The new labor law (No. 4857) has introduced
changes in accordance with the European Commis-
sion directives, but further reform in the labor law
and related regulations are needed to comply fully
with the acquis. The potential effects of the changes
introduced by the new labor law can be summa-
rized as follows.
First, the new labor law has provided a legal
basis for “atypical” employment relationships—
that is, part-time and fixed-term employment.
This is the most welcome aspect of the new law
for employers. However, as mentioned early in
this chapter, part-time employment is not wide-
spread in Turkey (except in the agricultural sec-
tor). Moreover, the average work week is quite
long, and the lobbying against implementing the
directive’s provision (93/104) on the maximum
average work week (48 hours) has been effective.24
According to the Household Labour Force Statistics
of the State Institute of Statistics (SIS 2000b), 41.5
percent of all paid workers work 50 hours or
longer a week. Therefore, the law is not expected
to have any significant impact on part-time
employment. Because of the emphasis on labor
market flexibility, one might expect a tendency
toward the increasing use of fixed-term and sub-
contract labor. The directives on part-time and
fixed-term employment require “that, in respect of
employment conditions, part-time and fixed-term
workers shall not be treated in a less favorable
manner than comparable full-time and perma-
nent workers,” but it could be difficult to enforce
these provisions in the Turkish context, at least in
the medium term, because the Turkish labor law
does not provide sufficient safeguards to protect
part-time and fixed-term employees. Moreover,
the law does not impose any restriction on the
cumulative duration or the number of successive
contracts. Thus, employers are expected to lower
labor costs by gradually switching to fixed-term
contracts and subcontract labor. However, this
strategy, if it is thought to be the main strategy for
improving competitiveness, could easily turn out
to be a “low road” labor flexibility practice that
might lead to neglect of investment in human
capital.
Second, the new law reduces the cost of layoffs by
establishing a special Severance Payment Fund
(SPF). Firms are required to pay a certain proportion
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of the wage bill to the fund, and it then covers all sev-
erance payments. Thus the overall effect of the
change in the severance pay system is likely to reduce
firms’ (hiring and firing) costs.
Third, the new labor law has included most of
the articles of the law on employment protection
(No. 4773), but reduced the coverage of employ-
ment protection by excluding those establishments
employing fewer than 30 workers (Law No. 4773
excluded only those employing fewer than 10 work-
ers). Therefore, the new labor law has legally pro-
vided extensive flexibility to small establishments.
To summarize, the changes introduced by the
new labor law address mainly the short-term
concerns of employers about achieving labor mar-
ket flexibility. However, as shown in our earlier
analysis, even the labor market for the manufac-
turing industry seems to be quite flexible. There-
fore, excessive emphasis on labor market flexibility
may lead to the adoption of a “defensive strategy”
by firms that ignores the human capital, entrepre-
neurship, and innovativeness that the Turkish
economy needs to tackle the challenges listed ear-
lier. This process may also delay the restructuring
of the corporate sector, because it would tilt the
field of competition in favor of less productive
firms that reduce their costs by relying on atypical
employment relations and avoiding all social
expenditures.
The new labor law, by increasing flows from and
to unemployment, is likely to change the structure
of unemployment. The proportion of short-term
unemployment may increase, just as it did, for
example, after the labor market reform in Colom-
bia (Kugler 1999; Kugler and Cárdenas 1999).
The Impact of Adopting and Implementing 
the Employment Acquis
Although the new labor law has made some
progress in the field of social policy and employ-
ment, it is still far from full alignment with the
acquis. Therefore, Turkey needs to extensively
amend its laws and regulations in order to comply
fully with the acquis. As the comparison between
the new labor law and directives indicates, those
provisions that are not yet incorporated into the
labor law are exactly those that mean additional
costs for firms (e.g., the provisions on the
maximum work week and minimum period of
annual leave). These provisions, if implemented,
may increase the firms’ costs by a few percentage
points of the wage bill.
The most important discrepancy between the
Turkish labor law (both the former one and the
new law) and the EU directives is the complete dis-
regard of any social dialogue, employee participa-
tion, and consultation in the Turkish labor law. As
Table 9.3 demonstrates, the new law does not refer
to the provisions of various directives regarding
informing workers, and it does not address at all
Directive 2002/14 on consultation and employee
representation. Although the draft law prepared by
the tripartite Scientific Committee referred to
employees’ representatives, all these referrals were
omitted in the final version of the law adopted by
Parliament. Therefore, it is no surprise that the
European Commission’s report on the progress
toward accession by candidate countries points out
that “[s]teps have been taken in the field of social
policy and employment [in Turkey], but are not
always in full conformity with the acquis. There is
an urgent need to develop and strengthen the con-
ditions for a genuine social dialogue at all levels”
(European Commission 2002e). The Regular Report
on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession (European
Commission, 2002c) summarizes what needs to be
done, as follows:
As regards social dialogue, despite improve-
ments for trade union rights in free trade zones,
further progress needs to be made as a matter of
priority to create the conditions for a free and
genuine bipartite as well as tripartite social dia-
logue at all levels in line with the acquis. Turkey
should make rapid progress towards establishing
full trade union rights that includes elimination
of restrictive thresholds for forming a trade
union branch and requirement of 10% threshold
for a trade union to be eligible for collective bar-
gaining at company level. The law on public ser-
vants’ trade unions, which was adopted in June
2001 and which is not in line with the Commu-
nity acquis and the relevant ILO Conventions
ratified by Turkey, has not been amended. The
law contains a number of provisions which
entail significant constraints on the right to
organise in the public sector. Notably, there are
restrictive provisions relating to the exclusion of
the right to strike and to collective bargaining.
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The percentage of the labour force covered by
collective agreements is extremely low; it is esti-
mated to be below 15%. No social dialogue exists
in most private enterprises, which may limit the
proper implementation of the Community
acquis at enterprise level. . . . Promoting social
inclusion and developing a national employ-
ment strategy in line with the European Employ-
ment Strategy is a matter of priority.
Social dialogue and employee participation are
crucial for implementation of the acquis, but the
current emphasis on short-term solutions makes it
difficult to establish cooperative relationships
between employers and employees.25
The Copenhagen criteria for membership
include the acquis criterion that highlights the
importance not only of incorporating the acquis
into national legislation, but also of ensuring its
effective application through the appropriate
administrative and judicial structures.26 Effective
application of the acquis by extending the coverage
to include the informal sector would be by far the
most important impact of the accession process. In
other words, firms in the informal sector have to be
forced to abide by laws and regulations—that is,
they have to bear the costs of taxes and SSCs,
together with the firms that had been complying
with regulations. This process is likely to eliminate
some firms operating in the informal sector and
lead to a painful adjustment process in the medium
term. With the gradual elimination of the informal
sector, the long-run effect is very likely to be posi-
tive for productivity, growth, and employment. A
simple quantitative analysis is performed later in
this chapter to assess the impact of this process.
The Impact of Coordinating Employment Policies
Turkey as a candidate country has committed itself
to progressively adjusting its labor market institu-
tions and employment policies and coordinating
them with those of the EU. Turkey and the Euro-
pean Commission are expected to analyze the key
challenges for employment policies in a Joint
Assessment Paper, and the JAP commitments will
be monitored systematically. This process of coop-
eration and coordination is likely to have two cru-
cial effects on policymaking in Turkey.
First, Turkey must establish the institutional
framework needed to design and implement
employment policies. This step requires making
major improvements in the national statistical sys-
tem, strengthening the Turkish Employment
Organization (I˙S¸KUR), and so forth.27 Second, it is
hoped that Turkey will implement, after decades
of neglect and disorientation, consistent and sys-
tematic employment policies that bring forward
long-term objectives. These policies should be in
conformity with the three objectives of the EES
(full employment, quality and productivity at
work, and cohesion and an inclusive labor market)
that are also priority issues for Turkey. The “10
commandments” (especially the objectives of
more and better investment in human capital,
gender equality in employment and pay, the elim-
ination of undeclared work, and the promotion of
occupational mobility) are likely to cause an
upsurge in the short-term adjustment costs of the
corporate sector, although they would be
extremely beneficial in the medium and long run.
New employment policies are likely to have a sig-
nificant positive impact on productivity and
growth in the long term, if they are accompanied
by coherent competition, technology, and innova-
tion policies.
A Simulation Analysis
Because the implementation of laws and regula-
tions that cover the informal sector is likely to lead
to the most important effect by far in the accession
process, here we conduct a simple simulation exer-
cise to measure the order of magnitude of these
effects in the private manufacturing industry.
The first step in any analysis of the informal sec-
tor is likely to start with an estimation of its size
and characteristics. Because there are almost no
data available for the informal sector, we make the
following assumptions:
• The SIS’s Household Labour Force Survey meas-
ures total manufacturing employment. The
number of “informal workers” is equal to the
number of people employed in microenter-
prises.
• The SIS’s Annual Survey of Manufacturing
Industries (ASMI) reflects the average character-
istics of establishments categorized by size.
• Informal sector firms do not pay any tax
(including the income tax for employees) and
SSCs.
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• Informal sector firms are as productive as
“small” formal sector firms that employ 10–24
people.
Figure 9.7 depicts the distribution of employ-
ment, value added, and output in the private
manufacturing sector in 2000. Firms are classified
into four groups: large (employing 150 or more
people), medium (employing 25–49 people), small
(employing 10–24 people), and informal (small
firms and informal sector firms). Under our
assumptions, the share of informal workers is
about 41 percent in private manufacturing and 40
percent in all manufacturing.28 The latter value is
comparable with the share of informal workers in
Brazilian manufacturing (20.6 percent) and in
Colombia (54.0 percent) in the late 1990s (Gold-
berg and Pavcnik 2003).
The share of the informal sector in total value
added (and output) is estimated by assuming that
value added per employee in the informal sector is
equal to the net value added (value added minus all
taxes and social security expenditures) per employee
in small formal sector firms (for the composition of
output, see table 9.9). Under these assumptions, the
informal sector produces only 25 percent of total
value added in private manufacturing.
Figure 9.8 shows the structure of value added by
four categories of firms. Because cumulative
employment is plotted on the horizontal axis, the
area under the line defines total value added pro-
duced by that category. Large firms are the most
productive group. The informal sector firms are
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TABLE 9.9 Composition of Output in Private Manufacturing: Turkey, 2000
(percent)
Large Medium Small Informal
Net wage 5.44 4.35 3.97 4.42
Income taxa 1.16 0.78 0.59 0.00
SSC, employees’ sharea 1.16 0.91 0.80 0.00
SSC, employers’ sharea 1.67 1.30 1.15 0.00
Severance paymentsb 1.59 1.53 1.50 0.00
Total labor cost 11.02 8.87 8.02 4.42
Interest payments 3.91 2.50 1.37 1.53
Taxes 2.55 1.54 1.46 0.00
Profit 22.50 20.84 19.25 21.47
Materials 53.78 61.07 65.09 72.59
Value added (VA) tax 6.24 5.18 4.82 0.00
Total 100 100 100 100
Total VA per employee (millions of Turkish lira) 26,561 14,982 10,149 9,590
Share of VA in output (%) 40.0 33.8 30.1 27.4
VA per employee (large = 1) 1.00 0.56 0.38 0.31
a. Estimated.
b. Includes all compensation payments.
Sources: Large, medium, and small establishments, SIS 2000a; informal sector, authors’ estimates.
only 31 percent as productive as the larger firms.
The share of labor costs, including severance pay-
ments, in value added is 27.6 percent for large
firms, 26.3 percent for medium-size firms, and 26.6
percent for small firms. The informal sector firms
pay only 16.2 percent of value added as wages to
their employees.
If all informal sector firms and workers pay
income and corporate taxes and SSCs, their sales
prices will increase about 6 percent so that they
earn the same amount of profit and pay the same
net wage. The value added tax will add another 5
percentage points. In other words, the benefit of
operating in the informal sector is somewhat
higher than 10 percent of the sales price (including
the value added tax).
We conduct five simulations. In the first simula-
tion (Case 1), we assume that all informal sector
firms pay taxes and SSCs, but that there is no
change in the nominal output (size) of the manu-
facturing industry. Therefore, an increase in prices
caused by the increase in the costs of informal sec-
tor firms leads to a decline in demand of the same
proportion. We also assume that the market shares
of four categories of firms do not change.
When the informal sector firms pay taxes and
SSCs, the total revenue of the government and
social security institutions will increase to a large
extent. Therefore, we assume in Case 2 that the gov-
ernment reduces tax and social security rates so
that total tax and social security revenue remain the
same. This policy will help formal sector firms by
reducing their costs.
Because the assumption on constant market
shares is not realistic given the fact that informal
sector firms have to increase their prices, in the
third simulation (Case 3) we assume that the infor-
mal sector firms lose half of their market shares.
The next case (Case 4) adds a reduction in tax and
social security rates to the Case 3 simulation.
Finally, in Case 5 we take into consideration the
long-term effects in Case 4 by assuming that total
output increases by 10 percent (as a result of pro-
ductivity increases and other effects).
In all simulations, we assume that the structure
and level of output remain the same for the for-
merly formal sector firms. Nominal net wages and
profits for the informal sector firms are assumed to
remain constant. Thus our analysis is limited to the
effects of reallocation of output between formal
and informal sector firms within the same industry.
Table 9.10 summarizes the simulation results.
The Base Case shows the current situation. When
the informal sector firms begin to pay taxes and
SSCs (Case 1), the immediate impact will be
observed in a reduction in manufacturing employ-
ment (4.3 percent; about 150,000 jobs are lost) after
the decline in output. Total wage payments will also
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decline (3.0 percent), but the average net wage will
increase, because the informal sector will experi-
ence the highest employment loss. The share of
profits in total output (the profit margin) will
decline by 3.2 percent. Meanwhile, there will be a
huge increase in tax and social security revenue
(about 35 percent). In the second case, the govern-
ment reduces the SSC rate by 28.5 percent, the
income tax rate by 26.4 percent, and the value
added tax rate by 29.8 percent, so that total revenue
remains at the base level. The reductions in tax and
social security rates will help to moderate employ-
ment losses (now only 1.5 percent) and the decline
in the profit margin (0.2 percent).
If the informal sector firms exit en masse from
the market because of their increasing costs (Case
3), the impact on employment will be dramatic:
although we assume there is no change in nominal
output, the decline in employment will be 8.9 per-
cent because of the lower output-to-labor ratio in
the informal sector. Because low-wage jobs will be
lost, there will be a substantial increase in the average
wage rate (8.7 percent) that will make employees as a
group not much worse off. In this case, tax and social
security revenue will increase more than in Case 1
because of higher average wages and income in the
formal sector. A reduction in tax and social security
rates will again moderate employment losses.
If the manufacturing industry succeeds in grow-
ing during this period (we assume 10 percent
growth), then employment will increase 4.2 percent
even if half of the informal sector firms are elimi-
nated, and the average wage rate and the profit
margin will increase by 9 percent and 2 percent,
respectively. The government, to receive the same
amount of revenue that it receives in the Base Case,
must cut tax and social security rates substantially
(36–38 percent).
This simple simulation exercise shows that there
could be significant short-term transitory costs, in
terms of a loss in employment opportunities, in
eliminating the informal sector. These costs could
be reduced if the economy achieves a faster rate of
economic growth.
Conclusions and Policy 
Implications
Turkey has embarked on an effort to change its
institutional structure for employment and social
affairs. The new labor law has introduced changes
in accordance with the European Community
directives, mainly the provisions that help to estab-
lish flexible employment relationships, but further
reform is apparently needed in the labor law and
other regulations to fully comply with the EU
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TABLE 9.10 Simulation Results
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5
Base
Constant + Tax 50% Lost + Tax +10%
Case
Mkt. Share Reduction in Informal Reduction Growth
Percentage Change Relative to Base Case
Employment 3,394,000 4.3 1.5 8.9 6.0 4.2
Wage billa 6,433,657 3.0 0.0 0.9 2.4 13.5
Social security contributionsa 2,331,012 35.7 0.0 39.2 0.0 0.0
Income taxa 2,754,916 31.6 0.0 36.8 0.0 0.0
Value added taxa 5,347,145 38.3 0.0 40.7 0.0 0.0
Profita 29,538,664 3.2 0.2 2.0 1.3 12.2
Average net wageb 1,896 1.3 1.5 8.7 8.9 9.0
Profit margin 21.3 3.2 0.2 2.0 1.3 2.0
Social sec. contribution ratec 5.1 0.0 28.5 0.0 30.5 37.3
Income tax ratec 6.0 0.0 26.4 0.0 29.4 36.3
Value added tax ratec 11.6 0.0 29.8 0.0 31.3 38.0
a. Billions of Turkish lira.
b. Millions of Turkish lira per employee.
c. Share in value added.
Source: Authors’ estimates.
acquis. Adoption of the remaining regulations of
the acquis on employment and social affairs is likely
to raise the costs of adjustment, especially for infor-
mal sector firms. Moreover, it also will require a
comprehensive change in the mindset of employers
if the regulations (such as those on equal treatment
of fixed-term and part-time workers and employee
participation and consultation) are to be imple-
mented. Because Turkey needs to address all these
issues in its employment strategy while heeding the
EU’s long-term objectives and targets (full employ-
ment, quality and productivity at work, and cohe-
sion and an inclusive labor market), it has an
opportunity to solve underlying problems that have
plagued the processes of economic growth and
employment generation for decades. Four areas of
action need special consideration:
1. Give priority to strengthening Turkey’s institu-
tional capacity (such as the Turkish Employ-
ment Organization, I˙S¸KUR) to develop and
implement employment strategies. Moreover,
develop an institutional framework that guaran-
tees commitment, consistency, and continuity in
employment policies.
2. Reduce the costs of adjustment for the successful
implementation of new regulations and the
gradual elimination of the informal sector. Tem-
porarily reducing tax and social security rates
for new firms and hiring new workers could be
helpful in this regard.
3. Encourage, support, and even force firms to
adopt competitive strategies based on employ-
ing a “skilled, trained and adaptable workforce”
in the spirit of Article 125 of the Treaty Estab-
lishing the European Community. These strate-
gies include various support schemes and initia-
tives for on-the-job training29 and technology
development, transfer, and diffusion programs
especially designed for SMEs.
4. Generate employment and match the demand
and supply for skills—steps important to con-
fronting the main challenges summarized ear-
lier in this section. Special attention should be
paid to providing part-time jobs (for urban
women) by enforcing equal treatment for part-
time workers and to strengthening and widen-
ing the scope of active labor market policies. The
establishment of a national qualification and
certification system could help to match the
demand and supply for skills.
Notes
1. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Con-
ference on Turkey: Towards EU Accession, Bilkent University,
May 10–12, 2003. The authors would like to thank their discus-
sant, Necdet Kenar, then president of the Turkish Employment
Organization, Cem Somel of Middle East Technical University,
and three anonymous referees for their valuable comments and
suggestions.
2. For a synthesis of views on labor market flexibility, see the
OECD’s influential Jobs Study (OECD 1994a, 1994b). For an
overview of the evolution of the concept of labor market flexi-
bility, see Brodsky (1994).
3. Scarpetta and Tressel (2002) claim that “strict regulation
may hinder the adoption of existing technologies, possibly
because it reduces competitive pressures or technology
spillovers.”
4. At the time this chapter was written (summer 2003), there
were 10 acceding countries (Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Esto-
nia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and
Slovenia) and three candidate countries (Bulgaria, Romania,
and Turkey).
5. Here, part-time employed in Turkey is defined as those
who work less than 25 hours a week. Casual employment (sea-
sonal and temporary employment), as defined by the State Insti-
tute of Statistics, is used for fixed-term employment.
6. “Long-term unemployed” refers to those unemployed at
least one year.
7. Except in areas where transitional arrangements will have
been granted during the accession negotiations.
8. For detailed descriptions of the legal framework in Turkey
for the labor market and social protection system, see compre-
hensive studies by Tunalı and others (2003) and Adaman (2003).
9. Although the first pillar of the EU, the European Commu-
nity, is analyzed in this study, only the term EU is used for
convenience.
10. This section is based on information provided on the
Web site of the European Commission DG for Employment and
Social Affairs, http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/employment_
social/index_en.htm.
11. Falkner and others (2002) show how this process works
for labor law.
12. For Council directives on employment, see http://europa.
eu.int/comm/employment_social/soc-dial/labour/index_en.
htm.
13. We also analyzed the draft law prepared by the Scientific
Committee formed by nine academicians appointed by the gov-
ernment (the Ministry of Employment and Social Security) and
the social partners (the Confederation of Employers’ Unions,
TI˙SK, and three confederations of trade unions—Türk-I˙s¸, Hak-
I˙s¸, and DI˙SK). Because some minor modifications have been
made in the draft, we use the one posted on the Web site of
the confederation of the Turkish employers’ unions, http://
www.tisk.org.tr (downloaded on February 22, 2003).
14. The directives usually set the minimum conditions, and
the member states may, therefore, introduce laws, regulations, or
administrative provisions more favorable for workers.
15. For example, the directive on fixed-term work defines
“comparable worker” as a worker with “an employment contract
of relationship of indefinite duration, in the same establishment,
engaged in the same or similar work/occupation, due regard
being given to qualifications/skills. Where there is no compara-
ble permanent worker in the same establishment, the compari-
son shall be made by reference to the applicable collective
agreement, or where there is no applicable collective agreement,
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in accordance with national law, collective agreements or prac-
tice” (emphasis added).
16. The draft law prepared by the Scientific Committee
envisaged the establishment of a Wage Guarantee Fund (WGF)
and required employers to contribute to the fund 0.5 percent of
the gross wage. However, the new labor law adopted by Parlia-
ment has transferred the financial burden of the WGF to the
Unemployment Insurance Fund.
17. Under the parental leave directive (Directive 96/34 of
June 3, 1996, on the framework agreement on parental leave
concluded by UNICE, CEEP, and the ETUC), fathers and moth-
ers have an individual right to at least three months of parental
leave to take care of their (natural or adopted) child. They have
the right to return to the same or an equivalent workplace.
18. These included (1) developing human resources through
vocational training, (2) promoting productive investments
through moderate wage policies, (3) improving the efficiency of
labor market institutions, (4) identifying new sources of jobs
through local initiatives, and (5) promoting access to the world
of work for some specific target groups such as young people,
long-term unemployed people, and women.
19. The Turkish data were calculated from the Household
Labour Force Survey for the period 2000–02.
20. Unless otherwise stated, the data from the United
Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) Indus-
trial Statistics Database, at the International Standard Industrial
Classification (Rev. 2) three-digit level are used throughout this
section.
21. Interindustry wage differential is defined as the coeffi-
cient of deviation of (log) industry wages.
22. As Agell and Bennmarker (2002) reveal for the Swedish
case, it is easier to achieve real wage flexibility in an inflationary
environment, even if nominal wages are “rigid.”
23. In this study, we focus our attention on the challenges
during the accession period. However, after the eventual mem-
bership, the conditions in the labor market are expected to be
quite different because of the provisions on free movement of
people at the EU level. Although it is difficult to predict the
extent of migration dynamics under the conditions of stable
growth in Turkey, one may expect a limited amount of emigra-
tion toward other EU countries that could be mutually benefi-
cial for Turkey and the host countries.
24. In the former labor law, the “weekly working time” was
45 hours, which had to be distributed equally over the week. The
new labor law (No. 4857) defines the “normal average weekly
working time” for which the worker is paid at the “normal” wage
rate  (the average is calculated over two months) as 45 hours.
The law sets the maximum annual limit for overtime work at
270 hours. Thus if a worker works 50 weeks a year, the maxi-
mum average weekly working time would be 50.4 hours.
25. In the Laeken Declaration of December 2001 (http://
www.europa.eu.int/futurum/documents/contrib/cont071201_
en.pdf), the European-level employers’ organizations UNICE
and CEEP and the trade union confederation ETUC defined the
concepts of tripartite concertation, consultation, and social dia-
logue as follows: tripartite concertation designates exchanges
between the social partners and European public authorities;
consultation of the social partners describes the activities of
advisory committees and official consultations; social dialogue is
defined as the bipartite work by the social partners.
The distinction between tripartite concertation and bipartite
social dialogue must be emphasized, because the tripartite con-
certation between the social partners and public authorities
(which, in many cases, is dominated by public authorities) is usu-
ally confused with genuine bipartite social dialogue in Turkey.
Social dialogue can take place at different levels (company,
sectoral, regional, national, and European). Social dialogue at
the European level has become more structured and has
increased significantly in importance over time, especially since
1991, when the Maastricht Treaty made it possible for the social
partners to conclude European-level framework agreements in
the area of individual and collective employees’ rights. As a
result, agreements between the European-level social partners
(UNICE, CEEP, and ETUC) on parental leave (1995), part-time
work (1997) and fixed-term contracts (1999) have been imple-
mented as European directives. However, the level of social dia-
logue is far from uniform among the member states. For exam-
ple, the current U.K. Labour government, which emphasizes the
importance of flexibility in labor markets, seems to be uneasy
about the way regulations are being implemented at the EU level
(for details, see the European Industrial Relations Observatory
Web site, http://www.eiro.eurofound.ie). Moreover, as Keller
(2003) explains, after the eastern enlargement of the EU, “the
already existing degree of diversity [in the EU] could even
increase despite the fact that all existing regulations are part of
the acquis communautaire that has to be adopted by all candi-
date countries,” because the social partners are either weak or do
not exist in the accession states (the “social dialogue gap”). For
the level of social dialogue in accession countries, see Rychly and
Pritzer (2003) and EFILWC (2003).
26. This process may also help to fully implement Interna-
tional Labour Organization (ILO) conventions. For the ILO con-
ventions ratified by Turkey, see Bronstein (2003).
27. The law establishing the Turkish Employment Organiza-
tion (No. 4904) was enacted by Parliament on June 25, 2003.
28. Because we assume that the number of workers
employed in the informal sector is equal to the number of peo-
ple employed in microenterprises, the share of the informal sec-
tor is likely to be overestimated.
29. Recall that the EU aims to increase the investment of
companies in the training of adults (on-the-job training) from
the existing level of the equivalent of 2.3 percent of labor costs
up to 5.0 percent of labor costs on average in the EU by 2010.
Although no reliable data on firm-sponsored training in Turkey
are available, one could conjecture that the ratio of firm-
sponsored training to labor cost is very small in Turkey.
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and to the Middle East, northern Africa, and
Central Asia markets. The recent market–export
and domestic market–oriented investments in the
automobile industry are a clear indication of
Turkey’s attractiveness for FDI flows. However, over
the last decade, Turkey lost ground to the Central
and Eastern European (CEE) countries in attract-
ing foreign investments, especially those from
Europe. Although Poland, the Czech Republic, and
Hungary together (three countries whose combined
population is smaller than that of Turkey) received
US$71 billion1 in FDI flows between 1995 and 2000,
Turkey received only $5.1 billion over the same
period, almost 14 times less. And it appears from
other countries’ experiences that, unless there is a
major paradigm shift in a country’s or its competi-
tors’ FDI policies, there is likely to be very little
change in FDI inflows.
This chapter explores how Turkey may be
different from most CEE countries, and what any
differences imply for the appropriate FDI policy in
light of EU accession prospects. The chapter begins
by outlining the benefits of FDI through an
overview of the economic concepts, together with
an assessment of the Turkish experience. FDI
After following inward-oriented development
strategies for 50 years, Turkey switched to outward-
oriented policies in 1980. The policy of further open-
ing up the economy was pursued with the aim of
eventually integrating Turkey into the European
Union (EU). The European Council’s Helsinki
summit, held on December 10–11, 1999, produced a
breakthrough in EU-Turkey relations by officially
recognizing Turkey as an EU candidate state on an
equal footing with other candidate states.With acces-
sion, Turkey would become part of the European sin-
gle market. In joining the EU, Turkey will have to
adopt and implement the whole body of EU legisla-
tion and standards—the acquis communautaire—
and also participate eventually in the European
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).
Over the past four years, Turkey has been under-
going a series of serious social, economic, and insti-
tutional transformations with the clear political
objective of EU membership. The definitive
prospect of EU membership should make Turkey
very attractive for foreign direct investment (FDI),
because, among its other strengths, it has a highly
skilled and adaptable labor force, a large domestic
market, and geographic proximity both to Europe
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inflows are not generally considered to be an end
goal but rather an instrument to create a globally
competitive economy. Through FDI-stimulated
increases in productivity, Turkey seeks to be
positioned at the higher value added end of the
fast-changing worldwide division of labor. In its
analysis of obstacles to foreign investment, this
chapter will emphasize competition-related and
legal and judicial barriers.
After analyzing the benefits from and impedi-
ments to FDI, the chapter reviews what steps have
been taken to improve the policy and regulatory
framework in Turkey and then analyzes what
Turkey has yet to do to meet EU requirements and
to fully benefit from FDI. In summary, Turkey
should benefit significantly from EU accession in
terms of a step change in sizable FDI inflows, largely
because the accession process would help Turkey to
overcome its rule of law and competition-related
constraints to foreign direct investment. The EU
accession process will encourage more rapid and
consistent implementation of the rules and regula-
tions that ensure a level playing field for all compa-
nies, which, in turn, would enable Turkey to take
full advantage of investment-related benefits.
The Benefits of FDI
As a capital-scarce country, Turkey can benefit
substantially from injections of foreign capital that
will expand productive capacity and stimulate job
creation.
The Role of FDI in Economic Growth 
Although foreign direct investment is beneficial,
the type of capital inflows matters. Unlike portfolio
investments and loans to the private sector, FDI
inflows involve direct equity ownership plus signif-
icant ownership control, and therefore they are
more stable. They do not easily flee in a domestic
market downturn. Unlike loans, FDI inflows ensure
that business risks are borne by foreign investors.
FDI differs from other forms of capital flows in
other crucial aspects. It does not just entail the
transfer of financial resources and the creation of
new jobs; it is a bundle that involves the transfer of
fixed assets, technology, know-how, and interna-
tional market access. FDI connects the recipient
country to international best practices, helps to
upgrade the management and work force, and
establishes stronger ties between domestic and
international markets.
Because FDI entails the transfer of technology
and know-how, it usually has both a direct and an
indirect impact on the economic growth of a
country. And, because FDI involves significant
ownership control as well as the transfer of technol-
ogy, its impact on economic growth takes place
through increased productivity, human capital
accumulation, research and development activity,
and technological and productivity spillovers. Its
impact on economic growth could be even greater if
the types of FDI that the country receives
stimulate—in other words, crowd in—domestic
investment activity.
Several studies have established a link between
FDI and economic growth. Using data on FDI flows
from industrial countries to 69 developing coun-
tries over 1970–89 and using a cross-country
regression framework, Borensztein, De Gregorio,
and Lee (1998) show that FDI flows have a positive
impact on economic growth. They also demon-
strate that the impact of foreign investment exceeds
the impact of domestic investment on growth. Not
all countries, however, benefit from FDI. According
to Borensztein, De Gregorio, and Lee, countries
require a minimum stock of human capital to real-
ize the growth effects of FDI. In other studies,
Zhang (1999) shows that FDI inflows helped to
stimulate economic growth in several East Asian
countries, and Gruben and McLeod (1998) find
that in a sample of 18 countries, FDI had a signifi-
cant impact on economic growth, especially in
Latin American countries.
The Role of FDI in Raising Productivity 
and Stimulating Spillovers
One of the important contributions of FDI compa-
nies is to enhance the transfer and diffusion of tech-
nology to the host country. A multinational corpo-
ration undertaking investment in a country brings
to that sector its production technology, its access to
global production and distribution networks, and
its know-how and experience. Being generally larger
corporations, FDI companies have access to large,
low-cost investment funds that could be used to
finance investment in more advanced technology
than is available and accessible in the host country.
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The direct technology transfer effect may not be
realized in all FDI projects, however. If the FDI is an
export-oriented investment, the impact on technol-
ogy diffusion will generally be more significant
than that made by a domestic market–oriented
investment. The impact of FDI on technology
diffusion was rather limited in the import substitu-
tion era, because the main incentive for a foreign
company to undertake investment was the heavily
protected domestic market. In such an environment,
foreign companies preferred to transfer old and
outdated technology to their factories in developing
countries, creating little technology diffusion.
Today, however, FDI decisions cannot focus only
on the domestic market. One result of the push for
more liberal trade relations throughout the world is
that FDI companies face competition in the domes-
tic markets of the host country through imports.
Consequently, FDI decisions, especially in the
manufacturing sector, are often made after seriously
considering the international competitiveness of
the affiliate firm. That firm must have the techno-
logical capability and the resulting efficiency that
render it flexible enough to target export markets as
well as the domestic market. Consequently, one
would expect to observe higher productivity in
FDI companies when compared with domestic
enterprises.
The impact of FDI on the host country economy
is not limited to just the direct channels of technol-
ogy transfer and diffusion; the presence of multina-
tionals also may affect local companies through
several channels. One channel is intensified domes-
tic market competition. As the FDI companies
become major players in the domestic market, local
companies will be forced to adopt newer and more
advanced technologies and to use the existing
resources of the firm more efficiently in order to
survive (see Blomström and Kokko 1998). This
channel is similar to the effect of import liberaliza-
tion, even though the impact on local companies
may be more significant than imports. The technol-
ogy transfer may take embodied (imports of
machinery and equipment) or disembodied (know-
how, knowledge, licenses) forms. Local enterprises
will not find it difficult to organize the transfer
of embodied technology, but the transfer of disem-
bodied technology requires absorption capacity.
However, the workers and engineers employed by
FDI companies will gain experience and accumulate
knowledge through their tenure there. In the
medium to long run, these employees will have an
opportunity to transfer this experience and knowl-
edge to local enterprises.
Other channels through which the presence of
FDI companies affects the local companies mostly
take the form of spillovers. Productivity spillovers
from FDI take place when the entry or presence of
multinational corporations increases the produc-
tivity of domestic firms in a host country and when
the multinationals do not fully internalize the value
of these benefits. Spillovers may occur when local
firms improve their efficiency by copying technolo-
gies of foreign affiliates operating in the local
market either by observation or by hiring workers
trained by the affiliates. Horizontal spillovers to
other firms in the same sector may be accompanied
by vertical spillovers—that is, the presence of FDI
companies may affect local firms in other sectors of
the economy. These vertical spillover effects may
take place through backward linkages (purchases of
inputs from local suppliers) and forward linkages
(supply of outputs to local downstream purchasers).
In line with findings for other countries, in
Turkey FDI companies have higher labor produc-
tivity than local enterprises.2 In 1991 the average
labor productivity of FDI companies was 35 per-
cent higher than that of all manufacturing plants.
Over time, the productivity gap between FDI com-
panies and the sector average was closed slightly, to
30 percent by 1996. The average labor productivity
in foreign-owned plants increased from TL
(Turkish lira) 4.1 million to TL 4.7 million (from
$1,611 to $1,803) in 1990 prices. The average labor
productivity in all plants, by contrast, increased
from TL 3.1 million to TL 3.6 million (from $1,189
to $1,550). These numbers are a clear indication
that the labor productivity gap between foreign-
and domestic-owned plants is significant and does
not vanish over time.
These annual average values support the case for
significant labor productivity differences between
FDI and local enterprises, but the possibility cannot
be ruled out that these differences stem from plant
characteristics other than foreign ownership. Based
on regression results using various measures of for-
eign participation, Yılmaz and Ozler (2004) show
that plants with foreign partners have higher total
factor productivity even after other plant character-
istics and sector and time effects are taken into
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account.3 Finally, Yılmaz and Ozler (2004) show
that domestic plants tend to have higher total factor
productivity (TFP) in sectors with greater FDI
involvement than in sectors in which FDI involve-
ment is low. All else being equal, as the foreign
ownership–weighted sectoral output share of
foreign-affiliated plants increases by 1 percentage
point, the total factor productivity of local plants in
the same sector increases by 0.82 percentage point.
However, horizontal spillovers from all foreign-
owned plants are not similar. As the output share of
FDI companies with less than 50 percent foreign
participation increases by 1 percentage point, the
TFP in local firms increases on average by 0.72 per-
cent, and the spillover effect from plants with
foreign share ownership greater than or equal to
50 percent but less than full foreign ownership
jumps by 1.1 percentage point. Finally, fully
foreign-owned plants tend to generate external
benefits that would increase the productivity of
local plants in the same sector by 0.4 percent.
The Current State of FDI
Foreign direct investment can have strong, positive
effects for national economies. The previous section
described how FDI in the Turkish manufactur-
ing sector has had both direct and indirect
productivity-enhancing benefits. The evidence of
these benefits, which is based on plant-level studies,
can be viewed as the most reliable evidence avail-
able. However, this finding and the results discussed
establish only that FDI is desirable for Turkey. The
next step in the analysis is to characterize the level
and other features of FDI in Turkey relative to those
of comparator countries and explore why FDI is so
low despite being highly desirable for the country.
FDI in Turkey and in Central and Eastern Europe:
A Comparison 
The most striking feature of foreign investment
flows to Turkey is their low level relative to the
flows of the comparator CEE countries’ emerging
market economies (table 10.1). In terms of popula-
tion in 2000, Turkey was larger than Poland, the
Czech Republic, and Hungary combined. In terms
of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2000, Turkey’s
economy was four times as large as that of the
Czech Republic or Hungary and one-quarter larger
than Poland’s. And in terms of gross fixed capital
formation (GFCF)—the total value of producers’
acquisitions of fixed assets—Turkey’s investments
during 2000 were three to four times as large as
those of the Czech Republic and Hungary and
roughly a sixth larger than Poland’s. As highlighted
in table 10.1, however, in terms of average annual
inflows of FDI during the 1990s, Turkey’s inflows
($800 million) were roughly one-fifth of FDI
inflows to Poland ($4.1 billion) and also signifi-
cantly lower than those of the Czech Republic and
Hungary (about $2.1 billion per year).
A second striking feature in comparing Turkey
with Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary is
that the FDI gap did not close throughout the
1990s. To the contrary, with the formal announce-
ment at the December 1997 European Council
summit in Luxembourg that EU accession negotia-
tions would open with Poland, the Czech Repub-
lic, and Hungary on March 31, 1998, these coun-
tries appear to have benefited from a virtuous
cycle. The enhanced likelihood of EU accession
and further FDI flows improved credit ratings and,
in turn, attracted more FDI, thereby increasing the
difference between those countries and Turkey.
Table 10.1 and figure 10.1 reveal that average
annual FDI inflows increased during 1997–2000
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FIGURE 10.1 FDI Inflows: Turkey
versus Comparator CEE
Countries, 1990–2001
(millions of US$)
Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report,
selected years.
more than threefold in Poland, from $2.1 billion to
almost $7 billion, and more than fourfold in the
Czech Republic, from $0.9 billion to over $4 billion.
Meanwhile, in Turkey they remained completely
unchanged relative to gross fixed capital formation.
It is remarkable that Turkey’s announcement of its
EU customs union in 1996 had no discernable
effect on aggregate FDI flows.
Anyone comparing FDI inflows across countries
should take into account that the FDI definition
used by Turkey is much narrower than that of some
countries and international institutions, leading to
systematic undervaluation of FDI inflows to Turkey.
Turkey adopted the definition of the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) for FDI in 2001, and that definition was
included in the new FDI law of 2003 (see, e.g., OECD
1996, 2003). Table 10.2 compares the elements of
Turkey’s definition of FDI (in both the 1954 and
2003 FDI laws) with those of the definitions used
by other OECD countries, highlighting the omission
of preferredstockstradedonthestockexchange,long-
term loans, other marketable securities and bonds,
and financial derivatives from the previous definition
(short-term loans, commercial/retail loans, and leas-
ing are still not included in the new law).
Turkey’s Foreign Direct Investment Challenges: Competition, the Rule of Law, and EU Accession 265
TABLE 10.1 FDI Summary Data: Turkey versus Comparator CEE Countries
Czech
Turkey Poland Republic Hungary
GDP 2000 (US$ millions) 199,267 157,598 51,433 46,604
GFCF 2000 (US$ millions) 44,542 39,212 14,550 11,269
Population, 2000 (millions) 67.4 38.7 10.3 10.0
FDI inflows, 1991–96 (US$ millions, annual average) 751 2,119 939 2,205
FDI inflows, 1997–2000 (US$ millions, annual average) 878 6,971 4,072 1,957
FDI inflows, 2001 (US$ millions) 3,266 5,713 4,924 2,440
FDI inflows/GFCF, 1991–96 (annual average) 1.9% 10.7% 6.4% 26.8%
FDI inflows/GFCF, 1997–2000 (annual average) 1.9% 18.1% 26.5% 17.9%
FDI inflows/GFCF, 2001 12.4% 15.0% 30.6% 20.1%
FDI stocks, 1996 (US$ millions) 5,825 11,463 8,785 14,193
FDI stocks/GDP, 1996 3.2% 8.8% 15.2% 31.4%
FDI stocks, 2000 (US$ millions) 9,335 34,227 21,644 19,804
FDI stocks/GDP, 2000 4.7% 21.7% 42.1% 42.5%
FDI stocks, 2001 (US$ millions) 12,601 42,433 26,764 23,562
FDI stocks/GDP, 2001 8.5% 24.1% 47.1% 45.4%
Exports of affiliates of foreign TNCs,a 3,684 12,267 10,876b 19,558
2000 (US$ millions)
TNC exports/total exports, 2000 7.2% 26.5% 32.7%b 61.1%
Imports of affiliates of foreign TNCs, 2000 12,628 23,554 11,107b 22,820
No. of affiliates of foreign TNCs, 2000 5,334 35,840c 71,385d 26,645
Note: GFCF = gross fixed capital formation; TNC = transnational corporation.
a. An affiliate is an incorporated or unincorporated enterprise in which an investor, who is resident in
another country, owns a stake that permits a lasting interest in the management of that enterprise (an
equity stake of 10 percent for an incorporated enterprise or its equivalent for an unincorporated
enterprise).
b. Foreign trade, 1999.
c. Number of affiliates, 1998 (includes all firms with foreign capital).
d. Number of affiliates, 1999 (includes joint ventures). Of this number, 53,775 are fully owned foreign
affiliates.
Sources: International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Financial Statistics (CD-ROM); United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Directory (WID) Country Profiles,
2003; UNCTAD, World Investment Report, selected years.
TABLE 10.2 FDI Definition in OECD Countries
Preferred Stocks Preferred Stocks Other Kinds of Indirectly Capital Long- Short- Bonds and
Traded on Not Traded on Nonpreferred Reinvested Owned FDI in Term Term Commerce/ Marketable Financial
Stock Exchange Stock Exchange Stocks Earnings Enterprises Kind Loans Loans Retail Loans Leasing Securities Derivatives
Australia Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes — Yes Yes
Austria Yes Yes No — No Yes No No No No No No
Belgium Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes No Yes No No
Canada Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes —
Czech Rep. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes — Yes No No — — —
Denmark Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No
Finland No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No
France Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No No No No
Germany Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No No No No
Greece Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes —
Hungary Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Iceland No Yes — Yes Yes — Yes Yes Yes — — —
Ireland Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes —
Japan Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No
Korea, Rep. of Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No No No No
Luxembourg Yes Yes Yes Yes — No Yes Yes Yes No No No
Mexico Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Netherlands Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No —
New Zealand Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Norway Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Poland Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes —
Portugal Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Spain Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No
Sweden Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Switzerland Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Turkey (6224) No Yes Yes Yes
No
Yes No No No No No No
Turkey (4875) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No Yesa Yes
England Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No
United States Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
— Not available.
Note: Two sets of entries are given for Turkey: one for the 1954 FDI law (No. 6224) and one for the 2003 FDI law (No. 4875).
a. Excluding state bonds.
Source: OECD 2003.
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In addition, even though the new FDI law may
allow certain flows to be included, local statistical
data collection and recording practices may pre-
clude their inclusion in the official statistics. Capital
in-kind is one such example—statistics are gener-
ally not calculated and therefore not included. Even
though the precise figures are not available, for
some big projects Turkey’s previous narrower
definition and statistical processing can underesti-
mate FDI inflows by significant orders of magni-
tude. For example, Turkey has traditionally not
recorded long-term credits from foreign partners as
FDI. It has included such flows only if the foreign
partners’ receivables are added to the company’s
capital; otherwise, they are not recorded as an
increase in FDI but rather as an increase in external
debt. For the first time, however, because of a par-
ticularly large intracompany, long-term foreign
credit and in response to internal discussions on
the matter, in 2001 it was decided to classify such
credits as an FDI flow in conformity with interna-
tional norms. Therefore, the $1.4 billion credit
provided by the mobile phone arm of Telecom
Italia, the foreign partner of the GSM I
.
s¸-TIM
Telekomunikasyon Hizmetleri A.S¸. company, has
been included in 2001 inflows.
In terms of type of investment, most of the
growth of FDI companies worldwide in the 1990s
was by cross-border mergers and acquisitions
(M&As), in particular the acquisitions by foreign
investors of privatized state-owned enterprises
rather than greenfield investments. Less than 3 per-
cent of the total number of global cross-border
M&As during the 1990s are officially classified as
mergers; the rest are different types of acquisitions.
In terms of ownership, roughly two-thirds of cross-
border M&As were full acquisitions, and the
remaining one-third were minority acquisitions
(10–49 percent control). In terms of value, 70 per-
cent of cross-border M&As are functionally
classified as horizontal, between firms in the same
industry.4 Figure 10.2 highlights how this global
trend was especially critical in driving FDI in
Poland, but also in the Czech Republic and
Hungary, in contrast to its significantly lesser
influence in Turkey. Figure 10.3 presents evidence
suggesting the importance of privatization in
fueling M&A-related FDI inflows, and it highlights
the much more important role of privatization
in the CEE countries throughout the 1990s in
contrast to Turkey. However, although a significant
share of FDI in transition economies may have
been generated by the privatization process, the
privatization process in Poland has, notably,
involved a sizable amount of stock market flota-
tion, in which privatization-related capital inflows
would be reported as portfolio inflows rather than
FDI. The Czech Republic has actively promoted
privatization to local investors, which was usually
debt financed and thus linked to either domestic or
foreign credit rather than FDI.
In terms of industrial subsector allocation, a
majority of FDI inflows to Turkey have been directed
to the tertiary sector. Table 10.3 illustrates that by the
end of 2000 over 57 percent of total FDI stocks in
Turkey were dedicated to services, including three of
the top five subsectors—transport and communica-
tions, banking and other financial services, and trade
and repairs—in a pattern similar to that of Poland.
The other major recipients of FDI inflows to Turkey
have been in the manufacturing sector—the auto-
motive and auto parts subsector and the petroleum,
chemicals, rubber, and plastic products subsector.
The subsectoral pattern in the smaller countries, the
Czech Republic and Hungary, which do not benefit
from as large a domestic internal market, is even
more concentrated in the tertiary sector, with all five
top subsectors dedicated to producing services
rather than manufacturing goods. Table 10.4 reports
the identity of the largest FDI companies by world-
wide sales in each of the four economies, highlight-
ing the important role of the automotive and auto
parts subsector and the petroleum, chemicals, and
rubber and plastic sector in Turkey. Nine of the
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TABLE 10.3 FDI Stocks by Industrial Sector, 2000
(percent)
Sector/Industry Turkey Poland Czech Republic Hungary
Primary Sector 1.5 0.9 2.0 1.5
Agriculture, hunting, forestry, and fishing 0.8 0.5 0.2 1.1
Mining, quarrying, and petroleum 0.7 0.4 1.9 0.4
Secondary Sector 41.3 38.6 38.1 36.8 
Food, beverages, and tobacco 7.3 8.4 4.8 8.9
Textiles, leather, and clothing 1.9 0.7 1.3 1.6
Wood, paper, publishing, and printing 0.3 4.4 3.1 1.9
Petroleum, chemicals, rubber and plastic products 9.5 6.5 6.5 6.8
Nonmetallic mineral products 2.6 — 5.9 2.3
Basic metal and metal products 2.6 2.0 3.6 2.2
Machinery and equipment 0.2 1.3 1.7 1.9
Electrical machinery and apparatus 3.7 1.2 3.3 7.2
Motor vehicles and other transport equipment 12.1 6.4 6.5 3.6
Precision instruments 0.4 — 0.7 —
Other manufacturing 0.7 7.8 0.6 0.4
Unspecified secondary 0.0 — 0.0 —
Tertiary Sector 57.3 60.5 59.8 61.7
Electricity, gas, and water — 1.2 6.6 9.4
Construction 0.8 6.6 1.5 1.2
Trade and repairs 8.1 16.7 15.0 12.4
Hotels and restaurants 4.4 0.5 0.3 1.8 
Transport, storage, and communication 17.0 8.0 11.2 7.7
Finance 16.6 20.0 14.7 11.3
Real estate and business activities — 7.0 9.2 15.7
Education 0.0 — — 0.0
Health and social services 7.5 — — 0.1
Other services 2.8 0.5 1.2 1.9
Total 100 100 100 100
— Not available.
Sources: UNCTAD, World Investment Database (WID) Country Profiles, 2003; Turkey General Directorate
of Foreign Investors (GDFI) database.
TABLE 10.4 Largest Affiliates of Foreign Transnational Corporations
Sales
Company Home Country Industry (US$ millions)
Turkey, 2001
1 Tofas¸ Türk Otomobil Fabrikası Italy Motor vehicles 875.5
A.S¸.
2 Oyak Renault Otomobil Fabrikaları France Motor vehicles 748.4
A.S¸.
3 Vestel Elektronik San. ve Tic. A.S¸. Netherlands Electronics 690.2
4 Ipragaz A.S¸. France Petroleum products 375.5
5 Sasa Dupont Sabancı Polyester Netherlands Chemicals 333.3
Sanayi A.S¸.
6 Mercedes Benz Türk A.S¸. Germany Motor vehicles 284.9
7 Philsa PhilipMorris Sabancı Sigara- Netherlands Tobacco 264.6
Tütün A.S¸.
8 Bosch Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S¸. Germany Auto parts 245.7
9 Siemens Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S¸. Germany Electrical machinery 231.3
10 Pas¸abahçe Cam Sanayi Saudi Arabia Glass 223.0
11 Ford Otomotiv Sanayi A.S¸. United States Motor vehicles 212.9
12 Goodyear Lastikleri TA.S¸. United States Rubber 193.5
13 Trakya Cam Sanayii A.S¸. United States Glass 192.0
14 Profilo Telra Elektronik Sanayi ve France Electronics 189.0
Tic. A.S¸.
15 BSH Profilo Elektrikli Gereçler Germany Electrical machinery 185.0
Sanayii A.S¸.
16 Alcatel Teletas¸ Telekomünikasyon Neth./Belgium Electronics 176.7
End. 
17 Türk Pirelli Lastikleri A.S¸. Italy Rubber 173.7
18 Korsa Sabancı Dupont End. I
.
plik Netherlands Textiles 173.2
San. A.S¸.
19 JTI Tütün Ürünleri Sanayi A.S¸. Japan Tobacco 168.6
20 I
.
zmir Demir Çelik Sanayi A.S¸. Saudi Arabia Iron, steel 161.0
Total 6,098.0
Poland, 1999
1 Fiat Auto Poland SA Italy Motor vehicles 1,844.1
2 Makro Cash and Cary Poland Germany Distributive trade 1,544.8
3 Centrum Daewoo Sp ZOO Rep. of Korea Motor vehicles 916.6
4 Volkswagen Poznan Sp ZOO Germany Motor vehicles 661.5
5 Reemtsma Polska SA Germany Tobacco 595.7
6 Thompson Polkolor Sp ZOO France Electrical equipment 439.3
7 Real Sp ZOO Germany Distributive trade 423.7
8 General Motors Poland Sp ZOO United States Motor vehicles 411.3
9 Procter and Gamble Polska United States Distributive trade 400.0
Sp ZOO
10 Geant Polska Sp ZOO France Distributive trade 387.9
11 Unilever Polska SA Netherlands Distributive trade 383.6
12 International Paper Kwidzyn SA United States Paper products 360.7
13 Renault Polska Sp ZOO France Motor vehicles 360.7
14 Kulczyk Tradex Sp ZOO United Kingdom Distributive trade 304.8
15 Auchan Polska Sp ZOO France Distributive trade 297.5
16 Electrocieplownie Warszawkie SA Sweden Electricity 293.0
17 Frantschah Swiecie SA Germany Paper products 289.9
18 Philips Lighting Poland SA Netherlands Electrical equipment 289.4
19 Jeronimo Martins Dystrybucja Portugal Distributive trade 262.0
Sp ZOO
20 British American Tobacco United Kingdom Tobacco 282.9
Polska SA
Total 10,749.4
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TABLE 10.4 (Continued)
Sales
Company Home Country Industry (US$ millions)
Czech Republic, 1999
1 Skoda Automobilovi AS Germany Motor vehicles 3,292.5
2 Makro Cr Spol SRO Germany Distributive trade 736.2
3 Rewe Spol. SRO Germany Mach. and equip. 509.2
4 Tabak AS United States Tobacco 416.2
5 Philip Morris United States Tobacco 402.5
6 Jihomoravska Energetica Germany Energy 382.2
7 Tesco Stores Cr AS United Kingdom Distributive trade 335.0
8 IPS AS Finland Construction 327.6
9 Delvita AS Netherlands Distributive trade 318.6
10 Penny Market SRO Germany Distributive trade 294.8
11 Severoceska Energetica Germany Energy 285.0
12 Julius Meinl AS Austria Distributive trade 218.4
13 Siemens Automobilova Germany Motor vehicles 208.6
Technika SRO
14 Stavby Silnic A Zeleznic AS France Construction 207.9
15 Plzensky Prazdroj AS Netherlands Beverages 203.9
16 Autopal SRO United States Motor vehicles 201.3
17 Glaverbel Czech AS Belgium/Japan Nonmetal mineral 196.3
18 Robert Bosch Spol. SRO Germany Motor vehicles 162.6
19 Nestle Cokoladovny AS Switzerland Food 148.7
20 Siemens Elektromotory SRO Germany Mach. and equip. 147.5
Total 8,995.0
Hungary, 2000
1 Audi Hungaria Motor Kft. Germany Motor vehicles 3,190.6
2 Philips Magyarorszag Kft. Netherlands Electronics 2,266.3
3 IBM Storage Products Kft. United States Electronics 2,239.7
4 Matav Rt. Germany Telecom. 1,565.3
5 Panrusgaz Magyar-Orosz Russia Distributive trade 1,027.6
Gazipari Rt. 
6 Flextronics International Kft. United States Electronics 868.1
7 Metro Holding Kft. Germany Distributive trade 715.1
8 GE Hungary Rt. United States Electronics 658.1
9 Opel Magyarorszag United States Motor vehicles 629.5
Jarmugyarto Kft.
10 Kromberg Es Schubert Austria Basic metals 628.0
Kabeleket
11 Vogel and Noot Mezogepgyar Kft. Austria Basic metals 584.4
12 Westel 900 Mobil Rt. United States Telecom. 541.9
13 Budapesti Elektromos Muvek Rt. Germany Electricity 483.6
14 Elmu Rt. Germany Electricity 483.6
15 Tesco Global Rt. United Kingdom Distributive trade 447.6
16 Suziki Rt. Japan Motor vehicles 446.4
17 Hungarotabak Tobaccoland Rt. Austria Trade 442.3
18 Shell Hungary Rt. Neth./U.K. Distributive trade 420.5
19 Alcoa Kofem Kft. United States Basic metals 395.1
20 BorsodChem Austria Chemical 393.5
Total 18,427.2
Sources: See table 10.3.
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TABLE 10.5 FDI Stocks by Country of Origin, 2000
(percent)
Czech
Country of Origin Turkey Poland Republic Hungary
Austria 0.5 3.2 11.1 12.2
Belgium and Luxembourg 3.4 2.5 5.4 5.3
Denmark 0.5 2.5 1.2 0.5
Finland 0.1 0.6 0.6 1.6
France 7.3 12.2 4.3 6.5
Germany 14.1 18.9 25.5 25.8
Ireland 0.2 1.2 0.0 0.7
Italy 2.0 4.3 0.8 2.7
Netherlands 31.4 24.6 30.1 22.5
Spain 2.2 1.9 0.2 0.4
Sweden 1.0 3.5 1.4 0.9
United Kingdom 6.0 3.3 3.5 1.1
European Union, total 68.7 78.8 84.0 80.2
Japan 4.4 0.4 0.5 2.1
Korea, Rep. of 0.7 1.3 0.0 1.0
Switzerland 5.4 2.5 4.0 2.1
United States 8.7 9.5 6.5 8.2
Other OECD countries, total 19.2 13.7 11.0 13.4
OECD, total 87.9 92.5 95.1 93.6
Other Eastern European countries 0.4 4.3 1.0 0.4
Israel 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Saudi Arabia 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Panama 3.7 0.0 0.0 0.0
Dutch Antilles 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
Other countries 5.4 1.8 2.5 5.0
Total 100 100 100 100
Sources: See table 10.3.
top 20 Turkish FDI companies are in these two sub-
sectors, followed by the electronics and electrical
machinery subsector. The absence of service sector
companies in the Turkish list is explained by the
investment-to-sales profile typical of these subsec-
tors, in which there usually is a lag between the large,
lumpy up-front investments required and the subse-
quent stream of sales revenues generated by the
installed infrastructure service networks.
In terms of country of origin, a striking feature
of FDI stocks is the significantly greater concentra-
tion of investment going from EU countries to the
officially recognized EU accession countries than
to Turkey (table 10.5). In 2000, Turkey received
only 68.7 percent in FDI flows from EU countries,
in contrast to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic, which received 79, 80, and 84 percent of
their FDI flows, respectively, from EU countries.
Turkey has, however, received significantly more
FDI inflows from Japan, Saudi Arabia, and offshore
locations such as Panama and the Netherlands
Antilles than the three CEE countries. Interestingly,
in spite of important investments from the United
States in the top 20 Turkish FDI companies (motor
vehicles, rubber, and glass), the relative share of
U.S. investment is not significantly different in
Turkey than in the CEE countries.
Determinants of FDI
Investment climate can be defined as the policy,
institutional, and behavioral environment, present
and expected, that influences the perceived returns
and risks associated with investment in terms of
both quantity and productivity of investment
flows.5 Investment climate depends on a wide array
of factors that can be grouped under three broad
headings: macroeconomic and trade policies, infra-
structure, and governance and institutions. These
factors help to explain both the strong potential
attractiveness of Turkey as a global location for FDI
and the shortcomings that have led Turkey to fall so
far below its potential in this area.
Macro Policies, Infrastructure, 
and the Automotive Sector
Macroeconomic and Trade Policies. Since the
1980s, Turkey has undergone significant changes in
its economic relations with the outside world involv-
ing its macroeconomic and trade policies. After the
January 24, 1980, decision to open up Turkey’s econ-
omy, the government put great emphasis on an
export orientation. This first step was followed by
gradual import liberalization, which began in 1984
and finally culminated in the customs union with
the EU in 1996. However, despite the gradual
removal of trade barriers and the greater export ori-
entation, Turkey was unable to attract large FDI
inflows. One of the main culprits behind this failure
was the uncertain macroeconomic environment.
With its heavy dose of patronage relations and rent-
seeking activities, domestic politics never allowed
the creation of a stable macroeconomic environ-
ment. Fiscal imbalances continued throughout the
1990s, and were transformed into rather stark debt
dynamics by the end of the decade (table 10.6).
Public sector borrowing requirements increased
from 5 percent of the gross national product (GNP)
in 1995 to as high as 15.5 percent in 1999 and 2001.
Chronic budget deficits and the rapidly increasing
public debt are at the root of the high and chronic
inflation problem that Turkey has suffered over the
last 25 years. During that time, the average con-
sumer price inflation rate was 63 percent, and over
the last two decades annual inflation has never been
lower than 30 percent. Through the second half of
1990s and early 2000s, the real interest rate was quite
high. With the exception of 1997 and 2000, the ex
post real interest rates on bonds and Treasury bills
were above 20 percent, reaching as high as 36 per-
cent. In addition to the high real interest rates that
inhibit domestic and foreign investment, the
exchange rate devaluation risk created an extra
burden on foreign investors who were willing to
invest in the country with a long-term perspective.
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TABLE 10.6 Macroeconomic Indicators, 1995–2001
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
(percent of GNP)
Public sector borrowing requirement 5.0 8.6 7.7 9.4 15.6 12.5 15.5
Primary surplus 2.1 1.3 0.0 2.1 −1.9 3.8 6.5
Interest expenditures (consolidated budget) 7.4 10.0 7.7 11.5 13.7 16.3 22.2
Public sector debt stock 37.6 40.3 40.5 41.3 51.8 53.4 97.8
Domestic 14.6 18.5 20.2 21.7 29.3 29.0 66.3
External 23.0 21.8 20.3 19.6 22.5 24.4 31.5
(percent per year)
Interest rate on bonds and T-bills (average) 124.2 132.2 107.4 115.5 104.6 38.2 99.6
Inflation (CPI, annual average) 89.0 80.2 85.7 84.6 64.9 54.9 54.4
Ex post real interest rate (CPI-based) 24.4 25.0 12.4 30.7 32.1 −10.5 36.0
GNP growth rate 8.0 7.1 8.3 3.9 −6.1 6.3 −8.5
Real exchange rate (CPI-based index) 100.0 102.7 109.4 118.5 123.1 136.5 112.5
Real exchange rate (WPI-based index) 100.0 101.2 107.0 110.1 107.4 114.3 98.3
Average maturity of borrowings (days) 188.0 186.6 393.5 235.1 502.3 426.8 146.3
Note: CPI = consumer price index; WPI = wholesale price index.
Sources: Yılmaz, Akçay, and Alper 2002; Özatay and Sak 2002.
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Because of the uncertainties stemming from
domestic politics, the macroeconomic environ-
ment, and the ensuing high real interest rates,
Turkey experienced very erratic growth perform-
ance. After the capital account liberalization in
1989, it was able to attract foreign capital to finance
public sector borrowing requirements and generate
growth rates of about 5 percent. Yet because of the
availability of external funds, successive govern-
ments were “unable” to bring budget deficits, and
thus inflation, under control. As the country’s
inability to cope with its economic woes became
evident toward the end of the 1990s, the external
funds dried up and growth rates declined sharply.
The 2001 economic crisis was the final blow that
underlined the need for a new economic policy
framework in Turkey.
Over the last two decades, Turkey put on hold
many decisions that could help foreign investors
cope with high inflation. One of the critical meas-
ures was an inflation accounting framework. In a
country that has lived with an average of 60 percent
inflation, it is only now that an inflation accounting
framework has been implemented.
Infrastructure-Related Factors. The quantity and
quality of Turkey’s broadly defined infrastructure,
including its geographic and demographic endow-
ments and its physical and financial infrastructure,
help to position Turkey as a potentially powerful
magnet for FDI inflows. Turkey enjoys a very spe-
cial location at the crossroads between East and
West, overlapping Europe and Asia geographically
and culturally. The proximity to the Balkans and
the rest of high-income Europe, as well as to the
emerging markets in Russia, Caucasia, and Central
Asia and the expanding markets of the Middle East
and North Africa, offers the potential of over 1 bil-
lion consumers.
As highlighted in tables 10.7a and 10.7b,
Turkey’s demographic endowments present both
strengths and weaknesses to foreign investors when
compared with those of Poland, the Czech Republic,
and Hungary. Turkey’s huge and growing domestic
market compares favorably with those of the com-
parator CEE countries. Turkey is projected to con-
tinue to have one of the largest populations in the
Middle East and Eastern Europe. The domestic mar-
ket is predominantly urban, and at least 17 major
cities have a population in excess of 1 million, led by
Istanbul, Ankara, and I
.
zmir. The population is
much younger than those of European countries;
over 60 percent of the population is below the age
of 35. On the negative side, the purchasing power of
TABLE 10.7a Infrastructure-Related Factors—Strengths: Turkey versus Comparator
CEE Countries
Czech
Turkey Poland Republic Hungary
Demography and business values
Population—market size (millions) 67.8 38.7 10.3 10.1
Labor force growth (% change) 2.46 −0.33 −0.04 −0.47
Avg. no. of working hours per year 2,074 1,870 1,976 1,988
Flexibility and adaptability of people (survey) 7.53 4.77 5.83 6.74
Entrepreneurship (survey) 7.03 4.12 6.44 6.74
Availability of competent senior managers (survey) 6.5 5.21 4.92 6.37
Physical and financial infrastructure
Internet costs for 20 hours (US$) 11.4 39.16 42.92 42.61
Adequacy of communications (survey) 6.66 4.93 7.17 7.19
Quality of air transport (survey) 7.44 4.55 7.00 5.93
Adequacy of distribution infrastructure (survey) 6.06 3.68 5.67 4.89
No. of credit cards issued (per capita) 0.57 0.13 0.21 0.29
Availability of finance skills (survey) 6.88 5.26 4.78 6.52
Note: The survey measures are all reported on a 0–10 scale, with 10 indicating the most positive
perception.
Source: All measures are from the Institute of Management Development (IMD) 2002.
the average citizen is still significantly lower than
that in the CEE countries, with per capita GDP 30
percent less than Poland’s and less than half that of
Hungary and the Czech Republic. Yet Turkey’s
improving consumption patterns and purchasing
power, along with its growing middle class, are
important positive features of the domestic market.
Because Turkey’s population growth rate has fallen
from over 3 percent to under 2.5 percent, it is on the
verge of entering a “golden demographic period”
similar to that experienced by East Asia in the
1980s, in which the productive working population
is largest relative to children and retirees, providing
a critical ingredient for rapid income growth. Only
a few emerging markets in the world have the
potential to attract investment both for export and
for their domestic market. Turkey, however, is in
such a privileged position. It has the potential to
create a “virtuous investment cycle,” in which a
more competitive domestic business environment
further strengthens the country as a platform for
exports, and the exports, in turn, stimulate firms to
upgrade and better serve the domestic market.
In addition to geography and demography,
another area in which Turkey compares favorably
with its comparator CEE countries is its highly
skilled, flexible, and business-oriented labor force.
As reported in table 10.7a, Turkey’s work force is
considered to be significantly more flexible, adapt-
able, and entrepreneurial than those of its com-
parator countries.6 Yet its levels of actual employ-
ment, adult literacy, secondary school enrollment,
and female labor force participation are low relative
to those of the CEE countries, indicating the strong
positive role still to be played by more widespread
and improved nationwide education services.
Although Turkey scores comparatively well in terms
of availability of competent senior managers, train-
ing of employees is less of a priority in Turkish
companies on average than in the CEE countries.
As for the traditional basic infrastructure meas-
ures, Turkey is again characterized by areas of
strength and weakness (tables 10.7a and 10.7b). In
communications and transport, Turkey stands out
for its relatively low Internet costs—the cost of
Internet access in Turkey for a basket of 20 hours at
peak time is the lowest of all countries included in
the World Competitiveness Yearbook 2002 (IMD
2002) and is perceived as providing adequate
communications standards. Turkey also is rated
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TABLE 10.7b Infrastructure-Related Factors—Weaknesses: Turkey versus 
Comparator CEE Countries
Czech
Turkey Poland Republic Hungary
Demography and business values
GDP per capita (US$ at PPP) 6,175.0 9,151.0 14,485.0 12,663.0
Employment (% of population) 29.1 37.1 45.8 37.4
Adult literacy (% of population over 15 years) 84.6 99.0 99.0 99.0
Secondary school enrollment (% of relevant 51.0 87.0 100.0 97.0
age group)
Female labor force (% of total labor force) 26.4 45.1 44.7 44.5
Employee training in companies (survey) 4.03 3.74 5.61 5.78
Physical and financial infrastructure
Electricity costs for industrial clients (US$/kWh) 0.082 0.037 0.043 0.050
Adequacy of energy infrastructure (survey) 3.94 5.57 7.94 6.69
Computers per capita (per 1,000 people) 53.0 122.0 179.0 176.0
Technological cooperation between 4.00 4.03 6.17 5.19
companies (survey)
Credit flows from banks to business (survey) 2.84 3.39 3.28 4.52
Venture capital for business development (survey) 1.97 3.42 3.17 3.48
Note: The survey measures are all reported on a 0–10 scale, with 10 indicating the most positive
perception. PPP = purchasing power parity.
Source: All measures are from IMD 2002.
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highly for both air transport quality and internal
distribution infrastructure. Yet Turkey lags behind
in its energy infrastructure. Although it recently
passed new laws on its electricity and natural gas
framework, which are designed to spur significant
market-driven improvements in line with Turkey’s
underlying endowments, effective implementation
to yield the expected results will take some time.
Turkey also lags behind the CEE countries in com-
puterization and technological cooperation. Finally,
in finance, Turkey stands out in the breadth of its
private sector–relevant finance skills and access to
credit cards. But Turkey performs less well in areas
critical to starting new indigenous businesses not
connected to existing industrial groups; venture
capital for business development is not so easily
available, and credit does not flow very easily from
banks to businesses.
The Automotive Industry. A natural implication of
Turkey’s large domestic market is the presence of
FDI directed largely toward the internal market.
However, the automotive industry is a good exam-
ple of how an initially protected home market can
be transformed into a competitive and increasingly
export-oriented industry through FDI inflows.
During the debate on the customs union, the auto-
motive industry was expected to be the industry
worst affected by lowering protections on EU
imports. However, that prediction was proved
wrong. Over the last few years, the automotive
industry has become the second largest exporter.
By the mid-1990s, four FDI companies had
more than 20 years of experience in the Turkish
automotive industry (Fiat, Ford, Mercedes, and
Renault).7 In the mid-1990s, with the increasing
prospects of a customs union agreement with the
EU, Japanese and Korean companies (Honda,
Hyundai, Isuzu, and Toyota) began investing in
Turkey in joint ventures with Turkish industrial-
ists.8 Perhaps because of the uncertain business
environment in Turkey, these companies did not
initially make substantial investments, and they
built plants with small production capacity. Once
the customs union with the EU went into effect in
1996, the domestic market gradually opened to
tough competition from the EU. Actually, in the
first couple of years of the customs union, the
sector struggled with wild fluctuations in domestic
demand as well as with competition from imports.
However, much was at stake. There was already a
substantial production capacity, coupled with a
competitive parts and accessories industry. In
addition, domestic business establishments with
years of experience in the automotive industry and
low-cost but good quality labor induced FDI
companies in the automotive sector to increase
their investments in Turkey and build new capacity
to produce motor vehicles for the European mar-
ket. None of the companies just mentioned decided
to close shop in Turkey. Only Opel decided to close
its small assembly plant near I
.
zmir.
In the meantime, the auto parts industry was also
attracting foreign investors. Most of the world lead-
ers in the sector have joint ventures with Turkish
partners. Some of them are big suppliers such
as Robert Bosch, Valeo, Delphi Packard, and
Mannesmann Sachs. Altogether, between 1992 and
2000, the automotive industry realized a total of
$3.4 billion in investment. Of this amount, the
industry used $750 million for capacity develop-
ment, $976 million for new model development,
$497 million for modernization, $300 million for
localization, and $195 million for quality improve-
ment. Moreover, because of the new investment
projects directed at the production of new models,
in 2000–02 this investment amount increased by
almost $1 billion.
The success of the automotive industry in attract-
ing FDI flows, despite the continuing constraints
arising from macroeconomic and governance and
institutional factors (see next section), is driven
largely by the relevance of all the positive aspects of
trade and infrastructure for this industry—the rea-
son automobile-related multinational corporations
(MNCs) decided to invest in Turkey. If other obsta-
cles were not present, the Turkish auto industry
would likely have attracted far more FDI inflows
than current levels.
Governance and Institutions: Case Studies Bot-
tlenecks related to insufficient respect for the rule
of law and to weak competition in local markets,
reinforced by uneven application of bureaucratic
red tape and of competition rules to all economic
actors in the market, profoundly damage any coun-
try’s investment climate. In these critical areas
requiring improved governance and more effective
institutions, Turkey, unfortunately, compares unfa-
vorably with the comparator CEE countries, as
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reflected in the perceptions of the global investors
and experts who compiled the following rankings.
According to the Heritage Foundation’s economic
freedom index 2003, Turkey ranks 105th (with a
score of 3.3), in contrast to Poland, 45th (2.7), and
the Czech Republic and Hungary, both tied at 32nd
(2.4). In PricewaterhouseCoopers’ opacity index
2001, Turkey ranks 74th, compared with the Czech
Republic at 71st, Poland at 64th, and Hungary at
50th. Finally, in Transparency International’s cor-
ruption perception index 2002, Turkey ranks 64th
(with a score of 3.2), in contrast to the Czech
Republic at 52nd (3.7), Poland at 45th (4.0), and
Hungary at 33rd (4.9).
To help illustrate what may be the central under-
lying factors accounting for Turkey’s poor perform-
ance in these widely cited indices, the rest of this sec-
tion presents three case studies that reflect the recent
experiences of actual foreign investors. The case
studies represent the primary sector (Normandy’s
experience in gold mining), the secondary manufac-
turing sector (Cargill’s experience in agroprocess-
ing), and tertiary services (I
.
s¸-TIM’s experience in the
mobile telecom market). Figure 10.4 summarizes
the main facts of the case studies. A discussion of the
common elements across the case studies follows.
The Eurogold Investment. Because of its complex
geology, Turkey possesses a diverse and rich array
of minerals. It is a major world producer of boron
minerals (it has two-thirds of the world’s borate
reserves), marble, copper and chrome ores,
feldspar, magnesite, and others. Its total mineral
industry revenues (primary and secondary mineral
production, including cement, glass, refined petro-
leum products, steel, and certain inorganic chemi-
cals) are estimated to account for roughly 10 per-
cent of GDP. The mining sector is still
overwhelmingly controlled by state-owned compa-
nies, although some public companies have been
placed in the privatization process. Since enact-
ment of the mining law (No. 3213) in 1985, the
peak points in the value of FDI approvals in the
sector have occurred with the following major
investments: in 1990 in the Omya calcite mine, a
joint venture involving the Swiss company of the
same name; in 1991 in the Ovacik gold deposit by
Eurogold; and in 1995 in an Eskis¸ehir magnesite
mine by Magnesit A.S¸., a subsidiary of the Dutch-
based Société d’Interets Magnesiens.
Normandy Madencilik A.S¸. (formerly Eurogold,
but later purchased by Australia-based Normandy
Mining Limited) was registered in 1989 as a 100 per-
cent FDI company. It found total reported gold
reserves of 24,000 metric tons (and another 24,000
metric tons of silver) near the village of Ovacik,
Bergama, in I
.
zmir province. Under the initial appli-
cation, the mine was to be operated for eight years,
if no more reserves were discovered in the interim.
The ore would be mined by both open pit and
underground mining methods, followed by cyanide
leaching. Gold and silver doré metal were to be the
final products. In response to a request by the com-
pany in August 1991, the Ministry of Environment
issued a letter of no objection in October 1994,
indicating no health and environmental drawbacks
and allowing the mining and processing facility to
operate. The company also secured the required
permit for mining activities from the Ministry of
Energy and Natural Resources, and related permits,
licenses, and investment certificates from relevant
government entities. The amount of total invest-
ment was $100 million. As part of its application in
1991, Normandy prepared an environmental
impact assessment (EIA) report. After enactment of
a formal EIA regulation in 1993, Normandy agreed
to meet the new discharge limits, even though it
was exempt from the EIA because the mining rights
were granted before the regulation took effect.
Accordingly, the waste material from the facility
would be stored in a water retention-type tailings
dam, lined with clay and geo-membrane liners,
with no discharge to the environment.
The judicial problems facing Normandy began
with a court case initiated by the inhabitants of
Ovacik and some nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) in 1994, based on a suit to annul the origi-
nal Ministry of Environment decision authorizing
the project. Long-lasting and repeated legal proce-
dures followed. In 1997, after a long judicial process
and just as construction of the facility had been
completed and the mine was ready to operate,
Turkey’s highest relevant court, the Council of State
(Danıs¸tay), overturned the initial government
authorization and ordered the mine and processing
plant to be sealed by 1999. The ruling stated that the
facility’s proposed use of cyanide posed risks for
health and environment and thereby violated Article
17 of the constitution, which granted all citizens the
right to live in a healthy and balanced environment.
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FIGURE 10.4 Case Studies
Source: The authors.
Some lawyers have criticized Danıs¸tay’s decision
that the technical method for mining was hazardous
to human health. They argue that setting the rules
on such a technical issue and prohibiting the use of a
technical method are not the responsibility of
Danıs¸tay; rather, that responsibility resides with the
related ministries or government institutions.
In response to this ruling, Normandy took addi-
tional safety measures in 1998 and reapplied to the
Ministry of Environment for administrative
permission, adding a cyanide destruction system
for effluents from the facility, a sealed tailings pond,
and a zero discharge system for wastewater. With
these measures, the Ovacik facility became known
as one of the better examples of environmental
protection in the world (see, e.g., Arol 2002). The
Ministry of Environment, in turn, consulted with
the Prime Ministry. The Prime Ministry appointed
a team of scientists under the governance of the
Turkish Scientific and Technical Research Institute
(TUBITAK) to evaluate the process. Based on a
positive report from TUBITAK, the company was
allowed to operate the facility for a one-year trial
period, and it began operations in June 2001.
Normandy has been operating the facility since
then and publicizing the results of periodic
independent environmental monitoring showing
results well within national and international
limits.
Project opponents have continued to challenge
government decisions in various administrative
courts in I
.
zmir, with at least 10 separate court cases
filed since August 2000 by local plaintiffs; defen-
dants are the Prime Ministry, Ministry of Environ-
ment, Ministry of Health, and Ministry of Forestry.
In late February 2002, an administrative court in
I
.
zmir ruled that the trial permit was violating the
public good and issued an injunction against the
facility, ordering it to close on April 2, 2002. How-
ever, the government passed a special permit for
Normandy to continue operations.
Normandy’s involvement in Turkey has benefited
the Turkish mining sector in terms of improving
environmental standards in the sector, applying
state-of-art technology in gold mining and process-
ing, and improving local technical training. Since
the start of operations in June 2001, the facility has
provided direct employment for 250 persons and
indirect employment for an additional 1,200,
including through the formation of new businesses
in supporting industries. The acquisition of
Normandy Mining Limited by U.S.-based Newmont
Mining Corporation was completed in February
2002.
This case study highlights the problems for
investors arising from the insufficient clarity of and
lack of respect for the rule of law in Turkey. In this
instance, Normandy followed established rules and
procedures. The initial government authorization by
the Ministry of Environment based on Normandy’s
adherence to the prescribed rules did not protect the
company from successive legal challenges. After the
first order for plant closure, subsequent authoriza-
tions based on the company observing newly
prescribed rules (the new EIA regulation) by the
Ministry of Environment, the Prime Ministry, and
TUBITAK again were overturned, and the plant was
ordered to be closed for a second time in August
2004. Since the plant shut down, the government has
not issued a technical standard on the permitted
methods for gold mining and specifically for cyanide
leaching. Moreover, the government has adopted
new regulations on sectoral licensing authorizing
the Ministry of Health and the provincial governors,
along with the Ministry of Environment, to issue
operating licenses. Faced with insurmountable legal
problems and the constantly changing regulations,
the parent company, Newmont Mining Corpora-
tion, sold Normany Mining to a Turkish company in
early February and withdrew from Turkey.
Cargill Starch-Based Sugar Investment. Turkey’s
sugar production can be divided into traditional
beet sugar (sucrose or ordinary table sugar)
processed from crushed sugar beets and starch-
based sugar (glucose and fructose), a lower-cost
alternative processed from maize. Although
fructose can be used as a substitute for sucrose
(because it is sweeter and metabolizes more slowly,
it is often used in food products designed for
people with diabetes), glucose cannot be used as a
substitute, even though both are used as important
sweetener inputs in food processing industries. The
more traditional beet sugar is produced by 29 com-
panies in Turkey, with state-owned production
capacity accounting for 80 percent of the total.
Starch-based sugar is produced by five private com-
panies, of which three are MNCs. In 2001 Turkey
produced 2 million metric tons of beet sugar, over
five and a half times more than the privately
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produced 360,000 metric tons of starch-based
sugar (235,000 of fructose, 125,000 of glucose). The
sugar industry is characterized by substantial excess
capacity, with total production capacity of 2.25 mil-
lion metric tons of beet sugar and 930,000 metric
tons of starch-based sugar. However, given the
uncompetitively high local production costs of beet
sugar, even current levels of beet sugar production
are feasible only with extremely high nominal rates
of protection of 78.5 percent and effective rates of
protection of 1,500 percent. The excess capacity of
starch-based sugar is not market based, however.
It was artificially created by the new sugar law
(No. 4634) announced in April 2001, which
imposed a quota limiting starch-based sugar
production to 10 percent of total beet sugar pro-
duction in response to pressure from beet sugar
farmers and processors. (This quota can be
increased to 15 percent by the Council of Ministers.
The actual quota has always been 15 percent.)
U.S.-based but Dutch-registered Cargill Incor-
porated began starch-based sugar production in
Turkey in 1990. It obtained the required investment
certificates (10 separate certificates between 1990
and 1997) for a wet corn milling (starch) process-
ing plant in Pendik, Istanbul, with a capacity of
220,000 metric tons. Based on the success of that
plant, Cargill obtained an additional investment
certificate for a $90 million investment in a second
facility at Orhangazi, in Bursa province in January
1998, again with a capacity of 220,000 metric tons.
Like the first facility, this plant was constructed in
full compliance with all the relevant legislation in
force, and it has obtained all the necessary consents,
permits, licenses, and authorizations (with a special
condition within the foreign investment certificate
recognizing the High Planning Board decision
transferring the former agricultural area land into
industrial area land). Significantly, 800 families and
4,000 people in the region were making their living
out of the Orhangazi facility between 1998 and
2002, and 70 percent of the maize processed in the
facility in 2002 was purchased from domestic
growers.
In response to intense lobbying from the more
expensive beet sugar producers, the Orhangazi
facility has, since 2001, faced two separate but
related problems. First, four court cases, still pend-
ing, commenced in 2001 challenging the govern-
ment’s initial granting of construction, discharge,
and emission permits. The plaintiffs, supported by
the Bar Association of the city of Bursa, various
professional chambers of Bursa, and some national
members of Parliament from Bursa, undertook
these actions against the Prime Ministry, the
Governorship of Bursa, and the Ministry of Public
Works and Housing. Although a case in the Sixth
Administrative Chamber of the Council of State
was decided unanimously in favor of Cargill and
the government, it was appealed by the plaintiffs.
Eventually, the initial decision was overruled, and
the plaintiffs then sought cancellation of the
original discharge and emission permits. A sepa-
rate ruling found that the High Planning Board
gave inappropriate permission for facility con-
struction on “first priority agricultural land”—
that is, it was claimed that the permission was in
contradiction of the constitution. It was, therefore,
ruled that the Orhangazi facility must be torn
down. For a while, the company operated under
special permission by the government. Then, in
2004, the government enacted a new law for the
establishment of “industrial zones.” The law
authorizes the Council of Ministers to designate
certain regions or already existing plant locations
as industrial zones in which construction, dis-
charge, and emission permits are not obligatory.
Cargill has applied to the Industrial Zone Coordi-
nation Board for industrial zone status for the
Orhangazi facility, and it is likely to be granted.
However, no one, including government officials,
knows what will happen when the court cases are
finalized.
The second problem is related to the unpre-
dictable introduction of quotas on starch-based
sugar production in 2001. The initial government
policy was to create substantial additional capacity
by promoting starch-based production to substitute
for higher-cost beet sugar. Although the initial
quota for the period 2002–03 was restricted to
234,000 metric tons, it was increased by 50 percent
by a subsequent Council of Ministers decision.
However, the government’s decision to increase the
production quota has been ineffective so far,
because it has not been implemented by the respon-
sible independent regulatory board (the newly insti-
tuted Sugar Board). To add to the already existing
chaos, the government abolished some articles of
the sugar law at the end of 2004. With this move, the
Sugar Administration was abolished. Now the Sugar
Board legally exists, but it does not have an institu-
tion to represent. A lawsuit is being prepared for
cancellation of the decree on the grounds that the
government does not have the authority to change
the law unless there are international commitments.
This case highlights problems for investors simi-
lar to those encountered in the Eurogold invest-
ment, again arising from insufficient clarity of and
the lack of respect for the rule of law. Cargill, too,
followed the established rules and procedures. The
initial government authorization granted in 1998
(supported by a High Planning Board decision)
after Cargill followed the prescribed rules again did
not protect the company from successive legal chal-
lenges, nor did subsequent support by the govern-
ment (Prime Ministry, Ministry of Public Works
and Housing, Governorship of Bursa) protect the
company from plaintiffs eager to find legal loop-
holes to force plant closure (and, again, the legal
problems have still not been solved permanently).
In addition, this case highlights the negative impact
on investments arising from the lack of a level play-
ing field for all firms. In effect, unpredictable and
uneven changes in rules with the introduction of
highly restrictive quotas on some market players
and not on others, together with the biased and
anticompetitive decision of the Sugar Board in
favor of entrenched local incumbents, have a
negative effect on investments not only by efficient
companies in the sugar industry but also by
efficient companies in all sectors.
I
.
s¸-TIM Mobile Telecom Investment. The move to
liberalize the Turkish telecommunications indus-
try’s state-run monopoly began in 1994 with legis-
lation to corporatize (as a state economic enter-
prise) the sole fixed-line operator, Türk Telekom
(TT) and remove telecom services from direct
government involvement. Also in 1994, the mobile
telecommunications market was opened to limited
competition from two private operators, Turkcell
and Telsim, which began business under revenue-
sharing agreements with Türk Telekom. These
duopoly providers were granted 25-year licenses in
1998, although this initial assignment of spectrum
was not competitively determined. In January
2000, new legislation (Law No. 4502) established
an independent authority, the Telecommunications
Authority (TA), and Türk Telekom was granted
independence in business operations, but it was to
end its monopoly in fixed-voice telephony by
December 31, 2003. The third mobile license was
allocated on the basis of a competitive tender in
April 2000, with the condition that the minimum
bid for a fourth license be equal to that paid by
the third operator. I
.
s¸-TIM, a consortium of
domestic I
.
s¸bank and the mobile phone arm of
Telecom Italia Mobile (TIM) operating under the
Aria brand, won the third tender with an unex-
pectedly high bid price of $2.525 billion, sus-
pected to have been an attempt to prevent a
fourth operator from entering.9 The tender offer
for a fourth license failed, and the fifth license was
granted to Türk Telekom (through a newly
created subsidiary, Aycell) at the same price paid
by I
.
s¸-TIM. I
.
s¸-TIM entered the market in March
2001 and Aycell in December 2001. By the end of
2001, the mobile penetration rate had reached
28.7 per 100 inhabitants, surpassing that in the
fixed-telephony market. By the end of 2002,
Turkcell had a market share of 64.3 percent,
Telsim 30.2 percent, I
.
s¸-TIM 4.7 percent, and
Aycell 0.8 percent. Unlike Eurogold and Cargill,
which are 100 percent FDI companies, I
.
s¸-TIM is a
joint venture investment in which TIM owns
49 percent and the domestic partner is one of the
largest banks and holding companies in Turkey.
The main problem facing I
.
s¸-TIM since its entry
into the Turkish market has arisen from its
inability to conclude mutually acceptable roaming
agreements with the incumbent competitors,
Turkcell and Telsim. After the parties failed to
resolve the tariff dispute among themselves, in
March 2001 I
.
s¸-TIM asked the TA to intervene. The
regulator determined the terms, conditions, and
tariffs for roaming in October 2001, but Turkcell
and Telsim obtained preliminary injunction
decisions in November 2001 with the aim of
suspending implementation of these terms and
conditions, and they applied to international arbi-
tration. In March 2002, the TA adopted the Regula-
tion on the Procedures and Merits concerning the
Execution of National Roaming Agreements, but
Turkcell and Telsim again obtained preliminary
injunction decisions and applied to international
arbitration for a second time. I
.
s¸-TIM raised an
objection against both injunction decisions as the
third party suffering from the decision, but its
objections were rejected. I
.
s¸-TIM sent a letter as a
last warning to the TA in February 2003 and filed a
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lawsuit against the TA with the International Court
of Arbitration of the Paris-based International
Chamber of Commerce on March 31, 2003, seek-
ing nearly $3 billion in damages as a result of the
negative response to its letter (the full value of the
paid license fee plus valued added tax, because
Turkey did not make available the roaming rights it
had purportedly promised). On May 13, after nego-
tiations involving Italian Prime Minister Silvio
Berlusconi and Turkish Prime Minister Yılmaz
Erdog˘an, I
.
s¸-TIM announced a merger with Aycell
(TIM and Türk Telekom each to hold 40 percent of
the merged provider, with I
.
s¸bank holding the
remaining 20 percent). With the announcement of
the merger, I
.
s¸-TIM withdrew its lawsuit, because
the merger is expected to furnish I
.
s¸-TIM with
national roaming capacity, given Aycell’s sizable
network of base stations. The Turkish government
accepted the merger of the two companies to pre-
vent any further damage to Turkey’s already poor
reputation with foreign investors. The merger was
completed in February 2004. The new company is
called TT-TIM and is operating under the Avea
brand, with a market share of 16 percent.
In the meantime, on June 9, 2003, Turkey’s
Competition Board fined Turkcell $15.4 million
and Telsim $6.1 million (1 percent of the compa-
nies’ net sales in 2001) for refusing to allow I
.
s¸-TIM
access to their networks. The Competition Board
ruled that Turkcell and Telsim have been deliber-
ately stifling competition in the mobile services
market. The Competition Board also urged the TA
to provide the requisite remedy by better regulating
the market in order to end competition rule
violations of this kind.
The request for arbitration arose out of the right
that national operators have to national roaming
and the presumption by I
.
s¸-TIM that this right was
not adequately guaranteed by the TA. The right of
I
.
s¸-TIM to benefit from national roaming is included
in Article 6 of Law No. 4502, which requires mobile
operators “to satisfy reasonable, economically
proportionate and technically feasible roaming
requests of other operators working in the same
field” and requires the regulator “to issue regula-
tions setting out the principles of implementation
of this provision and the details to which standard
reference tariffs, interconnection and roaming
agreements are subject.” National roaming rights
are also presumed to arise out of Article 35 of the
concession agreement between I
.
s¸-TIM and the TA.
The article requires the regulator “to provide a
necessary, sufficient and fair competitive environ-
ment since I
.
s¸-TIM entered the market,” although it
also specifies that “the coverage area of the [new]
companies should cover 50 percent of the popula-
tion of the country in three years and 90 percent in
five years by investments exclusively made by the
operators themselves without any national roaming
support.” The presumed shortcoming of the TA is
that it has been late in coming up with its own regu-
lations on roaming, that standard interconnection
tariffs based on the long-run incremental cost
accounting methodology have not yet been estab-
lished, and that no requirement is in place ensuring
that regulatory decisions remain in force while
court proceedings are undertaken.
The I
.
s¸-TIM case, like the Cargill case, highlights
the negative impact that lack of a level playing field
for all firms has on investments. Although the rele-
vant regulatory body in the sugar industry made an
anticompetitive decision in favor of entrenched local
incumbent enterprises, the anticompetitive impact
in this instance arose from the inability of the TA to
impose a pro-competitive decision about roaming
rights on Turkcell and Telsim in a timely manner.
The origins of the problem in this case are related to
the too-slow evolution of rules and regulations in
the telecommunications sector and the lack of
authority of the regulatory body, driven no doubt at
least in part by a natural learning process of the TA.
Common Governance- and Institutions-Related
Constraints. One of the common features of the
three cases examined is the lack of credible indus-
trial policy framework statements that could give
investors confidence in the expected rules of the
game in each industry. In fact, no such document is
available for any industry. Even the changes made
in the legislative framework for telecommunica-
tions in May 2001 that gave more power to the TA
were made without a clearly articulated policy
framework. Thus, they hardly form the basis for
giving investors confidence about the government’s
long-term vision for the industry and for the econ-
omy as a whole. To help give credibility to such
policy framework statements, related legislation,
including implementing decrees in line with the
policy statements, are essential, as is the subsequent
consistent implementation of such legislation.
The case studies highlight two distinct but
related classes of constraints that account for
Turkey’s poor performance in attracting FDI: (a)
the legal and judicial constraints related to the
insufficient clarity of and lack of respect for the rule
of law, and (b) competition constraints related to
the absence of a level playing field for all firms. Lack
of clarity refers to insufficiently defined, missing,
incoherent, or changing rules. Lack of respect for
the rule of law refers to the practice of decision
making based not on ex ante defined rules but on
opportunistic motives irrespective of the prevailing
rules. It also refers to both a reluctance to apply
rules when they should be applied and a tendency
to allow loopholes and ambiguities to persist in the
legal framework. Lack of respect for the rule of law
creates an environment in which multiple appeals
are common and in which successive appeals
attempt to overrule the previous court’s or public
authority’s ruling. The ineffectiveness of many of
the recently established regulatory boards intensi-
fies the adverse effects of this constraint on foreign
investors. In such an environment, it is only natural
for investors to lack confidence that established
rights will be respected by the courts.
In each of the presented cases, the government
as rulemaker has not been able to solve the underly-
ing problems in a timely manner. In those instances
in which the government has strived to help the
investor, its attempts have been met with judicial
challenges. These judicial challenges, when circum-
vented by the government such as in the Eurogold
and Cargill cases, were carried out without address-
ing the underlying legal bottlenecks. This funda-
mental problem of unaddressed underlying legal
ambiguities appears to be one of the most critical
problems. It raises the question of whether lack of
clarity in the underlying rule of law is intentional,
so that public decision makers have the freedom
required to grant special treatment and exemptions
whenever politically convenient. Unfortunately,
the substantial cost of such unpredictability in the
rule of law in terms of forgone current and future
investments amplifies the impact of distortions
stemming from government allocations based on
personal connections.
In the face of competition-related constraints,
state-owned, local, joint venture, and fully foreign-
owned companies are not able to compete on an
equal footing. In both the Cargill and I
.
s¸-TIM cases,
the failure of the relevant regulatory body to rap-
idly enforce a pro-competitive order has sent nega-
tive signals for future investments by existing or
new, potentially efficient enterprises. It is, of course,
natural for entrenched local incumbents, whether
in primary, secondary, or tertiary sectors, to seek to
maintain market power and prevent new investors
from challenging their local dominance. However,
it is the role of properly enforced competition
policies, both through the independent regulatory
bodies and through the Competition Board, to
ensure that incumbent companies only do so by
lowering their costs and offering improved prod-
ucts rather than by seeking to dull the competitive
market process, either on their own or through
alliances with organs of government.
This analysis of governance- and institutions-
related constraints in Turkey is consistent with a
broader analysis of politics and democracy in
Turkey as populist patronage—allowing people
greater access to the resources of the state through
the help of political parties (see, e.g., Kalaycıog˘lu
2001). In a cultural environment in which interper-
sonal trust is low, regional solidarity ties, blood
relations, clientelistic networks, favoritism, and
nepotism have deeply influenced and molded the
political culture.10 For patronage to thrive, authori-
ties must distribute favors to their clientele, which
is difficult to do if allocation of contracts and con-
tract monitoring, recruitment, promotion, tariff
decisions, and expansion of new entrants are con-
ducted purely on meritocratic grounds and
through transparent procedures as required by EU
standards. Only when rules and laws are applied
evenly for all market participants (and not directly
modified for politically influential firms) will non-
market-based favoritism be overcome and more
substantial investments driven by underlying effi-
ciencies be forthcoming.
FDI-Related Policies and
Institutions and EU Accession
Turkey scores better than its competitors along
many of the dimensions of FDI just described (also
see tables 10.7a and 10.7b). A huge and growing
domestic market, skilled and cost-effective labor,
strong local companies, and access to other expand-
ing markets are all strengths of Turkey. Further-
more, Turkey has had a liberal legal framework for
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FDI since 1954 and a convertible currency for
almost 15 years, far earlier than its competitors.
However, relatively low levels of FDI inflows over
past years reveal that Turkey has not been able to
translate these competitiveness-related strengths
into a sufficiently large number of concrete FDI
projects. In comparison with other candidate coun-
tries, Turkey’s EU candidacy has not positively
affected its inflow of FDI, and figures show that even
the customs union has had a negligible effect.11
The policies Turkey must follow to foster its
future competitiveness have to include all the tradi-
tional components needed to attract more FDI, such
as the further harmonization of trade and industrial
policies and the adoption of related legislation and
administrative procedures. However, these compo-
nents are not sufficient conditions for a more com-
petitive economy and will not automatically result in
increased inflows of FDI. All EU candidate countries
have applied the acquis, but each country also has
country-specific rules, policies, and institutions to
seek FDI. In addition to meeting EU requirements
in a broad range of traditional harmonization-
related areas, Turkey must attempt to improve its
legal/judicial and competition-related environment
in order to ensure predictable respect for the rule of
law and a level playing field for all firms, not only on
paper but also in terms of implementation.
EU Requirements
Turkey’s EU candidacy status and obligations as a
member of the customs union do not directly impose
EU requirements on Turkey’s FDI policy. Until 2003,
no explicit clause on FDI policy appeared in the
accession partnership (AP) report or the “Regular
Report on Turkey’s Accession,” even though Turkey’s
limits on foreign ownership for certain sectors were
criticized in the context of freer movement of capital
(European Commission 2003, 2002). However, FDI
as well as domestic investments are very much related
to the overall business environment and policy deci-
sions on taxes and state aids, intellectual property
rights, sectoral licenses, customs, and standards.
Furthermore, broader areas of competition policy
have a direct impact on how a country performs in
attracting FDI. Thus the previous AP documents and
the national program of Turkey had included a long
list of legislation to be amended, which, in turn,
could positively affect the investment climate.
The 2003 accession partnership report for Turkey
has, for the first time, clauses related to FDI policy
(European Commission 2003). The two require-
ments, which are explicitly stated in the AP docu-
ment, both as short-term priorities, are that Turkey
should “facilitate and promote the inflow of FDI”
(in the Economic Criteria section) and “remove all
restrictions affecting FDI [originating from the EU]
in all sectors in Turkey” (in the Free Movement of
Capital section).
As for broader EU requirements for FDI, the
2002 “Regular Report” contains criticism of the lim-
itations on foreign ownership in some sectors, of the
authorization system for investment, and of the
obligation to pay $50,000 to establish a company or
open a branch in Turkey (European Commission
2002). As for the restrictions on foreign ownership
in certain sectors, such as civil aviation, maritime
transport, port enterprises, radio and television
broadcasting, telecommunications, and mining and
energy, the government argues that most of the
other candidate countries still have similar restric-
tions and that Turkey should not remove them until
a more definite road map for EU accession is agreed
on. However, it is also argued that these restrictions
should be removed not only to comply with the EU
acquis, but also to develop a more competitive
investment environment for Turkey.
Reform Efforts to Date
Turkey adopted an ambitious structural reform
program in 2001 to lay the foundation for sustain-
able growth, driven by private investments and
supported by a smaller but more effective govern-
ment. The main pillars of the government’s
economic program related to development of the
private sector include an improved investment
climate; a smaller, more transparent, effective pub-
lic sector; a sound and competitive financial sys-
tem; accelerated privatization; and a more efficient
business infrastructure, with a particular focus on
communications and energy. The ongoing reform
efforts are closely linked to Turkey’s objective to
accede to the EU. The government realizes that
Turkey has fallen behind many other developing
countries in its effective liberalization, enforcement
practice, legal, and judicial reforms. Pushing ahead
with the ongoing reforms is crucial to the country’s
economic future.
Currently, Turkey is implementing a major fiscal
adjustment program to increase the effectiveness of
the public sector while reducing its size. Fiscal and
public sector reforms are imperative to ensure a
sustainable domestic public debt profile, which is
itself critical to establishing macroeconomic stabil-
ity with low inflation. These actions are essential to
allowing lower interest rates, facilitating long-term
investment planning, and promoting more robust
private sector growth. To complement these
reforms and ensure their sustainability, Turkey also
is undertaking fundamental reforms of its expendi-
ture and taxation systems. The banks act in 1999
established the Banking Regulation and Supervi-
sion Agency (BRSA) as an independent authority to
regulate and supervise the banking sector. The
BRSA has implemented a comprehensive banking
restructuring program to promote more efficient
financial intermediation for the enterprise sector.
To strengthen the scope for private sector
investment in telecoms, Turkey passed an amend-
ing law in 2000 to create, as noted earlier, the
Telecommunications Authority, an independent
regulatory body responsible for licensing, tariffs,
spectrum allocation, and other supervisory activi-
ties. Similarly, to strengthen the scope for private
sector investment in energy, separate electricity and
natural gas laws in 2001 established the independ-
ent Energy Market Regulatory Authority. In August
1999, Turkey’s constitution was amended to estab-
lish the legal basis for privatization and to allow
public services to be performed under private law.
Importantly, the amendments also allow the inter-
national arbitration of disputes. A new public pro-
curement law also was enacted in 2002. Although
all these policy announcements are desirable and in
the right direction, the government must ensure
that these policies will be implemented carefully,
consistently, and promptly so that business expec-
tations will not be adversely affected.
To address feedback received from international
investors about Turkey’s troublesome investment
climate, the government in 2001 launched a reform
process to improve administrative procedures. The
idea behind the Reform Program for Improving the
Investment Climate was that administrative barri-
ers can make the difference between the perception
that a location is an attractive one for investment
and the perception that it is not competitive.
Indeed, complex and time-consuming administra-
tive procedures appear to be among the most
important disincentives to investment, and they
can discourage investors, despite other attractive
features that a country might have to offer. Taking
into account the findings and recommendations of
a diagnostic study and a project on administrative
barriers to investment, conducted jointly by the
government and the Foreign Investment Advisory
Service (FIAS, a joint facility of the International
Finance Corporation and the World Bank), the gov-
ernment enacted a “Decree on Improving the
Investment Climate in Turkey” on December 11,
2001, as part of a national strategy to increase the
overall level of income and productivity and to
raise the level of competitiveness of firms operating
in Turkey (see FIAS 2001).
The challenge facing the government was how to
implement this reform vision in a manner that
would streamline administrative procedures while
incorporating private sector feedback on the meas-
ures to be taken. Within this framework, a three-
phase strategy was designed and then launched to
facilitate the reform process. In the first phase, a
clear vision and a consistent direction for the
reform were embodied in the December 2001 min-
isterial decree in order to demonstrate political
commitment and consensus behind the reform
scheme. The decree established the Coordination
Council for the Improvement of the Investment
Climate (YOIKK), a coordinating body composed
of senior public and private sector decision makers
with the mandate to identify and remove regulatory
and administrative barriers to private investment.
The second phase entailed formulating a clear and
precise action plan defining priorities, timing, and
responsibilities for attracting more FDI flows. In
the third phase, YOIKK was scheduled to hold
regular monthly meetings in order to monitor
progress made, with quarterly reports submitted to
the Council of Ministers.
As shown in figure 10.5, key areas of reform have
been identified and grouped under nine technical
committees to deal with the following constraints:
• Company registration. The goal is to eliminate
time-consuming, unnecessary, and duplicative
transactions.
• Employment. Problems are related to short-term
work visas, employment of special groups, and
high social contributions by employers.
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FIGURE 10.5 Areas for Investment Climate Reform
Source: Undersecretariat of the Treasury.
• Sectoral licenses. Licensing procedures are
unnecessarily complicated in various industries,
primarily because of overlapping authorities,
highly centralized approval procedures, and
little involvement by the private sector.
• Location. Access to public lands and site devel-
opment by the private sector are very time-
consuming and subject to some restrictions.
• Taxes and incentives. The corporate income tax
rate is comparatively high, and the system is
complex. Incentives should be aligned with the
EU state aids regime, and the process should be
simplified and automatic where possible.
• Customs and standards. Despite major reform
initiatives, customs procedures still cause some
delays because of the significant documentation
requirements, lengthy testing procedures,
delayed valued added tax (VAT) reimbursement,
and discretionary decision making with inci-
dences of corruption.
• Intellectual property rights. Protection of patents,
trademarks, and copyrights is insufficient,
mainly because of remaining gaps in the existing
legislation, weak implementation and enforce-
ment of laws, and cumbersome procedures.
• Investment promotion. No one single entity
effectively conducts targeted investment promo-
tion and policy advocacy.
• FDI legislation. Legislation on FDI at the time
of the formation of YOIKK was based on the
1954 law.
The first YOIKK meeting, held in March 2002,
set targets and timelines for these technical com-
mittees. One core dimension of the reform process
has been private sector involvement in all efforts
through disseminating the information and shar-
ing the results obtained over time. This emphasis is
in line with the government’s conviction that joint
evaluation of the needs and identification of appro-
priate solutions are of utmost importance for the
success of the reform initiative.
The reports of the technical committees have
been quite positive. The government already has
taken several steps in compliance with the recom-
mendations of the committees. Even though there
were elections and change in government, the
reform program has proved to be effective, and var-
ious legislative changes have been made and draft
laws prepared. After the November 2002 elections,
the new government amended the Council of Min-
ister’s decree to include another technical commit-
tee on small and medium-size enterprises. To
increase the influence of YOIKK, the government
decided to head it with a minister. Laws enacted as a
direct result of the YOIKK process to date include
(1) a new, up-to-date FDI law that serves as a
declaration to foreign investors of their rights and
that will enable a shift from an ex ante, control-
based “investment permission system” to a “promo-
tion and facilitation approach” with minimal ex
post monitoring to continuously improve the
investor climate in conformity with international
best practices; (2) a law that redesigns the company
registration process by diminishing the prior 19
required steps to three and by reducing turnaround
from two and a half months to one day; (3) a law on
employment of foreign personnel; and (4) a law
on the investment allowance system, which enables
a shift to an automatic state aids system in line
with EU requirements. Among the drafted laws that
have been sent either to the Prime Ministry or to
Parliament are a law on the duties and responsibities
of the Patent Institute, which will enable the insti-
tute to deal with intelllectual property rights issues
in a more professional way, and a law on the estab-
lishment of an investment promotion agency.
Although some investment promotion initia-
tives are being undertaken by several public and
private institutions, Turkey at present does not have
an agency that has a strong and clear mandate, setup,
and budget to carry out effective investment pro-
motion, including functions such as investor serv-
icing, investment generation, and policy advocacy,
and that is governed jointly by the public and pri-
vate sectors. Work is still under way on establishing
an appropriate institution to carry out these tasks.
YOIKK’s efforts also have borne fruit in several
other areas, such as recruitment of expatriates, sec-
toral licensing, customs, and intellectual and indus-
trial property rights. As for customs reform, the
Undersecretariat of Customs has been implement-
ing an ambitious reform program to improve its
administrative efficiency and effectiveness. The
customs automated system has been rolled out to
99 percent of all customs offices and has been fur-
ther enhanced to assist customs in controlling move-
ment of goods. Important steps taken include mod-
ernizing customs laws, regulations, and procedures
in line with those of EU legislation and simplifying
and harmonizing forms, procedures, and control
techniques in line with those internationally rec-
ommended by the World Customs Organization.
The legislation necessary to strengthen the capacity
and infrastructure of the Turkish Patent Institute
has been submitted to Parliament. The intent is to
ensure effective implementation of the regulations
on the protection of intellectual and industrial
property rights.
Finally, land acquisition and site development
for investment are critical issues for both local and
foreign investors. A very useful discussion forum
involving public and private sector representatives
has led to the creation of a priority list of problems
and measures to be taken in this field. The technical
committee working on this issue will begin by for-
mulating solutions to the most urgent problems.
Outstanding Priorities
Although current efforts have focused largely on
introducing new laws in pre-identified areas to spur
administrative reforms, predictable implementa-
tion of existing and new legislation is far more
important. As for competition-related reforms, it is
vital that all investors—existing producers and new
entrants, whether local, joint venture, or wholly
foreign-owned—face a level playing field in the way
that laws, regulations, and administrative proce-
dures are implemented. Certain critical problems
still exist for investors in these areas, as highlighted
by the case studies.
Legal and Judicial Reforms Improvements on the
legislative front, many of which were achieved in the
last few years, were necessary but not sufficient to
create an attractive legal framework for foreign
investors. Improvements in FDI legislation in the
narrow sense fall into this category of the necessary
but not sufficient changes required to generate sus-
tainable increases in FDI inflows. One of the critical
outstanding impediments to investment is that
implementation of the laws in both the executive
and judicial branches of government is fraught with
problems for investors. The most important, but
also probably the most difficult, reforms needed in
this area are basic changes in the legal and judicial
systems and in the way that administrative proce-
dures more generally are implemented.
The way in which the legal and judicial systems
work is a critical determinant of FDI—especially
high-value FDI destined for export markets that
can go anywhere and that need a reliable, hassle-
free environment. Lengthy, nontransparent proce-
dures, combined with unpredictable outcomes, in
both the executive branch of government and the
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courts, are among the main problems in this area.
Incomplete reforms and poor implementation of
laws and regulations are the overarching issues.
Adopted laws are often not implemented on time.
All this contributes to the general perception of an
unpredictable legal framework. Not only are the
administrative procedures time-consuming, but
also enforcement procedures for commercial cases
in the courts take much longer than in many other
countries. The heavy workload of judges is the
major reason for these delays. Often, court cases in
Turkey consume more than a year. In the survey
carried out by FIAS, another point frequently
raised by investors was their lack of confidence in
the impartiality and quality of the commercial
courts (FIAS 2001). Even if the legal issue appears
clear, foreign investors routinely state that the judg-
ments are still much more unpredictable than they
would be in their home country. Foreign compa-
nies and larger companies are very visible, and laws
may be applied more strictly to them than to
domestic and smaller companies. Although the
laws themselves respect the principle of equal treat-
ment stipulated in the 1954 law on foreign capital
and the new foreign direct investment law, imple-
mentation often has been different.
The government is taking steps to reform the
judicial system and enhance its predictability as a
component of Turkey’s EU accession program. The
commitments made in this area, as well as the
short- to medium-term plans, are reflected in the
national program. These targets will require some
years to achieve; however, these reforms should
help to improve the perception of Turkey in foreign
investors’ eyes. One desirable step would be for
Turkey to institute a comprehensive legal and judi-
cial review to identify and address important items
in existing private sector–related laws that are in
contradiction or that are not clearly defined. Fur-
thermore, a specific institution should be entrusted
with improved oversight responsibilities to reduce
the likelihood of such recurrences in the future.
Such a review should also include in its terms of
reference the removal of detailed sectoral issues—
such as those related to the allocation of land, first-
priority agricultural land, privatization, and
arbitration—from the constitution and their intro-
duction instead into the appropriate laws. Two
related recommendations that could be acted on
immediately are to refrain from allowing so much
time to pass between the adoption of laws and their
implementing legislation and to seek maximum
input from private sector participants, both local
and foreign, at the legal preparation phase. Best
practice would be to draft implementing regula-
tions in parallel with the law, or at least to have a
detailed draft ready at the time the law is adopted
on what the implementation will look like. Seeking
significant input from business associations before
laws and regulations are adopted will result in
adequate legislation that reflects the concerns of the
private sector. This procedure, common practice in
most OECD countries, increases the knowledge
base on which legislation is drafted.
Competition-Related Reforms The general goal
of creating a more competitive environment in
Turkey has been dealt with as part of the process of
meeting basic EU accession requirements. Turkey
developed its competition law while negotiating its
customs union with the EU. The law was adopted in
1994, taking the EU treaty as its substantive basis.
The Competition Board has been actively applying
Turkey’s competition law since the end of 1997.
However, industrial policy, company law, free move-
ment of goods, capital and service provision, taxa-
tion, sectoral policies, regional policies, and policy
on small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs) are
also all related to competition. Progress in all of
these areas to comply with the EU acquis will help
Turkey to achieve a better competitive environment.
As for enforcing the competition law, a few
outstanding issues are crucial to effective private
sector development. In particular, the current legis-
lation does not allow the Competition Board to
apply competition rules to all public undertakings,
including those with special or exclusive rights, and
to other entities of public administration. It is in
Turkey’s interest to change this situation and to
include the equivalent of Article 86 of the Treaty of
Rome (1957), which established the European
Community. As privatization progresses and public
participation withdraws, care should be given to
better aligning the specific sectoral laws with the
1997 Competition Act in order to ensure the effi-
cient enforcement of competition rules. Therefore,
it is essential that the government grant the Compe-
tition Board enhanced powers to act during the pri-
vatization process and in the regulated infrastruc-
ture sectors. In this respect, closer coordination
should be secured between the Competition Board
and special sectoral regulatory authorities. The sec-
toral regulatory authorities should focus more on
ex ante regulation, and the Competition Board
should concentrate on ex post regulation. After
such “specialization,” the current state of competi-
tion between these two types of institutions will
diminish, laying a stable foundation for coopera-
tion and coordination. This need for improved
coordination is evident in the Cargill case, where
quotas imposed by the Sugar Board have adversely
affected private sector parties by inhibiting compe-
tition, and also in the I
.
s¸-TIM case, where earlier
coordination would have helped to address the
situation sooner.
A recent study carried out by experts from the
Competition Board on legislation not compatible
with competition supports the view that the gov-
ernment is not consistent in its application of com-
petition policy principles (Ekdi and others 2002).
The study lists various laws and regulations from
different sectors that contradict the enacted com-
petition law, and almost all of these sectors are
dominated by public enterprises. Although such
inconsistencies might be understandable for legis-
lation that dates back to when the government
applied an import-substitution strategy and the
public sector was the driving force of the economy,
there is no economic rationale for such contradic-
tions in legislation adopted after approval of the
Competition Act. Such contradictions are most
glaring for regulatory bodies. As discussed in the
Cargill case, the Sugar Board should not have uni-
lateral authority to impose anticompetitive quotas.
More generally, there should be enhanced oversight
of competition policy to ensure that the decisions
of regulatory boards do not contradict competition
principles. A strong case can be made for the desir-
ability of strengthening the traditional competition
advocacy responsibilities of the Competition
Board, including granting the board the power to
introduce or amend new laws to promote competi-
tion, the power to modify existing laws that are
anticompetitive in their impact, the oversight
responsibility to ensure that relevant institutions
do not perform an anticompetitive role, and the
power to review whether decisions of all regulatory
institutions are in the public interest, with the man-
date to submit their reports to Parliament and
other appropriate public oversight entities.
Another key area of competition policy with an
unfinished agenda is state aids. Turkey has been
criticized by the EU for not aligning its state aids
system with that of the EU, even though such a step
has been a commitment of Turkey under the cus-
toms union. Progress has been made in this area,
but legislative changes and an independent moni-
toring authority have not yet been established.
Moreover, the current attempts to align the state
aids rules cover only the aids given to the private
sector, whereas public sector incentives also should
be covered to ensure a competitive environment.
The broader EU requirements shed light on
other issues on which Turkey should focus in seek-
ing a more competitive environment. These include
alignment with the acquis on intellectual and
industrial property rights (company law) and the
removal of limitations for foreign ownership in
certain sectors (free movement of capital).
The Benefits of Full EU Accession Turkey’s even-
tual EU membership is very crucial for FDI inflows.
Regardless of the many characteristics that render it
an attractive place for foreign investment, Turkey
cannot attract as much FDI as its competitors in
Central and Eastern Europe unless the government
takes further steps toward full EU membership.
Actually, Turkey would not have to wait very long
to start reaping the benefits of an eventual EU
accession. With the opening of EU accession nego-
tiations, Turkey is already likely to attract larger
sums of FDI, and there are many reasons to expect
such a development to take place.
The opening of EU negotiations in October
2005 is expected to act as a strong signal that
Turkey will eventually become a full member of the
EU, assuming that the government continues on
the current path of structural reforms with a clear
focus on the sustainability of public debt. Such a
decision would assure foreign investors that the
Turkish economy will follow a stable growth path
for the foreseeable future. Equally important, the
opening of EU accession negotiations would pro-
vide all investors with enhanced confidence that the
legal and judicial environment will improve across
all relevant areas of the common acquis and that
implementation of all required secondary legisla-
tion also will improve, because the accession
process in Turkey’s case requires not only progress
in enacting laws but also progress in implementing
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them. For Turkey, stability, together with institu-
tional reforms that will improve application of the
rule of law and enhance competition, would have
the benefit of convincing foreign investors to chan-
nel more funds to Turkey for domestic as well as
export market–oriented projects. Especially with its
domestic market potential, Turkey would be very
attractive for FDI in nontraded sectors. Because the
average size of investments in these sectors is in
general larger, it is likely that they would attract
significant FDI inflows immediately after the open-
ing of negotiations.
The attractiveness of Turkey for foreign investors
will continue to increase as the accession negotia-
tions proceed, allowing it to close the gap with the
CEE countries in attracting FDI. Meanwhile, Turkey
will continue to take steps toward harmonization
with the EU framework. At one step, even before
becoming a full member, Turkey will be in a posi-
tion to accept the authority of EU agencies in the
resolution of any problems that may arise between
foreign investors and the Turkish government. This
step will further ease some of the reservations that
foreign investors may still have in relation to Turkey.
After all, EU rules and regulations and the ways they
are implemented are well known and predictable to
foreign investors. It is at this stage that one of the
most important benefits from EU accession will be
realized by Turkey: the rule of law and competition-
related constraints will be eased even further, with
concomitant increases in private investment flows.
The Role of Proactive Investment Promotion
Policies In each of the anticipated stages in the
accession process, a critical question is what shape
should the most appropriate set of investment
promotion policies, best adapted to the evolving
Turkish reality, take? Another question is, in
addition to focusing on those elements of the
investment climate most critical to moving from
one stage to the next in the accession process, what
else should Turkey be doing on the policy side?
From these questions emerges one about the
desirability of more targeted FDI policies. The
experiences of both developed and developing
countries demonstrate the potential benefits of
specific policies to stimulate investment and of an
investment promotion agency (IPA) that will
engage in activities such as investment generation,
policy advocacy, investor servicing, and image
building (see chapter annex, which describes the
functions of an IPA). According to UNCTAD
(2000), more than 160 national and over 250 sub-
national IPAs are in place worldwide. A recent
empirical study on the effectiveness of IPAs in
58 countries revealed that FDI inflows are
positively correlated with investment promotion
activities, and that the quality of the investment
climate and the level of development have a signif-
icant effect on IPA performance (see Morisset
2003). This finding suggests that countries are well
advised to focus on basic improvements in the
investment climate first, and then consider intro-
ducing an IPA, at a minimum, concurrently with
serious efforts to improve the investment climate.
Political visibility and participation of the private
sector appear to be two elements critical to the suc-
cess of an IPA. Worldwide experience shows that
IPAs are more effective when they are autonomous
from the government (though subject to policy
oversight by the public sector) and when they are a
product of a genuine joint effort by the private and
public sectors.12
Turkey does not presently have an IPA. The
government has been carrying out promotion
activities on a negligible budget. Those activities
consist mainly of publications, limited advertising,
and participation in seminars and trade investment
fairs. It is difficult to claim that Turkey has a coher-
ent promotion policy when it is compared with
those of many other countries. Nor is it possible to
claim that the budget allocated to promotion is
sufficient. Under the YOIKK reform program, the
Technical Promotion Committee is still working to
set up an appropriate institution that could
perform the key IPA functions. In addition to the
public sector’s oversight role in establishing an
appropriate institutional framework, a government
also has a key role to play in articulating an overall
investment policy and specific FDI policy actions.
Ideally, a government should first decide on an
overall investment and FDI policy and then use
incentives where appropriate as tools to achieve the
stated objectives. The use of incentives will differ by
country, but the World Trade Organization (WTO)
has specified some general rules that each country
should obey. For Turkey, additional rules stem from
the customs union agreement with the EU. As part
of cross-national efforts to abolish barriers to
investment, bilateral or international agreements
are signed between countries to protect mutual
investments, with clauses ranging from admission
and establishment to standards of treatment and
dispute settlement mechanisms.
Attracting more FDI per se should not necessar-
ily be the main target of a country’s FDI policy. Just
as important are questions of how the country can
benefit more from any specific level of FDI and how
to prevent any negative effects of FDI. Ideally, FDI
policies should provide incentives for investors to
act in ways that will contribute most to the
country’s development process. In order to get
the most from FDI, countries can try to build local
capabilities, using local suppliers and upgrading
local skills, technological capabilities, and infra-
structure (UNCTAD 2003). Typically, policymakers
attempt to understand the potential and attractive-
ness of their country before designing a policy
accordingly. The sectoral and regional capabilities of
the country, the needs of specific investors—be they
market seeking or resource seeking—and the devel-
opment level of specific sectors relative to global
trends should all be taken into consideration. Even
developed countries apply specific policies to attract
FDI, and Germany’s use of special incentives to
attract investment in information-communication
technologies is an example of this practice.
Despite the general shift in attitudes in favor of
FDI, significant concerns remain about its possible
negative effects. Crowding out of local firms and
products, transfers of polluting activities or tech-
nologies, and concessions made to investors in
special zones that allow them to skirt labor and
environmental regulations are examples of these
negative effects (UNCTAD 2003: 88).
Given the benefits that could accrue to Turkey
from significantly higher levels of FDI, there is
indeed more that Turkey could and should do on
the policy side—subject to WTO and EU customs
union constraints. Indeed, Turkey has negotiated
investment agreements with 79 countries and
signed 66 of these agreements, and it has signed
“double taxation agreements” with 49 countries. It
also has taken part in the WTO negotiations for an
international investment agreement, and it has
participated in FDI-related issues in platforms such
as UNCTAD, OECD, WTO, and the European
Commission. However, a comparison of Turkey’s
potential with its actual levels of FDI inflows
suggests that the policies implemented to date need
further strengthening. In addition to enhanced
legal/judicial implementation and more effective
competition across markets, Turkey would benefit
from a coherent overall investment and FDI policy
that clearly articulates how specific policies and
more activist promotion are intended to achieve
stated objectives.
Conclusion
This chapter has examined the main challenges
currently facing Turkey in attracting foreign direct
investment. The setting of the analysis is that FDI
can in principle be highly beneficial for a country’s
growth and development prospects. The available
evidence suggests that FDI would indeed highly
benefit the Turkish economy as a whole, based on
its significant direct and indirect benefits for pro-
ductivity in the manufacturing sector.
Despite its beneficial effects, however, recorded
FDI inflows to Turkey have been extremely low
compared with those of the CEE countries. The
main FDI challenges facing Turkey, therefore, are
determining why FDI inflows have remained so low
and how Turkey can increase the inflows to desir-
able levels. But to what extent do recorded inflows
fully reflect actual inflows? This chapter provides
preliminary evidence that understatements may be
significant in some years, though changes in the
new 2003 FDI law, coupled with improved statisti-
cal recording, should help to alleviate discrepancies
from international common practice.
One of the major culprits behind Turkey’s laggard
performance in FDI inflows is the country’s long-
running fiscal problems and the ensuing macroeco-
nomic uncertainty. Turkey’s current efforts to imple-
ment a major fiscal adjustment, if sustained, should
help to achieve lower inflation and macroeconomic
stability. The introduction of inflation accounting
will no doubt be a welcome interim measure for local
and foreign investors alike. Besides macroeconomic
uncertainty, specific infrastructure-related weak-
nesses also continue to diminish Turkey’s attractive-
ness to investors. Although Turkey benefits from its
skilled, adaptable, and entrepreneurial work force,
and communications and transport do not appear to
be major problem areas, it lags behind in its energy
infrastructure, its level of computerization, and
the availability of credit for the private sector.
Turkey’s recently passed electricity and natural gas
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framework laws, to the extent that they are effectively
implemented, should spur significant improvements
in line with Turkey’s underlying endowments in the
energy area. Successful implementation of the
adjustment program will ensure that more funds
will be channeled to the private sector, rather than be
used to fund the huge public sector deficit, at low
real interest rates.
Perhaps the most important contribution of this
chapter is its examination of the standing rule of
law and competition-related impediments to
investment through three detailed case studies
from the primary, secondary (manufacturing), and
tertiary (services) sectors. Based on these studies,
we argue that the main unaddressed obstacles to
increased FDI in Turkey are governance and
institutions-related problems related to the rule of
law and competition. The most important legal and
judicial constraints are the insufficient clarity of
and lack of respect for the rule of law. In each of the
analyzed cases, the government as rulemaker has
failed to address the underlying legal ambiguities in
a timely fashion, raising the question of whether
lack of clarity in the underlying rule of law is inten-
tional in order to give public decisionmakers the
degrees of freedom needed to grant special treat-
ment and exemptions whenever politically conven-
ient. Unfortunately for the country as a whole, the
resulting unpredictability has resulted in substantial
forgone current and future investments. Competi-
tion constraints, in turn, are related to the absence
of a level playing field for all companies. In two of
the cases examined, the failure of the relevant regu-
latory body to rapidly enforce a pro-competitive
ruling also has sent negative signals for future
investments.
As for future policy priorities, we argue that pre-
dictable and uniform implementation of existing
and new legislation is of utmost importance. In the
legal and judicial area, reforms should focus on
removing legal ambiguities by addressing all pri-
vate sector laws and their implementing regulations
that are in contradiction or are not sufficiently
clearly defined. In the competition area, it is in
Turkey’s interest to empower the Competition Board
to apply competition rules to all public undertak-
ings, aligning its competition law to Article 86 of the
Treaty of Rome and its state aids system to that of
the EU. Improved coordination between the Com-
petition Board and other independent regulatory
boards should yield more rapid pro-competitive
outcomes.
The EU accession process itself should provide
Turkey with significant benefits in the way of FDI
inflows by helping to ease further the rule of law
and competition constraints. The expected EU
decision to begin negotiations on full membership
for Turkey will be crucial to finally convincing
larger numbers of foreign investors to invest in
Turkey. Finally, in addition to aligning Turkey’s
investment climate more closely with that of the
EU, Turkey also should follow a more proactive
approach by implementing more specific FDI poli-
cies and by undertaking active promotion.
Annex: Functions of an Investment
Promotion Agency
The groupings of the different functions of an IPA
can differ for developed and developing countries
or from one country to another. The four-part
grouping proposed by Wells and Wint (2001) and
used for the studies carried out for the Turkish IPA
is described in this annex.
Image building is the function of creating the per-
ception of a country that is an attractive site for
international investment. Activities commonly asso-
ciated with image building include focused advertis-
ing, public relations events, and the generation of
favorable news stories by cultivating journalists.
Investor servicing and facilitation refer to the
range of services provided in a host country that
can help an investor to analyze investment deci-
sions, establish a business, and maintain it in good
standing. Activities in this area include the provi-
sion of information, one-stop shopping services
aimed at expediting approval processes, and
various forms of assistance in obtaining access to
sites and utilities.
Generating investment entails targeting specific
sectors and companies with a view toward creat-
ing investment leads. Activities include identifying
potential sectors and investors and undertaking
direct mailings, telephone campaigns, investor
forums and seminars, and individual presentations
to targeted investors. These activities can be carried
out both at home and overseas.
Policy advocacy consists of the activities through
which the agency supports initiatives to improve
the quality of the investment climate and identifies
the views of the private sector on each relevant
topic. Activities include surveys of the private
sector, participation in task forces, policy and legal
proposals, and lobbying.
The emphasis of the IPA facility depends on the
purpose of the FDI policy; how much promotion is
needed depends on the kind of FDI to be attracted
and the basic attractions of the host country. A
large and dynamic economy promotes itself less
than a small one. The bulk of the massive inflows of
FDI to China were not the result of active FDI pro-
motion. And promotion can only go so far. If the
economic base is weak and unstable, no amount of
persuasion can attract large and sustained FDI
flows (UNCTAD 2003).
Of the main investment promotion functions
that all countries consider, image building and
investor servicing and facilitation are typically the
ones best left entirely to the separate public-private
IPA.
Notes
1. All dollar amounts are U.S. dollars unless otherwise
indicated.
2. This analysis is based on plant-level data collected by the
Turkish State Institute of Statistics (SIS) through annual manu-
facturing surveys. However, the data have limitations. They cover
only a small portion of the FDI companies active in the Turkish
economy, and so reflect only a subset of manufacturing-related
FDI. Although the records of the Undersecretariat of the Treasury
indicate that 581 FDI companies were active in the Turkish
manufacturing sector in 1991, increasing to 922 by 1996, the SIS
manufacturing survey includes only 210 plants, increasing to 273
plants by 1996, as partially or fully owned by foreigners.
3. Variables used to control for other characteristics that
could affect productivity include firm size as measured by
employment, imported license use, percent share of output
exported, imported machinery and equipment use, whether the
firm is incorporated, subcontracted input use and subcon-
tracted output sale, measures of agglomeration at the provincial
level, and share of skilled production workers.
4. For a detailed description of this trend worldwide, see
UNCTAD (2000).
5. For this definition, see Stern (2002).
6. Many of these measures are based on surveys, which in
this context are arguably the most appropriate measures,
because they reflect the perceptions of actual investors. In 2002,
3,532 executives responded to the World Competitiveness sur-
vey, which gauges widespread business knowledge about each
country and cross-country international experience.
7. Other producers were, however, active in the domestic
market. The four listed had the largest market presence in the
automotive industry at the time.
8. Of these four, Honda and Toyota became the sole owners
of their production units once they decided to direct their pro-
duction toward the European rather than the domestic market.
This situation is an example of the difficulty that foreign
investors face in entering the domestic market without an
insider on board. This argument is strengthened by the fact that
the other two multinational corporations (MNCs) retained their
local partners, because they continued to target the local market.
Anadolu Isuzu focuses on light trucks and midibuses and mainly
targets the local market. Hyundai Assan also sells half of its pro-
duction to the local market.
9. It is known that as part of the final communications prior
to the bid, I
.
s¸-TIM received a verbal promise from the Ministry of
Tranport about roaming privileges.
10. Among the 44 countries included in the World Values
Survey of 1989–90, Turkey ranks the lowest, with less than
10 percent of its population believing that most fellow human
beings are trustworthy. See Kalaycıog˘lu (2001).
11. The customs union agreement does not send as strong a
signal to investors as the prospects of full EU membership,
because it entails only market integration, without ensuring the
deeper political, social, and legal transformations that would
bring greater comfort to investors.
12. The key functions of a well-designed IPA are summa-
rized in the annex to this chapter.
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15 years. Thus, the period of investment to meet the
required standards is long, and the fiscal implica-
tions of accession depend significantly on the terms
of derogation. The fiscal impacts are also sensitive
to which parties undertake the investments—the
greater the share that can be borne by the private
sector, the less the fiscal burden—and to how much
funding can be obtained from EU sources.
This chapter looks at the likely costs to Turkey of
meeting the environmental acquis, with special
focus on the costs to the public sector. Fortunately,
considerable data are available from the latest
group of accession countries, and particularly from
large ones such as Poland, which has already met
part of the EU’s environmental requirements and
has prepared detailed plans to 2017 for the rest.
These countries’ experiences also are good guides
to approximating how much support can be
obtained from EU funds.
The chapter is structured as follows. The first
section reviews the estimates from previous studies
of the costs of EU membership for Turkey and
other countries, and on this basis some “best guess”
estimates of meeting the environmental acquis are
derived for Turkey. An important factor in making
such estimates is that these costs depend on the
policies pursued, and the breakdown of the costs
between the public and private sectors depends on
the extent to which key water and energy services
are provided by the private sector.
In December 1999, the European Council con-
firmed that Turkey is a candidate state destined to
join the European Union (EU) on the basis of the
same criteria applied to the other candidate states.1
A precondition of membership is that candidate
countries must align their national laws, rules, and
procedures, including those relevant to the envi-
ronmental sector, with those of the EU in order to
give effect to the entire body of law contained in the
acquis communautaire. In October 2004, the Euro-
pean Commission recommended opening acces-
sion talks with Turkey, which gives even more
impetus to the alignment process.
This process, also known as the approximation
process, requires that (1) all relevant EU require-
ments be transposed into legal legislation (legal
transposition), (2) the appropriate institutional
structures with sufficient budgets be established in
order to administer the national legislation (practi-
cal implementation), and (3) the necessary controls
and penalties be put in place to ensure full compli-
ance with the laws (enforcement). Most of these
steps have to be undertaken prior to membership
in the EU. At the same time, public and private
sector entities in Turkey will have to undertake a
significant investment program to meet the EU
requirements for environmental protection and
provision of environmental services. This program
typically begins in earnest about three to four years
prior to membership, and continues for up to
295
11
Turkey on the Path
to EU Accession:
The Environmental
Anil Markandya
Acquis
The second and third sections discuss how the
total costs of compliance with the environmental
acquis can be kept to a minimum and how the bur-
den on the state and local budgets can be reduced.
The fourth section gives a more detailed break-
down of costs based on three scenarios: (1) a base
case in which no special reforms are made and the
public sector remains much as it is today; (2) a
medium reform case in which the private sector’s
share of the costs of compliance with the acquis is
increased modestly and in which reforms in pricing
reduce the demand for some of the cleanup serv-
ices; and (3) a high reform, or fast reform, case in
which the private sector’s role is somewhat greater,
and in which the reforms discussed in the first sec-
tion are implemented more vigorously.
The fifth section compares the cost estimates
with some benefit estimates—that is, the possible
gains from implementation of the environmental
directives in terms of, among other things, reduced
health problems, increased recreational use of the
natural environment, and less damage to ecosys-
tems. This comparison will reveal where the case
for spending is strongest and where a case can be
made for delaying the investments on the grounds
that the benefits are considerably less than the costs.
The sixth section presents a more detailed,
short-term assessment of the three scenarios pre-
sented earlier, as well as a time profile of invest-
ments by sector that covers the first six years of the
program. As noted, the first three to four years of
the program to comply with the environmental
acquis are typically implemented prior to member-
ship. These investment needs are compared with
current environmental spending and with the cur-
rent budgetary resources available. The final sec-
tion looks at what mechanisms can be developed
to mobilize more public sector financing for the
environment.
Estimated Costs of the Environmental
Acquis: Turkey and Other 
Accession Countries
Estimates of the capital costs of the environmental
acquis have been made in the following studies:
• Those undertaken as part of the first assessment
of the costs for 10 potential candidate countries2
(Ifo Institute 1994; EDC 1997).
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• Further detailed studies undertaken by the 10
countries that joined the EU in 2004. Of these,
the estimates for Poland are given in table 11.1.
• Estimates for Turkey undertaken by Carl Bro
International as part of the EU-MEDA (Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership) funded initiative
(Carl Bro International 2002).3
The data from these disparate sources are sum-
marized in table 11.1, presented as costs per capita.
The following observations are worth noting:
• The range of estimates in the earlier studies (EDC
1997) was quite wide in per capita terms. The
highest estimates were five to 10 times higher
than the lowest estimates. This situation arises in
part from the fact that national programs to
comply with the acquis have a “fixed-cost” ele-
ment, so smaller countries tend to have higher
costs, and in part from the fact that countries
have different gaps to fill in meeting the direc-
tives. The average per capita cost is about €1,260,
but the range is from €580 to €3,600.
• The estimates from more recent studies are not
notably lower than the earlier estimates. For
example, the estimate for Poland in the study
noted earlier was €988, while the estimate in the
national calculations of costs was about €1,170.
Part of the reason for the increase is the addition
of the Integrated Pollution Prevention and Con-
trol (IPPC), nitrate, and other directives, which
were not covered in the first round of studies.
After these are removed, the estimate for Poland
in the national study is €878 versus €988, or a
reduction of about 11 percent.
• For Turkey, the figures in the Carl Bro study
were considerably lower. This difference reflects
in part the different situation in Turkey with
respect to some directives. For example, the
water supply directive will cost less in Turkey,
because it mandates only an increase in quality
for those who are already connected to a piped
water system; it does not require an increase in
connections. Because in Turkey only 35 percent
of the population is connected to piped water,
the per capita costs of meeting the directive
across the whole population are lower. The Carl
Bro study did not cover all directives, however.
The notes to table 11.1 indicate which directives
were not covered by the Carl Bro study. In those
2
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TABLE 11.1 Comparison of Environmental Costs of EU Accession for Turkey and Other Candidate Countries
(euros per capita in 2001 prices)
Turkey,
Turkey,
Turkey, Turkey, Turkey,
Poland,
Range
State
Nonstate
Total Total Total
Mid-value CEEC10 Minimum MaximumMid-value Low Mid-value High
Water supplya 12.0 0 9.0 12.0 15.0 41.5 187.4 32.7 385.2
Wastewaterb 212.1 0 159.1 212.1 265.2 217.1 354.9 117.6 1085.0
Airc 83.9 49.4 100.0 133.3 166.6 294.0 508.1 297.2 1240.1
Wasted 25.1 74.4 74.6 99.4 124.3 325.4 210.1 132.7 854.9
IPPCe 5.8 47.3 39.8 53.1 66.4 184.7 — — —
Nitratesf 44.1 16.3 45.3 60.5 103.4 103.4 — — —
Otherg 5.1 0.9 4.5 6.0 7.5 7.7 — — —
Total 432.3 576.4 748.2 1173.8 1260.6 580.1 3565.3
— Not available.
Note: Low and high values for Turkey are, respectively, 25 percent lower and 25 percent higher than the mid-values.
a. Water supply estimate is based on Carl Bro study for Turkey. It is lower in per capita terms than those of other countries because only 35 percent of the population
is connected to the water supply.
b. Wastewater estimate is based on Carl Bro study for Turkey. Directive 76/464 is excluded. Estimate is taken from data on Poland.
c. Carl Bro estimate is taken for electricity large combustion plants (LCPs). Not included are other LCPs, directive 98/70 on quality of petrol, directive 99/32 on sulfur
content of liquid fuels, directive 94/63 on volatile organic compounds (VOCs) from gas stations, and directive 94/67. Estimates for directives not included are
minimum estimates from studies of Poland.
d. Caro Bro estimates are not specifically based on assessment of directives but on an earlier World Bank/METAP (Mediterranean Environmental Technical Assistance
Program) study that was undertaken in the context of EU directives. Directives 96/59 on PCBs, 94/62 on packaging waste, and 75/439 on oil waste disposal are
excluded. Estimates for these are taken from Poland and the Baltic states. Estimate is likely to be at lower end.
e. Carl Bro looked at only a limited number of public enterprises. Most of the expenditure will be in the private sector. Private sector estimates are based on data 
on Poland.
f. Because no nitrate estimates are available for Turkey, detailed estimates for Poland are used.
g. “Other” includes Directives 97/403 (nuclear safety) and 2000/53 (end of life vehicles).
Sources: Various—see text.
instances, the estimates were based on previous
studies (mainly Poland, because that study had
the best and most comprehensive data).
• Based on the data from the Carl Bro study, the
cost of the environmental directives for Turkey
is between €432 and €748 per capita for the
2000 population of 65.3 million. The range is
based on a middle value calculated from the esti-
mates provided, a lower value that is 25 percent
lower, and a higher value that is 25 percent
higher. This range represents the extent to which
costs can be reduced, depending on adoption of
the appropriate policies, or raised in the absence
of a shift to more efficient delivery systems for
environmental services. It is based on previous
studies that have looked at the scope for reduc-
ing costs. Note that the lower end of the cost
range is from the studies for the 11 Central and
Eastern European (CEE) countries.
What do these per capita figures imply for
total costs? The total amount is between €28 billion
and €49 billion—an enormous sum. But the outlay
is over some 17 years, so the annual amount is more
manageable. As noted later in this chapter, annual
investments amount to about €2 billion to €3 bil-
lion for the high reform, or fast reform, case (i.e.,
low-cost case) and €3 billion to €5 billion for the
base case entailing slow reform (i.e., high-cost case).
In the initial years, these investments would amount
to 1–1.5 percent of GDP in the low-cost case and
1.5–2.5 percent in the high-cost case. In addition,
extra annual operating costs would be incurred,
which are difficult to estimate for the early years
but would eventually be on the order of €80 billion
to €120 billion per capita or €5 billion to €8 billion.
To put these figures in perspective, the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) estimated Turkey’s capital spending on the
environment in 1999 to be about $US1 billion, or
0.5 percent of its GDP.4 At the very least, this spend-
ing would have to double, or more likely increase by
a factor of three or four once the EU accession pro-
gram was initiated. In addition, a much higher level
of current spending would be required.
How to Reduce the Total
Investment Costs
The total cost figure is useful only to get some
idea of the overall size of the task. What is more
important for Turkey is to prepare detailed plans,
covering periods of three to six years, that ensure
compliance with the agreements arrived at under
the environmental chapter and to do so in a way
that minimizes the costs and ensures that the under-
lying financing arrangements are sustainable.
Indeed, although the acquis communautaire is pre-
scriptive on environmental standards, it leaves con-
siderable latitude on how to meet them. The price of
complying varies accordingly.
Savings in investment costs can be achieved in
several ways5:
• By following a least-cost investment plan, espe-
cially in energy-related investments. This plan
can, in turn, be promoted by the use of economic
instruments such as bubbles and permit trading.
• By increasing the efficiency with which munici-
palities make investment decisions. Opening up
procurement to international tender and under-
taking careful project appraisal in evaluating the
design of schemes will reduce costs significantly.
• By designing investments to take account of the
lower demand for some services when future
service charges will have to recover capital and
operating costs. The World Bank has had stark
experience with such lower demand in the
wastewater projects it has funded in the Baltic
states. The level of capacity is turning out to be
substantially in excess of demand as a result of
the large increase in volume-based charges (see
box 11.1).
• By allowing for the fact that new investments are
likely to reduce total operating costs, because
the operation and maintenance costs of new
equipment will be lower than those of the
equipment it replaces. This gain has not been
fully accounted for in the current cost figures
presented earlier.
• By taking into account that the present value of
total costs will fall if the more expensive items
are scheduled later in time. This approach would
be all the more justifiable when the ensuing ben-
efits are comparatively low.
• By accounting for the fact that environmental
mitigation costs may not expand at the same
pace as income. With growth and convergence,
countries should therefore be better able to meet
the acquis. The demand for services such as
energy and transport and the related costs are
likely to rise in tandem, but the demand for
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services such as water may not increase propor-
tionately. The resulting increase in total costs
may therefore be substantially less than the
growth in national income.
• By relaxing statutory standards (particularly for
water treatment), if it can be shown (1) that the
investment is seriously uneconomical (e.g., if
the community served will decline dramatically
in the next few years) and (2) that the savings in
costs that can be achieved by reducing the
attainment level by a small percentage will allow
more plants to be built, thereby making a higher
overall contribution to meeting the ambient envi-
ronmental goals.6
Reducing the Share of Costs Borne
by the Public Sector
Although some CEE countries have now concluded
the environmental chapter of the negotiations, it is
fair to say that they have not fully established how
these investments will be funded. Indeed, the front-
line CEE countries have ongoing concerns about
the availability of co-financing from the national
budget to match the EU accession funds available
under the Pre-Accession Structural Instrument
(ISPA), PHARE, and the Special Accession Pro-
gramme for Agriculture and Rural Development
(SAPARD). Indeed, the slow rate of development of
projects for such funding can be partly attributed
to this factor (as well as to the lack of administra-
tive capacity to implement the acquis).
The problem that many countries are having in
meeting the local cost share of investments is
unlikely to be solved merely by increasing the allo-
cation from the public budget for the environment.
Other solutions also must be found.
The scope for moving some items out of the
public budget is quite large.7 As for investment in
the manufacturing sector, the more of the sector
that is privatized, the less will be the burden of the
acquis on the public budget. Experience has shown
that successful privatization of some of the larger
and more polluting industries requires a clear
understanding of the liability for past environmen-
tal damages through an internationally acceptable
audit, accompanied by a legal agreement with the
government on the new owner’s responsibility for
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BOX 11.1 The Experience of the World Bank with Water Utilities 
in the Baltic States
The World Bank has provided financing for five
water and wastewater projects in the Baltics: one
in Estonia, two in Latvia, and two in Lithuania, at
a total cost of US$134 million. The upgraded
plants are now in operation. The wastewater
plants meet Helsinki Commission standards
(HELCOM protects the Baltic marine environ-
ment as mandated under the Helsinki Conven-
tion), and the drinking water plant also meets
the highest standards. Although the projects
have met many criteria, one of the most serious
problems has been the drop in demand for
water and in the generation of wastewater. The
projects were planned under the assumption
that demand would stabilize at a moderate level
of consumption similar to that in other compa-
rable countries. Yet such consumption has not
materialized, and the actual level has been as
much as 50 percent lower than anticipated. This
extreme decline in demand has led to:
• Overdimensioning of systems (i.e., making
them larger than required)
• Overinvestment in systems
• Higher than optional operations and mainte-
nance costs
• Water quality problems in potable water 
networks.
The central lesson learned is that, while draft-
ing financial and economic forecasts, the project
teams should be conservative in their assump-
tions of the critical variables that have the great-
est impact on revenues and costs. These fore-
casts tend to be too optimistic, and in the long
run the projects are likely to experience lower
than anticipated economic and financial rates of
return. Project appraisal should ensure that the
assumptions are realistic and that contingency
plans are drawn for coping with deviations from
the most likely outcomes. The range of possible
outcomes, with their respective probabilities,
although subjective, should be listed in the
appraisal document. 
Price escalations also tend to be greater than
expected (in real terms) because of the elimina-
tion of existing market distortions and price dis-
equilibria that were present in the economies
during the early transition process. This situation
is another important reason for the dramatic
reduction in water sales. Tariffs have had to
increase more than anticipated. 
cleanup. If internationally credible investors are to
be attracted to bidding for such enterprises, these
issues have to be addressed. Furthermore, the state’s
responsibilities have to be backed by a credible pro-
gram of investment in remediation. Otherwise, the
uncertainty of the private party will result in a fail-
ure to bid, or in an offer that reflects the increased
risk. This situation illustrates one in which it may
pay for the state to undertake investment in reme-
diation with a view toward making the privatiza-
tion effort more successful and generating higher
revenues from the sale of state assets.
The same is true to a large extent of public utili-
ties and infrastructure. A Czech study has shown
that as much as half of the big-ticket items could be
shifted out of the public budget under certain
assumptions (World Bank 1999). To date, however,
the detailed national plans for adoption of the
acquis have paid limited attention to the role of the
private sector, and there has been mixed progress
on the ground. Hungary has transferred all power
generation to the private sector, Poland has moved
9 of its 27 generation stations into private hands,
and other countries have moved none.8
Privatization is not, however, the only way of
sharing the burden of upgrading environmental
standards. Another is to commercialize the enter-
prises even when they are nominally state-owned
and to raise the financing for the investment
through commercial loans. This strategy is being
followed widely in many of the candidate coun-
tries. It was successfully adopted, for example, by
Poland in the power generation sector. When
Poland privatized nine generation stations, the
financing for investing in pollution control equip-
ment came from commercial loans, backed by
power purchasing agreements between the com-
mercialized generating units and the state electric-
ity authority. The same strategy has been adopted
in municipalities dealing with water supply and
wastewater in various countries, including the
Baltic states. Although it is successful in taking the
direct investment cost off the budget, this approach
suffers from the problem that the borrowing is
invariably guaranteed by the government and
therefore forms part of the consolidated national
debt. There is also the issue in such cases of subsi-
dies to these enterprises, through working capital
and loans from state-owned banks, being given at
below commercial rates. To the extent that these
practices prevail (and they are still quite common),
the institutional mechanism of commercialization
for taking environmental costs off budget will still
leave some budgetary burden.
The commercialization of utilities has, however,
opened the door to their raising charges for their
services to a level that at least recovers the costs of
the new investments. The higher charges will result
in reduced levels of demand, thus saving the budget
the cost of the subsidies the utilities receive for
ongoing operations. The same increase in charges
will also reduce the size of the investment needed
(box 11.1).9 Another way in which commercializa-
tion can save costs is through a rationalization of
provision, because many utilities are currently too
small to make cost-effective investments or manage
operations in an efficient manner.
Breakdown of the Share of Investments
by Sector in Turkey
Based on the discussion in the two previous sec-
tions, table 11.2 offers a more detailed description
of the three scenarios—base case, medium reform,
and high reform. The changes in parameter values
in the table are only rough estimates, based on
judgments about the scope for reform and the
potential impacts it would have. Nevertheless, they
offer a useful guide to what can be expected if the
reforms are made as indicated. The resulting costs
for the state and nonstate sectors are shown in
table 11.3, which shows state expenditures ranging
from €32 billion in the base case to €15 billion in
the high reform case, a fall of 52 percent. Of this
fall, 42 percent can be attributed to cost savings in
general from the reforms and 10 percent to the
increased share of the private sector in providing
the environmental services. The biggest shift arises
for the water supply and wastewater sector, fol-
lowed by the waste sector. In the base case, the share
of state expenditures is 65 percent, and in the high
reform case it is 54 percent. In the medium reform
case, it is 59 percent.
Comparing the Costs and Benefits
of the Environmental Directives 
In comparing the costs and benefits of the environ-
mental directives,one can,fortunately,rely on a study
undertaken by the European Commission, which
made initial estimates of these benefits (ECD 1997).
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The study explored the benefits of compliance in
three steps:
• Type of benefits. What types of benefits arise
from implementing the acquis, and what are
some examples of these benefits in the candidate
countries—for example, health impacts or
impacts on agriculture, buildings (also known as
“qualitative benefits”)?
• Extent of benefits. What is the extent of the
benefits—that is, how much are emissions
reduced and how many cases of respiratory
diseases are avoided (also known as “quantitative
benefits”)?
• Value of benefits. What is the economic value of
the avoided costs—for example, how much
would the reduced emissions and damages
avoided by implementing EU directives be
worth (also known as “monetarized benefits” and
given in millions of euros)?
The types of benefits included in the study are
summarized in table 11.4.10 The monetary value of
the benefits was estimated using a large body of
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TABLE 11.2 Scenarios for Implementation of Environmental Investments
for the Acquis
Scenario
Policy Base Case Medium Reform High Reform
Pricing of utilities’ 
services
Use of market-based
instruments
Private sector
participation in 
water sector
Private sector 
in waste 
management
Reforms in energy 
sector
Reforms in 
industrial sectors
Slow progress toward 
cost recovery in water 
and waste sectors.
Existing charges on
effluent continue and
new charges on carbon;
some products
introduced slowly
at low rates.
Virtually no participation 
of private sector in 
delivery of services.
Virtually no participation 
of private sector in 
delivery of services.
Current ownership of 
energy sector 
enterprises implies 
about 37% of all 
expenditures will be in 
the nonstate sector; all 
large plant combustion 
(LPC) investments in 
public sector.
Current estimate is based
on 90% of expendi-
tures being undertaken
by private sector. 
Moderate progress 
toward full-cost 
recovery and some 
volume-based 
pricing.
Existing charge levels 
raised and new
charges introduced
more rapidly at
higher rates.
Moderate participa-
tion, with
investment going
up to 10% of total.
Moderate participa-
tion, with
investment going
up to 20% of total;
some recycling
programs effective.
Private sector takes
over up to 20% of
plants needing to
respond to LPC;
reforms introduce
more renewable
sources and
increase efficiency.
Rapid progress to
full-cost recovery
and volume-based
pricing.
Existing and new
instruments
introduced rapidly,
with rates that
have incentive
effects.
Substantial participa-
tion, with
investment going
up to 20% of total.
Substantial participa-
tion, with
investment going
up to 30% of total
and significant
recycling programs.
Private sector takes
over up to 30% of
plants needing to
respond to LPC;
reforms introduce
more renewable
sources and
increase efficiency
faster.
Source: The author.
In both of these cases, the share of private
sector investment under the Integrated
Pollution Prevention and Control (IPPC)
goes up to 95%.
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TABLE 11.3 Environmental Accession Costs for Turkey
(millions of euros, in 2001 prices)
State Nonstate Total
Base case
Water supply 976 0 976
Wastewater 17,315 0 17,315
Air 6,848 4,031 10,879
Waste 2,046 6,071 8,117
IPPC 474 3,860 4,334
Nitrates 3,603 1,333 6,749
Other 420 70 490
Total 31,682 15,365 48,860
Medium reform
Water supply 703 78 781
Wastewater 12,467 1,385 13,852
Air 4,382 4,320 8,703
Waste 1,309 5,184 6,493
IPPC 270 3,197 3,467
Nitrates 2,882 1,066 3,948
Other 336 56 392
Total 22,350 15,287 37,637
High reform
Water supply 469 117 586
Wastewater 8,311 2,078 10,389
Air 2,876 3,651 6,527
Waste 859 4,011 4,870
IPPC 205 2,395 2,600
Nitrates 2,162 800 2,961
Other 252 42 294
Total 15,134 13,094 28,228
Sources: Author’s calculations.
TABLE 11.4 Types of Benefits of Compliance with Directives, Estimated 
for Candidate Countries
Type of Benefit Air Drinking Water Wastewater Solid Waste
Health benefits Avoided Household access Reduced risk of None 
respiratory to cleaner poisoning and assessed
illnesses and drinking water accidents due to
premature methane leakage from
deaths landfills
Resource Avoided Cleaner bathing Reduced input of None
benefits damage to water and primary material assessed
buildings and cleaner water
crops for companies
Ecosystems Avoided global Improved river Avoided global Protected
warming from water quality warming from areas and 
CO2 emissions methane emissions species
Source: ECOTEC and others 2001.
past and ongoing research on economic valuation.
The results of the estimation for Turkey are given in
table 11.5, where the benefits are compared with
the cost figures in table 11.3. The exercise is only
possible for a few areas: air, drinking water, waste-
water, and solid waste.
Although the data on benefits are subject to con-
siderable uncertainties, table 11.5 nevertheless
reveals some useful findings. First, investments in
water supply and reductions in air pollution are
amply justified in terms of benefits, even taking the
upper end of the costs and the lower end of the
benefits. Second, investments in wastewater are not
justifiable given the measurable benefits. This does
not mean that all individual projects for building
wastewater treatment have negative net benefits;
some almost certainly will be of high priority. But it
does mean that as a program, with a time profile for
investments more or less like the one in the 2004
candidate countries, the net benefits are likely to be
negative. Because these results are based on Euro-
pean Commission–supported data, they should
prove useful in arguing for derogation for a large
part of the wastewater treatment directives. Third,
for solid waste the question of whether benefits
exceed costs is unresolved; it depends on where the
benefits lie in the range that has upper values
20 times the lower values.11
The Medium Reform Scenario 
for EU Accession for Turkey 
Those countries that have closed the environmental
chapter have committed themselves to comply-
ing with the acquis by the agreed-on dates. The
highest priority in all cases is being given to legal
approximation, ensuring that the national legal
framework is consistent with the EU legislation.
Next in priority is the institutional strengthening of
supervisory bodies and environmental agencies. All
this is expected to be completed before accession.
The investment program necessary for compliance
for those joining in 2004 has a completion date of
2015, with interim targets for key directives. For
example, Lithuania must comply with the directive
on the sulfur content of petrol and diesel by 2005,
the large urban wastewater directive by 2010, and
so on (Republic of Lithuania 2001). The Baltic
states, Poland, and the other 2004 accession candi-
dates commended their investment programs in
1999/2000 (see World Bank 2002, 2003).
Taking the cue from these countries, Turkey
would have to start its program in earnest three to
four years before entry and negotiate the deroga-
tion of the items that have a high cost but that gen-
erate have relatively modest benefits, following the
analysis presented in the previous section.
The time profile that the present accession
countries have negotiated indicates the costs of
accession in the first six years of the program.
Table 11.6 was derived from this profile (giving
the share of total costs in the first six years and the
share of the six-year total by year) and from the
total estimated costs for Turkey. The table also
includes estimates of the external funding agreed to
for this period. It is reported separately and is
assumed to reduce the part of state expenditure
that has to be financed from domestic sources.
The table reveals an important point, that funds
such as ISPA and SAPARD will provide only between
25 percent and 30 percent of the “state” spending—
that is, the “state from domestic” plus the “state from
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TABLE 11.5 Estimated Benefits for Turkey from Compliance 
with Environmental Directives
(millions of 2001 euros)
Directives Relating to Present Value of Costs Present Value of Benefits
Water supply 586–976 1,500–26,050
Wastewater 10,400–17,300 7,140
Air 6,500–10,900 > 21,000
Waste 4,900–8,100 800–18,000
Source: ECOTEC and others 2001 and this study. Both benefits and costs are
discounted at 4 percent in real terms.
external.” Thus the domestic state sources will have
to undertake a significant expenditure; in table 11.6
this expenditure increases from €1.2 billion in year
1 to €2.8 billion in year 6 under the base case and
€0.6 billion in year 1 to €1.2 billion in year 6 under
the high reform case.
The differences between the base case and the
other cases depend on how much of the reform
actions can be undertaken prior to the actual start
of the formal program. Without prejudging the
date of accession for Turkey, it is possible to say that
a rapid program of reform over the next five years
would place it in a position in which the esti-
mated state expenditures in table 11.6 could be
considered realistic. If, however, reforms do not
take place prior to the accession period, which
starts three to four years before the date of acces-
sion, then the estimates under the reform scenarios
will be too low.
How do these estimates of environmental
spending compare with current spending on the
environment? Unfortunately, data are available
only for the period 1997–99 and then, except for
1997, not for all the categories—see table 11.7. The
table shows that
• Spending by government organizations was
about €480 million in 1997, of which three-
quarters was for investment. By 1999 the total had
fallen to €420 million, of which only 55 percent
was for investment. Total spending was about
1 percent of government expenditure in 1997, but
it had fallen to 0.6 percent in 1999.
• Spending by municipalities amounted to
€1,200 million in 1997 and €1,500 million in
1998. Of this, about 30–34 percent was for
investment.
• Manufacturing sector environmental invest-
ments (available only for 1997) were only
€52 million.
• Investment by thermal power plants amounted
to €294 million in 1997, €61 million in 1998,
and €104 million in 1999.
• The total investment in all sectors amounted to
€2.2 billion or 1.4 percent of GDP.
If municipalities and thermal power plants are
included as part of public sector spending, the total
amount of investment by the state sector amounted
to about €1 billion in 1997 and in 1998. The com-
parison in table 11.6 of this figure with the required
investment by the state sector reveals that, in fact,
the amounts needed in state investments are not
very different from the actual levels in 1997–98.
State investment, after accounting for EU funds,
ranges from €0.6 billion to €1.3 billion in year 1,
but rises sharply in the next six years (table 11.6).
Although this comparison does not establish
firmly that the actual investments in the environ-
ment were of the right amount to meet the first year
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TABLE 11.6 Costs of Accession for Turkey in First Six Years
(millions of 2001 euros)
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Total
Base case
State 1,253 1,636 2,422 2,546 2,703 2,773 13,334
Domestic nonstate 1,215 1,317 1,560 1,656 1,728 1,712 9,187
External 474 617 822 853 910 938 4,613
Total 2,942 3,571 4,804 5,054 5,340 5,423 27,134
Medium reform
State 807 1,055 1,561 1,641 1,742 1,787 8,593
Domestic nonstate 1,148 1,245 1,474 1,565 1,633 1,618 8,683
External 332 433 576 598 638 658 3,235
Total 2,288 2,732 3,611 3,804 4,013 4,063 20,511
High reform
State 560 731 1,082 1,138 1,208 1,239 5,958
Domestic nonstate 962 1,043 1,235 1,311 1,368 1,355 7,275
External 221 288 383 397 424 437 2,150
Total 1,743 2,062 2,700 2,846 3,000 3,032 15,383
Source: Author’s calculations.
of the EU accession investment program (the cover-
age and priorities may not have been the same), it
does suggest that if state investment spending could
be maintained at 1997–98 levels and if the external
funds are forthcoming, the amount will at least be
enough to start the accession program. The big gap
appears to be in private sector spending, which is very
much below what would be required. Table 11.6 gives
a figure of €1 billion to €1.2 billion for the first year,
whereas actual spending for the one year for which
data are available (1997) was €52 million.
Finally, an allowance also must be made for an
increase in the budgets needed for monitoring and
compliance enforcement. Table 11.8 provides the
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TABLE 11.7 Environmental Expenditures in Turkey, 1997–99
1997 1998 1999 1997 1998 1999
(TL billions) (€ millions)
Government 
organizations
Current 20,898 35,941 85,401 121.3 123.1 191.2
Investment 62,602 115,342 105,989 363.5 395.0 237.2
As % of budget 1.0% 0.9% 0.6% 1.0% 0.9% 0.6%
Municipalities
Current 147,576 287,864 — 856.9 985.8 —
Investment 62,542 148,269 — 363.1 507.8 —
Manufacturing
Current 11,499 — — 66.8 — —
Investment 8,871 — — 51.5 — —
Thermal power plants
Current 26,913 4,455 — 156.3 15.3 —
Investment 50,605 17,747 46,502 293.8 60.8 104.1
Total
Current 206,886 — — 1201.2 — —
Investment 184,620 — — 1071.9 — —
As % of GDP 1.4% — — 1.4% — —
— Not available.
Note: Data for 1998 are not confirmed.
Sources: Turkish State Institute of Statistics and International Monetary Fund.
TABLE 11. 8 Estimated Annual Spending on Monitoring and Enforcement, Turkey
Expenses of 
Regulator
Directive (€ millions) Comments
Integrated Pollution 2.2 Recoverable from industry on a 
Prevention and Control IPPC purchasing power parity (PPP) basis
Air quality 19.6 Monitoring in 287 towns with more 
than 25,000 inhabitants
Water quality 14.2 26 teams in each of 26 water basins
Nitrates 2.2 4 teams, one for each affected 
catchment
Conservation of habitats 0.9 Monitoring of habitats of wild birds
and protection of animals used in
experiments
Total 39.1
Source: Carl Bro International 2001.
figures estimated by Carl Bro International for this
purpose, which amount to about €39 million a
year. This figure does not include an increase in the
analytical and management capacity of the Min-
istry of Environment, which has not been estimated
but requires an increase in the ministerial staff of
about 20 percent.
Conclusions
This chapter has looked at the environmental
dimension of EU accession for Turkey. As a country
now in accession talks with the EU, Turkey has
actively begun to prepare for the approximation
process, and the environmental component is a
major part of the process. The time period required
for most of the approximation process is about
three to four years before accession and 15 years
after accession. Based on estimates of the invest-
ment costs of accession made for other candidate
countries and (partly) for Turkey, the total cost
comes out between €28 billion and €49 billion.
This range looks frightening, but, spread over
18–19 years, it amounts annually to 1–2.5 percent
of GDP for Turkey. This amount is more than the
country has been investing in the environmental
sector, which is about 0.5 percent of GDP. The
investment must come from various sources: the
state, municipalities, state enterprises, and the pri-
vate sector. The analysis shows that, whereas the
first three (which are consolidated into the state
sector) have current investment at a level similar to
that required by the approximation, private sector
spending is woefully short. This situation implies
that the appropriate regulations will have to be put in
place to ensure compliance by the private sector in
accordance with the agreement on investment
reached with the EU.
The costs of the environmental acquis are not
predetermined and depend on policy choices and
reforms. This chapter has identified those actions
that can, first, reduce the costs and, second, shift the
costs from the state sectors to the private sector.
Reducing costs will require a more careful assess-
ment of the least-cost options, better procurement
in public spending, and better assessment of future
demand as prices increase. The whole process of
commercialization and privatization has a major
role to play in shifting costs from the state sectors to
the private sector. This chapter has provided three
scenarios that reflect different rates of reform and
different rates of increase in the involvement of the
private sector in the provision of environmental
services. The resulting costs for the state sector
range from €32 billion in the base case to €15 bil-
lion in the high reform case, a drop of 52 percent.
This drop is made up of 42 percent from cost sav-
ings from the reforms and 10 percent from the
increased share of the private sector in providing
the environmental services.
The costs of accession can also be compared
with its potential benefits by drawing on a major
European Commission study that included Turkey.
Although the data on the benefits of the water sup-
ply, wastewater, air, and solid waste directives are
subject to considerable uncertainties, the results
reveal the following:
• Investments in water supply and a reduction in
air pollution are amply justified in terms of ben-
efits, even taking the upper end of the costs and
the lower end of the benefits.
• Investments in wastewater are not justifiable
given the measurable benefits. This finding does
not mean that all individual projects for building
wastewater treatment have negative net benefits;
some almost certainly will be of high priority.
But it does mean that as a program, with a time
profile for investments more or less like that in
the 2004 candidate countries, the net benefits are
likely to be negative. Because these results are
based on European Commission–supported
data, they should prove useful in arguing for
derogation for a large part of the wastewater
treatment directives.
• For solid waste, the issue of the program is unre-
solved; it depends on where the benefits lie in a
range in which the upper values are 20 times the
lower values.
This chapter has described a possible medium-
term accession program for Turkey (i.e., covering
the first six years). Based on the time profiles for
investment in the candidate countries, external
funds such as ISPA and SAPARD will provide only
between 25 and 30 percent of the “state” spending.
Thus domestic state sources will have to provide a
significant amount of the expenditure, which
increases from €1.2 billion in year 1 to €2.8 billion
in year 6 under the base case and from €0.6 billion
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in year 1 to €1.2 billion in year 6 under the high
reform case. There is also an urgent need to
increase the budget and resources available to the
Ministry of Environment if the program is to be
realized. An EU study has estimated this amount to
be about €39 million annually.
In summary, Turkey faces an enormous chal-
lenge in meeting the environmental acquis, but not
one that is beyond its capabilities. By adhering to a
vigorous reform program and adopting increased
incentives for the private sector to make the neces-
sary investments, it should be able to achieve the
goals in much the same way as the other candidate
countries—by a combination of good manage-
ment, good luck, and a little help from its friends.
Notes
1. The views in this paper are those of the author and do not
necessarily reflect the official position of the World Bank.
2. The countries are Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia,
and Lithuania.
3. The estimates by Carl Bro International are undiscounted
costs over the period of up to 18 years. In the figures presented
here, a real rate of 4 percent has been applied to a typical profile
of costs. For Turkey, this approach would imply a nominal rate
today of about 35 percent.
4. Details of the OECD estimate were not obtainable, but
earlier data confirm a similar figure for 1997 (see the final
section of this chapter).
5. Total costs may also fall over time as manufacturers drop
their prices for capital equipment in response to the larger level
of production (Hager 2000).
6. The marginal costs of standards rise with the standards
themselves, and this observation holds true particularly in the
area of wastewater treatment.
7. The increased level of private sector activity implies a
greater effort by the state to ensure compliance. This effort, in
turn, requires investment in capital equipment for monitoring
and testing, among other things. Funding for this can be
obtained from ISPA, if the demands can be bundled to meet the
€5 million threshold.
8. A comprehensive status of privatization in the energy and
utility sectors for the CEE countries does not appear to be avail-
able and is being prepared by the World Bank.
9. The constraints on raising charges, however, are real and
raise issues of affordability for the poorer customers. Most
countries adopt some lifeline rates to get around such a
situation, although adoption of the rates tends to be done in an
ad hoc fashion and is not based on a careful assessment of a
structure that meets specified targets at least cost.
10. The results from the exercise are reported as the net pres-
ent value of benefits, discounted at a real rate of 4 percent. In
actual practice, countries may use higher discount rates, if only
to ensure that they give priority to those investments that will
yield earlier benefits for the populations.
11. Benefits from the waste directives arise largely from the
landfill directive, which reduces methane emissions as well as
amounts of waste subject to disposal. The benefit range is so
wide because the benefits depend on how much recycling takes
place and how much incineration is carried out. The higher the
recycling and the less the amount incinerated, the greater are the
benefits.
References
Adler, A., and others. 1994. Economic Costs and Legislation in
Western and Eastern Europe, Munich: Ifo Institute.
Carl Bro International. 2002. Analysis of Environmental Legisla-
tion in Turkey. Project Number LOHAN-23-MEDA/TUR/
ENLARG/D4-01. European Commission: DG Enlargement,
Brussels.
ECOTEC, IEEP, Metroeconomica, TME, and Candidate Counter
Experts. 2001. The Benefits of Compliance with the Environ-
mental Acquis for the CEECs.Brussels: European Commission.
EDC (Environmental Development Consultants). 1997. Compli-
ance Costing for Approximation of EU Legislation in the
CEEC. European Commission: DG Environment, Brussels.
Hager, W. 2000. “Environmental Investment in the CEEC
Preparing for Accession.” World Bank, Washington, DC. (Ifo
Institute 1994; EDC 1997).
Republic of Lithuania. 2001. “National ISPA Strategy: Environ-
ment Sector.” Ministry of Environment, Vilnius.
World Bank. 1999.“Czech Republic: Towards EU Accession: Sum-
mary Report.” World Bank Country Study, Washington, DC.
————. 2002. “Expenditure Policies toward EU Accession.”
Technical Paper No. 533, Washington, DC.
————. 2003. “Poland: Toward a Fiscal Framework for
Growth.” Report No. 25033-POL, Washington, DC.
Turkey on the Path to EU Accession: The Environmental Acquis 307

309
Part IV
Implications of
EU Accession
for Turkey 
and the EU

the gains to Turkey will amount to 1.1 percent of its
gross domestic product (GDP) per year. If liberaliz-
ing trade in industrial goods can affect the GDP,
then there should be comparable gains from liber-
alizing agriculture and also services.
Agriculture
Because Togan, Bayener, and Nash thoroughly
study in chapter 2 of this volume the impact of EU
enlargement to Turkey on Turkey’s agricultural
markets and incomes, this section only briefly sum-
marizes the main points presented by the authors.
According to Togan and his colleagues, adoption of
the CAP will lead to substantial changes in the agri-
cultural incomes of producers, the welfare levels of
consumers, and the budget revenues of the govern-
ment. Because the prices for many major agricul-
tural products in Turkey will have to be reduced at
some point between now and accession, consumers
will derive great benefits. The authors estimate that,
in the medium to long term, EU-like policies will
lead to a 1.87 percent increase in real household
incomes in Turkey, which is equivalent to about
€2.92 billion. Lower-income households (rural
households) will experience an even more signifi-
cant increase in real income.
Yet adoption of the CAP will require substantial
adjustments on the part of Turkish farmers, and the
effect on farmers’ incomes will be driven mainly by
With accession to the European Union (EU),
Turkey will complete the harmonization of its tech-
nical regulations, liberalize entry and exit into vari-
ous sectors of its economy, impose hard budget
constraints on all of its public and private enter-
prises, adopt the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP), liberalize its trade with the EU in services,
and join the European single market. Furthermore,
joining the EU will require Turkey to adopt and
implement the whole body of EU legislation and
standards—the acquis communautaire. According
to the EU membership criteria, new members must
be able to demonstrate the “ability to take on the
obligations of membership including adherence to
the aims of political, economic and monetary
union.” Thus Turkey is expected to adopt the euro
when it is ready to do so, but not immediately upon
accession.
Welfare Effects of Integration
Any study of the effects of integration on the
Turkish economy must keep in mind that the cus-
toms union in industrial goods between the EU and
Turkey was established in 1996 and that a period of
perhaps 10 years or more will precede full member-
ship and Turkish participation in the internal mar-
ket. Harrison, Rutherford, and Tarr (1997), who
have calculated the impact of the customs union in
industrial goods on Turkish welfare, estimate that
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the amount of CAP-like compensation payments
granted to farmers. Farmers’ incomes will decrease
considerably under Agenda 2000 policies without
direct payments and will increase under Agenda
2000 policies with direct payments. Table 12.1
shows that agricultural value added will increase by
€2.15 billion under Agenda 2000 policies with
direct payments equal to those applied in the EU
and by €0.34 billion under Agenda 2000 policies
with direct payments equal to 35 percent of pay-
ments granted in the EU member countries.
The budgetary costs to Turkey of adopting EU-
like agricultural policies will depend on whether
Turkey receives compensation from the EU budget
for introducing these policies. If Turkey does not
receive any compensation from the EU budget, the
cost will amount to €3 billion under Agenda 2000
policies with direct payments equal to those applied
in the EU and to €1.2 billion under Agenda 2000
policies with direct payments equal to 35 percent of
payments granted in the EU member countries.
Services and Network Industries
To join the EU, Turkey must liberalize its services and
network industries. This section considers the bank-
ing, telecommunications, transportation, electricity,
and natural gas sectors as representative of those
making up Turkey’s services and network industries.
Banking Sector Before 1999, Turkey lacked the
crucial components of financial markets: compe-
tent supervisory authorities, a regulatory frame-
work, and a legal and institutional infrastructure.
In addition, regulations in Turkey were lax and
poorly enforced. In February 2001, Turkey faced a
currency crisis. The cost of this crisis in terms of its
effect on the banking sector has been estimated at
US$46 billion,1 or about 27–30 percent of the
Turkish GDP (the crisis and its effects are described
in more detail by Pazarbas¸ıog˘lu in chapter 6). After
the crisis, Turkey changed its legislative, regulatory,
and institutional framework. As of 2004, Turkish
prudential requirements related to capital adequacy
standards, loan classification and provisioning
requirements, limits on large exposures, limits on
connected lending, and requirements for liquidity
and market risk management were generally in
conformity with those of the EU.
The welfare effects of policies followed by
Turkey in the banking sector are illuminated by com-
paring a base case—the Turkish economy operat-
ing under the rules and regulations that prevailed
in the banking sector during the latter half of the
1990s—with a case in which Turkey adopts and
implements in the banking sector all of the rules
and regulations of the EU.
The effects of the adoption of EU rules and regu-
lations in the banking sector on the price of bank-
ing services are illuminated by a study by McGuire
and Schuele (2000) in which they develop index
values of restrictiveness in financial services for sev-
eral countries. McGuire and Schuele, in extending
the work of McGuire (1998), base their analysis on
1997 data and distinguish between prudential and
nonprudential requirements. The authors note that
prudential requirements aimed at ensuring the sta-
bility of the banking system by preserving solvency,
limiting risks, and protecting bank deposits are, in
general, similar across economies. Therefore, they
abstract from consideration of prudential require-
ments and concentrate on nonprudential require-
ments. The index values of the nonprudential vari-
ables considered by McGuire and Schuele (2000)
are shown in table 12.2; scores range from 0 (least
restrictive) to 1 (most restrictive). In the table, the
restrictions have been divided into two groups:
those affecting “commercial presence” and “restric-
tions on ongoing operations.” The first group indi-
cates the restrictions on the movement of capital,
and the second group is modeled as restrictions on
trade in banking services. The commercial presence
restrictions group covers restrictions on licensing,
direct investment, joint venture arrangements, and
the permanent movement of people. The other
group covers restrictions on raising funds, lending
312 Turkey: Economic Reform and Accession to the European Union
TABLE 12.1 Impact of Agenda 2000 Policies
(millions of euros)
Effect on real income 2,916
Effect on agricultural value added
Direct payments equal to 2,145
those applied in the EU
Direct payments at 35 percent 341
of payments granted in EU 
countries
Effect on government budget −2,998
Source: Chapter 2 of this volume.
funds, providing other lines of business, expanding
banking outlets, composition of the board of direc-
tors, and the temporary movement of people. Based
on the scores shown in table 12.2 for each variable
considered, the authors assign weights to the vari-
ables and obtain first restrictiveness index values for
the two groups and then the overall restrictiveness
index values for the economies considered.
Table 12.2 reveals that the Turkish banking sys-
tem is more restrictive than the banking system in
the EU. Kalirajan and others (2000) use this infor-
mation to study the effects of restrictions in the
banking sector on performance indicators. The
authors note that banks provide a wide range of
financial services, including deposit taking, lend-
ing, insurance, and securities. But they emphasize
that, although banks are diversified entities, their
core business remains matching depositors and
lenders. Thus the price of banking services can be
measured by the net interest margin—that is, the
difference between the interest rate banks charge on
their loans and the rate they pay on their deposits.
Restrictions on trade in banking services is
expected to increase the interest margin. The effect
of these restrictions in the banking sector on the
net interest margin is shown in the third and fourth
columns of table 12.2 for the EU countries and
Turkey. The table reveals that, as a result of restric-
tions in the banking sector, the net interest margin
in the EU increases relative to the free trade net
interest margin by 5.32 percent, and that the
increase amounts to 31.54 percent for Turkey. One
could thus infer that the net interest margin in
Turkey will decrease by 26.22 percent when Turkey
adopts and implements the EU rules and regula-
tions on banking services.
Telecommunications The telecommunications
industry in Turkey has been dominated by Türk
Telekom, a national monopoly with exclusive
rights to all fixed-line voice operations. It also
provides cable services, and so also has been
responsible for the radio and television transmit-
ters. Türk Telekom has a monopoly on the provi-
sion of international calls, and prices for local calls
through fixed lines were cross-subsidized by
national long-distance and international calls.
Reforms since the early 1990s have led to the
introduction of four new mobile telephone com-
panies and a series of private companies that pro-
vide value added services such as Internet access
and cable television.
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TABLE 12.2 Restrictiveness Index Scores and Price Effects for Banking Services,
EU and Turkey
Restrictiveness Index Price Effect (%)
EU Turkey EU Turkey
Licensing of banks 0.0100 0.2000 0.7515 16.8479
Direct investment 0.0100 0.0100 0.7515 0.8424
Joint venture arrangements 0.0050 0.0525 0.3758 4.4226
Permanent movement of people 0.0085 0.0119 0.6403 1.0025
Restrictions on establishment total 0.0335 0.2744 2.5191 23.1154
Raising funds by banks 0.0075 0.0075 0.5636 0.6318
Lending funds by banks 0.0075 0.0075 0.5636 0.6318
Other business of banks—insurance and 0.0050 0.0525 0.3758 4.4226
securities services
Expanding the number of banking outlets 0.0025 0.0131 0.1879 1.1056
Composition of board of directors 0.0119 0.0120 0.8973 1.0126
Temporary movement of people 0.0028 0.0074 0.2131 0.6213
Restrictions on ongoing operations total 0.0373 0.1000 2.8013 8.4257
Index value 0.0708 0.3744 5.3203 31.5410
Source: Australian Productivity Commission (http://www.pc.gov.au).
Akdemir, Bas¸çı, and Locksley note in chapter 5 of
this volume that the Turkish Parliament approved
legislation to reform the telecommunications sector
in 2000 and that the legislation was amended in
May 2001. The reform program was quite successful
in transforming the Turkish telecommunications
system into a modern one. The objective of the leg-
islative and regulatory reform was to bring the regu-
latory and supervisory regime for the Turkish
telecommunications sector up to the level of inter-
national practice in line with EU standards. The
objective has been achieved partially by opening the
mobile telecom market to competition. With acces-
sion to the EU, Turkey will have to introduce full
competition in telecommunications, and it will
have to adopt and implement the EU legislative
measures centering on liberalization of all telecom-
munications services and infrastructures, adoption
of open network provision measures to the future
competitive environment, maintenance and devel-
opment of a minimum supply of services, and defi-
nition of common principles for financing the uni-
versal service.
The welfare effects of policies followed by Turkey
in the telecommunications sector are studied here by
comparing the situation of the Turkish economy
in the base case—the Turkish economy operating
under the rules and regulations that prevailed in the
telecommunications sector during the latter half of
the 1990s—with the case in which Turkey adopts and
implements in the telecommunications sector all of
the rules and regulations of the EU. The effects of
adoption of EU rules and regulations in the telecom-
munications sector on the price of telecommunica-
tions services are examined as well. The telecommu-
nications sector is a heterogeneous service industry
just like the banking sector, and its services include
fixed-line voice services (e.g., local, domestic, and
international long-distance telephony), mobile serv-
ices (mobile access, calls, and messaging services),
Internet services (e.g., dial-up and Web hosting),
data services (e.g., leased lines, asynchronous trans-
fer mode [ATM] services, and public data network
services), and content services (e.g., pay TV and
online information and entertainment). Thus the
price of telecommunications will be an index of all
these prices.
Warren (2000a) considers four types of impedi-
ments to trade in telecommunications services:
restrictions on cross-border trade, restrictions on
establishment, restrictions on direct investment in
fixed and mobile network services, and restrictions
on ongoing operations. For each type, Warren
derives index values, for which the higher values
indicate greater restrictions. The index of restric-
tions on cross-border trade captures policies that
discriminate against all potential entrants (domes-
tic and foreign) seeking to supply cross-border
telecommunications services, and the index of
restrictions on establishment captures policies that
discriminate against all potential entrants (domestic
and foreign) seeking to supply telecommunications
services via investment in the country. The index of
restrictions on direct investment is designed to cap-
ture policies that discriminate against potential for-
eign entrants seeking to supply telecommunications
services via investment in the country. Finally, the
index of restrictions on ongoing operations cap-
tures policies that discriminate against potential
foreign entrants seeking to supply cross-border
telecommunications services. Based on the index
values derived from an international survey under-
taken by the International Telecommunications
Union (1998) for 136 countries, Warren (2000b)
estimates first the impact of impediments to trade
and investment in telecommunications services on
the penetration of fixed and mobile telecommuni-
cations network and thereafter the price impact.
The results are shown in table 12.3. The table
reveals that Finland and the United Kingdom fol-
low liberal trade and investment policies in
telecommunications and that, as a result of restric-
tions in the trade of telecommunications services,
Turkish telecommunications prices are 33.53 per-
cent higher than the prices in Finland and the
United Kingdom.
Transportation In the transportation sector, one
can distinguish broadly between three different
modes of transport: land transport (including rail
and road transport), maritime transport, and air
transport. In Turkey, road transport constitutes the
significant portion of transport services. Roads
carry an estimated 90 percent of domestic freight
volumes and 40 percent of international freight val-
ues. The sector is competitive domestically; there
are many competing firms; and access to the roads
is relatively simple. Conditions in the international
segment of the market are very different from
those in the domestic freight segment, however.
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TABLE 12.3 Restrictiveness Index Scores for Telecommunications Services
Restrictiveness Index Price Effect (%)
Restrictions on Establishment Restrictions on Ongoing Operations Restrictions on Establishment Restrictions on Ongoing Operations
Restrictions Restrictions 
on Direct on Direct
Investment in Investment
Fixed and Restrictions in Fixed and Restrictions
Mobile Restrictions on Restrictions on Ongoing Mobile Restrictions on Restrictions on Ongoing
Network Establishment on Cross- Operations Index Network Establishment on Cross- Operations Price
Services Total Border Trade Total Value Services Total Border Trade Total Effect
Austria 0.1333 0.1333 0.0000 0.0000 0.1333 0.8480 0.8480 0.0000 0.0000 0.8480
Belgium 0.1334 0.1334 0.0667 0.0667 0.2001 0.8710 0.8710 0.4353 0.4353 1.3063
Denmark 0.0333 0.0333 0.0000 0.0000 0.0333 0.1985 0.1985 0.0000 0.0000 0.1985
Finland 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
France 0.2100 0.2100 0.0000 0.0000 0.2100 1.4298 1.4298 0.0000 0.0000 1.4298
Germany 0.0493 0.0493 0.0000 0.0000 0.0493 0.3195 0.3195 0.0000 0.0000 0.3195
Greece 0.1609 0.1609 0.3000 0.3000 0.4609 1.5778 1.5778 2.9424 2.9424 4.5202
Ireland 0.3533 0.3533 0.0000 0.0000 0.3533 2.6655 2.6655 0.0000 0.0000 2.6655
Italy 0.1369 0.1369 0.0000 0.0000 0.1369 1.0019 1.0019 0.0000 0.0000 1.0019
Luxembourg 0.1667 0.1667 0.0000 0.0000 0.1667 1.0458 1.0458 0.0000 0.0000 1.0458
Netherlands 0.0300 0.0300 0.0000 0.0000 0.0300 0.2025 0.2025 0.0000 0.0000 0.2025
Portugal 0.1100 0.1100 0.4000 0.4000 0.5100 1.3473 1.3473 4.8992 4.8992 6.2465
Spain 0.1793 0.1793 0.2333 0.2333 0.4127 1.7099 1.7099 2.2247 2.2247 3.9346
Sweden 0.1000 0.1000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1000 0.6530 0.6530 0.0000 0.0000 0.6530
U.K. 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Turkey 0.3987 0.3987 0.4000 0.4000 0.7987 16.7384 16.7384 16.7944 16.7944 33.5328
Note: The restrictiveness index scores range from 0 to 1. The higher the score, the greater are the restrictions for an economy.
Source: Australian Productivity Commission (http://www.pc.gov.au).
Operations between countries are regulated by a
web of bilateral and multilateral agreements that
restrict quantity and capacity by limiting the num-
ber of permits available for a truck to make a jour-
ney between jurisdictions. Bilateral agreements
generally prohibit cabotage.2 Thus the domestic
Turkish market is reserved for Turkish firms. By
contrast, the road freight market within the EU for
EU national firms is highly liberalized, including
cabotage freight. Effectively, it is a single market in
which the only entrance requirement is a national
license from an EU country that permits unre-
stricted international and domestic carriage within
the EU irrespective of the country of origin of the
carrier within the EU. Ultimate access to the EU
would largely solve the access problems of the
Turkish industry, but it would also lead to increased
competition from abroad.
As for rail transport, Turkish Railways is a
national monopoly with exclusive rights to the
transport of passengers and freight by rail in
Turkey. By contrast, the EU acquis in the rail trans-
port sector has been designed to improve the com-
petitiveness of the rail transport sector and to
liberalize rail transport markets. Harmonization of
the current rules in the rail transport sector with
the EU acquis requires that access rights be
extended and that different organizational entities
be set up for rail operations and infrastructure
management in the rail transport sector. Functions
such as rail capacity allocation, infrastructure
charging, and licensing will have to be separated
from rail operators. In addition, the financial rela-
tions between different parties and activities must
be clearly defined by separation of accounts to
enable the cost of operations to be accurately estab-
lished and to avoid cross-subsidization.
Maritime transport is another area in which
compliance with the EU acquis requires major
changes in the sector. The EU acquis covers freedom
to supply services, the requirements for competition,
pricing practices, and the conditions to be applied to
vessels carrying dangerous or polluting goods. As in
road transportation, access to the Turkish maritime
transportation market is restricted. With accession,
access problems will be solved, and the sector will
face increased competition from abroad.
Finally, in the air transport sector Turkey has
taken major steps toward liberalizing air transport
services. Major reforms were introduced during the
1980s. In this sector, Turkey will need to harmonize
its regulations with those of the EU on civil avia-
tion licenses, civil aviation rules and procedures, air
carrier liability in the event of accidents, allocation
of slots, ground handling at airports, aviation
safety, and traffic management. But, overall, the
existing structure will satisfy the requirements of
the acquis on air transport services with relatively
little alignment.
Francois’s study in chapter 6 of this volume is
helpful in determining the tariff equivalent of trade
barriers in transportation services. Francois asserts
that the tariff equivalent is roughly 8.9 percent.
Electricity The Turkish electricity sector is domi-
nated by state-owned enterprises. The two largest
firms are the Turkish Electricity and Transmission
Company (TEAS¸) and the Turkish Electricity Dis-
tribution Company (TEDAS¸). Recently, TEAS was
separated into three companies covering generation,
trading, and transmission activities. Some privately
owned firms have entered the industry through
build-operate-transfer (BOT), build-operate-own
(BOO), or auto-generator schemes. Today, these
firms account for more than 21 percent of electric-
ity generation. Under the regulations prevailing in
Turkey, the private operators signed long-term
power purchase agreements with the state-owned
generation enterprise in which the enterprise com-
mitted itself to buying the output of the plants for a
period of, say, 20 years at a fixed price in foreign cur-
rency. In these contracts, the price has been on aver-
age between $.08 and $.09 per kilowatt-hour for the
first 5–10 years of operation. These contracts, guar-
anteed by the Treasury, assured investors that the
projects would be profitable irrespective of the
demand for power.
Recently, the government of Turkey passed, as
noted by Atiyas and Dutz in chapter 7 of this vol-
ume, a new electricity law. The law provides for the
establishment of a new independent Energy Market
Regulatory Authority. With this law, the government
is introducing a market model, like the one in the
EU, that will transfer most of the task of supplying
and distributing electricity and the associated mar-
ket risks to the private sector, eliminate the need for
additional state-guaranteed power purchase agree-
ments, and minimize costs through competitive
pressures on producers and distributors along the
EU model.
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The welfare effects of policies followed by
Turkey in the electricity sector are studied here by
comparing the situation of the Turkish economy in
the base case—the Turkish economy operating
under the rules and regulations that prevailed in
the electricity sector during the latter half of the
1990s—with the case in which Turkey adopts and
implements in the electricity sector all of the rules
and regulations of the EU. The effects of regulation
on the price of electricity are examined by means of
table 12.4, which summarizes the status of the reg-
ulatory environment and market structure in the
electricity sector in selected EU countries and
Turkey as of 1998. In the electricity markets, com-
petition can be secured as long as the principle of
third party access (TPA) is observed. This principle
is based on the idea that the owner of the network
is obliged to give access to all delivery requests
through the network by production and sales
operators. The table shows that by 1998 Finland,
Germany, and the United Kingdom had liberalized
access to transmission and distribution networks,
and that access liberalization in Finland and Britain
had taken the form of regulated TPA, which is a
legal obligation to provide network access under
nondiscriminatory conditions. Germany has cho-
sen the negotiated TPA arrangement, in which con-
sumers and producers contract directly with each
other and then negotiate with the transmission and
distribution companies for access to the network.
Turkey, by contrast, had not observed the principle
of TPA by 1998, and it introduced this principle
only in 2001 under the regulated TPA regime.
But TPA alone will not secure competition in
the electricity sector. The owner of the network
could charge high access prices, which would put
the competitors in the final market at a disadvan-
tage. The achievement of competition requires that
the access charge be nondiscriminatory and cost-
reflective and that it give the network owner the
appropriate incentives to maintain and develop the
infrastructure so that the system avoids bottleneck
problems. The two dominant models for this
approach are cost-based (rate of return) pricing
and loosely regulated prices (the model more
prevalent in countries with a decentralized electric-
ity supply industry and a tradition of regulation
and control on a more local level). Under rate of
return regulation, the government sets the trans-
mission prices so that they effectively guarantee a
firm and “fair” rate of return. By contrast, under
price cap regulation, prices are indexed to a moving
indicator, such as the producer price index, less a
portion that provides incentive for innovation and
improved efficiency. Under this type of regulation,
firms could realize negative returns in the short run
if they are operating inefficiently. Table 12.4 reveals
that Finland and Germany have introduced 
cost-based pricing and that the United Kingdom
favors price cap regulation, but that Turkey did not
have an explicit transmission pricing regulation
during 1998.
The separation of generation and transmission,
in tandem with expanded TPA, is crucial to encour-
age competition. Without separation, the network
owner has very high incentives to preclude, or at
least limit, the access of competitors in the down-
stream market, thereby eliminating liberalization. If
the network owner does not participate in the
downstream markets, it is neutral toward the appli-
cants. Thus “unbundling” is important. The alloca-
tion of transmission rights must be separated from
transactions between upstream and downstream
firms. Where generation and transmission have
been unbundled, there may be either an accounting
separation, a legal separation, or a propriety separa-
tion into different companies. Accounting separa-
tion is the weakest form of separation, and legal
separation is achieved through the creation of
different companies under a common holding.
Propriety separation is the preferred alternative.
Table 12.4 shows the degree of overall
integration—from generation through transmis-
sion and distribution to supply—as well as the pres-
ence and type of separation of generation from
transmission in each of the countries considered.
Finland and the United Kingdom have separated
generation and transmission into legally distinct
firms, whereas Germany has introduced accounting
separation. The table also shows that, distinct from
liberalization, countries vary as well in the degree of
private ownership that has developed over time, as
well as in the decision made about privatization at
the time of liberalization. Indeed, it reveals the cur-
rent status of ownership in the generation segment
of the electricity sector, and it provides details about
privatization in electricity generation at the firm
level for the countries selected. The decision to pri-
vatize does not necessarily correlate with the degree
of liberalization. Germany has mixed ownership in
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TABLE 12.4 Country Data on European and Turkish Electricity Sectors, 1998
Finland Germany United Kingdom Turkey
Regulatory reform
Third party access (TPA) Regulated TPA Negotiated TPA Regulated TPA None
Electricity market Finnish Electricity Exchange (1995) None English and Wales market (1990) None
Transmission price regulation Cost-based Cost-based Price cap n.a.
Consumer choice thresholds 1995, 500 kW; 1997, 0 kW 1998, 0 kW 1990, 1 MW; 1994, 100 kW; No choice
1998, 0 kW
Vertical integration in the industry
Degree of vertical integration Unbundled Unbundled Unbundled Integrated
Generation separate from Separate companies Accounting separation Separate companies Integrated
transmission
Ownership in the industry Mostly public Mixed Private Mostly public
Privatization in electricity generation 2/1/1997, Komijoki Oy, 25% 7/5/1994, Rhein-Main 3/6/1991, National Power, 60% Private participation
Donau, 75.5% 3/6/1991, Power Gen, 60%
12/31/1995, Neckar, 99% 3/1/1995, National Power, 40%
3/1/1995, Power Gen, 40%
7/19/1996, British Energy, 87.73%
n.a. Not applicable.
Sources: Steiner 2000 and the author.
the industry; the United Kingdom has made priva-
tization a central feature of reform.
A further requirement for liberalization of elec-
tricity markets is the “opening of the demand side.”
This principle promotes the idea that eligible cus-
tomers have the right to seek the most convenient
supplier. The table reveals that Finland and the
United Kingdom introduced consumer choice ini-
tially for large consumers and then gradually
phased in full consumer choice, that Germany
introduced full consumer choice immediately in
1998, and that Turkey had not opened the demand
side by 1998.
Finally, competition requires the existence of
exchange markets, which should yield prices in line
with marginal costs covering fixed costs. By 1998
Finland and the United Kingdom had introduced
such markets for electricity and allowed the prices
and quantities traded to be determined by the
equivalence of supply and demand. Germany and
Turkey did not have such a market by 1998.
Steiner (2000), basically using the information
provided in table 12.4, extends it to 19 Organisa-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) economies over the period 1986–96 and
develops indexes of regulatory indicators, which he
then uses to investigate empirically the linkages
among regulatory regimes, market environments,
and performance in electricity supply. Using the
productive efficiency of generation plants and retail
electricity prices as indicators of performance,
Steiner concludes that unbundling of generation
and transmission, expansion of the TPA, and intro-
duction of electricity markets reduce the industrial
end user prices. The results obtained by Steiner
(2000) were later extended by Doove and others
(2001) by increasing the number of countries con-
sidered from 19 to 50. The results are shown in
table 12.5. As a result of restrictions, Turkish elec-
tricity prices are 20.7 percent higher than the prices
in Finland and the United Kingdom, which follow
liberal policies in the electricity sector.
Natural Gas The natural gas sector in Turkey is
dominated by government-owned entities. The
Petroleum Pipeline Corporation (BOTAS¸) owns
the pipeline infrastructure for oil and gas transmis-
sion, liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals, and the
gas distribution network. BOTAS¸ had monopoly
rights for gas imports and exports and wholesale
trading. In 2000, domestic consumption was
14.6 billion cubic meters, with imports accounting
for 96 percent of consumption. Demand growth
was about 17 percent a year between 1990 and
1999. The distribution of natural gas is carried out
by local companies that are owned either by the
municipalities or by BOTAS¸. Pricing was deter-
mined by BOTAS¸, with indirect influence by the
government. In May 2001, the Turkish government
passed, as described by Mazzanti and Biancardi in
chapter 8 of this volume, a new gas law. With this
law, the government plans to establish a competi-
tive market like the one in the EU and encourage
private sector participation through a phased pol-
icy. The Energy Market Regulatory Authority,
which regulates both the gas industry and the elec-
tricity industry, determines the transmission and
distribution access rules and tariffs and the method
for regulating retail prices.
Competition in the electricity sector can be
achieved as long as the competition upstream is
sufficiently developed and network access is open,
but the situation is quite different in the natural gas
industry, where firms are burdened with long-term
investments in the upstream phase (gas contracts
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TABLE 12.5 Price Impact of Regulation
in Electricity Supply, EU
and Turkey
(percent)
Impact on Price
Austria 13.2
Belgium 15.4
Denmark 8.5
Finland 0.0
France 16.0
Germany 8.3
Greece 16.6
Ireland 13.9
Italy 17.1
Luxembourg 13.8
Netherlands 15.5
Portugal 17.9
Spain 9.5
Sweden 0.0
U.K. 0.0
Turkey 20.7
Source: Doove and others 2001.
and infrastructures). They buy the gas from pro-
ducers under long-term contracts with take-or-pay
clauses. Under these obligations, gas purchasers
must pay 70–90 percent of the contracted capacity
whether they receive the natural gas or not. Thus
firms have to sink huge investments in extraction
fields and international pipelines, where they face
huge fixed costs and almost zero marginal costs.
In those cases, the extractor needs coverage from
the market risk. It is often claimed that vertical
integration is needed to cover firms’ take-or-pay
obligations. Table 12.6 describes the main features
of the natural gas industry in EU countries
for three main areas of interest: access to the net-
work, the unbundling of monopolized activities
from the competitive ones, and the opening of the
demand side.
According to Polo and Scarpa (2003), three main
issues must be determined for implementation of
the TPA principle: (1) the technical and commercial
conditions to be set for access (access price setting),
(2) how disputes about access will be solved, and
(3) the kind of regulatory regime to be used.
According to the authors, a key aspect of the TPA is
the institution that deals with disputes and acts as an
arbitrator. In most of the EU countries, the regula-
tory authority intervenes in disputes in the natural
gas sector (table 12.6). In Ireland, Luxembourg, and
Spain, the Ministry of Industry is in charge of dis-
pute resolution in this sector, but the authority
is unspecified for France, Greece, and Portugal.3
Finally, the national liberalization plans also differ
in the kind of regulation that is adopted on the
TPA. The majority of countries have chosen ex ante
regulation in which the regulator sets the price and
technical conditions in advance, rather than an
ex post regime in which the regulator intervenes
ex post on the tariffs communicated by firms.4
Table 12.6 shows that demand opening, the third
element to create a level playing field in the natural
gas sector, has been treated rather differently across
countries. Germany and the United Kingdom had
already completed their process by 2000, and in
most other countries the complete opening will be
reached by 2007 at the latest. However, in some
important countries—Denmark, France, Greece,
and Portugal—a final date for the process has not
been set. In Turkey, the process of liberalization
began only in 2001 with the new gas law.
To weigh the overall effectiveness of the liberal-
ization plans of the EU countries for the natural gas
sector, Polo and Scarpa (2003) use a scoring proce-
dure in which higher scores correspond to a more
advanced solution. The authors find that the more
320 Turkey: Economic Reform and Accession to the European Union
TABLE 12.6 EU Country Data on European Natural Gas Sectors
Third Party Access Demand Opening
Access Dispute Type of Percent Complete
Price Setting Solution Regulation Unbundling Eligible Opening Score
Austria Negotiated Regulator Ex post Accounting 49 2001 10
Belgium Regulator Regulator Ex ante Legal 59 2005 16
Denmark Regulator Regulator Ex post Legal 30 Unspecified 11
Finland Regulator Regulator Ex post Proprietary 90 2003 21
France Unspecified Unspecified Ex ante Accounting 20 Unspecified 4
Germany Negotiated Antitrust Ex post Accounting 100 2000 12
Greece Unspecified Unspecified Ex ante Unspecified Unspecified Unspecified 2
Ireland Ministry Ministry Ex ante Legal 75 2005 14
Italy Regulator Regulator Ex ante Legal 65 2003 17
Luxembourg Ministry Ministry Ex ante Accounting 51 2007 11
Netherlands Negotiated Regulator Ex ante Accounting 45 2004 10
Portugal Unspecified Unspecified Ex ante Unspecified Unspecified Unspecified 2
Spain Ministry Ministry Ex ante Legal 72 2003 15
Sweden Regulator Regulator Ex post Accounting 47 2006 11
U.K. Regulator Regulator Ex ante Proprietary 100 1998 23
Source: Polo and Scarpa 2003.
advanced solutions have been adopted by Finland,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
Welfare Effects
This section examines the welfare effects of Turkish
accession to the EU by considering the 1996 input-
output table of the Turkish economy. The table has
97 sectors. Of these, banking is sector 84; telecom-
munications, sector 83; transport via railways,
sector 78; land transport, sector 79; water transport,
sector 80; air transport, sector 81; electricity pro-
duction, transmission, and distribution, sector 69;
and natural gas, sector 70.
Consider the case in which Turkey adopts and
implements the EU rules and regulations in the
banking sector. A denotes the 97 × 97 matrix of
input coefficients. Given A, the 96 × 96 input
matrix B is formed by deleting the 84th column
and 84th row referring to the banking sector. The
84th row where the 84th column element has been
deleted is denoted by e ; p denotes the 1 × 96 price
vector of the 96 commodities, excluding the bank-
ing sector; and va denotes the corresponding
1 × 96 unit gross value added vector. The price
equation can then be written as
(12.1) p = pB + pbe + va
where pb denotes the price of the banking services.
From this equation follows
(12.2) p = pbe(I − B)−1 + va(I − B)−1
Thus, given the price of banking services that
will prevail in Turkey after it adopts and imple-
ments the EU rules and regulations, pb, the equilib-
rium prices of the other 96 commodities can be
determined from equation 12.2, assuming that
there is no change in the unit gross value added
vector va . Given the equilibrium price vector p, the
1 × 97 price vector can be formed as π= (p pb). If
CON denotes the 96 × 1 consumption expenditure
vector obtained from the 1996 input-output table
by deleting the value of consumption of the bank-
ing sector and if conb denotes the value of con-
sumption of banking services, the 97 × 1 consump-
tion vector can be formed as 
(12.3) CONS =
[
CON
conb
]
Initially, all base year prices equal unity. The
value of the total consumption expenditure
evaluated at the base prices of 1996 can be
expressed as 
(12.4) C = u CONS
where u denotes the 1 × 97 unit vector. The value
of the total consumption expenditure evaluated at
the prices that will prevail after Turkey adopts and
implements the EU rules and regulations in the
banking sector is then given by 
(12.5) C∗ = πCONS
The effect on consumer welfare5 can now be calcu-
lated as
(12.6) (C − C∗) × 100/C∗
By construction, the prices of all commodities in
the base year equal unity. The previous section
revealed that adoption of the EU rules and regula-
tions by the banking sector will decrease the net
interest margin by 26.22 percent. If the value of the
26.22 percent decrease is taken as the percentage
change in the price of banking services stemming
from adoption of the EU rules and regulations by
the banking sector, it is possible to conclude that
the welfare of society will increase by 1.36 percent
after adoption of the EU rules and regulations by
the banking sector. The change in consumer wel-
fare will amount to about €2.12 billion.6
Assuming that with the adoption of EU rules
and regulations by the telecommunications, trans-
portation, and electricity sectors prices will decline
by 33.5 percent in the telecommunications sector,
8.9 percent in transport services, and 20.7 percent
in the electricity sectors, a study similar to that in
the banking sector reveals that adoption of the EU
rules and regulations by the telecommunications,
transportation, and electricity sectors will cause the
welfare of society to increase in those sectors by
0.59 percent, 1.01 percent, and 0.53 percent, respec-
tively. The effect of the adoption of EU rules and
regulations by the telecommunications, transporta-
tion, and electricity sectors thus amounts, respec-
tively, to increases of €915 million, €1.57 billion,
and €822 million in the real incomes of consumers.
Table 12.7 reveals that the natural gas prices in
Turkey are considerably higher than those in some
EU countries, which, as was determined earlier,
have adopted more advanced regulatory solutions
in the sector. A weighted average of natural
gas prices for the industry in Finland and the
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United Kingdom demonstrates that Turkish natu-
ral gas prices are 48.9 percent higher than the aver-
age price in those countries. Calculation then
shows that with the adoption of EU rules and regu-
lations by the natural gas sector, the welfare of soci-
ety will increase by 0.08 percent. This change
amounts to a €128 million increase in the real
income of consumers.
The findings described in this section therefore
reveal that Turkey will benefit from adopting EU
rules and regulations in the banking, telecommuni-
cations, transportation, electricity, and natural gas
sectors, and that liberalization within the context
of EU integration in those sectors will lead to a
3.56 percent increase in real household incomes.
This increase is equivalent to a change in con-
sumers’ welfare of €5.56 billion. During 1996, con-
sumption was 72.95 percent of GDP, and thus the
percentage change in the welfare of the society is
equivalent to a 2.6 percent increase in real GDP.
Because the estimates of the price wedges caused
by service barriers are the key parameters deter-
mining the welfare effects of services liberalization
and liberalization in the calculations just presented,
the estimates made here of tariff equivalents are
compared with estimates from other sources. Fig-
ures 12.1 and 12.2 show, respectively, the telecom-
munications prices for business and residential cus-
tomers in selected countries. By contrast, table 12.8
presents the OECD basket of international tele-
phone charges during November 2001. The figures
and the table reveal that the price wedge implicit in
these figures is much larger than the figure of
33.5 percent used in the calculations made here.7
Thus the estimates presented of the price wedge in
the telecommunications sector are rather conserva-
tive, and the estimate of the effects of liberalization
in telecommunications services gives the lower
bound of the welfare gains derived in the sector.
A look at the nominal prices for electricity over
the period 1990–2000 in Turkey reveals that elec-
tricity prices for industrial customers have fluctu-
ated between $.075 and $.095 per kilowatt-hour
and prices for residential customers between $.045
and $.10 per kilowatt-hour. The prices for indus-
trial consumers are almost exactly as high as those
for residential consumers. Because the cost of sup-
plying residential consumers is much higher than
that of supplying industry, there seems to be cross-
subsidization in favor of residential consumers.
According to TEAS, the state-owned generation
and transmission company, the sales prices per
kilowatt-hour at the end of 1999 for industrial cus-
tomers was $.0687 for high-voltage customers,
$.0715 for intermediate and low-voltage customers,
and in the range of $.04 per kilowatt-hour for dis-
tributors. However, the cost of producing electric-
ity, as noted by OECD (2002), is much larger than
is suggested by these data. The cost of purchasing
additional electricity from BOT, BOO, and transfer
of operating rights (TOOR) contract generators
reaches $.11–$.12 per kilowatt-hour. Atiyas and
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TABLE 12.7 Retail Prices of Natural Gas and Electricity, 2000
Natural Gas Natural Gas
for Industry for Households Electricity Electricity
(US$/107 kcal, (US$/107 kcal, for Industry for Households
GCV basis) GCV basis) (US¢/kWh) (US¢/kWh)
Austria .. 348.40 3.80 11.80
Finland 130.70 159.50 3.90 7.80
France 167.80 347.50 3.60 10.20
Germany 187.90 373.40 4.10 12.10
Greece 216.10 287.20 4.20 7.10
Ireland 145.00 345.80 4.90 10.10
Spain 175.40 491.40 4.30 11.70
U.K. 104.60 292.80 5.50 10.70
Turkey 175.20 259.60 8.00 8.50
.. Negligible.
Note: GCV = gross calorific value.
Source: International Energy Agency 2003.
Dutz point out in chapter 7 of this volume that the
average cost of producing electricity will further
increase over time as new BOT, BOO, and TOOR
plants begin to produce electricity. Table 12.7,
which presents the electricity prices in EU coun-
tries and Turkey, reveals that the electricity prices in
Turkey are considerably higher than those in the
EU countries where prices are the least expensive.
Thus the price wedge implicit in these figures is
much larger than the figure of 20.7 percent used
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FIGURE 12.1 OECD Composite Telecommunications Business Basket, November 2001
(US$ PPP)
Note: VAT is excluded; calls to mobile networks and international calls are included; PPP = purchasing power
parity.
Source: OECD.
0
400
1,400
1,200
200
800
1,000
600
Ice
lan
d
Sw
ed
en
De
nm
ark
No
rw
ay
Lu
xe
mb
ou
rg
Ne
the
rla
nd
s
Sw
itze
rla
nd
Ge
rm
an
y
U.K
.
Ire
lan
d
Fin
lan
d
Ca
na
da
Fra
nc
e
Be
lgiu
m
Au
str
ia
Ja
pa
n
Un
ite
d S
tat
es
Sp
ain
Au
str
ali
a
Ne
w 
Ze
ala
nd Ita
ly
OE
CD
 av
era
ge
Re
p. 
of 
Ko
rea
Gr
ee
ce
Po
rtu
ga
l
Cz
ec
h R
ep
.
Me
xic
o
Hu
ng
ary
Tu
rke
y
Slo
va
k R
ep
.
Po
lan
d
US$ PPP
Fixed Usage
FIGURE 12.2 OECD Composite Telecommunications Residential Basket, November 2001
(US$ PPP)
Note: VAT is included; calls to mobile networks and international calls are included.
Source: OECD.
here in calculations, and the estimate made here of
the price wedge in the electricity sector is thus
rather conservative.
Table 12.9 shows the tariff equivalents of trade
barriers in traded services and network industries
estimated by different authors for Turkey. Research
into the measurement of services trade barriers is
fairly recent, and very few studies cover Turkey. One
such study was conducted by Hoekman (1996), who
used information from the country schedules of the
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).
Hoekman’s estimates for Turkey are shown in the
second column of table 12.9. According to the fig-
ures, the tariff equivalent in the banking sector is
9.2 percent, in the basic telecommunications sector
92.9 percent, and in the value added telecommuni-
cations sector 42.9 percent. But these estimates
have, as Hoekman notes, certain drawbacks.8 First,
the method assumes that the absence of positive
country commitments in the GATS schedules can
be interpreted as indicating the presence of restric-
tions. Second, the different types of restrictions are
given equal weight and are not distinguished
according to their economic impact. Finally, the
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TABLE 12.8 OECD Basket of International Telephone Charges, November 2001Hoekman Francois (1999)
Current Study (1996) and Hoekman (2000)
Financial services 9.2 46.3
Banking 31.54
Telecommunications 33.53
Basic telecommunications 92.9
Value added telecommunications 42.9
Source: The author.
TABLE 12.9 Estimated Tariff Equivalents in Traded Services and Network Industries
TABLE 12.8 OECD Basket of International Telephone Charges, November 2001Business, Excluding Tax Residential, Including Tax
(US$) (US$ PPP) (US$) (US$ PPP)
Austria 0.77 0.83 1.06 1.15
Belgium 0.49 0.56 0.57 0.66
Denmark 0.50 0.46 0.80 0.73
Finland 0.78 0.74 1.00 0.95
France 0.34 0.37 0.66 0.73
Germany 0.42 0.45 0.62 0.67
Greece 0.77 1.12 1.17 1.69
Ireland 0.51 0.55 0.70 0.76
Italy 0.90 1.16 1.32 1.69
Luxembourg 0.37 0.41 0.49 0.55
Netherlands 0.30 0.35 0.46 0.53
Portugal 0.71 1.08 0.96 1.46
Spain 0.78 1.01 1.12 1.46
Sweden 0.34 0.34 0.53 0.54
U.K. 1.18 1.16 1.61 1.58
Turkey 1.51 3.98 1.89 4.98
Note: PPP = purchasing power parity.
Source: OECD 2002.
TABLE 12.8 OECD Basket of International Telephone Charges, November 2001
method assumes that market access restrictions are
the only type of barriers to trade in services.
Francois (1999) fits a gravity model to bilateral
trade in services between the United States and its
major trading partners, taking Hong Kong (China)
and Singapore as free trade benchmarks. The inde-
pendent variables are per capita income, gross
domestic product, and a Western Hemisphere
dummy variable. He interprets the differences
between actual and predicted imports as indicative
of the size of barriers to trade. These differences
between actual and predicted imports are then
normalized relative to the free trade benchmarks.
These quantity measures also are converted into
tariff equivalents by assuming a specific value of
demand elasticity. Francois’s estimate for Turkey,
reported in Hoekman (2000) and shown in the
third column of table 12.9, is 46.3 percent in finan-
cial services. Finally, a comparison of the tariff
equivalents for Tunisian financial services and
telecommunications sectors used by Konan and
Maskus (2002) with the estimates made here of tar-
iff equivalents reveals that the estimates used in this
study are rather reasonable.
Economic Challenges
This section considers issues related to Turkey’s
membership in the European Economic and Mon-
etary Union (EMU), labor markets, compliance
with EU environmental directives, and state aids.
Membership in the European Economic 
and Monetary Union
Participation in the European Economic and Mon-
etary Union is a must for Turkey, because the acquis
is expected to be adopted in full, including EMU
participation, as well as, in due time, all the requi-
site “Maastricht criteria” for Euro Area integration.
Turkey is not expected to adopt the euro immedi-
ately upon accession. According to Article 122 of
the Treaty Establishing the European Community,
upon accession Turkey will be treated as a “country
with a derogation” until it fulfills the convergence
criteria, which involve conditions on price stability,
interest rate convergence, the budget deficit, the
government debt, and exchange rate stability.
As emphasized by the European Commission
(2003), during the preaccession period Turkey
must adopt the required EMU legislation in order
to acquire the status of “Member State with a dero-
gation” for adoption of the euro. In particular,
Turkey needs to take the relevant steps to liberalize
capital movements completely, prohibit the privi-
leged access of financial institutions to the public
sector, and attain the political and economic
independence of the monetary authorities. Upon
accession, the common macroeconomic policy
framework will become more constraining, with
strong reinforcement of fiscal discipline and the
integration of other economic policies. Budgetary
policy and outcomes will become subject to the
excessive deficit procedure and the nonpunitive
parts of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). The
Maastricht Treaty specifies that the country will
have to progress toward fulfillment of the Maas-
tricht criteria, and under the conditions of the SGP
it will have to endeavor to avoid excessive deficits.
Furthermore, exchange rate policy will become a
matter of common interest. Finally, adoption of the
euro will require Turkey to become part of the sin-
gle, stability-oriented monetary policy and of the
ensuing single exchange rate policy. Furthermore,
Turkey will become subject to the sanction parts of
the SGP. Once Turkey adopts the euro, it will
replace its domestic currency with the euro at an
irrevocably fixed exchange rate, transfer the bulk of
its reserves to the European Central Bank, and
agree to be bound by the SGP.
In addition to the legislative changes just
described and thorough implementation of this leg-
islation, Turkey will face the problem of attaining
over time sustainable development while simulta-
neously satisfying the Maastricht criteria. The coun-
try realizes that, in the long run, price stability and
fiscal discipline create the best conditions for sus-
tained, robust economic growth. But the current sit-
uation is problematic. Turkey is not satisfying the
Maastricht conditions. In 2003 the inflation rate was
25.3 percent compared with 2.7 percent, the refer-
ence value for inflation in the EU; public sector bor-
rowing requirements as a percentage of GDP were
8.8 percent compared with 3 percent, the reference
value of the budget deficit in the EU; the debt-to-
GDP ratio was 80.3 percent compared with 60 per-
cent, the reference value of the debt-to-GDP ratio in
the EU; and the average interest rate was 28.5 per-
cent compared with 6.2 percent, the reference value
of long-term interest rates in the EU. But as of the
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end of 2004, the annual inflation rate had been
reduced to 9.2 percent, and the average interest rate
on government debt during December 2004 to
19.8 percent. During 2004, the growth rate of GDP
is expected to be more than 8 percent, and the
unemployment rate as of the second quarter of 2004
had been reduced to 9.3 percent. Although these are
all positive developments, the annual current
account deficit during 2004 amounted to $15.6 bil-
lion, and the annual current account deficit-to-GDP
ratio for 2004 is expected to exceed 5 percent.
The challenge facing Turkey is how to move
from the current state of affairs to a state in which
the Maastricht criteria are satisfied. According to
Togan and Ersel in chapter 1 of this volume, the fol-
lowing issues are facing Turkey:
• Although the country has reduced the inflation
rate considerably through strict implementation
of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) eco-
nomic program, the reduction was achieved
partially through decreases in the cost of
imported goods stemming from real apprecia-
tion of the Turkish lira. But reducing the infla-
tion rate through real appreciation of the cur-
rency is not sustainable in the long run, because
such a measure will lead to problems of sustain-
ability of the current account.
• Although the country has reduced the debt-to-
GDP ratio substantially during the last few years
by running primary surpluses amounting to
6.3 percent, such as during 2003, the reduction
was achieved partially through real appreciation
of the currency. However, reducing the debt-to-
GDP ratio by this means is not sustainable in the
long run.
• Because the debt-to-GDP ratio can be reduced
over time by achieving surpluses of govern-
ment revenues over noninterest expenditures
amounting to at least 6.5 percent of GDP, the
government will be constrained in its use of fis-
cal policy to decrease the unemployment rate in
the economy, which in 2004 was still 9.3 percent.
The constraint may have political implications.
• A close look at the issues related to the sustain-
ability of the current account reveals that the
choice of exchange rate policy during the preac-
cession period will be of prime importance for
Turkey. The policy of real exchange rate appreci-
ation pursued during the last two years is not
sustainable in the long run under rather realistic
values of foreign real interest rates. Sustainabil-
ity of the current account requires depreciation
of the real exchange rate over time to its long-
run equilibrium value.
Labor Markets
In chapter 9 of this volume, Taymaz and Özler
describe the flexibility of the Turkish labor market,
which stems primarily from the fact that the labor
market is not homogeneous. It has different wage-
setting mechanisms in its formal and informal sec-
tors. The informal sector is largely free from most
types of labor regulation and pays few taxes and
related charges. Activities in this sector rely mostly
on the provision of labor services without formal
employment contracts. Job insecurity is pervasive,
and workers receive very few benefits from their
employers. By contrast, the formal sector observes
labor regulations and pays all taxes and related
charges such as social security contributions and
payments to various funds. According to various
studies, the share of the informal sector of total
employment is about 60 percent.9 The reasons for
the relatively high share of the informal sector in
total employment are (1) the very high tax rates on
wage income, the high tax-related charges, and the
substantial payments to various funds that must be
paid by those working in the formal sector to com-
ply with the social security law and the laws regulat-
ing the taxation of personal incomes; (2) the rela-
tively high firing costs imposed by the labor law
and the stringency of the various clauses of the
labor law; and (3) the lack of enforcement mecha-
nisms for the respective laws in the economy.
The population of Turkey increases on average
at a rate of 1 million persons per year, and thus the
country must continually create new jobs to
accommodate this growth. In addition, Turkey
must create jobs for those unemployed and must
increase the labor force participation rate from its
low level of 48.3 percent. In the past, Turkey suc-
cessfully managed the unemployment problem
through its large, flexible informal sector where
wages are free to equilibrate demand and supply
and through labor migration from Turkey.
With its accession to the EU, Turkey will have to
enforce the rule of law uniformly in the country. It
can no longer tolerate the lack of enforcement
mechanisms for different laws and regulations in
the economy. Yet such a shift will have to occur
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without increasing Turkey’s unemployment rate.
Taymaz and Özler estimate that when all manufac-
turing firms in the informal sector begin to pay
taxes and social security contributions at the same
rates as in the formal sector and when informal
sector firms lose half of their market shares
because of the change, employment in the manu-
facturing sector will decline by 8.9 percent. Thus
about 300,000 jobs will be lost. But the effect of the
policy change on employment—when all informal
sector firms in all sectors of the economy begin to
pay taxes and social security contributions at the
same rates as in the formal sector—will actually be
much more drastic, because the effects on employ-
ment in the agricultural and services sectors must
be considered as well. In the end, the number of
jobs lost will far exceed the 300,000 estimated by
Taymaz and Özler. Thus to avoid an increase in
unemployment the country must introduce com-
prehensive labor market reform. Such a reform will
probably entail substantial decreases in the tax
rates on wage income, tax-related charges and pay-
ments to various funds, decreases in the firing
costs, and changes in various clauses of the labor
law so they are less stringent.
Complying with EU Environmental Legislation
To join the EU, Turkey must adopt and implement
the entire body of EU legislation and standards on
environmental protection. Bringing its environ-
mental protection system, infrastructure, and stan-
dards up to Western European levels will require, in
turn, substantial investments by the public and pri-
vate sectors as well as changes in regulations and
supporting institutions.
Within the EU regulations on wastewater collec-
tion and treatment, the urban wastewater directive
(91/271/EEC) requires all urban areas with a total
wastewater discharge of 2,000 population equiva-
lent to be connected to the sewer system, and the
discharges of sewers must receive at least secondary
treatment. The directive allows exceptions for
towns with a population of less than 10,000 when
sewers would produce no environmental benefit or
would involve excessive cost.
In 1997 the population of Turkey was 62.87 mil-
lion. Of this number, 13.75 million were living in
areas with a population of 2,000 or less, 49.12 mil-
lion in areas with more than 2,000, 22.57 million in
areas with 10,000 and less, and 40.3 million in areas
with more than 10,000. In 1997 there were 2,835
municipalities with a total population of 48.2 mil-
lion; 7.3 million people were living in rural
municipalities. According to the State Planning
Organization, 72 percent of the people living in
municipalities were not connected to sewage treat-
ment. For an additional 23 percent of population,
sewer systems were under construction. Upon the
completion of these systems, 51 percent of the pop-
ulation living in municipalities (24.5 million out of
48.2 million) will be connected to sewer systems,
leaving 23.7 million with no connection. Two per-
cent of municipalities have wastewater treatment
facilities and 14 percent of people living in villages
have a sewer connection with septic tanks, but
11.8 million people have no sewer connection.
The costs of meeting sewer needs will depend on
three parameters: (1) the proportion of the rural
population living in towns that would be classified
as agglomerations with a population of more than
2,000 population equivalent; (2) the proportion of
towns with between 2,000 and 10,000 population
that will be exempted from constructing sewer sys-
tems on the grounds of no environmental benefit
or excessive costs; and (3) the proportion of rural
population that must have sewers. Once the
European Commission and Turkey agree on these
parameters during the negotiations, the cost of
compliance with the EU directive would be deter-
mined. The investment cost of complying with the
directive has been roughly estimated at more than
$10 billion. Adding the additional operations,
maintenance, and replacement costs would
increase this cost even further.
Environmental protection will therefore present
challenges for Turkey. The costs will be substantial
when, in addition to the costs of complying with
EU regulations on wastewater collection and
treatment, the costs of complying with those on
drinking water, industrial pollution, dangerous
chemicals, fuel standards, air quality, and waste
management are considered. In chapter 11 of this
volume, Markandya estimates that the total cost
would be between €28 billion and €49 billion.
But he notes that because the outlay will be over a
long period (about 17 years), the annual amount
will be more manageable. Furthermore, he finds
that annual investments would amount to around
€2 billion to €3 billion in the “fast reform”
(low-cost) case and €3 billion to €5 billion in the
slow reform (high-cost) case. In the initial years,
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this investment would amount to 1–1.5 percent of
GDP in the low-cost case and 1.5–2.5 percent of GDP
in the high-cost case. The extra annual operating
costs also incurred would range from €5 to €8 bil-
lion. Markandya reports that OECD has estimated
Turkey’s capital spending on the environment at
about 0.5 percent of GDP. Thus with accession, this
spending would have to double, or more likely
increase by a factor of three or four. In addition, a
much higher level of current spending would be
required. These costs, although substantial by any
standards, could be considered the price for joining
the EU. One could also argue that these investments
would have been made in any case by Turkey. Only
the timing of the investments would be different,
because EU directives may not correspond to
Turkey’s priorities at this stage of its development.
State Aid
During the 1980s, Turkey used three tools of indus-
trial policy intensively: investment incentives,
export incentives, and policy on state-owned enter-
prises. In each case, the government tried to obtain
a preferred allocation of resources through the use
of subsidies. The investment incentives, regulated
by laws and decrees, have been directed toward
reducing the cost of investment, reducing the need
for external financing, and increasing profitability.
On the export side, the government’s use of various
types of export incentives during the 1980s in-
creased the profitability of export activities. As for
the policy on state-owned enterprises in Turkey, the
Turkish public enterprise sector has been and still is
very large. The state-owned enterprises have in
general exhibited poor economic performance
because of the soft-budget constraints they have
faced. Public enterprises are not subject to com-
mercial code and, as such, they escape bankruptcy
laws. Moreover, they receive subsidies from the gov-
ernment in the form of direct transfers, equity
injections, and debt consolidation.
Recently, Turkey eliminated most of the invest-
ment and export incentives. Within this context,
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
legal subsidies (e.g., research and development
subsidies and subsidies to facilitate the adaptation
of plants to new environmental regulations) have
been introduced. Export subsidies in Turkey are
restricted to those given to research and develop-
ment activities and environmental projects and to
export promotion activities. Although considerable
progress has been achieved in the fields of invest-
ment and export incentives, similar progress has
not been possible for public enterprises. Privatiza-
tion has become a prominent part of the Turkish
structural adjustment program since 1983, but it
did not gain momentum until very recently. Turkey
recognizes that it will have to stop subsidizing its
public enterprises at the prevailing rates and that it
will have to take steps to align its state aid policies
with those of the EU, to apply the same competi-
tion policies to all firms whether private or public,
and to privatize public enterprises.10
Growth Effects
The preceding discussion of the welfare effects of
accession reveals that Turkey’s integration within
the EU will remove the distortions in the country’s
price system, which, in turn, will boost allocative
efficiency within the economy. The heightened effi-
ciency also will make the country a better place in
which to invest. Investment will therefore increase,
as will foreign direct investment. Thus the allo-
cative efficiency gains from integration will be
boosted by induced capital formation. When
investment rises above its normal level, the Turkish
economy will experience a growth effect. All this
means improved material well-being for the
Turkish people in the long term.
The growth effects of accession will be studied
here by first forecasting the volume of trade
between Turkey and the EU15, under the assump-
tion that it will reach the same level of intensity as
the present trade between the EU member states.
The forecast is then used to study the growth effects
of accession.
The forecast of the volume of trade between
Turkey and the EU is based on estimation of a grav-
ity function for trade within the EU15. The gravity
function, which has been used to explain the vol-
ume of bilateral international trade since the 1960s,
has proved remarkably successful. It postulates that
the volume of trade between a pair of countries is a
function of (1) the size of the trading partners,
measured by GDP, population, or geographic area;
(2) their income level or capital abundance,
measured by GDP per capita; and (3) trade costs,
measured by a variety of factors such as tariffs
and other administratively imposed trade barriers,
328 Turkey: Economic Reform and Accession to the European Union
geographic distance, common borders, common
language, or common legal systems. The follow-
ing standard version of the gravity function was
estimated:
(12.7) ln [(exports from country i to country j
+ exports from country j to country i)/2]
= constant + β1 ln (GDP of country i
× GDP of country j) + β2 ln (GDP per
capita of country i × GDP per capita
of country j) + β3 ln (geographic
distance) + error term.
The dependent variable in the gravity equation
is the logarithmic average of bilateral exports. It is
explained by the logarithmic product of GDP; the
volume of trade is simply assumed to rise in pro-
portion to the combined economic size of the trade
partners. GDP per capita can be thought of as a
measure of product differentiation and specializa-
tion. The higher the per capita income, the more
differentiated are taste and production and the
larger is the volume of trade based on product dif-
ferentiation and increasing returns to scale. A high
per capita income is also an indication of abundant
physical and human capital relative to manual
labor. Thus the per capita variable should serve to
capture both the intraindustry trade produced by
product differentiation and the increasing returns
to scale and interindustry trade produced by differ-
ences in factor endowments. Trade costs are
controlled by the inclusion of geographic distance,
which is an indicator of transportation costs, but
also of the costs of cultural differences, which tend
to increase with geographic distance.
The estimates of the gravity equation are pre-
sented in table 12.10. The equation explains more
than 90 percent of the variation in the data. All coef-
ficients are estimated with a very high level of statis-
tical significance (less than 1 percent) and have the
expected sign, with one exception. The product of
real per capita GDP is found to have an unexpected
negative effect on the volume of trade. The estimate
of the gravity equation is then used to make fore-
casts of bilateral trade for Turkey with the EU15.
The forecasted value of Turkish–EU15 trade for
2000 is $25.75 billion, which is almost 25.2 percent
higher than the actual average value of $18.55 bil-
lion for the period 1999–2001. For that period, the
average of Turkish exports to the EU was $14.99 bil-
lion and of imports from the EU $22.1 billion.
Next, it is assumed that Turkey eventually will
have a share of EU trade to total trade that is equal
to that of the four largest EU countries—58 per-
cent. Then, the total trade of Turkey will increase to
$44.4 billion. When this value is divided by the
average value of GDP for the period 1999–2001, it
produces a ratio between the average of exports and
imports to GDP of 25.2 percent. The actual value of
total trade to GDP over the 1999–2001 period is, by
contrast, 20.67 percent. Noting the assertion by
Frankel and Rose (2002) that every percent increase
in the country’s overall trade relative to GDP raises
income per capita by at least one-third of a percent,
one then finds that, with EU accession, per capita
income in Turkey will increase by about 1.5 percent.
Conclusion
To join the EU, Turkey must attain macroeconomic
stability, adopt the EU’s Common Agricultural Pol-
icy, and liberalize its services and also its network
industries. Integration will be beneficial for Turkey,
because it will remove the distortions in the price
system, thereby boosting allocative efficiency within
the economy, which, in turn, will make the country a
better place to invest. Furthermore, with accession
Turkey will be eligible for EU structural funds. The
increase in infrastructural investments will con-
tribute to economic growth in Turkey. Turkey will
also reap benefits from monetary integration.
The welfare gains derived by Turkey from inte-
gration will, however, have a price. The price will be
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TABLE 12.10 Gravity Estimates for 
Intra-EU15 Trade
Estimate
Constant −3.884133
(−3.193833)
ln real product GDP 0.815026
52.1816
ln real product GDP per capita −0.145238
(−2.705978)
ln distance −0.901144
(−21.50092)
R-squared 0.622767
Source: The author.
the adjustment costs associated with the attainment
of macroeconomic stability, adoption of the CAP,
adoption of the EU’s labor market rules and regula-
tions, and compliance with EU environmental
directives.
Notes
1. All dollar amounts are U.S. dollars unless otherwise
indicated.
2. Cabotage refers to the carriage of freight within a country
or between two countries by a carrier that is from neither
country.
3. Polo and Scarpa (2003) consider it more appropriate that
an independent regulatory authority devoted to the liberaliza-
tion of the industry fill the delicate role of arbitrator rather than
a ministry, which is typically responsible for a broader range of
political objectives.
4. Although in both cases the regulator has the final word on
the access conditions, Polo and Scarpa (2003) argue that the ex
ante regime, requiring the regulator to act as a first mover, forces
it to reach a better solution.
5. This approach determines the equivalent variation in con-
sumer income.
6. When considering the welfare effects of integration, I
abstract from explicit consideration of problems of implemen-
tation and assume that once the acquis is adopted liberalization
of the sector will be achieved. This is a simplification introduced
in the analysis.
7. The implicit price wedge is derived from the relation p =
p∗ (1 + t), where p refers to the Turkish price p∗ , the best prac-
tice price in the EU, and t is the price wedge parameter.
8. See Stern (2002) and Whalley (2004) for further discus-
sion of the state of knowledge on barriers to trade in services
and the robustness of existing empirical research in this area.
9. Taymaz and Özler report that the share of the informal
sector in manufacturing is 40 percent. Its share is much higher,
however, in the agricultural and services sectors.
10. Turkish competition law is silent on the subject of public
undertakings. It does not contain a clause like Article 86 (ex
Article 90) of the Treaty Establishing the European Community,
which explicitly brings public undertakings within the scope of
competition policy. Recently, state aid in Turkey has taken the
form of injections to private banks under the management of
Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF). These banks are largely
those hit by capital losses during the November 2000 and Febru-
ary 2001 crises. The capital losses stemmed from the sharp
decline in the market value of government securities holdings
and the sharp increase in the foreign exchange rate. According to
EU regulations, state aid to the banking sector is subject to the
same conditions as any other state aid and as such it should be
avoided.
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Up to October 31, 2004, the pre–Treaty of Nice
rules apply—that is, qualified majority voting with
weighted votes and the old majority threshold of
71 percent to win. The number of votes for the
incumbent 15 are unchanged; those for the 10 new-
comers are a simple interpolation of EU153 votes as
specified in the Accession Treaty.
From November 1, 2004, to October 31, 2009, the
Nice Treaty rules apply (as per the “Draft Council
Decision relating to the implementation of Article
I-24”). The Nice Treaty rules maintain the basic
“qualified majority voting” framework, but add two
extra criteria for the number of yes voters and the
population they represent. Specifically, the vote
threshold is 72.2 percent of Council votes (232 of
321 votes); the member threshold is 50 percent of
members (13 members); and the population
threshold is 62 percent of the EU population.4
As of November 1, 2009, the Constitutional
Treaty rules apply, and thus weighted voting is out
and a double majority is in. A winning coalition
must represent at least 55 percent of EU members
and 65 percent of the EU population. A last-minute
summit compromise inserted the requirement that
at least 15 members vote yes, but this compromise
was irrelevant; 15 of 25 members is 60 percent and
thus greater than 55 percent. By the time these rules
take effect, however, the EU should have 27
members, and 55 percent of 27 is 15 (Bulgaria
and Romania are tentatively slated for membership
in 2007). The 15-member rule will therefore
be redundant when it takes effect. Turkey’s and
The Treaty of Nice in 2001 and the Constitutional
Treaty in 2004 radically reformed the voting rules
of the Council of the European Union (also known
as the Council of Ministers).1 The Constitutional
Treaty rules were accepted politically at the Brussels
summit in June 2004. The Nice rules went into
effect in November 2004. Implementation of the
changes was postponed by five years and made con-
ditional on ratification of the constitution by all 25
member states of the European Union (EU). The
next EU enlargement (Bulgaria and Romania) is
tentatively scheduled for 2007. Thus Bulgaria and
Romania will enter under the current Nice Treaty
rules, but future new members are likely to join
under the rules of the Constitutional Treaty.
This chapter evaluates the impact of Turkey’s
membership on EU voting—specifically, decision-
making efficiency and the distribution of power in
the EU’s leading decision-making body, the Council
of Ministers. The chapter compares two alternative
Council voting rules: those accepted in the Treaty of
Nice and implemented by the Accession Treaty for
the 10 entrants in 2004 and the rules laid down in
the Constitutional Treaty.2
Council of Ministers Voting
Reforms
The Constitutional Treaty explicitly sets out two
sets of voting procedures for the Council of Minis-
ters and implicitly recognizes the current system
implemented by the Accession Treaty (Article 24).
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Croatia’s membership will, in any case, materialize
after that date.
To enter into force, the Constitutional Treaty
rules must be ratified by all member states. The fall-
back position is the Nice Treaty rules, which means
that Turkey and Croatia may enter the EU under
those rules. Therefore, what follows is an evaluation
of these two rules for the EU25 and EU29. It com-
pares especially the impact of Turkey’s membership
on the countries of the EU25 that have the most
substantial say in the ratification process of the
constitution.
Tools of Assessment
“Capacity to act” and “decision-making efficiency”
are slippery concepts. However, one quantitative
tool in voting game theory will help to achieve pre-
cision. Passage probability gauges how likely it is
that the Council would approve a randomly
selected issue—random in the sense that each EU
member would be equally likely to vote for or
against it. The best way to describe this measure is
to explain how it is calculated.
First, the researcher, with the help of a com-
puter, calculates all possible coalitions among EU
members—that is, every possible combination of
yes and no votes by EU members (134 million
coalitions are possible in the EU27). Second, each
coalition is evaluated to determine whether it is a
winning coalition under the Nice Treaty voting
system. This process is carried out using each
member’s actual weight for three criteria (votes,
members, and population) and the three thresh-
olds. Passage probability is, then, the likelihood that
a random proposal would attract a winning
coalition, assuming all coalitions are equally likely
(random in the sense that member states do not
know what their stance would be). Admittedly,
passage probability is a crude measure, but it is
objective and precise, and its strengths and short-
comings are clear.
Even if the exact passage probability is meaning-
less (the European Commission does not put forth
random proposals), figure 13.1 reveals that the Nice
Treaty fails on efficiency grounds, because it
implies a level of efficiency that is far, far below that
of the EU15. Indeed, the Nice Treaty reforms
actually make matters worse. Admitting 12 new
members without any reforms would cut the
passage probability to 2.5 percent—a third of its
already low level. With the Nice Treaty reforms, the
figure drops even further, to 2.1 percent. The main
source of the lower efficiency is the high threshold
of the Nice Treaty rules for Council votes. An even
cruder but more transparent efficiency-measuring
tool—blocking-minority analysis—confirms these
efficiency findings.
No perfect measure of power exists, but even
imperfect measures are useful when considering
complex voting rules, because a voting scheme’s
political acceptability turns almost completely on
its power implications. The measures used here—
the normalized Banzhaf index (NBI) and the
Shapley-Shubik index (SSI)—gauge how likely it is
that a nation finds itself in a position to “break” a
winning coalition on a randomly selected issue.5
The NBI assumes that each possible coalition has
the same probability of occurrence. Thus all coali-
tions are equally likely to be winning ones, and
power is measured simply by calculating the score
of breaking positions for each player. A relative
measure of power is then obtained by dividing this
score by the total of all of scores. On particular
issues, some countries may be much more powerful
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or much less powerful than others, especially if they
are part of a like-minded group (see Baldwin and
others 2001 for details and simple numerical exam-
ples), but the NBI has recently proved its worth,
especially as an unbribable tool in assessing and
designing voting rules.
What follows is a simple example of how the
NBI works. Consider a three-person voting body,
such as the Council of Ministers, in which the vot-
ers are labeled A, B, and C. Suppose that A has four
votes, B has two votes, and C has one vote, for a
total of seven votes. It is assumed that five votes are
needed to pass proposals. The three winning coali-
tions are then
AB AC ABC
where underlining indicates the actors able to
“break” a winning coalition. In this situation, A has
three breaking positions, B has two, and C only one,
for a total of six breaking positions. Thus the NBI
of A is 1/2, whereas the NBIs of B and C are 1/3 and
1/6, respectively.
The SSI tries to capture a different abstract
voting model. It assumes that voters have different
intensities in terms of accepting or rejecting a
proposal. Suppose that these intensities can be
expressed as a continuum that extends between the
extremes of more spending and less spending. For
example, when the issue is the support for hillside
farmers, A may be the most reluctant to increase
spending, and B may be the second most reluctant,
leaving C as the most favorably disposed toward
increasing support for this purpose. On another
day, the issue might be the inclusion of reindeer
meat in the price support mechanism of the
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). This time, a
different order of preferences might emerge.
In general, given a large enough number of
issues, all preference orders of A, B, and C are equally
likely. In the example used earlier, six orderings are
possible:
ABC  ACB  BAC  BCA CAB  CBA
where the critical voter is underlined. A critical
voter exerts the power of being able to break a win-
ning coalition. In the first order of ABC, B can
break the winning coalition AB. Voter A favors
spending more on this issue than does B. Therefore,
A is not critical. Should voter A try to break the
winning coalition AB by voting against spending,
voter B would have already broken that coalition
because B is less eagerly in favor of spending. In the
example, voter A has four pivotal positions,
and voters B and C have one each. In relative
terms, winning probabilities (“power”) of 2/3 are
obtained for A and 1/6 for both B and C. If SSI is a
meaningful estimate of power and if power politics
is able to explain EU budget, then these fractions
should represent the budget shares of A, B, and C,
respectively.
Clearly, these measures of power do not provide
a detailed description of real-world voting proce-
dures. For example, they lack all the strategic
aspects, such as who makes the proposal to be voted
on or the sequence of moves. They both contain,
however, some information on voters’ preferences,
understood as the intensities of holding a favorable
position. The measures also consider all possible
orderings of intensities (SSI) or presume the equal
likelihood of all coalitions (NBI), and so they repre-
sent a very long-term concept. For a general evalua-
tion of voting rules, this is a desirable property.
The example just described demonstrates that
the NBI and SSI can have very different values.
Which one should then be chosen to assess
decision-making power? The answer is not clear,
but a rough distinction can be made between the
two measures. If one is interested in voting rules as
such, the NBI is more advantageous. If one is more
interested in decision making and bargaining
under certain rules, knowing that actors communi-
cate, then the SSI is a far more suitable tool.6
Impact of Turkey’s Membership
on EU Voting
Turkey’s accession to the EU would have
implications for EU decision making. As a large
country, Turkey would play a relatively bigger role
in the EU than many other entrants. To what extent
will accession change the balance of power?
Implications of Turkey’s Membership for EU’s
Capacity to Act
Turkey’s membership would have only moderate
implications for the passage probabilities—see
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figure 13.1. This finding is not surprising, because
moving from 27 members to 29 members does
not change much. Although the addition of
Croatia increases the number of small nations in
the EU, Turkey’s large population means that effi-
ciency suffers little. (Efficiency, if not legitimacy,
tends to be higher when a large share of power is
in the hands of just a few nations.) The vote
thresholds used in calculations of passage proba-
bilities are extrapolations of the current Nice
Treaty/Accession Treaty threshold. In EU29, it is
276 out of a total of 381 votes, plus the two addi-
tional criteria: at least 15 member states and
62 percent of population. In EU27, it is 250 out of
a total of 345 votes, plus the two additional
criteria—at least 14 member states and 62 percent
of population.
The Nice Treaty rules—which are essentially
unworkable in an EU27—become even less viable
in an EU29. The same does not hold for the
Constitutional Treaty voting rules. The passage
probability jumps drastically from the low levels of
the Nice Treaty rules up to the level of the EU12
and even higher. Surprisingly, under the Constitu-
tional Treaty rules the EU’s ability to act improves
when its membership expands from 25 to 27 or 29.
There is only a slight drop from EU27 to EU29
from 12.9 to 12.2 percent.7
In summary, the passage probability calcula-
tions demonstrate that Turkey’s membership in the
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EU does not erode the EU’s ability to act. Under the
Constitutional Treaty rules, the effect of Croatia
and Turkey together is significantly smaller—one
percentage point—than Turkey’s alone. The most
important impact on the EU’s capacity to act stems
from the switch from the Nice Treaty rules to the
Constitutional Treaty rules.
Impact of Turkey’s Membership on the Distribution
of Power
The Constitutional Treaty and the Nice Treaty
rules also differ substantially in power evaluation.
Figure 13.2 shows the difference between these
rules in terms of the NBI and SSI for the EU25,
and figure 13.3 reveals the same numbers for the
EU29. The difference is measured in percentage
points.
According to figure 13.2, before Turkey’s entry
the Constitutional Treaty rules favor the four
biggest nations and the six smallest—that is,
Latvia and smaller—if the comparison is made
using the SSI. Based on the NBI, the conclusion is
somewhat different: Germany and Slovakia and
smaller countries would gain from the Constitu-
tional Treaty rules compared with the Nice Treaty
rules. This result differs from that obtained by
Baldwin and Widgrén (2004b) for EU27, in which
the NBI produced exactly the same pattern as the
SSI here.
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After Turkey’s entry into the EU, the biggest
nations gain more from the Constitutional Treaty
rules than was the case for the EU25. This finding
holds true for both power measures. For the small-
est countries, the effect is ambiguous: the NBI
shows gains for Latvia and smaller nations, whereas
the SSI shows small losses. Otherwise, both indices
show consistent results.
Figure 13.4 explicitly compares the Nice Treaty
and Constitutional Treaty rules by showing the NBI
values under both rules. The message of the figure is
very clear. The countries that gain the most from the
Constitutional Treaty rules are the biggest nations,
Germany and Turkey. The biggest losers are Spain
and Poland, as well as the medium-size countries,
from the Netherlands to Austria. This finding could
affect these countries’ attitudes toward either the
ratification of the Constitutional Treaty or Turkey’s
membership. (The index values for both the EU25
and EU29 are found in the annex to this chapter.)
Impact of EU Enlargement on Incumbent’s
Power Figures 13.5 and 13.6 evaluate the impact
of the EU25 to EU29 enlargement in terms of both
power indices. Under the Nice Treaty rules, the
countries’ power losses are proportional to their
sizes. Thus Germany, the biggest country, loses the
most power, while the smaller nations lose less. The
relative losses are of the same magnitude. This find-
ing reflects the fact that in weighted voting power,
the indices tend to converge to voting weights if the
number of actors increases and if the voting
weights have relatively small variance.
In figure 13.6, the result is more interesting.
When evaluated by the NBI, the enlargement from
EU25 to EU29 benefits France and the United
Kingdom.8 The losses of the other large countries
(the Netherlands and larger nations) are very small.
For the countries smaller than Romania, the losses
increase slightly as the nations become smaller. The
SSI, however, gives a somewhat different picture.
The most notable exceptions are the biggest
countries, especially Germany. The power loss of
the Netherlands remains small.
Conclusions
This chapter investigates the decision-making
impact of expanding the EU from 25 members to
29 members with the addition of Bulgaria,
Romania, Turkey, and Croatia. The chapter focuses
on a measure of the EU’s capacity to act—passage
probability—and the power distribution among
members.
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As for the capacity to act, the enlargement is
projected to have relatively little impact if the
Constitutional Treaty voting rules take effect. In
particular, Turkey’s membership would have only
a negligible effect on the EU’s capacity to act. The
answer is quite different, however, if the Constitu-
tional Treaty is rejected and the Nice Treaty rules
remain in place. Under the Nice Treaty voting
rules, the EU25 to EU29 enlargement would
substantially lower the ability of the EU25 to act.
Thus our findings confirm that the enlarged EU
cannot function well under the Nice Treaty rules.
It also suggests that if the Constitutional Treaty is
rejected, the Nice Treaty voting rules must be
reformed before further enlargement.
As for power, Turkey’s membership in the EU
will have a big impact. Under either the Nice
Treaty or Constitutional Treaty rules, Turkey
would be the second most powerful member of
the EU29. Under the Constitutional Treaty rules,
Turkey would be substantially more powerful than
France, Italy, and Britain, while under the Nice
Treaty rules the power differences among the
members with more than 50 million population
would be small. Plainly, this situation might
decrease the acceptability of the Constitutional
Treaty or Turkey’s membership.
The impact of the enlargement from EU25 to
EU29 on the voting power of EU incumbents
depends heavily on the rules. Under the
Constitutional Treaty rules, the enlargement lowers
the power of all incumbents on a fairly even basis,
with the marked exception of Germany; Germany
loses more than twice as much power as any other
member. Under the Nice Treaty rules, the power
loss is more heavily skewed toward the big incum-
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bents. Again, all incumbents are projected to lose
power, but the power loss increases progressively
with member size. For example, the power loss to
France under the Nice Treaty rules is about seven
times larger than the power loss to Malta.
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Annex: Power Indices under the Constitutional Treaty Rules and Nice Treaty Rules
TABLE 13.1 Power Indices under Constitutional Treaty Rules
Member State NBI_EU29 NBI_EU25 SSI_EU29 SSI_EU25
Germany 0.10203 0.10407 0.13556 0.15816
Turkey 0.09960 n.a. 0.13152 n.a.
U.K. 0.07644 0.07614 0.09389 0.10332
France 0.07611 0.07587 0.09339 0.10278
Italy 0.07469 0.07475 0.09121 0.10041
Spain 0.05491 0.05670 0.06313 0.06798
Poland 0.05429 0.05602 0.06203 0.06694
Romania 0.03786 n.a. 0.03664 n.a.
Netherlands 0.03052 0.03715 0.02701 0.03440
Greece 0.02495 0.03304 0.01991 0.02721
Czech Rep. 0.02474 0.03287 0.01964 0.02693
Belgium 0.02463 0.03279 0.01950 0.02680
Hungary 0.02453 0.03271 0.01936 0.02666
Portugal 0.02442 0.03262 0.01922 0.02651
Sweden 0.02314 0.03162 0.01758 0.02489
Bulgaria 0.02250 n.a. 0.01676 n.a.
Austria 0.02239 0.03103 0.01663 0.02403
Slovakia 0.01940 0.02870 0.01288 0.02000
Denmark 0.01940 0.02870 0.01288 0.02000
Finland 0.01918 0.02854 0.01261 0.01975
Croatia 0.01886 n.a. 0.01221 n.a.
Ireland 0.01768 0.02737 0.01077 0.01785
Lithuania 0.01768 0.02737 0.01077 0.01785
Latvia 0.01628 0.02630 0.00905 0.01631
Slovenia 0.01585 0.02598 0.00853 0.01568
Estonia 0.01521 0.02547 0.00774 0.01487
Cyprus 0.01445 0.02490 0.00680 0.01384
Luxembourg 0.01413 0.02465 0.00641 0.01342
Malta 0.01413 0.02465 0.00641 0.01342
n.a. Not applicable.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
TABLE 13.2 Power Indices under Nice Treaty Rules
Member State NBI_EU29 NBI_EU25 SSI_EU29 SSI_EU25
Germany 0.07189 0.08630 0.07814 0.09292
Turkey 0.07189 n.a. 0.07814 n.a.
U.K. 0.07189 0.08630 0.07814 0.09292
France 0.07189 0.08630 0.07814 0.09292
Italy 0.07189 0.08630 0.07814 0.09292
Spain 0.06821 0.08159 0.07237 0.08613
Poland 0.06821 0.08159 0.07237 0.08613
Romania 0.03832 n.a. 0.03615 n.a.
Netherlands 0.03565 0.04195 0.03340 0.03983
Greece 0.03305 0.03881 0.03082 0.03648
Czech Rep. 0.03305 0.03881 0.03082 0.03648
Notes
1. Legally, the Accession Treaty for the 10 new member states
in 2004 implemented the voting system agreed on politically in
the Treaty of Nice. The voting rules of the Constitutional Treaty
will come into force on November 1, 2009, if it is ratified by all
member states.
2. This chapter draws on the methodology and results
described in Baldwin and Widgrén (2003a, 2004a, 2004b).
3. EU15 refers to the 15 members of the EU prior to the 2004
enlargement in which 10 more countries joined the EU. The
15 countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
4. The rules that took effect in November 2004 were not those
agreed on at the Nice summit in December 2000. The deal struck
at 4 a.m.at the end of the longest EU summit in history was a polit-
ical commitment. The legally binding changes are in the Acces-
sion Treaty.Because EU leaders eventually realized how inefficient
the Nice rules were, they improved efficiency by lowering the vote
threshold from the 74 percent mentioned in the Nice Treaty.
5. In the literature, the term swing is quite often used instead
of break.
6. See, for example, Widgrén (1994), Laruelle and Widgrén
(1998), and Laruelle and Valenciano (2004). A recent empirical
application of the SSI can be found in Kauppi and Widgrén
(2004).
7. Note that in EU28 (EU27  Turkey), the passage probabil-
ity is 11.2 percent, which is lower than it is in EU29 (see Baldwin
and Widgrén 2003b). The reason is that the membership
quota—55 percent of membership—is 16 in both EU28 and
EU29. It is thus closer to 55 percent in EU29 than in EU28—the
exact numbers are 55.2 percent and 57.1 percent, respectively.
8. This phenomenon is often referred to as the paradox of
new members.
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TABLE 13.2 (Continued)
Member State NBI_EU29 NBI_EU25 SSI_EU29 SSI_EU25
Belgium 0.03305 0.03881 0.03082 0.03648
Hungary 0.03305 0.03881 0.03082 0.03648
Portugal 0.03305 0.03881 0.03082 0.03648
Sweden 0.02771 0.03246 0.02560 0.03024
Bulgaria 0.02771 n.a. 0.02560 n.a.
Austria 0.02771 0.03246 0.02560 0.03024
Slovakia 0.01954 0.02291 0.01777 0.02099
Denmark 0.01954 0.02291 0.01777 0.02099
Finland 0.01954 0.02291 0.01777 0.02099
Croatia 0.01954 n.a. 0.01777 n.a.
Ireland 0.01954 0.02291 0.01777 0.02099
Lithuania 0.01954 0.02291 0.01777 0.02099
Latvia 0.01124 0.01324 0.00999 0.01190
Slovenia 0.01124 0.01324 0.00999 0.01190
Estonia 0.01124 0.01324 0.00999 0.01190
Cyprus 0.01124 0.01324 0.00999 0.01190
Luxembourg 0.01124 0.01324 0.00999 0.01190
Malta 0.00841 0.00998 0.00755 0.00895
n.a. Not applicable.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
recipient of transfers from the EU budget, at least
under the present rules and policies.
As for trade, Turkey’s accession is not likely to
have any significant trade effects, and consequently
any significant effects for EU industry, for two
reasons. First, Turkey is not an important trading
partner of the EU countries, with the exception of
Greece. (The EU is, however, Turkey’s most impor-
tant trading partner.) Second, Turkey has free com-
modity trade with the EU under a customs union,
except for agricultural commodities. By the time
Turkey becomes a member of the EU, the customs
union will have been in effect for more than a
decade.
Migration
The PPP-adjusted per capita income of the EU153 is
four times higher than that of Turkey. Because
Turkey has had about the same per capita growth
rate as the EU15 since 1990, the probability that
Turkey will catch up in the foreseeable future seems
very low. The income differential will therefore con-
tinue to be a strong incentive for migration from
Turkey to the EU. Turkish migration to Western
Europe was particularly high in the 1960s, but it
continues to be steady flow, particularly to Germany
and, to a lesser extent, the Netherlands. In the 1950s
and 1960s, many of the present EU countries
actively recruited foreign labor, but that recruitment
ended after the first oil crisis in 1973–74. Since then,
immigration policies have become successively
From the perspective of the European Union (EU),
which is considering the economic consequences of
accepting Turkey as a member, the most important
facts about Turkey are its size and its low per capita
income.1
With a population of almost 70 million, Turkey
would, in terms of today’s population figures,
become the second largest member of the EU.
However, the population of Turkey is relatively
young, and it is likely to exceed Germany’s 82 mil-
lion by 2020, if not earlier.
By comparison with the European countries,
Turkey is poor. It has a PPP (purchasing power
parity)-adjusted per capita income of roughly
US$7,000,2 which is equal to those of Bulgaria and
Romania, countries slated to join the EU in 2007.
The income disparities across Turkey are great; the
population in the southeast has less than half the
national average income, and the large rural popu-
lation is generally much poorer than the urban
population. Turkey’s relatively low level of develop-
ment is evident in the share of the labor force in
agriculture and in the sector’s share in value added.
Only Bulgaria and Romania have a similar depend-
ence on agriculture.
The descriptive statistics suggest that the impor-
tant economic effects of Turkey’s accession to the
EU should be related to its size, per capita income,
and dependence on agriculture. For the EU, these
three factors combine to create a huge immigration
potential if migration is let free. Moreover, these
factors indicate that Turkey may become the largest
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more restrictive, and immigrants have mostly con-
sisted of relatives of former immigrants, refugees,
and asylum seekers. Most migrants from Turkey
have ended up in Germany, which has a population
of Turkish origin of 2.1 million. The second largest
recipient has been the Netherlands, which has
250,000 immigrants and their descendants from
Turkey.
The prospect of large-scale immigration from
Turkey is a source of considerable concern among
the EU15; they fear immigrants will depress wages,
boost unemployment, and cause social frictions
and political upheavals. Free migration will surely
not be allowed immediately upon full membership.
After the enlargement in the 1980s and the latest
enlargement in 2004, old member countries were
allowed to restrict immigration from new member
countries for a period of seven years. It can there-
fore be safely assumed that immigration from
Turkey will be subject to restrictions for several
years.
Migration Theory
The effects of migration from Turkey to any of the
EU15 member states are illustrated in figure 14.1.
The horizontal axis measures the total supply of
labor in Turkey and, say, Germany. The simplified
approach used here first assumes that labor is a
homogeneous factor of production. Later, labor is
differentiated by education, training and experi-
ence. The demand for labor by employers in Turkey
is shown by the demand curve DT. Likewise, the
demand for labor in Germany is shown by the
demand curve DG. The total supply of labor in
Germany and Turkey is assumed to be fixed. Ini-
tially, the total supply is divided so that the supply
of labor in Turkey is measured by the length of the
line segment LTL0 and the supply of labor in
Germany by the length of the line segment LGL0.
The supply of labor in each country is assumed to
be inelastic. Before migration is allowed, the equi-
librium wage in Germany is wG, which is much
higher than the equilibrium wage in Turkey, wT.
When free migration is allowed, labor will move
from Turkey to Germany to earn the higher wage.
Migration stops when the wage is equalized
between the two countries, at w, and when L1L0 of
the labor force has moved from Turkey to Germany.
Thus one effect of migration is that it raises the
wage in the sending country and reduces the wage
in the receiving country. Migrants as well as those
remaining in Turkey gain, while German workers
lose. The effects for capital owners are the opposite;
Turkish capital owners now earn the surplus TwE
instead of TwTC, and German capital owners
earn GwE instead of GwGA. (It is assumed that
capital does not migrate in response to earnings
differences.) The fact that part of the labor force has
moved from Turkey to Germany also means a
decline in the Turkish gross domestic product
(GDP) and a rise in the German GDP. All these
changes amount to an increase in the combined
social surplus or welfare. The increase is given by the
area ACE, and it is captured by German capital
owners and Turkish migrants. The welfare increase
stems from a more efficient allocation of labor;
Turkish laborers become more efficient when moved
to Germany, and the optimal allocation is achieved
when the marginal productivity of labor in Germany
and that in Turkey are equalized.
Figure 14.1 provides a simplistic but powerful
analysis of the income, redistribution, output, and
welfare effects of migration. It builds on the
assumption that migration is entirely driven by a
wage differential and that no unemployment exists.
Unemployment can be easily added to the model.
Assume that before migration is allowed, L1L0 of
the Turkish labor force is unemployed. Those
employed now earn a higher wage—w instead of wT.
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FIGURE 14.1 Effects of Migration
Source: The author.
Assume also that employment is decided periodi-
cally by a lottery. Thus the expected wage (the
actual wage w times the probability of winning
employment) is lower than the actual wage and lies
somewhere between w and wT. The expected wage
in Turkey is still below the certain wage wG in
Germany. Consequently, labor will migrate to
Germany once migration is allowed. Assume that
all the unemployed in Turkey migrate to Germany,
that those who remain are employed, and that some
fraction of the larger labor force in Germany can-
not be employed because of a lack of new invest-
ment. Employment in Germany is also decided
periodically by a lottery, in which German and
Turkish workers have equal probabilities of win-
ning. The expected wage therefore falls below wG,
but not all the way to w. Thus in the new equilib-
rium, both the actual and the expected wage are
higher in Germany than the actual wage in Turkey.
The expected wage can be higher in Germany
because workers attach a negative value to the risk
of becoming unemployed and demand a higher
expected wage to compensate for the risk. The
analysis here captures an idea first expressed in a
model by Harris and Todaro (1970) of rural to
urban migration in a developing country.
Turkish migration can, then, serve both to
depress wages in the receiving country and to raise
unemployment. Changes in the assumptions made,
such as allowing employment to increase in
Germany or letting immigrant Turkish workers
have a higher risk of becoming unemployed than
native German workers, would not change the basic
conclusions. One assumption in the analysis is
questionable, however—that labor is homoge-
neous. In reality, labor is highly differentiated by
education, training, experience, and many other
characteristics. Thus there are not just two factors
of production—labor and capital; there are many
types of labor and many types of capital. As soon as
three factors or more are allowed for, the effects of
migration on income distribution and social wel-
fare become less clear-cut (see Borjas 1995). In gen-
eral, its effects on native labor and capital become
more favorable when immigrants are complements
to rather than substitutes for the native factors. For
example, if German workers are skilled and Turkish
immigrants are unskilled, then immigrants tend to
increase the productivity and wages of German
workers. Likewise, the increase in social surplus
from migration tends to rise the more comple-
mentary migrants and native workers are. In terms
of figure 14.1, a smaller substitutability between
labor and capital means that the demand curves
become steeper and the size of the surplus triangles
becomes greater (up to a point).
The decision to migrate depends not only on
relative wages and unemployment, but also on
many other factors. The early theoretical research
(e.g., Berry and Soligo 1969) focused on income
differentials and individual decisions. Recent
research stresses that migration is a household
decision and that social networks, culture, lan-
guage, geographical distance, and other factors are
also important. For example, the adjustment cost
for a migrant depends on the size of the migrant
population from the same source country in the
receiving country and on language and cultural dif-
ferences. Turks are attracted to Germany in part
because of the large Turkish immigrant population
there, and Algerians are attracted to France partly
because of their knowledge of French and familiar-
ity with French culture (for a survey, see Ghatak,
Levine, and Wheatley Price 1996).
Empirical Research Findings
Empirical research on immigration has focused
largely on two questions (Borjas 1994). First, how
do immigrants perform in the host country? Sec-
ond, what is the impact of immigration on the
wages and employment of natives? Most of the
research has been carried out on the United States,
and it is therefore not fully relevant for Europe. In
the past, immigration to the United States has been
more permanent in nature than immigration in
Europe, and permanence has an impact on the per-
formance of immigrants. Furthermore, European
labor markets are generally considered to be more
rigid than those in the United States because of
their stronger labor unions, more regulation, and
immigration policies.
The recent wave of immigration in the United
States differs from past waves by the markedly
lower level of education of immigrants compared
with that of natives. Whereas earlier immigrants
reached the income and employment levels of natives
fairly soon, later immigrants do not. Moreover,
there is a high correlation between first- and second-
generation immigrants in terms of educational
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attainment, and therefore a high probability that
the second generation, too, will fall behind (Borjas
1994). These findings for the United States may be
applicable to Europe and, in particular, to immigra-
tion from Turkey, which mostly consists of people
from rural areas with low levels of education.
There is little evidence that immigration has a
significant negative effect on the employment
opportunities of natives, either in the United States
or in Europe. There is, however, some evidence of
small negative effects on the wage of unskilled labor
in both. A positive effect on the wage of skilled
labor has been found in Germany, which can be
expected when unskilled immigrants are comple-
ments to skilled native workers.4
A third question that has been the subject of
some research and has received much attention
from policymakers and the general public is
whether immigrants are net recipients of or net
contributors to the public coffer. The problem with
earlier studies is that they focus on a single year,
neglecting the cost and expenditures for an immi-
grant later in life, such as pensions, and they do not
consider some general equilibrium interactions,
such as that between immigrants and an aging pop-
ulation. The studies by Auerbach and Oreopoulos
(1999) and Storesletten (2000) for the United States
take a dynamic, life-cycle approach with partial or
general equilibrium interactions. They find nega-
tive, but relatively small, fiscal effects for low-skilled
immigration. Storesletten estimates the average net
present value of a representative low-skilled legal
immigrant to be −$36,000. A high-skilled immi-
grant, by contrast, contributes $96,000 over his or
her lifetime. A study of Germany by Bonin (2001)
finds a significant positive effect for the average
immigrant over his or her life cycle; net immigra-
tion of 200,000 persons to Germany is estimated to
yield natives €200 per capita per year. The positive
effect stems from the fact that the average immi-
grant has a younger working age and thus is obliged
to participate in the repayment of the existing
government debt. The fiscal impact of immigration
is bound to differ among European countries,
depending on the structure and level of taxes and
benefits.
The relatively scant empirical research on the
economic effects of immigration to Germany, host
to the largest immigrant population among the
EU15 and the largest population of Turkish immi-
grants by far, seems to indicate fairly small and
mixed effects: employment opportunities are not
much affected; the wage of low-skilled labor is
somewhat depressed but that of skilled labor is
raised; and the net present value of public transfers
is positive. It is more difficult to evaluate the social
costs and benefits of immigration. Immigrant ghet-
tos with high unemployment, crime rates, and
social problems loom large in the minds of the
native population in many countries, although the
immediate costs are mostly borne by the immi-
grants themselves.
Estimated Model of Migration to Germany 
from Southern Europe
The forecast of free Turkish migration to Germany
presented in this section is based on an estimated
model of immigration to Germany from the EU15,
Norway, Turkey, the United States, and former
Yugoslavia by Boeri and Brücker (2000) in a report
to the European Commission. The choice of
Germany is dictated by the facts: first, Germany is
home to the largest population of Turkish immi-
grants among the EU15 countries by far, and it can
therefore be expected to attract the largest numbers
of future immigrants; and second, there is a paucity
of data on migration flows and stocks before the
1990s for most of the EU15 countries.
Boeri and Brücker estimated how the flow of
migration depends on the wage differential, employ-
ment rates in the home and host countries, the
stock of migrants from the home country, restric-
tions on migration, and country specifics, such as
language differences, distance, and institutions. The
migration decision is assumed to be dependent on
expectations about the following factors: the future
wage differential, based on present and past values
of the differential, conditioned by the individual
probability of finding employment in the host
country relative to the home country, which is
assumed to be based on present and past average
employment rates; the ease of adjustment, proxied
by the number of migrants in the host country; the
difference in development between the home and
host country and language differences; and the
agreements regulating migration, such as guest
worker agreements. Migration flows are viewed as
short-run adjustments to a long-run equilibrium
in which migration has ceased and the migrant
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population relative to the source country popula-
tion has attained an equilibrium level dependent
on the wage differential, the employment rate dif-
ferential, restrictions on migration, and country-
specific factors. The long-run equilibrium is also
estimated, thereby producing long-run relations
between the ratio of migrants to the source country
population and the explanatory variables.5 The
existence of a long-run equilibrium builds on the
assumption that the propensity to migrate has a
certain distribution over individuals in the home
country; the equilibrium is reached when those
with the highest propensity have emigrated for the
given long-run values of the explanatory variables
and those remaining do not find emigration
worthwhile.6
As expected, the migrant population as a pro-
portion of the source country population is in the
long run positively related to the income differen-
tial between the receiving and the source country,
the employment rate in the receiving country, and
free migration and guest worker agreements, and is
negatively related to the employment rate in the
source country.
Forecast of Migration from Turkey to Germany
Boeri and Brücker’s estimates are used here to fore-
cast free migration from Turkey to Germany from
2000 to 2030. Making such a forecast requires
assumptions about population and GDP growth
rates and employment rates for the whole period.
Population growth is based on forecasts by the
World Bank in its World Development Indicators
database. It is assumed that the employment rates
in 2000 remain constant during the period under
consideration. German GDP growth is assumed to
be the average for 1990–2000. The GDP and popu-
lation growth rates yield a GDP per capita growth
rate of 1.7 percent. For Turkey, a higher GDP
growth rate is assumed. The forecasts are based on
the admittedly optimistic assumption that, alterna-
tively, 1, 2, or 3 percent of the per capita income gap
is closed every year. This assumption means, in
turn, that GDP per capita in Turkey is assumed to
grow at (a very high) 9, 12, or 15 percent at the
beginning of the period and at about 3 percent at
the end. The assumption of a 2 percent yearly
reduction of the per capita income gap implies an
average GDP per capita growth rate of 5.5 percent.
This rate can be compared with the average GDP
per capita growth rate of about 3 percent over the
last five decades.
The results of the forecast are shown in fig-
ure 14.2. In the figure, the Turkish immigrant pop-
ulation starts out at about 2.2 million in 2000 and
reaches about 3.5 million in 2030 under the
assumption that no restrictions are placed on
migration. This forecast, however, is highly uncer-
tain. It depends on the specification of the migra-
tion model, the precision of the estimates, and
heroic assumptions about GDP and population
growth rates. Furthermore, it is assumed that esti-
mates made for a group of countries can be applied
to a different country pair and a different time
period. If anything, the assumed rates of conver-
gence may be overly optimistic, considering the fact
that no convergence has taken place since 1990.
The rate of migration is about 80,000 per year in
the beginning of the forecast period, when little
convergence has taken place. This finding implies
that in the extreme case of no convergence, about
2.5 million Turks would migrate to Germany over
a 30-year period compared with about 1.3 million
in the case in which 2 percent of the income gap is
closed every year.
Although forecasts of Turkish migration to all
EU15 countries are desirable, lack of data makes it
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FIGURE 14.2 Forecast of Turkish Immigrant
Population in Germany,
2000–30
Note: Figure shows forecasts for a 1, 2, and 3 percent
convergence rate of per capita income between
Germany and Turkey. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Boeri and
Brücker 2000.
impossible to estimate the flow of migration along
the lines of Boeri and Brücker for more than one
or two countries. However, Germany is by far the
most important target country of migration from
Turkey, and it would dominate any estimate of
immigration to the whole of the EU.
The EU Budgetary Effects of
Turkey’s Membership
The structure of the present system of EU revenue
and expenditure is such that rich member states
transfer resources to poor members, but the rela-
tion between income per capita and net transfer is
far from straightforward.7 Some rich countries give
proportionately more than others, and some poor
countries receive a disproportionate share of the
transfer. The countries that joined the EU in 2004
and Turkey are all poor relative to the EU15. Much
attention has therefore been given to the effects of
EU enlargement on the EU budget, assuming that
enlargement will be very costly for the EU15. The
present net recipients from the EU budget fear that
they will be the ones to bear a disproportionate
share of the cost, and the net contributors fear that
they will be required to raise their contributions.
The major items on the revenue and expenditure
sides of the budget in 2002 are shown in table 14.1.
Revenues are collected from three sources: member
states’ valued added tax (VAT) revenues, customs
duties collected by member states, and a tax related
to member states’ gross national product (GNP).
The total contribution by a member state to the EU
budget is, by decision, capped at an annual amount
equal to 1.27 percent of GNP until 2006, when the
present budget ends.
Expenditures have two main destinations: the
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and Structural
Operations, aimed at disadvantaged countries and
regions. Until recently, the CAP focused on price
supports. The prices of many agricultural products
were kept above world market prices by purchasing
excess supplies at administratively determined
minimum prices and by protecting EU markets
from low world market prices by imposing duties
on imports. Excess supplies were disposed of at a
loss in the EU and on the world market. Since 1993,
the CAP has gradually shifted away from price
support to income support. Prices in the EU have
been reduced so that they are more in line with
world market prices, and farmers are increasingly
receiving support payments based on their hold-
ings of land and animals. The CAP favors farmers
and the main agricultural products—grains, sugar
beet, dairy products, and beef—of the original EU6
(Belgium, Federal Republic of Germany, France,
Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands). Fruits,
vegetables, poultry, and pork, important products
of the newer, southern members, receive less or no
support.
Structural Operations are based on criteria of
underdevelopment and the structural disadvan-
tages of particular regions and countries. Regional
support is furnished through the EU’s Structural
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TABLE 14.1 EU Budget, 2002
Revenues Expenditures
Amount Share Amount Share 
(€ millions) (%) (€ millions) (%)
Duties and levies 15,267 17.3 Agriculture 40,506 48.6
Value added tax 35,193 40.0 Structural operations 27,591 33.1
GNP 37,580 42.7 Internal policies 5,361 6.4
Correctiona −71 External expenditure 5,231 6.3
Total 87,969 100.0 Administrative 
Other revenueb 4,755 expenditure 4,643 5.6
Total 92,724 Total 83,331 100.0
a. Does not add up to zero because of exchange rate differences. 
b. Consists of interest, surplus from previous years, fines, taxes on salaries of employees of European
institutions, and so forth.
Source: European Commission 2001. 
Funds. For example, to be eligible for support under
the classification of Objective 1, a region must have
a per capita income that is less than 75 percent of
the EU average. About 55 percent of the Structural
Operations expenditure falls under this classifica-
tion. By construction, the Cohesion Fund is exclu-
sively directed at Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and
Spain. The Cohesion Fund expenditure is modest,
or about 2 percent of the total budget, but it is
important for the recipient countries.
Turkey’s contributions to and receipts from the
EU budget can be calculated by estimating the “tax
base”—that is, VAT and tariff revenue and GNP—
and the extent to which Turkish agriculture and
regions are eligible for support from the CAP,
Structural Funds, and Cohesion Fund. Such a
calculation is likely to produce a large net transfer
to Turkey, both because of the size of the agricul-
tural sector and because Turkey is relatively poor. It
is unlikely that the EU will accept Turkey as a mem-
ber if this transfer proves to be very costly. More-
over, the enlargement in 2004 included countries
with relatively large agricultural sectors that will
put a heavy demand on the EU budget once the
present transition period has come to an end.
Negotiations are presently under way on the EU
budget for 2007–13. It is expected that the EU15,
which is a large net contributor to the budget, will
try to modify the rules for contributions to and
receipts from the budget in order to reduce the
amount of redistribution from rich to poor mem-
ber states.
Under past enlargements, rules were changed if
an acceding country became a disproportionately
large net contributor or was a disadvantaged recip-
ient of CAP or Structural Funds support under the
existing rules. For example, the United Kingdom
has a relatively small agricultural sector and
receives modest CAP support. After a long struggle,
it won a permanent rebate—a “correction of budg-
etary imbalances”—on its contribution. Portugal
and Spain also receive modest CAP funding,
because their agriculture produces relatively little
grain. After Portugal and Spain acceded to the EU,
the member states decided to limit the aggregate
CAP spending in favor of Structural Funds spend-
ing, which benefited both countries. The Cohesion
Fund, established in 1993 ostensibly to help the
poor members cope with the European Economic
and Monetary Union (EMU), can be viewed as well
as a form of compensation to Greece, Ireland,
Portugal, and Spain. Austria, Finland, and Sweden
do not have poor regions eligible for much support
from the Structural Funds. Objective 6 of those
funds (later included in Objective 1) was tailored
for support to the northernmost parts of Finland
and Sweden and the mountainous areas of Austria
as compensation.
The present rules for contributions to and
receipts from the EU budget favor poor countries,
because contributions are more or less propor-
tional to income per capita. Meanwhile, Structural
Operations are targeted at poor countries and
regions to raise their incomes relative to those of
the richer countries and regions. The CAP has a
bias toward temperate climates and therefore the
richer members, but not enough to overturn the
redistributive effects of Structural Operations. In
the final instance, the rules in a future EU29 (i.e., an
EU that includes Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, and
Turkey) will depend on whether the decision rules
under the new Constitutional Treaty will come into
force in 2009 and what strategy the countries that
entered in 2004 and the four candidate countries
are going to follow.
The old pre–Nice Treaty rules gave small coun-
tries much more voting power per capita than large
countries (see chapter 13). This situation produced
these extremes: Germany, with a population of
82 million, had 10 votes in the Council of Ministers,
while Luxembourg, with a population of 400,000,
had two, giving voters in Luxembourg 42 times the
voting power of voters in Germany. The Nice Treaty
rules modified the inequality, giving Luxembourg
voters 22 times more weight than German voters.
The Constitutional Treaty rules, which are sup-
posed to take effect in 2009, do away with weighted
voting and introduce a double majority rule: for a
decision to pass, it has to be supported by 55 per-
cent of EU members and 65 percent of the EU pop-
ulation. A coalition of the 14 countries that entered
the EU in 2004 or will enter later would comprise
48 percent of EU members and 28 percent of the
population. Thus such a coalition could be power-
ful and even decisive in a future EU that includes
Turkey.8
The present redistribution of funds between
member countries through the EU budget reflects
the pre–Nice Treaty distribution of votes in the
Council of Ministers. Calculation of the transfers to
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the countries that entered the EU in 2004 and to
Turkey if these rules were unchanged would indi-
cate what incentive the EU15 has to alter the rules
in order to reduce the transfer of funds to the new
members.
The contribution per capita to the EU budget is
explained by regressing contribution per capita on
GDP per capita, and the receipts per capita are
explained by regressing receipts per capita on the
number of Council votes per capita plus the level of
development as defined by eligibility for Cohesion
Fund status.9 The results are shown in table 14.2.
The table reveals that GDP per capita alone can
explain 78 percent of the variation in contributions
per capita among the EU15. The estimated coeffi-
cient is highly significant. As for receipts per capita,
the number of votes per capita and Cohesion Fund
status can explain as much as 86 percent of the
variation in the data. The effect of voting power is
borderline significant (it is significant at the 10 per-
cent confidence level, but not at the 5 percent confi-
dence level), whereas the effect of Cohesion Fund
status is highly significant.
The estimates in table 14.2 were then used to
estimate the contributions and receipts of each new
member country, plus Bulgaria, Romania, and
Turkey, on the assumption that each country would
receive a number of votes consistent with pre–Nice
Treaty rules (table 14.3). The exact number of votes
that each country will have is, of course, somewhat
uncertain, but it is known that each country will
receive a number of votes equal to that of an EU15
country with a population of similar size. Whether
a country will have Cohesion Fund status is also
uncertain. The assumption is that all countries
except Cyprus have such status.
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TABLE 14.3 Estimated EU Budget Contributions and Receipts 
GDP Assumed Cohesion Contribution Total Receipts Total
Population (€ Number Fund per Capita Contribution per Capita Receipts
(millions) billions) of Votes Status (euros) (€ millions) (euros) (€ millions)
Poland 38.7 174 8 1 90 3,472 297 11,505
Romania 22.4 39 6 1 67 1,499 337 7,544
Czech Rep. 10.3 55 5 1 96 992 477 4,917
Hungary 10.0 49 5 1 93 930 487 4,868
Bulgaria 8.2 13 4 1 65 536 479 3,927
Slovak Rep. 5.4 21 3 1 84 453 523 2,823
Lithuania 3.7 12 3 1 79 293 688 2,544
Latvia 2.4 8 3 1 79 190 971 2,331
Slovenia 2.0 19 3 1 133 266 1,133 2,266
Estonia 1.4 5 3 1 84 118 1,548 2,168
Cyprus 0.8 10 2 0 159 128 212 170
Malta 0.4 4 2 1 133 53 3,394 1,358
Turkey 65.3 215 10 1 80 5,200 263 17,152
Total 14,130 63,572
Source: World Bank 2001 and author’s estimates.
TABLE 14.2 Estimates of EU Budget 
Contributions/Receipts 
Equations
Receipts Contributions
per Capita per Capita
GNP per capita 0.008
(0.00)
Votes per capita 19.3
(0.067)
Cohesion dummya 629.9
(0.00)
Adjusted R2 0.86 0.78
No. of observations 30 15
Note: P values appear in parentheses. Receipts
per capita are based on for 1999 and 2000 data,
and contributions per capita are based on 2000
data.
a. Interacted with votes per capita.
Source: European Commission 2001.
The total net transfer to the 13 countries is quite
large, €49 billion, which is more than half of the
present budget of the EU15. Turkey would receive a
net transfer of about €12 billion and Poland a net of
about €8 billion. The smaller countries receive net
transfers that are much larger per capita than those
of the larger countries because of their greater vot-
ing power. The extreme cases are Malta and Turkey,
with net transfers of €3,400 and €263 per capita,
respectively.
It is clear that balancing the EU budget will
require changes in the EU budget rules and in the
CAP. The calculations in table 14.3 assume full CAP
subsidies to the new members, but, at present, the
countries that entered in 2004 receive 25 percent of
CAP subsidies. Such changes must take effect
before the new members are eligible for full CAP
and Structural Operations support. (The latter are
more redistributive than the CAP.)
Trade
Commodity trade between Turkey and the EU has
been practically free since the late 1990s, except for
agricultural commodities. The pattern of trade is
not expected to change substantially as a result of
full EU membership for Turkey, but the volume
of trade could increase considerably. The 2004
entrants have experienced substantial increases in
trade volumes as a result of large investments by
firms from Western Europe and elsewhere, which
combine their technical, managerial, and marketing
assets with a generally well-educated and skilled
labor force at low wages. Turkey has a long way to go
before it can hope to attract the same level of foreign
direct investment (FDI) as some of the more suc-
cessful countries in Central and Eastern Europe. For
example, Turkey attracted $15 in foreign direct
investment per capita in 2000 compared with
Poland’s $256 per capita. FDI in Turkey is hampered
by political and economic uncertainty, bureaucracy,
detailed regulation, and—by rumor—corruption.
Indeed, according to UNCTAD (2002), Turkey has
one of the lowest rankings in terms of FDI potential
and performance. EU membership and adoption of
the acquis communautaire will go some way toward
establishing a better investment climate, which, in
turn, should lead to higher volumes of trade.
What follows is a forecast of the volume of trade
between Turkey and the EU15 under the assumption
that trade will reach the same level of intensity as
trade between the EU member states at present.
The forecast is based on estimation of a gravity
equation for trade within the EU15.10 In the gravity
equation, the trade between a pair of countries is
explained by the size of their GDP and their GDP
per capita, as well as the geographical distance
between them and whether they share a common
land border. GDP captures the effect of country
size; a large country typically has more trade than
a smaller country. GDP per capita is a measure
of product differentiation and specialization. The
higher the per capita income, the more differenti-
ated are taste and production, and the larger is the
volume of trade based on product differentiation
and increasing returns to scale. A high per capita
income is also an indication of abundance of phys-
ical and human capital relative to manual labor.
Thus the per capita variable should serve to capture
both intraindustry trade caused by product differ-
entiation and increasing returns to scale and
interindustry trade caused by differences in factor
endowments. Trade costs are controlled for by the
inclusion of geographical distance and a common
land border. Geographical distance is an indicator
of transportation costs, but also of the costs of
cultural differences, which tend to increase with
geographical distance. Finally, a common land
border is considered to have a level effect on the
volume of trade. The ordinary least squares (OLS)
estimates of the gravity equation are presented in
table 14.4.
In the column OLS (1), the estimated coefficient
on GDP per capita has an unexpected negative sign.
Leaving out distance as an explanatory variable
in the specification OLS (2) yields the expected
positive sign. Apparently, the effects of GDP per
capita and distance are confounded in the original
specification because of a high positive correlation
between distance and differences in GDP per
capita; the poorest countries are on the periphery
of Europe. (The correlation between distance and
the log of the product of GDP per capita is –0.51.) 
The OLS (1) estimates were then used to forecast
the bilateral trade of each of the 2004 entrants and
Turkey with the EU15, notwithstanding the negative
sign on GDP per capita. For one thing, distance is a
more important factor between the candidate coun-
tries and the EU15 than between the EU15 coun-
tries and should therefore be included. Second, both
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specifications have about the same explanatory
power. The results are presented in table 14.5. In the
table, the forecast value of Turkish–EU15 trade is
$26.3 billion in 2000, which is much higher than the
actual value of $18 billion. Most of the 2004
entrants are also projected to increase their trade
with the EU15, some of them considerably more
than Turkey, and two countries—Estonia and
Hungary—actually have higher actual trade than
projected trade. However, the point estimates
obtained with this forecast method are highly
uncertain, as shown by the 95 percent confidence
intervals for the point estimates.
Conclusion
Turkey’s membership in the EU is not expected to
have significant economic effects on the present
EU members, with the possible exception of immi-
gration and EU budget transfers. Turkey has a
large population, a low level of income, and a large
agricultural sector. These facts could stimulate
substantial migration from Turkey to Germany
and other West European countries and make
Turkey a recipient of large transfers from the richer
EU members.
Provided that migration from Turkey to the EU
is free, it is estimated that about 1.3 million people
would migrate to Germany—the country with
the largest Turkish immigrant population—over a
30-year period and thus increase its population by
1.5 percent. However, this estimate is highly uncer-
tain; it rests on heroic assumptions about relative
growth rates and parameters in the estimating
equation, among other things.
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TABLE 14.4 Pooled Panel Gravity Estimates
for Intra-EU15 Trade
OLS (1) OLS (2)
Log real product GDP 0.8577 0.8818
(0.0098) (0.0120)
Log real product GDP −0.2802 0.2439
per capita (0.0362) (0.0384)
Log distance −0.8819
(0.0326)
Common border 0.4000 1.2557
(0.0516) (0.0673)
R2-adjusted 0.9249 0.8797
Note: Estimates are based on 1,155 observations,
annual data for 15 countries, 1990–2000.
Intercept and year controls are not recorded.
Standard errors are in parentheses. All estimates
are significant at less than 1 percent.
Sources: GDP and population: OECD 2001; trade:
OECD Monthly Statistics of International Trade,
CD-ROM, June 2001; great circle distances
between capitals: U.S. Department of
Agriculture, http://www.wcrl.ars.usda.gov/cec/
java/lat-long.htm. 
TABLE 14.5 Forecast of Trade with EU15
95% Confidence Interval
Forecast, 2000 Lower Upper Forecast/Actual 
Country (€ billions) Bound Bound Trade, 2000
Bulgaria 4.4 1.6 12.3 1.82
Czech Rep. 24.4 9.0 65.3 1.29
Estonia 1.8 0.7 5.1 0.69
Hungary 15.0 5.5 40.4 0.80
Lithuania 3.5 1.3 9.4 1.82
Latvia 2.5 1.0 6.7 1.59
Poland 42.0 15.6 112.8 1.75
Romania 10.4 3.9 28.4 1.63
Slovak Rep. 11.1 4.1 30.4 2.02
Slovenia 7.3 2.7 19.5 1.26
Turkey 26.3 10.5 76.3 1.46
Sources: GDP and population data: World Bank, World Development Indicators; trade: OECD Monthly
Statistics of International Trade, CD-ROM, June 2001; great circle distances between capitals: U.S.
Department of Agriculture, http://www.wcrl.ars.usda.gov/cec/java/lat-long.htm.
If present rules for contributions to and receipts
from the EU budget were unchanged—including
the Common Agricultural Policy—it is estimated
that Turkey would receive a net transfer of €12 bil-
lion, which corresponds to about 14 percent of the
present EU budget. The overall net contribution to
the 2004 entrants and Turkey was projected to cor-
respond to about 60 percent of the present budget.
The EU budget for 2006–13 is now under negotia-
tion. It is unlikely that present rules will not change
in the face of such large increases in net transfers
from richer to poorer countries.
Turkey has had free trade with the EU since the
late 1990s, except in agricultural products. The pat-
tern of trade should therefore not change as a result
of membership, but there is the potential for a
higher volume of trade should Turkey become
more attractive for foreign direct investment. If
the volume of trade between Turkey and the EU
were to reach the same level as that of trade among
the EU15—controlling for differences in income
levels, geographical distance, and the absence of
common land borders—it would be about 50 per-
cent higher than at present, according to the
estimates presented in this chapter.
Notes
1. The author is grateful for comments on earlier versions of
this chapter by Refik Erzan and Sübidey Togan, for research
assistance by José Mauricio Prado Jr., and for editorial work by
Christina Lönnblad.
2. All dollar amounts are U.S. dollars unless otherwise
indicated.
3. EU15 refers to the 15 members of the EU prior to the 2004
enlargement in which 10 more countries joined the EU. The
15 countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
4. For the United States, see Friedberg and Hunt (1995); for
Europe, see Zimmerman (1995); for Germany, see Haisken-De
New and Zimmerman (1996); and for Germany and Austria, see
Winter-Ebner and Zimmerman (1998).
5. Boeri and Brücker estimate an error-correction model.
The assumptions and the model are described in detail in Boeri
and Brücker (2000).
6. A common approach to explaining migration is to esti-
mate a gravity equation. Yearly migration is explained by wage
and employment rate differentials, distance, language, regula-
tion, and the stock of earlier migrants in the host country—that
is, much the same variables as in the present error-correction
model. A problem with this approach is the long-run implica-
tion that the entire population will leave for a sufficiently large
income differential. The error-correction model tests for the
existence of a long-run equilibrium in which only a (small) part
of the population has emigrated. Technically, it tests for co-
integration between the variables. I estimated a gravity equation
of migration between Germany as the host country and Greece,
Portugal, and Spain as the home countries with disappointing
results—most of the coefficients were insignificant or very
small. An examination of the time-series data makes it clear that
other factors not accounted for, such as political developments,
played a major role.
7. This section draws on the corresponding discussion in
Baldwin, Francois, and Portes (1997).
8. In chapter 13 of this volume, Baldwin and Widgrén ana-
lyze various aspects of the different sets of rules for decision
making in the EU.
9. This approach was taken in Baldwin, Francois, and Portes
(1997).
10. A fixed-effects estimation is preferable, but it cannot be
used to make out of sample forecasts. Standard versions of the
gravity equation can be derived from all three basic trade
models—that is, the Ricardian, Heckscher-Ohlin, and increas-
ing returns to scale models, as well as from other models,
as demonstrated by Anderson (1979), Bergstrand (1990),
Deardorff (1998), and Helpman (1998). Recent research has
sought to ascertain to what extent the various models con-
tribute to the empirical success of the gravity equation and
thereby to evaluate their empirical relevance—see Feenstra,
Markusen, and Rose (2001) and Evenett and Keller (2002). A
tentative conclusion is that models based on increasing returns
and product differentiation are more successful in explaining
intraindustry trade, whereas trade in homogeneous goods is
better explained by differences in factor endowment or
differentiation of goods by country of origin (Armington
assumption).
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What requirements must Turkey—the largest country among the candidateand accession countries—meet to join the European Union? Whatprogress has been made toward meeting them? 
This timely volume analyzes the economic challenges confronting Turkey in its quest
to accede to the European Union (EU). It focuses on the extent to which Turkey is
ready to join the Single Market; comply with the EU’s body of economic regulations
and directives, the Acquis Communautaire; and meet the Maastricht criteria for fiscal,
monetary, and exchange rate policies.
This book also provides an assessment of Turkey’s national program to meet the
accession requirements. It describes briefly what Turkey needs to achieve on the
economic policy front to satisfy the conditions for accession, the progress to date,
and the likely consequences of implementing the full body of EU requirements. 
The book is divided into four parts:
a An analysis of the macroeconomic policies for EU accession
a An analysis of the effects of integration on key sectors: agriculture;
manufacturing; services industries, including banking, telecommunications,
transportation, and natural gas; and network industries
a An exploration of key economic policy challenges, including labor market
regulation, foreign direct investment challenges, and the costs and benefits of
meeting the EU environmental Acquis
a The quantification of the impact of EU accession and consideration of the
welfare effects of integration 
Although the focus is on the specific situation of Turkey, the subject will be of value
to all researchers with an interest in the challenges of deeper integration through
regional agreements.
The Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), established in 1983, is a network of over 600 Research Fellows and
Affiliates, based primarily in European universities. The Centre coordinates the research activities of its Fellows
and Affiliates and communicates the results to the public and private sectors. CEPR is an entrepreneur, developing
research initiatives with the producers, consumers, and sponsors of research.
THE WORLD BANK
CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC 
POLICY RESEARCH
